Magdalena Ciubăncan

Causative Constructions in Japanese and English



Presa Universitară Clujeană

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CAUSATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS IN JAPANESE AND ENGLISH
SEMANTIC AND SYNTACTIC ASPECTS

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ISBN 978-973-595-693-6

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2014

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Causative constructions have been one of the most investigated linguistic phenomena over the last forty years. Their complexity, both in regard to their semantic characteristics and to their syntactic structure, has posed numerous problems, many of which stIll constitute the ground for heated debates among linguists from various theoretical backgrounds. The major goal of our work is to offer a comprehensive view on causative constructions in Japanese and English by analyzing them both from a syntactic and from a semantic perspective. Causative construction are defined here as the linguistic expression of causation, understood as the production of an effect by a cause and are clearly distinguished from another notion widely used in reference to the cause-effect relation, namely causality, understood as the relation between cause and effect.

From a semantic perspective, Japanese and English causatives are treated in view of the elements composing the causative situation – the causer/causing event, the causee and the result. In regard to the causing event, I analyze the various underlying semantic predicates that can be postulated in order to capture the nuances of the causing process. Furthermore, the issue of causer agency and its related semantic causation types are also discussed. Regarding the causee, the main parameters to be examined are animacy/control and volition/intention, and how these parameters influence the choice of a particular case in Japanese morphological causatives. The result component of the causative situation is investigated in view of the aspectual properties of the verb. More specifically, I look into the matter of the relation between accomplishments and causatives.

From a syntactic perspective, causatives are analyzed according to their formal classification into lexical, periphrastic and morphological causatives. Thus, the syntactic structure of lexical causatives is similar to that of a simple transitive verb – the analysis of which involves a VP shell, while that of a periphrastic causative is a typical control structure. The most problematic issue regards Japanese morphological causatives and their mono/biclausality, which is investigated in view of the various types of arguments brought either in favor or against a lexical interpretation of the *(-s)ase* causative.

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This book is a revised version of the Ph.D. thesis "Syntax and Semantics of Causative Constructions in Japanese and English" that I defended in June 2009 at "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca.

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the Japan Foundation Japanese Studies Fellowship, for which I am very grateful.

I express my deepest gratitude to Professor Stefan Oltean, whose support and guidance made the accomplishment of the long and difficult task of obtaining a Ph.D. degree become possible. I thank him for his endless understanding and patience

My special thanks go to Professor Emma Morita and to Tomo Morita for their continuous support, both on the professional and on the personal level. I owe them much of what I have become. Professor Hiroshi Hayashi from Kobe University also deserves special mention for his valuable advice and stimulating conversations. I thank him for taking the time, on numerous occasions, to show me the direction in which I wanted to go but I did not know how. The list would not be complete without Professor Ecaterina Popa, whose encouragement has accompanied me from the very beginning of my student years.

I am also grateful to all my friends for being there whenever I needed them. Anca, Sorana, Renata, Ana - your constant support is truly appreciated.

Many thanks must also go to the Yamashita family - my 'adoptive' Japanese family who always made me feel at home in Japan and who showed me that any kind of barriers can be surpassed.

Last but not least, I am forever indebted to my family – my parents and my husband, who have been near me on my best and especially on my worst days. My gratitude to them goes beyond words.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Acc	Accusative	Neg	Negative
Caus	Causative	Nmz	Nominalizer
Conj	Conjunct/conjunction	Nom	Nominative
Dat	Dative	Pass	Passive
Emph	Emphatic	Past	Past
Fut	Future	Pl	Plural
Hon	Honorific	Pol	Polite
Imp	Imperative	Poss	Possessive
Infin	Infinitive	Pot	Potential
Instr	Instrumental	Prep	Preposition
Int	Interrogative	Pres	Present (Non-past)
Intr	Intransitive	Sg	Singular
Loc	Locative	Temp	Temporal
Mod	Modal	Tr	Transitive

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This book presents a contrastive analysis of causative constructions in Japanese and English. In view of the title, both syntactic and semantic aspects regarding causative constructions are taken into account, the discussion of the semantic aspects preceding however the analysis of the syntactic behavior of causatives. The reason for that lies, in my opinion, in the impossibility of describing the syntax of causatives accurately without resorting to their semantic properties first.

Causative constructions have been investigated thoroughly over more than four decades by linguists of diverse theoretical backgrounds, and they still remain one of the unsolved problems of grammar. Firstly, the empirical domain that they cover is of great complexity, including phenomena whose explanation requires resorting to elements belonging to various cognitive sciences – physics, linguistics, philosophy or psychology, to enumerate only a few. As I point out in Chapter 2, anything that involves the relation between a cause and an effect was considered to enter the domain of causatives and that lead to confusions and difficulties in the analysis of causative constructions, since many traditional grammarians included there constructions which, although related to causatives, are not actually causative constructions. I propose a more specific distinction, drawing a line between causality and causation and between the constructions expressing the two concepts.

Another interesting question about causatives is that there are certain properties which can be easily noticed among diverse languages that belong to very different and unrelated backgrounds. Typological studies on causatives showed that, for example, very diverse languages share the same mechanisms to express causation. There are three major types of causatives – lexical, morphological and syntactic/periphrastic – and they occur in basically all languages. On the other hand, the same language may have different types of causatives that express various facets of causation. English, for example, has lexical and syntactic causatives, while Japanese has lexical and morphological causatives, each of these becoming specialized in encoding certain aspects of the causation process and not others.

Furthermore, the same type of causative construction may show a different behavior in different languages. The case of the syntactic causative is one example. In English, it has been proven to be biclausal, formed of two distinct predicates, while in French one of the syntactic causatives – the one involving the verb *faire* - appears to be monoclausal, although the surface structure is similar to the one in English:

(1) John made Mary leave.
(2) Jean a fait partir Marie.
Jean make-Past leave Marie
'Jean made Marie leave'

In (2), although the surface structure of the causative construction involves two distinct lexical units, it can be interpreted as a monoclausal construction. The monoclausality of the French *faire* causative is supported by various arguments, among which: the position of the causee, the contiguity of the two verbs, clitic placement or case marking of the causee. While the normal position for the matrix object is after the matrix verb, with *faire* causatives, the causee appears after both verbs. Compare (2) above with the French *laisser* causative in (3):

(3) Jean a laissé Marie partir.
Jean let-Past Marie leave
'Jean let Marie leave'

Moreover, no other element can intervene between the two distinct verbs in the French *faire* construction. Clitic placement brings further evidence for the monoclausality of the French *faire* causative. The verb that assigns grammatical relations to clitic pronouns is generally the verb which heads their immediate clause:

(4) a. Jean a laissé Marie manger ces pommes.
Jean let-Past Marie eat these apples
'Jean let Marie eat these apples'
b. Jean a laissé Marie les manger.
Jean let-Past Marie 3 pl-Acc eat
'Jean let Marie eat them'
c. *Jean les a laissé Marie manger.
Jean 3 pl-Acc let-Past Marie eat

However, in the case of the *faire* causative, all clitic pronouns must attach to the initial verb, indicating that both verbs belong to the same clause:

(5) a. Jean a fait manger ces pommes à Marie.
Jean make-Past eat these apples Marie-Dat
Jean made Marie eat these apples'
b. Jean les a fait manger à Marie.
Jean them make-Past eat Marie-Dat
'Jean made Marie eat them'
c. * Jean a fait les manger à Marie.
Jean make-Past them eat Marie-Dat

Another similarity between *faire* causatives and morphological causatives (monoclausal) is the case marking of the causee. For example, when the main verb is transitive, the causee is marked with the Dative case like a secondary object, which does not happen in other types of causatives, where the causee is the object of the causative verb:

(6) a. Jean a laissé Marie manger une pomme.
Jean let-Past Marie-Acc eat an apple
'Jean let Marie eat an apple'
b. Jean a fait manger une pomme à Marie.
Jean make-Past eat an apple Marie-Dat
'Jean made Marie eat an apple'

The dative-marking of the causee in the case of *faire* causatives is consistent with Comrie's hierarchy of grammatical relations (subject > direct object > indirect object > oblique constituent) and can only make sense if the *faire* construction is a single clause, with the two verbs assigning a single set of grammatical relations.

Elements such as those presented above make causative construction an exceptionally interesting study domain. The languages that I work on are Japanese and English. The choice of Japanese when studying causative constructions needs little justification, since it is the Japanese (morphological) causative construction that has posed some of the most controversial problems in linguistic analyses. Nearly all cross-linguistic studies on causative constructions touch on some aspect or other regarding Japanese causatives. The different case marking of the causee in intransitive-based morphological causatives, the various semantic

restrictions that are applied in the choice of a particular causative type or the large number of valid arguments both in favor and against a mono/biclausal structure of the morphological causative are all aspects that made the Japanese causatives not fit into the frameworks that the early researchers Ire trying to apply on virtually all languages. English causatives, on the other hand, seemed to pose fewer problems. It is true that the English periphrastic causative is not as problematic as the Japanese morphological one or as its French counterpart. However, the English lexical causative represents solid research ground, both in view of semantic and of syntactic properties.

The attempt of explaining various semantic and syntactic characteristics of causative constructions required that I resort to more than one research trend, due to the complexity of the problem under investigation. For the semantics of causatives, I found cognitive concepts very helpful for explaining the structure of the causative situation. The "billiard-ball model", for example, illustrates the causation process, as I exemplified in Chapter 2.1. Furthermore, in order to provide a formal description of the meaning nuances associated with lexical causatives, I resorted to the use of the Lexical Conceptual Structure (LCS)[1]. LCS is a form of predicate decomposition "intended to capture those facets of verb meaning which determine grammatical behavior, particularly in the realm of argument realization" (Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 2008: 16). The components of LCS include a set of primitive predicates (the most recurring ones are ACT/DO, BE, BECOME, CAUSE, GO), arguments of the verb and of the primitive predicates and the verbal root, which can be integrated into the LCS in two ways – either as an argument of a primitive predicate (the case of the change-of-state verbs) or as a modifier of a predicate (in activity verbs):

(7) The road dried.
[BECOME [x <DRY>]]
(8) She wiped the table.
[x ACT <WIPE> y]

In regard to the syntax of causative constructions, I mainly used the concepts and the principles of transformational-generative grammar, but I also referred to lexicalist theories, especially in the sections dedicated to the Japanese morphological causative. The distinct structures of language postulated by Lexical Functional Grammar in particular proved very

[1] For a detailed history of LCS see Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 2008.

helpful in providing a framework in which the conflicting data about the Japanese morphological causative could be accommodated. Although I did not use the tools of Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG), I also referred to some theories on causatives developed in this framework.

The organization of the book is as follows. The second chapter is mainly dedicated to an analysis of the conceptual domain covered by causative constructions. I draw a clear distinction between causality and causation and I identify the linguistic expressions representative for the two concepts. Causative constructions are, in my opinion, the linguistic expression of causation. I further look into the most representative typological studies regarding causation and causatives - Song 1996, Talmy 1976, 2000 and Dixon 2000 and I present the situation in Japanese and English in view of the formal distinctions and classifications found in Dixon 2000.

Chapter 3 concerns the semantics of causatives. After describing the causative situation in terms of its consisting elements – the causer, the causee and the result, I consider each of these elements in detail. Regarding the causer, I first discuss the issue of whether this element of the causative situation is an entity or a process. Further on, I analyze the way in which the causing process can be represented in the case of lexical causatives. While in periphrastic causatives the causing process is easier to distinguish due to the presence of a separate verb, in lexical causatives this distinction is not so obvious, since both the causing process and the result are incorporated into a single lexical unit. Therefore, I resorted to the abstract causative verbs that can be postulated in order to distinguish the causing event from the result. Following Nakamura 2003, I analyze the main semantic predicates that can characterize causative verbs: COME ABOUT, CAUSE, INITIATE and CONTROL. Another aspect regarding the causing process that I consider is the agenthood of the causer and the types of causation that are associated with agentive and non-agentive causers. I discuss the distinction between direct and indirect causation and I am particularly concerned with the so-called "sociative" causation, introduced by Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002. My conclusion is that, although sociative causation can be successfully accounted for in other languages, where it also gets specific marking, in Japanese it is unclear whether the sociative meaning comes from the causative form or is a consequence of the progressive aspect of the main verb. The evidence coming from adverbial scope and reflexive binding does not show a different behavior of verbs expressing indirect causation and those expressing Shibatani and Pardeshi's sociative causation. Therefore, I do not consider sociative causation to be active in the case of Japanese. Regarding the non-agentive

causers, I mainly emphasize the differences between English and Japanese, since Japanese does not allow for non-agentive causers to be grammatical subjects, as it happens in English. The discussion regarding the causee focuses on the parameters of control, animacy, volition and intention and on how they are applied in the two languages that I considered. The last element of the causative situation – the result – is analyzed in terms of the aspectual properties of causative verbs. I follow Vendler's (Vendler 1969) aspectual classification of verbs into states, activities, achievements and accomplishments and I analyze lexical causatives and their relation to accomplishment-type verbs. After presenting a detailed account of the three elements of the causative situation, I briefly touch on the relation between the causing event and the result in terms of compactness, which links the conceptual structure of the causative situation to its formal representation.

In Chapter 4, dedicated to the syntax of causative constructions, I analyze the syntactic structure of each of the three causative types. In the case of lexical causatives, I first consider the issue of whether they are derived by the causativization of intransitive verbs or by de-causativization of transitive verbs, or if it may be the case that a non-derivational rule can explain the relation between the causing event and the result. The syntactic structure of lexical causatives is similar to that of transitive verbs, therefore I chose Radford's (Radford 2004) VP Shell model to illustrate it. Periphrastic causatives, on the other hand, are analyzed as typical control structures, with a causative verb taking a sentential complement. The largest part of Chapter 4 is however dedicated to the Japanese morphological causative, since it is this type of causative that poses most problems for a syntactic analysis. The fact that the Japanese *(s)ase* causative can be interpreted either as a lexical unit or as a syntactic structure made a uniform treatment of the construction extremely difficult. The various arguments that can be brought in favor to or against either of the two interpretations open the way to two major syntactic analyses – one which considers morphological causatives to have a monoclausal structure, corresponding to the lexical reading, and one which posits a biclausal structure, corresponding to the syntactic interpretation. Past analyses of causatives are organized and examined according to this distinction. The impossibility of proving either of the two theories wrong lead to a third direction of study, which includes the so-called complex or hybrid analyses that try to account for the apparent contradictions in the structure of morphological causatives by resorting to a non-uniform treatment. Among these accounts, I particularly focused on Matsumoto's investigation (Matsumoto 1996), which applies the distinction that Lexical Functional

Grammar makes between the four different structures of language – constituent structure, functional structure, argument structure and semantic structure – to the analysis of causatives, providing a coherent framework in which both monoclausality and biclausality can be accounted for.

CHAPTER 2
EXPRESSIONS OF CAUSATION

2.1. Causation / causality in the natural world and in natural languages

The notions of causation and causality have been in the center of a great variety of discussions and debates for a remarkably extended period of time. From simple observations of natural phenomena such as the melting of the snow to abstract ideas such as questions about the formation of the universe, the concept of causation has been used in a wide range of disciplines, covering both humanistic and science domains.

Basically all processes in the physical world are governed by laws of causation/causality and the relation between causes and effects. In his lectures on cause and chance in physics, Max Born (Born, 1949) stated three assumptions that dominated physics until the twentieth century:

- *Causality* postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.
- *Antecedence* postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect.
- *Contiguity* postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact.

Relativity and quantum mechanics came with a new view on our knowledge about the natural world, claiming that the physical universe is probabilistic rather than deterministic, and thus forcing physicists to abandon these assumptions as exact accounts of basic processes. However, they seem to remain valid at the level of human experience. And since it is human experience that serves as the background and the basis for the linguistic expressions of causation/causality, I expect them to be valid in explaining causation/causality relations as expressed by natural languages. In trying to define the so-called 'causative situation', linguists have resorted, conscientiously or not, to the three conditions postulated by Born. Consider the following definition of the causative situation:

> "Two events can be said to constitute a causative situation if the following two conditions hold:
>
> a. The relation between the two events is such that the speaker believes that the occurrence of one event, the "caused event", has been realized at t2, which is after t1, the time of the "causing event".

b. The relation between the causing and the caused event is such that the speaker believes that the occurrence of the caused event is wholly dependent on the occurrence of the causing event; the dependency of the two events here must be to the extent that it allows the speaker to entertain a counterfactual inference that the caused event would not have taken place at that particular time if the causing event had not taken place, providing that all else had remained the same." (Shibatani 1976b: 1-2)

Most of the studies on causative constructions have started from the above-quoted definition. The conditions of dependence and antecedence are clearly stated in Shibatani's formulation. References to contiguity can be found in linguistic studies in relation to the distinction direct/indirect causation. When analyzing the features of the direct/indirect causation, Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002 notice that the spatio-temporal configuration of the causative event plays a very important role, making it possible to distinguish the two types of causation by the spatio-temporal profile that they display:

> "The notion of direct causation emanates from the conceptualization of a causative situation as involving the same spatio-temporal profile for the causing-event segment and the caused-event segment [….]. Indirect causation, on the other hand, refers to conceptualization of a causative situation as involving two relevant sub-events that have two distinct temporal profiles and two potentially distinct spatial profiles […]." (Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002: 90)

In an ample work trying to sketch the framework of cognitive semantics, Talmy also lists among the features of the basic causative situation the necessary causal relation between the two events, the idea of overlapping (spatial and temporal) between certain elements of the causing event and of the caused event, as well as the dependency relation between the caused event and the causing event:

> "The basic causative situation consists of three components: a simple event, that which causes the event, and the causal relation between the two. (…) This contact *[between elements of the causing event and of the caused event – our comment]* can be initiated or maintained (…) but it may not be broken. (…) The caused event occurs and it would not occur if the causing event did not occur. (…) The

> caused event takes place exactly during the duration of the causing event."
>
> (Talmy 2000: 494-495)

The three laws of causation/causality postulated by physicists are thus easily traceable in linguistic theories on causation as well, even if linguists do not always conscientiously resort to them in explaining causative phenomena. Interesting enough however is the fact that the terms *causation* and *causality* have been often used as interchangeable terms by all these disciplines, and things are often confused (and confusing) even today. The origin of this confusion is the fact that both notions start from and reflect aspects of the same concept, that of *cause*. An interesting insight into the concept of cause comes from Menno Hulswit - *Causality and Causation: The Inadequacy of the Received View*, who makes a very helpful distinction between causation and causality, though the very usage of this distinction is not always visible in the body of his article. Hulswit's account does not concern linguistics, his analysis being a rather philosophical one, but I consider that his distinction between causality and causation can be easily applied to language as well, being relevant to a clearer view on which linguistic constructions express causality and which express causation.

Starting from the observation that there is an ambiguity in our common use of the concept of cause, Hulswit presents the moments that marked the historical evolution of *cause*, noticing that the terminology used when referring to *cause* displays discrepancies, and that there has been a gradual shift in the meanings of the terms used. Hulswit claims that there are two crucial points in the history of causality/causation: the Aristotelian (scholastic) conception and the Scientific conception. Aristotle differentiates between four types of causes (in the sense of "something without which the thing would not be"), each of them representing a different answer to the question "What is this?" regarding any singular entity. Thus, the question "What is this?" referring to a marble statue can get the following four answers:

1. This is marble.
2. This is what was made by Phydias.
3. This is something to be put in the temple of Apollo.
4. This is Apollo.

The first answer represents the material cause, referring to the material that the object is made of. The second answer represents the efficient cause, referring to the author of the object. The third answer represents the final cause, referring to the final aim of the object, while the fourth answer represents the formal cause, referring to the aspect that makes the object

what it is and not something else (Physics II.3). The contemporary idea of causation/causality has lost three of the Aristotelian features, only the efficient cause being today associated with causation/causality, in the sense that the efficient cause is a thing that brings about an effect in another thing. As Hulswit puts it, "causes are conceived as the active originators of a change that is brought about for the sake of some end". (Hulswit, at: http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see/SEED/Vol4-2/Hulswit.htm)
The Scientific conception (the 17th century) does not regard causes as active initiators of a change anymore, but sees causal relations as instances of deterministic relations, causation/causality and determinism becoming equivalent. Thus, while "A is the cause of B" could be read as "A is the initiator of a change in B" in the Aristotelian conception, the Scientific reading is "Given the occurrence of B, A must have necessarily occurred". Hulswit's proposal is that at this point a clear distinction between causation and causality must be made, namely that **causation** refers to *the production of an effect by a cause*, while **causality** refers to *the relation between cause and effect*.

2.2. Linguistic expressions of causation / causality

Hulswit's discussion on causation and causality in the natural world does not stop here, but what is of interest to us is the applicability of this distinction to the phenomena in natural languages. The terms *causation* and *causality* have been used in linguistic studies rather intuitively, without being clearly defined or analyzed. The various linguistic constructions and structures expressing one or another aspect of the underlying concept of CAUSE have been treated in a somehow undifferentiating manner in regard to the above-mentioned distinction. For example, in a study on ways of expressing causality in natural languages, Moeschler (http://www.interdisciplines.org/causality/papers/15) states that linguists recognize three syntactic means of expressing causality: 1) causative constructions, 2) ergative constructions (transitive constructions) and 3) unaccusative constructions. Another study (Song, G.&Wolff, P. 2003), this time on expressions of causation, mentions resultatives, prepositions, conjunctions and the causative constructions that Moeschler is also referring to, as the main linguistic means that native speakers of English use as "Ways of Expressing Causation" (subchapter title), while the same set of linguistic structures is constantly referred to throughout the article as means of expressing "causal relations". The authors state that "while all of these structures can be used to express causal events, the constructions are not fully interchangeable" (Song, G.&Wolff, P. 2003: 2).

The same loose usage is present in Japanese studies as well, where causatives, although called *shieki* ("use" + "role"), are often referred to as the representative constructions for expressing *ingakankei* ("cause-effect relation"). Despite the fact that in Japanese the expression for causative construction is not morphologically related to the expression for causal relation, as it happens in English, causative constructions are listed as expressions for causality, although most linguists agree that they are different from other expressions of causality, such as various postpositions *((no) tame (ni), (no) sei (de), ni yotte, no ue ni, node, kara*), case particles (*de, ni, kara*), verbal *te*-form, conditional expressions (*(e)ba, to*), etc. Here are a few examples:

> 「因果関係にある二つの出来事を捉えるには様々な方法があるが、その代表的なものに使役動詞がある。」(丸田 1998：3)
>
> "Although there are several ways of capturing the two events in the cause-effect relation, the representative expression is the causative verb" (Maruta 1998: 3) - *translation ours*
>
> 「主語の位置に物名詞や出来事名詞をすえた使役文は、ひろい意味で因果関係を表現している。」（佐藤 1990：103）
>
> "Causative constructions taking as subjects nouns that denote things/entities or events express cause-effect relations in a broad sense." (Sato 1990: 103) - *translation ours*

Once the source of this confusion has been identified, the next step is to clarify the difference between causative constructions and other expressions of causality. I believe that the reason for which these constructions cannot be used interchangeably, although they seem to revolve around the same concept, is very closely related to Hulswit's distinction. Thus, while all of the structures referred to above are linked to the concept of CAUSE, they express different facets of the relation between cause, effect, causer/causing event and causee/caused event. However, it is not the case that all constructions expressing two events as being causally related would fall under the category of causative constructions.

In the present paper I will consider **causative constructions** – of various types - as **the linguistic construction which, within the range of causality, has specialized in expressing causation**, while other means are employed for expressing causality solely. Our choice seems to be sustained not only by the generalized (though not necessarily chosen in a conscientious manner) use of the term *causation* in nearly all the major works related to causative constructions, but also by the fact that causative constructions generally refer to complex predicates formed of the combination between a causative verbal element and a base predicate, wherein the addition of the

causative verbal element also adds a new participant (causer), in the subject position, demoting the original subject (the causee) to direct object, indirect object or oblique status, depending on the valency of the main verb. Furthermore, there is the postulation of other underlying predicates for causative constructions aside from CAUSE, in various semantic analyses of lexical causatives (see for example Talmy 1976 for RESULT, EVENT, INSTRUMENT, AUTHOR, AGENT, etc., Maruta 1998 for INITIATE, Kageyama 1996 for CONTROL). The possibility of interpreting a causative as having a predicate different from CAUSE as its causative predicate allows us to believe that it is causative constructions which are used to express causation, understood as the production of an effect by a cause, the emphasis being laid on the effect-producing process rather than on the relation between cause and effect. However, as pointed out above, the claim that in causative constructions the relation between cause and effect is not expressed at all is definitely wrong, as the occurrence of the caused event of the causative construction implies the occurrence of the causing event. Consider the following examples, both in English and in Japanese:

(1) The sun melted the snow.
(2) The teacher made the students write an essay.
(3) Taro ga Hanako wo koroshita.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Acc kill-Past
'Taro killed Hanako'
(4a) Sensei ga gakusei ni ronbun wo kakaseta.
Teacher-Nom students-Dat essay-Acc write-Caus-Past
'The teacher made the students write an essay'
(4b1) Sensei ga gakusei wo Tokyo ni ikaseta.
Teacher-Nom students-Acc Tokyo-Loc go-Caus-Past
'The teacher made the students go to Tokyo'
(4b2) Sensei ga gakusei ni Tokyo ni ikaseta.
Teacher-Nom students-Dat Tokyo-Loc go-Caus-Past
'The teacher let the students go to Tokyo'

(1) and (3) are instantiations of lexical causatives, (2) is an analytical causative, while (4) includes examples of morphological causatives - (4a) is a transitive-based causative, (4b1) and (4b2) are the two types of Japanese intransitive-based causatives, namely causative constructions with Accusative-marked causee and Dative-marked causee). In all of the above-cited examples, the occurrence of the caused event presupposes that the causing event has also already occurred, which makes it possible for us to assert that causative constructions, although being

representative for expressing causation, also express causality, in the sense of a relation between cause and effect. The relation between causality and causation becomes thus one of inclusion:



The use of causatives does not, however, always presuppose that the realization of the causing event implies the occurrence of the caused event.[2] The relation that I want to emphasize at this point is merely that of the necessary occurrence of the causing event before that of the caused event. Issues regarding the realization of the two events, as well as the behavior of the actants in the causative situation are what make causative constructions distinct from other means of expressing causality and specific in expressing causation. I will try to explain such issues in detail in the present paper, focusing on the relations between causing event/causer – causee – caused event/effect, with the causee as the central element.

The distinction between causality and causation in the natural world and the identification of the linguistic expressions which tend to express one of the two concepts in natural languages is relevant, from the point of view of the present book, for a better understanding of the relations within the causative constructions and offers a deeper insight into the complex relations that occur between the participants in the causative situation. However, linguistic causation and causation in the natural world are two different things. While in the physical world the existence of every thing and the occurrence of every phenomenon are in some way causally related

[2] Japanese offers interesting examples in this respect:
Denki wo tsuketa ga, tsukanakatta.
The light/electricity-Acc turn on (tr)-Past but turn on (intr)-Neg-Past
'I turned on the electricity, but it didn't turn on'

to some causing event which is external to that particular thing or phenomenon, and at the same time every thing/phenomenon contains causal relations within it, linguistic expressions do not have the same kind of properties. A sentence such as "The snow melted" may be the linguistic expression of a causative process in the physical world (the melting of the snow does not occur as such, but is the result of the action of some external force acting on it; this external force determines changes in the microelements composing snow, which, in their turn, cause other microelements to undergo changes, thus establishing a continuous causal chain), but as a linguistic entity, it expresses an event that does not relate causally to any other event, inside or outside it. However, what is attempted in the semantic analysis of causative constructions by using the lexical decomposition of causative predicates is to illustrate the phenomena occurring in the natural world as accurately as possible. For example, by using various semantic predicates in order to illustrate the action of the causer, one can emphasize the way in which the external force brings about the chain of changes. Similarly, the lexical decomposition of the predicate of the caused event illustrates the type of process that the object of the external force undergoes. Causation is thus both a scientific and a linguistic concept. Causation in the natural world is grammaticalized differently in various languages. In the next section I will provide an account on causativity in Japanese and English, by which I understand grammaticalized causation in the two languages. There are various studies on causation from a linguistic perspective, but I will try to follow two main directions, namely the cognitive accounts – for an understanding of the way in which the causative processes are encoded in the two particular languages I are working on of the semantic variations and differences both between various causative types and within the same type, and the formal accounts – for an understanding of the syntactic ways in which causation is encoded in languages.

2.3. Models for an analysis of causative constructions

2.3.1. Song 1996

Based on data from 408 languages, Song's work is an attempt to provide an adequate typology of causative constructions that would constitute a solid point of reference in understanding how the human mind cognizes causation. He claims that there are three major types of causative constructions: the COMPACT type, the AND type and the PURP type. The three types are differentiated mainly based on syntactic and semantic criteria.

2.3.1.1. The COMPACT type

The COMPACT type of causative constructions illustrates the physical contiguity of the expressions of cause and that of effect, the two being bound within a single clause, with no other elements intervening between them:

$$S_1 (\ldots.[V_{cause}] + [V_{effect}] \ldots.) S_1 \qquad \text{(Song 1996: 20)}$$

The embodiments of the element $[V_{cause}]$ are further categorized. The first subcategory comprises instantiations of $[V_{cause}]$ as a "less than a free morpheme" (Song 1996: 21). Such instantiations include affixes (prefixes, suffixes and infixes) added to originally noncausative verbs, reduplication of the element $[V_{effect}]$, phonetic means (replacement of the final vowel of noncausative verbs, changing the voice quality of a consonant of noncausative verbs, tonal changes), zero-derivation (illustrated by lexical causatives such as *kill*). However, within this sub-category Song already distinguishes several irregular COMPACT causatives, where additional morphemes are added to the unity basic verb + causative affix, thus destroying their adjacency.[3] Furthermore, the second subcategory of embodiments of the element $[V_{cause}]$ – "as a free morpheme" poses bigger problems to the compactness that should characterize the COMPACT type. In this case, $[V_{cause}]$ occurs as an independent lexical verb, not bounded to the basic verb but still retaining the essential property of the COMPACT type, namely the physical adjacency of the terms $[V_{cause}]$ and $[V_{effect}]$. This subcategory includes most of the traditional periphrastic causatives, the occurrence of the two independent lexical verbs making it "less 'compact' than morphological and lexical causatives" (Song 1996: 28). There are

[3] For example, in Straits Salish, a Songish dialect spoken in Birtish Columbia and Canada, when the causative suffix –tx is used to derive causative verbs, a purposive suffix –(ə)s must follow the basic verb and precede the causative suffix.

several examples of languages in which the compactness between [V_{cause}] and [V_{effect}] is loosened by the possibility of inserting various elements between the two.[4]

2.3.1.2. The AND type

The AND type causatives consists of two clauses - one for [V_{cause}] and one for [V_{effect}] – which are linked by a coordinating element. The marking of the coordinating AND element can be either overt – by means of conjunctions, tense marking, affixes - or covert, in which case the coordination is realized by juxtaposition of the two clauses. Unlike the COMPACT type, the order of the two clauses is fixed, the temporal sequence [S_{cause}] and [S_{effect}] being the means of expressing causation:

S_1 (S_2 (…[[V_{cause}]…] S_2 + AND + S_2 (… [V_{effect}]…) S_2) S_1 (Song 1996: 35)

To exemplify the two subtypes of the AND causative, I will reproduce Song's examples from VATA (a language spoke in the Ivory Coast) – for the overt type – and from ATCHIN (a language spoken in New Hebrides) – for the covert type.

VATA
(5) Ń gbā le yÒ-Ò lī
I speak CONJ child-DEF eat
'I make the child eat' (Song 1996: 36)

ATCHIN
(6) Mar kete ni-vat mu tsöv
3PL/PAST make stone 3SG/PAST fall
'They made the stone fall' (Song 1996: 44)

The serial verb construction is also listed under the AND type causatives, as an instance of further clausal independence reduction. However, there is as yet no unanimous agreement of what constitutes a serial verb construction. Kroeger 2004 describes a prototypical SVC as containing two or more morphologically independent verbs within the same clause, neither of which is an auxiliary verb. The two verbs are not

[4] Romance languages – *faire* construction in French being cited as representative - allow for the insertion of clitic pronouns to the initial verb, thus destroying the unity. A large number of linguists consider such causatives to be monoclausal, thus being closer to the morphological type than to the periphrastic type.

separated by any overt markers of subordination or coordination and the whole construction has a single intonation contour, with no pause separating the two verbs. The SVC refers to a single event and tense, aspect, modality, negation, etc. are marked on the entire construction. The two verbs in the SVC share at least one semantic argument and the prototypical SVC contains only one grammatical subject. Furthermore, a true SVC does not contain two overt NPs referring to the same argument.[5]

Serial verbs are often found in certain linguistic areas and families (Western Africa, Southeast Asia (Chinese, Thai, Khmer, etc.), many pidgin and Creole languages) and differ from auxiliary verbs mainly in that the auxiliary verb does not function as an independent semantic predicate, as well as from complex predicates, in that the SVC contains only one grammatical subject and, unlike in complex predicates, both verbs can assign their own distinct semantic roles and grammatical relations, each component being able to function on its own. In Lexical Functional Grammar, for example, the French *faire*-causative construction is considered to be a special type of SVC, which would bring about its listing under the AND type causatives, in Song's classification.

SVCs appear thus to be a grammatical technique covering a rather wide semantic and functional area. They constitute a uniform way of treating various phenomena that in languages such as English are expressed by diverse and unrelated subordinating devices, such as infinitival or gerundial complements, modal auxiliaries, adverbs, prepositional phrases, etc. Nevertheless, the functions of serial verb constructions include the expression of causation.

2.3.1.3. The PURP type

The PURP type of causative constructions takes its name from the purposive marker which is used in order to show that an $event_x$ is carried out for the purpose of realizing $event_y$. The PURP causative type has been so far included in the traditional syntactic causative type. The PURP element represents "any element that signals a sense of goal, purpose, and the like" (Song 1996: 49) and its realizations include case markers (allative, dative, benefactive, purposive), verbal markings of future tenses, irrealis, subjunctive mood and incompletive aspect, or independent purposive particles:

[5] For a typology of SVCs and a more detailed discussion on their characteristics, see A. Y. Aikhenvald & R.MW. Dixon 2006.

S_1 (S_2 (…[V_{effect}]…)S_2 + PURP + [V_{cause}]…) S_1
or
S_1 (…[V_{cause}]…S_2 (…[V_{effect}]…) S_1 + PURP) S_1 (Song 1996: 49)

A look at the instantiations of the PURP element makes it clear that, at least in the prototypical form, the effect has not yet necessarily occurred or it is not factually realized yet. This particular characteristic of the PURP causative type allows Song to include in this category a large number of languages in such a causative may be "implicative" due to the semantic neutralization of the term PURP. A typical example is Latin (and the Romance languages) that uses subjunctive to signal PURP in causative constructions. Let us illustrate that with the following example from Romanian, where the subjunctive carries the purposive meaning:

(7) L-am făcut să plângă.
He-Acc make-Past-1sg cry-Subj-3sg
'I made him cry'

The three types of causative constructions are, however, hardly met in their prototypical form in natural languages, a language employing various constructions in order to express a certain causative type. Song claims that such variations may be a sign of historical changes within that particular language. As a matter of fact, he claims later in the book that the COMPACT type is nothing but a diachronic residue of the formal reduction of the AND and the PURP type. The parameter of formal compactness – although widely used as one of the distinguishing features of causatives – is regarded by Song as irrelevant to an understanding of how the human mind cognizes causation, being found in other language phenomena as well. The compactness parameter being removed from the typology, the main difference between the two remaining types is now given by the presence or absence of implicativity, understood as the relation between the truth of [S_{effect}] to the truth of [S_{cause}], namely whether the truth of [S_{effect}] is built into the semantics of [S_{cause}]. Song characterizes the AND type as always being implicative, while PURP causatives are implicative in many, but no all, of the cases.

Song's view on causatives is, to the extent of our knowledge, the only typological perspective based on such an extensive number of particular languages. However, the major complaints that have been made regarding this work have to do mainly with the sample of languages used. Some reviewers consider that although Song claims to have based his analysis on 408 languages, very few of them are actually closely examined within the

book. What particularly concerns us is that there are critics who claim that Song occasionally uses non-causative sentences as causatives in order to prove his point (Moore and Polinsky 1998) and that the categories COMPACT/AND/PURP are so vague that they are actually unworkable and that the relations between them are not clear (DeHann 1998).

As far as our discussion is concerned, one problematic issue is that of the very formulation of the proposed prototypical schemes. Song repeatedly asserts that the descriptions of the three causative types may not be applied fully to individual languages and that variations are expected. Moreover, he deliberately ignores and avoids discussing any problems arising from a formal analysis of causative constructions, referring specifically to the analyses carried out within the generative framework, on the justification that such analyses do not provide relevant insights into the nature of causation, but address completely different aims. While such claims may be true to some extent, I believe that the two perspectives do not necessarily exclude each other, but could be used to provide a much more exact typological classification. It is not the aim of this paper to follow this particular path, but I will point out shortly some issues concerning Japanese and English.

According to Song's typological classification, both Japanese and English lexical causatives would belong to the COMPACT causative type. Japanese morphological causatives could be integrated into the prototypical scheme quite easily, as the causative suffix *–sase* is bound to the main verb, so the physical adjacency between [V_{cause}] and [V_{effect}] is preserved. However, although at first sight the two elements belong to the same clause S_1, there have been discussions on the possibility of analyzing morphological causatives as bi-clausal in their inducing persuasive and permissive readings[6], which would require a different scheme, containing two different clauses S_1 and S_2. The case of the English syntactic causatives poses basically the same bi-clausality problem. Although English syntactic causatives could be considered as part of the COMPACT causative type in which [V_{cause}] is "less than a free morpheme", it is difficult to apply the prototypical scheme to the actual causative construction, since English syntactic causatives contain two independent lexical verbs which are not physically adjacent and which have been proven to belong to two different clauses. Moreover, it is not actually completely clear to which of the three categories the English syntactic causatives belong. As stated above, they could be considered part of the COMPACT type. However, some causative

[6] See Matsumoto 1996 for a detailed classification of causative constructions based both on semantic and syntactic features. I will return to this problem in section 4.3.3.3.4.

verbs – such as 'cause', 'get' – could fit into the PURP category as Well. They are followed by what can be considered a purposive marker – 'to' – and the effect is not necessarily factually realized.
Although widely documented, Song's categorization proves indeed to be too vague to be actually functional. The concept of formal compactness cannot be completely ignored in an analysis of causatives. It is actually one of the issues that pose most problems, since there are instances of 'compact' causatives – such as the Japanese morphological causative – that can be bi-clausal, with the two events being conceptualized as distinct, whereas 'less compact' causatives – such as the French periphrastic *faire* causative – that have been proven to be monoclausal, despite the use of two distinct verbs.

2.3.2. Talmy 1976, 2000

Talmy's work on causation covers a period of more than twenty years, but the basic concepts and theories remain almost unchanged. Unlike Song, Talmy bases his research mainly on English, so his work is not typological in the sense of comparing a large number of languages, but the models of causation that he proposes are intended to be universal. He developed a very rich and sophisticated model of causation which I do not intend to present in detail in this paper. I will restrict to pointing put those elements that are relevant to our analysis. However, it is worth noticing that even in the early version of his theory 1976, Talmy touches on most of the semantic issues that are to be found later in the works of many linguists working on causation. Ideas such as that there can be as many deep causative verbs as there are semantic causation types, that the causing event and the caused event must share certain elements and not others so that I can talk about a causative situation or that of defining agentivity on the basis of intentionality and then distinguishing agentivity-based causation from other types of causation are only a few examples of the above-mentioned issues and to which I will also refer in the present paper.
Talmy's first major distinction is that between the basic causative situation and complex causative situations. The basic causative situation consists of a simple causing event, a caused event and the relation between the two. The characteristics of the basic causative situation can be represented as follows:



(Talmy 2000: 485)

Regarding the issue as to whether in the basic causative situation I have a causer or a causing event, Talmy considers that it is a simple event that causes another simple event, rather than an object causing an event. Thus he also answers Fillmore's question as to whether the so-called *forces* (non-agentive causers, such as forces of nature) are to be classed as agents or instruments. In Talmy's view, they are neither; they are events, and what is expressed in sentences such as *The wind opened the door* is event causation. Furthermore, the terms FIGURE and GROUND in the representation above are defined as follows:

> "The FIGURE object is a moving or CONCEPTUALLY movable point whose path or site is conceived as a variable the particular value of which is the salient issue.
>
> The GROUND object is a reference point, having a stationary setting within a reference frame, with respect to which the FIGURE's path or site receives characterization". (Talmy 1976: 57)

In order for a causal relation to hold between the causing and the caused event, it is necessary that the two events share the caused event's FIGURE element. The causing event's GROUND is the object that functions as the FIGURE of the caused event and the FIGURE and GROUND objects of the caused event have the same functions in relation to the whole causative situation, the FIGURE object of the causing event functioning as the latter's instrument. Furthermore, in the basic causative situation the caused event occurs and it would not occur if the causing event did not occur.

An important distinction that Talmy makes is that between extent-durational causation and point-durational causation:

(8) a. The carton slid across the grass from the wind blowing on it.

b. The carton slid off its spot from a gust of wind blowing on it.

(Talmy 2000: 491)

Although in both situations the caused event would not take place if it were not for the wind's blowing, in (a) the actions of both the causer and the causee are continuous through an extent of time, while in (b) they are manifest at a single point in time. This opposition leads further to the distinction between onset and extended causation in the case of complex causative situations. Talmy considers that onset causation differs from point-durational causation in that it contains a point-durational instance of basic causation as Well as an autonomous event, thus getting out of the basic causative situation range. Talmy finds it difficult to specify an underlying structure for point-durational causation, but suggests that for extent-durational causation a suitable deep morpheme would be CONTINUE.

The last aspect from Talmy's account on causation that I will refer to is that of agency. The underlying predicate characteristic to agency is, in Talmy's view, ACT ON, and the major criterion for distinguishing agentive actions from non-agentive actions is intention. An agent is "an entity with body (parts), volition and intention, where the body parts respond to volition and intention applies to these responses and, optionally, to further consequent events." (Talmy 2000: 513). An entity that is non-intentional with regard to the event specified is not an agent, but an author.

Talmy's analysis of causation covers many other aspects and his categorizations are extremely rich and detailed, but the distinctions presented above are those which I will mainly use in our paper, although sometimes from slightly different perspectives. Seen from our perspective on causality and causation, Talmy's analysis of causation actually covers causality, since many of the instances that he analyzes are not instances of causation, as I understand it. The representation of the causal relation itself is, in Talmy's view, "RESULT FROM", the emphasis lying mainly on the result and not on the causing process. However, I will use Talmy's distinctions as the starting point for postulating distinct deep causative predicates for various causation types. His comments on agency and the relation between agency and intention are also issues that I refer to, although the terminology that I propose might be slightly different, especially in the case of the causee.

2.3.3. Dixon 2000

Dixon offers a typology of causatives from three perspectives: formal, syntactic and semantic. I will briefly outline his proposal, emphasizing those aspects that are relevant for our research.

From a formal point of view, Dixon accounts for the following types of causatives: morphological, 'serial', periphrastic and lexical. The

morphological processes for marking causatives can consist in: internal change – in vowel quality, or consonant mutation, repeating a consonant, lengthening a vowel, tone change, reduplication, various processes of affixation (prefixes, suffixes, circumfixes-combinations of prefix and suffix). Each of these processes is illustrated with examples from various languages, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into such details here.

Serial verb constructions are listed as a distinct type of causatives, different from periphrastic causatives in that they contain two (or more) verbs in one predicate. However, for his analysis of causatives, Dixon takes into consideration only those serial verbs constructions that involve a strictly causative verb (one which has no meaning other than as a marker of a causative construction), excluding situations in which the serial verb construction might have a causative-type meaning but does not contain a causative verb per se, such as in the Austronesian language Paamese, where, for example, 'they-hit pig it-die' can mean 'they killed the pig by hitting it' (Dixon 2000: 34).

Periphrastic causatives involve two verbs in separate clauses, with the causative verb generally in the main clause and the lexical verb in the complement or other kind of subordinate clause. Portuguese is given as an interesting example of a Istern Romance language that allows the causee to come between the causative verb *fazer* and the lexical verb in infinitive form, unlike the other Western Romance languages, which involve a predicate that includes two verbs, much like the serial verb construction (the French *faire* causative, Italian, Spanish and Catalan causatives are given as examples):

(9) Eu fiz José comer os bolos.
1sg make+PAST+1sg Name eat+INFIN the cakes
I made José eat the cakes (Dixon 2000: 37)

as compared with

(10) Je ferai manger les gâteaux à Jean
1sgA make+FUT+1sg eat+INF the cakes PREP Name
I shall make Jean eat the cakes
(Dixon 2000: 35)

Finally, lexical causatives are the kind of causative that involves neither a morphological process nor separate causative verbs and include two sub-classes: one lexeme and two lexeme causatives. The first sub-class is formed of those verbs that can occur both in transitive and in intransitive clauses, such as the English *spill*, for example – *John spilled the milk/The milk spilled*. The second sub-class includes pairs of lexemes (with quite different forms),

one intransitive and the other appearing to be a causative correspondent of it. In Yimas (Papuan region), for example, we have:

Intransitive	Transitive
mal- 'die'	tu- 'kill'
awa- 'burn'	ampu- 'burn'
aypu- 'lie down'	ti- 'lay down'

(Dixon 2000: 39)

Syntactically, causatives are analyzed according to the transitivity of the base verb. In the case of lexical causatives, the non-causative member is generally intransitive. Dixon considers that both in the case of lexical causatives involving two forms (such as the English *be dead/kill*) and in the case of lexical causatives in which the same form can be used in two syntactic frames (such as the English *trip*), the basic function of the verb is the intransitive one, while the causative one is secondary. Periphrastic causatives can apply to any transitive or intransitive verb. In some languages, the causee is the surface object of the transitive verb, while in others it still maintains its original function with respect to the lexical verb, and in some it may be marked for both functions. The other arguments of the verb are retained. Morphological causatives, on the other hand, are more varied. In some languages they apply only to intransitives, in others only to intransitives and simple transitives (but not ditransitives), while in others to all verbs. If we consider things from the perspective of the verb's transitivity, every causative mechanism applies to intransitive verbs, with the original subject becoming the object of the causative construction:

CAUSATIVE OF INTRANSITIVE

underlying clause (intransitive)		S
		|
causative construction (transitive)	causer: A	O

(Dixon 2000: 45),

while S = intransitive subject, A = transitive subject and O = transitive object.

For causatives of transitives, Dixon considers that the causative increases the valency of the verb by one, adding an argument to the argument structure of the lexical verb. The causer is always placed in A function. In a periphrastic causative, where there are two clauses involved, all the arguments can easily find a slot to fill. A morphological causative of a transitive verb, on the other hand, is itself a transitive clause and the

question to answer is what happens to the A and O arguments of the original clause. Dixon considers that there are five main possibilities:

CAUSATIVE OF TRANSITIVE

Type	causer	original A (causee)	original O
(i)	A	special marking	O
(ii)	A	retains A-marking	O
(iii)	A	has O-marking	has O-marking
(iv)	A	O	non-core
(v)	A	non-core	O

(Dixon 2000: 48)

In type (i) there is a special marking, used just for the causee in a causative construction. In (ii) both causer and original A receive A-marking. In (iii) the original A and the original O both receive O-marking. In (iv) the original A becomes O, and the original O takes non-core marking. In (v) the original O remains as is, while the original A takes peripheral marking. The Japanese morphological causative belongs to type (iv), as illustrated below:

(11) Hanako ga Tokyo he itta.
Hanako-Nom Tokyo-Loc go-Past
'Hanako Int to Tokyo'

(12) Taro ga Hanako wo/ni Tokyo he ikaseta.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Acc/Dat Tokyo-Loc go-Caus-Past
'Taro made/let Hanako go to Tokyo'

Regarding the semantics of causatives, Dixon suggests that when a language has two or more types of causative constructions, involving either different formal mechanisms or different marking of the causee, there is always a semantic difference which may involve one or more of the following nine semantic parameters:

(a) Relating to the verb

1. State/action – whether a causative mechanism applies only to state verbs or also to action verbs
2. Transitivity – whether a causative mechanism applies only to intransitive verbs, or both to intransitive and simple transitive verbs or to all types of verbs (intransitive, transitive, ditransitive)

(b) Relating to the causee

3. Control – whether the causee lacks control or has control of the activity
4. Volition – whether the causee does it willingly or unwillingly
5. Affectedness – whether the causee is partially or completely affected by the activity

(c) Relating to causer
6. Directness – whether the causer acts directly or indirectly
7. Intention – whether the causer achieves the result accidentally or intentionally
8. Naturalness – whether the activity happens fairly naturally (the causer just initiating a natural process) or is achieved only with effort
9. Involvement – whether the causer is also involved in the activity (in addition to the causee) or not involved.

Dixon's typology of causatives is probably the most useful for my analysis, since he points out the syntactic and semantic aspects that I consider being most relevant for the two languages that I use. I particularly focus on those semantic parameters from the above list which I consider to be functional in the case of Japanese and English. Dixon focuses less on the mechanisms that the human mind employs in encoding and decoding causation, but his account of causatives is comprehensive and very clear. He leaves the discussion open, suggesting that there might be other semantic parameters or particular cases of syntactic marking of causatives, but I consider that the framework that he offers for a classification of causatives is extremely valuable, even if it might be incomplete.

2.4. Causative constructions in Japanese and English

2.4.1. Overview of Japanese causatives

Japanese is well-known for having two types of causatives: morphological and lexical. The morphological causative has been traditionally classified into the so-called *ni*-causatives and *wo*-causatives, depending on whether the original/logical subject (the subject of the caused event) is marked with the Accusative case particle *wo* or with the Dative case particle *ni*. In both cases however, a new subject that corresponds to the Causer is added to the sentence and the original subject (the Causee) is marked either with *wo* (Accusative) or with *ni* (Dative). The resulting causative sentence means that the subject (the Causer) causes or allows someone/something (the Causee) to do the action denoted by the main verb. Apart from the different case marking particle, the rest of the sentence is exactly the same in both *wo*- and *ni*-causatives. However, the meaning associated with each variant is different. Thus, when the main verb is intransitive, the choice between the two particles depends on the following general rule: when *ni* is used, the Causee has taken an action intentionally; *wo*, on the other hand, can be used regardless of the Causee's

volition and the "permissive" or "coercive" reading depends on the context and/or the situation. The distinction is obscured when the main verb is transitive, the lower (original) subject being uniformly marked with the Dative case, due to the Double-*wo* Constraint.[7]

Intransitive-based causativess:
(13)

a. Chichi ga Hanako wo soko he ikaseta.
   Father-Nom Hanako-Acc there-Loc go-CAUS-PAST
   "Father made Hanako go there"
b. Chichi ga Hanako ni soko he ikaseta.
   Father-Nom Hanako-Dat there-Loc go-CAUS-PAST
   "Father let/alloId Hanako to go there"

Transitive-based causatives:
(14) Chichi ga Hanako ni hon wo yomaseta.
Father-Nom Hanako-Dat book-Acc read-CAUS-PAST
"Father made/let Hanako read the book"
(15) ⁎Chichi ga Hanako wo hon wo yomaseta.
Father-Nom Hanako-Acc book-Acc read-CAUS-PAST

The other category of causatives present in Japanese is the so-called "lexical causatives". Because of their irregularity, these nonproductive forms have been considered more as a part of the lexicon and not of syntax. Initial studies on causative constructions in Japanese focused extensively on morphological causatives to the detriment of the lexical ones, but the focus of interest appears to have changed quite extensively over the years, recent research papers focusing increasingly on issues related to lexical causatives. I will discuss several semantic issues regarding lexical causatives later in this paper, so I will not go into detail at this point.

Although in the early research on causative constructions (Kuroda 1965, Shibatani 1976b) a sharp distinction was made between lexical/nonproductive and productive causatives, recent research has come up with the idea that the distinction between these two types is not so easy to make after all, starting from the mere observation that the causative morpheme *–(s)ase* has the allomorph *–(s)as*, which is the same as the one found in transitivizing (causativizing) suffixes. The verbs which fall under

[7] The Double-*wo* Constraint prevents a clause from having two NPs marked with the Accusative case particle *wo* (see Tsujimura 1996). It is not, hoIver, a constraint specific to the formation of causative sentences.

the category of lexical causatives have been traditionally included and analyzed as transitive verbs, Japanese being well known for having pairs of transitive/intransitive verbs which belong to the same lexical family. Consider the following examples:

(16) Hanako ga Taro wo/ni kaeraseta.
Hanako-Nom Taro-Acc/Dat leave-Caus-Past
"Hanako made/let Taroo leave"
(17) Hanako ga Taro ni kuruma wo kawaseta.
Hanako-Nom Taro-Dat car-Acc buy-Caus-Past
"Hanako caused Taro to buy a car"
(18) Hanako ga yasai wo kusaraseta.
Hanako-Nom vegetables-Acc perish-Caus-Past
"Hanako caused the vegetables to perish".

Sentences (16) and (17) are instances of morphological causatives (intransitive-based in (16) and transitive-based causatives in (17)), with the suffix *–(s)ase* attached to the main verb. Sentence (18) is an example of what is generally considered to be a lexical causative. However, it is not completely clear whether the form *kusarasu* is the lexical causative counterpart of the intransitive verb *kusaru*, or the morphological causative form, with the falling of the final /e/ of the causative suffix *–(s)ase*. Similar cases can be found in the uses of *ikasu* (instead of *ikaseru*), *nomasu* (instead of *nomaseru*), *tabesasu* (instead of *tabesaseru*), etc. However, such forms have been considered as either originally regional uses which have been adopted by speakers of the standard language (Tokyo area) as well (Matsushita 1930), or as "short forms" (Martin 1975, Teramura 1982). In the present paper I will consider such forms as short variants of the standard forms and I will not refer to them as separate phenomena.

2.4.2. Overview of English causatives

English offers examples of lexical and periphrastic causatives. The following sentences exemplify the two categories:

(19) The sun melted the snow.
(20) The sun caused the snow to melt.

It is true that there are several affixes in English that carry a causative meaning, but I will consider these as instances of derivational affixes, creating new members of open classes and not being a distinct type of causative constructions. In this category I include suffixes such as *–ize (legal-legalize), -en (light-lighten), -ify (simple-simplify)*, or prefixes such as *en-*

(large-enlarge). I will consider the causative verbs obtained by means of prefixation or suffixation with causative prefixes/suffixes as lexical causatives and treat them respectively.

English lexical causatives are basically transitive verbs carrying a causative meaning. Although there are still discussions on whether lexical causatives in English are based on a process of transitivization/causativization of intransitive verbs or on one of intransitivization/anticauzativization of transitive verbs, I will follow the line which considers lexical causatives as deriving from intransitive sentences encoding a process, by adding a predicate of causation which is transformationally absorbed in lexical verbs (Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995). Thus, "*The snow melted*" can be transitivized by the adding of a causative predicate CAUSE, which triggers the addition of a causing agent: "*The sun melted the snow*".

Periphrastic causatives in English are formed with the help of verbs of causation such as 'make', 'get', 'have', 'cause'. The choice of a particular verb of causation brings about a difference in meaning as well. Generally it has been assumed that the difference lies in the distinction between an active sense and a passive sense, with the implied 'acting' vs 'undergoing' meanings; using a verb like 'make' will allow an active reading, while the choice of 'have' was considered to have a passive reading. However, this is not always true, since one can easily find, for example, occurrences of 'have' with an active reading as Well: "*The teacher had the students write an essay*". Thus, the distinction does not have to do exclusively with the active/passive dichotomy; I believe that oppositions like animate/inanimate, volitional/non-volitional must also be taken into account in the characterization of the Causer, the Causee or the Effect. The use of 'have', for example, will generally require an animate Causer and a non-volitional Effect. Whatever the choice, periphrastic/analytic causatives can be regarded as matrix verbs followed by complement clauses, in which the subject of the caused event becomes the object of the causative verb, regardless of whether the caused event is transitive or intransitive.

CHAPTER 3
SEMANTICS OF CAUSATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

3.1. Elements of the causative situation

The discussion in the second chapter of the present thesis has briefly touched on the definition of the causative situation. I concluded that in order to be considered causative, a situation must necessarily include the following elements, expressed overtly or covertly:

- The Causer/Causing event (referring to the entity/event which causes the causative process)
  The director *made the actors stand in the rain.*
- The Causee (referring to the entity that is changed or influenced by the Causer and that carries out the Result)
  The director made ***the actors*** *stand in the rain.*
- The Result/Caused event
  The director made the actors ***stand in the rain****.*

The network of relations between the three elements is what gives causative constructions their analytical complexity. Between the causer/causing event and the result/caused event there is a causal dependency relation, in the sense that the caused event would not occur if the causing event did not occur. The causee acts as a medium through which the result/caused event can be accomplished and can take on various roles, which I will further discuss in greater detail. Among various models used in analyzing causation, there is the so-called "billiard-ball model", which incorporates all of the above-mentioned elements. Widely-used in the world of science, the billiard-ball model describes motion as being fuelled by energy that transfers from a source to a recipient within an action chain, characterized by an energetic head from which energy flows from one entity to another. In linguistics, the billiard-ball model has been used by cognitivists to describe transitive and causative processes: an agent (causer) acts on an object by means of an instrument or medium (causee), bringing about an effect. Langacker 1991 provides the following illustration of the billiard-ball model:

(1) a. Sharon dried her hair with the blower.
b. The blower dried her hair.
c. Her hair dried.

(Langacker 1991: 332)

Agent (causer)	→	Instrument (medium)	→	Object	→	Result
(Sharon)		(the blower)		(her hair)		(dry)

(1a) depicts the entire process of energy transfer from the causer to the result through the instrument. In (1b), on the other hand, the agent/causer is set aside and the instrument becomes the grammatical subject, while in (1c) neither the agent nor the instrument is expressed. While the billiard-ball model may find full applicability in science, when it comes to language, I believe that its applicability is not as 'universal' as its supporters have initially considered it to be. Following Kageyama 1996, I must point out that the billiard-ball model was used to explain causation mainly in languages such as English, where the emphasis lies on the agent/causer. Japanese however is known for emphasizing either the result or the 'natural' occurrence of events, avoiding, where possible, to express the causer overtly. This distinction has been extensively discussed by Y. Ikegami (Ikegami 1981), who points out that while English is a DO-language, laying stress on human actions, Japanese is a BECOME-language, focusing on states rather than on actions. The preferred use of passive over active structures, as well as the wide use of intransitive verbs in Japanese can thus be accounted for. For example, in a situation where a person drops something without noticing it, the most common way of making him/her aware of that would be, in English, "*You dropped something*", with a transitive verb and necessarily expressing the subject, while the same event in Japanese would make use of the intransitive *ochiru* (fall, drop) – "*Nanika ochimashita yo*" (lit., "Something dropped"), its transitive counterpart, *otosu*, being considered too direct in a normal situation. In the same manner, in order to express any part of the above-described causal chain, Japanese shows an obvious preference for using result-oriented structures when expressing the causing event is not absolutely necessary. Aside from the wide use of intransitive verbs, resultative constructions are also found in a much larger number than in English. It is not my aim in this book to discuss about resultative constructions, but there are certain aspects relating to causation that need to be clarified before moving on.

It is worth noticing that there are certain differences between the English and the Japanese resultative constructions. The basic lexical semantic representation for resultative constructions can be described as follows:

[x CAUSE [y BECOME STATE]]

Resultative constructions appear thus to be a subcategory of causative constructions, in which the causee is a Patient/Theme and the caused event is of STATE-type[8]. Resultatives have been shown to derive

[8] For a detailed discussion on event types see section 3.2.1.

accomplishments from activities (Van Valin 1990, Pustejovsky 1991, Hoekstra 1988, Dowty 1979), accomplishments being understood as comprising an activity and a state, where the activity is the cause of bringing about of the state. The difference between a resultative phrase and a lexically simple causative phrase describing a change of state is that in the case of the resultative phrase, "both the activity and the result are lexically specified, each by a different predicate" (Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995: 50), while in the case of a simple causative verb, the activity that causes the result state is left unspecified. The English resultative phrase *"I hit/punched him down"* would be rendered in Japanese by means of the compound verb *naguritaosu* (hit/punch + 'cause fall down') – "*Kare wo naguritaoshita*". In both languages, both the activity (punch; *naguru*) and the resulted state (down; *taosu*) are lexically specified, although by different types of predicates. Although highly similar, the two resultatives are different in regard to the internal structure of the events that they encode. The English resultative consists of an agentive causing event ("I punched him") and a caused event which can be easily analyzed as an intransitive structure with the patient-causee as the subject ("He fell down"). On the other hand, the Japanese resultative displays a different internal structure, with an agentive causing event ("*Kare wo nagutta*" ~ 'I punched him'), and with a caused event comprising a transitive structure with the patient-causee as the direct object ("*(Kare wo) taoshita*" ~ 'I made him fall down'). Japanese resultatives appear to be much closer to causatives in this respect, as the caused event is expressed by means of a causative verb.

English: [I punched him] CAUSE [he (fell) down]]
Japanese: [[I punched him] CAUSE [I CAUSE [he fell down]]]

However, there is another construction in Japanese known as "resultative phrase", namely the construction formed of the verbal *–te* form, followed by the auxiliaries *iru* or *aru* depending on whether the verb is intransitive or transitive[9]. Although both V–*teiru* and V–*tearu* constructions express the same extra-linguistic reality – a state of affairs occurring as a result of a prior event, the difference lies in the presence/absence of agentivity, which I believe is actually the mere reflection of the (in)transitivity of the main verb. Thus, only the V–*tearu* (transitive-based) construction could be interpreted as incorporating a basic causative event, provided that the main verb is itself causative in nature. However, the causative nuance in the final

[9] For a detailed presentation of *–teiru/-tearu* constructions, see Tamaianu 2004.

reading of the V–*tearu* construction is much less visible than in an English resultative construction. Let us consider the following examples:

(2). a. He opened the door. (causative)
b. He opened the door wide. (resultative)

Their corresponding Japanese examples would be:

(3). a. Kare ga doa wo aketa. (causative)
He-Nom door-Acc open-Past
b.Kare ga doa wo hiroku aketa. (causative)
He-Nom door-Acc widely open-Past

The Japanese resultative phrase expressing a state of things occurring as a result of an agentive event will employ the verb *akeru* (open (tr.)) and the auxiliary *aru* (be-for inanimate entities), while the resultative phrase expressing only a state of things will employ the verb *aku* (open (intr)) and the auxiliary *iru* (be-for animate entities):

(4) a. Doa ga akete aru.
door-Nom open (tr) - Conj be-Pres.
b. Doa ga aite iru.
door-Nom open (intr)-Conj be-Pres.

An English version of the above-mentioned sentences would be "The door has been opened" (4a) vs. "The door is open" (4b), with the agentivity feature preserved in (4a).
What I am trying to underline here is that what is understood by resultative construction covers a slightly different area in English and in Japanese. The relevance to our dissertation lies in the fact that while resultatives can be subsumed to causative constructions in English, in Japanese only compound verbs functioning as resultatives can be included in the lexical causative class, whereas what is sometimes labeled as resultative constructions in Japanese (V-*teiru* and V-*tearu* constructions) does not necessarily have a causative implicature, but are stative constructions whose causative meaning surfaces only when the original verb is causative in nature.

3.2. The causing process

In order for a linguistic construction to be read as causative, the existence of a causer – whether overtly expressed or not - is absolutely necessary. However, there have been extensive discussions on what constitutes a causer in a causative situation. Most of the researchers consider causation as the relation between a causer argument and an event (see Jackendoff 1983, 1990, Levin and Rappaport 1988). Dowty 1979 offers a different perspective, considering causation as a relation between two propositions rather than between an individual and a proposition:

(9)He sweeps the floor clean:
[[He sweeps the floor] CAUSE [BECOME [the floor is clean]]]
(Dowty 1979: 93)

Following the line opened by Dowty, Pustejovsky 1988, 1991 and Grimshaw 1990 introduce the level of event structure, distinct from other levels of lexical representation. In this view, predicates can encode complex events as well. A predicate like *break*, for example, has the following representation:



(Grimshaw 1990: 26)

The activity represents what the agent does to cause the breaking, and the state represents the state of the broken item. Causation becomes now a relation between two events, and not necessarily between two predicates.

It is rather obvious that even in a simple sentence like "The man opened the door", it is not the man as such that caused the door to open, but it is something that the man did that produced the result. He could have pushed it, pulled it, slid it, turn the knob, pressed a button and so on. These actions are not lexically expressed in the causative 'open', but they may be, as in, for example, causative 'cut', whose lexical meaning include the modality in which the result is obtained (acting on the object with a sharp instrument). Causation is indeed a relation between two events, and that is much clearer in the subcategory of causatives represented by resultative constructions, in which both the causing and the caused event are lexically specified. Furthermore, in the case of productive causatives, the two events are generally expressed by distinct linguistic units – distinct verbs, in the case of periphrastic causatives, and causative morphemes in the case of

morphological causatives. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will generally refer to the causing event as *the causer* unless otherwise specified.

3.2.1. Underlying semantic predicates of the causing process (lexical causatives)

Before the further agentivity-based analysis of the entity functioning as the causer in the causative situation, let us take a look at the relation between the causing event and the result. I will first consider lexical causatives. There has been a long tradition in linguistic studies carried out within the generative grammar framework to analyze lexical causatives as incorporating an abstract predicate – CAUSE. The postulation of abstract predicates such as CAUSE made it possible for researchers to explain the relation between a causative sentence ("The man opened the door") and its non-causative correspondents ("The door opened", "The door is open") (see Shibatani 1973, 1976). Furthermore, it enabled syntacticians to account for the apparent inadvertences in the interpretation of the thematic roles played by the object in the causative construction (see Radford 2004). However, the developments in the semantic research, especially in the field of cognitive semantics, made it possible that the various causative processes could be described much more accurately than they used to be when causative constructions first started to be analyzed. That meant a further challenge for the more formal approaches to language to provide accurate descriptions of such processes. Predicate decomposition seems to be the most effective way of describing and capturing the nuances in the causative process, being widely used now in research conducted within more formal theories such as Generative Semantics or Lexical Functional Grammar. In this type of representation, a verb's meaning is represented in terms of a fixed set of primitive predicates. Verbs belonging to the same semantic class usually have common sub-structures in their decomposition. The conclusion arising from the analysis of causative predicates belonging to various verb classes seems to be that CAUSE alone cannot account for the complexity of event types encoded by causative predicates. Thus, other semantic predicates have been found in order to characterize distinct verb classes as accurately as possible. I will hereinafter present the main semantic causative predicates that have been discussed in the literature on causative verbs so far, following the framework provided by Nakamura (Nakamura 2003).

Starting from the premise that the occurrence of a causative event belongs to one of the following categories, I will discuss the necessity of postulating four distinct semantic predicates, one for each of these cases: a) an event that happens in a natural manner, 'by itself', and for which an external

cause cannot be identified; b) there is a causing factor that determines the occurrence of a state; c) there is a triggering cause that initiates the production of the event, after which the event unfolds 'by itself', based on the internal properties of its composing elements; d) there is a cause/causing factor that exerts its influence directly on the whole event and controls it. These four situations are illustrated by the following examples:

(6) An accident happened on the country road.
(7) A noise at the window startled me.
(8) The child spun the top.
(9) He moved the wardrobe.

The underlying predicates characterizing each of the above-mentioned situations are, in order: COME ABOUT, CAUSE, INITIATE (see Maruta 1998), and CONTROL (see Kageyama 1996). Each of these predicates appears to characterize a certain verb class.

3.2.1.1. COME ABOUT

The first semantic predicate that I analyze has been linked to the class of verbs of existence and appearance[10], which have been mainly discussed in close connection to unaccusativity, as they are considered highly representative for unaccusative verbs. Although the question of unaccusativity is not of central interest in our paper, I will briefly point out the main characteristics of unaccusative verbs, for a better understanding of their relation to causatives. Formulated by Perlmutter 1978, the Unaccusative Hypothesis claims that there are two classes of intransitive verbs – the unaccusative verbs and the unergative verbs. The syntactic configuration of an unergative verb consists of a D-Structure subject and no object, while that of an unaccusative verbs consists of a D-Structure object and no subject:

[10] For evidence on the semantic relation between verbs of existence and verbs of appearance, see Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995. The evidence relevant to our analysis is that both types of verbs require a location argument, with the term 'location' including both temporal and spatial reference. Verbs of existence appear to have two arguments: one describing the entity that exists and the other describing the location at which this entity exists. Verbs of appearance are related semantically to verbs of existence, as they can be viewed as verbs of coming into existence. (Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995: 120).

a. Unergative verb: NP [$_{VP}$ V]
b. Unaccusative verb: ____ [$_{VP}$ V NP/CP]
(Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995: 3)

In terms of argument structure, an unaccusative verb is the one that takes an internal argument but no external argument, whereas an unergative verb has an external argument but no direct internal argument.
Unaccusative verbs have been proven to participate in the causative alternation. As a matter of fact, the causative alternation has been used by some (Rosen 1981, Burzio 1986) as an unaccusative diagnostic. Verbs of existence and appearance, however, do not take part in the causative alternation (see Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995), since they do not have a causative counterpart:

(10a) Japan's economy flourished in the 20th century.
(10b) *The government flourished Japan's economy in the 20th century.
(11a) A picture appeared on the screen.
(11b) *He appeared a picture on the screen.

The point to be emphasized here is that although verbs of existence and verbs of appearance have been initially analyzed as causatives (see Chierchia 1989), further research demonstrated that these types of verbs cannot be treated in the same manner as other unaccusative causatives. Beside their inability to participate in the causative alternation, verbs of existence and appearance do not show the morphological pattern usually found in causative verbs taking part in the causative alternation, where the transitive and the intransitive forms of the verb are morphologically related. Furthermore, the adverbial modifier *by itself* – that brings out the existence of the cause argument - cannot appear together with verbs of existence and appearance. (Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995).
The behavior of this verb class reflects the absence of an external cause in the lexical representation of such verbs:

[_____ COME ABOUT [x BE Location]]

However, the absence of the external cause does not mean that verbs of existence and appearance are part of the internally-caused verb category, as defined in Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995. The two authors distinguish between externally-caused and internally-caused eventualities. With verbs describing internally-caused eventualities, "[…] some property inherent to

the argument of the verb is "responsible" for bringing about the eventuality. […] Unlike internally caused verbs, externally caused verbs by their very nature imply the existence of an "external cause" with immediate control over bringing about the eventuality described by the verb: an agent, an instrument, a natural force or a circumstance" (Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995: 91-92). Verbs of existence and appearance, although lacking an external cause, are not internally-caused either (such as *laugh* or *cry*), since the occurrence of the event does not depend on any kind of control – external or internal. They are considered to be a distinct class of verbs for which the notions of external and internal causation are apparently not relevant. Therefore, I will not consider COME ABOUT as a semantic predicate representative for causation.

3.2.1.2. CONTROL

CONTROL was defined as a semantic causative predicate by Kageyama 1996, in an attempt to identify the underlying predicates of each of the four categories of Vendler's verb classification[11]. Starting from the observation that the semantic predicate CAUSE cannot account for all the issues raised by accomplishment verbs[12], which usually correspond to transitives expressing a change of state/location, Kageyama introduces the semantic predicate CONTROL. Although I will use Kageyama's CONTROL predicate as one of the semantic predicates of causation, my understanding

[11] According to Vendler 1967, depending on aspectual properties, there are four classes of verbs in English: states, activities, achievements and accomplishments. I will return to this classification in the section on the result-component of the causative situation.

[12] The examples provided by Kageyama in order to prove that CAUSE is not adequate enough to represent accomplishment verbs are of the type "*John turned on the light, but the light didn't come on". Although unacceptable in English, such constructions are possible in Japanese:

(a) Denki wo tsuketa ga, tsukanakatta.
Electricity-Acc turn on (tr)-Past but come on (intr)-Neg-Past.
'(Subject) turned on the electricity, but it didn't come on'

When using CAUSE in the representation of examples as those above – [x CAUSE y] – it generally means that the event represented by y is accomplished. However, as shown above, this is not always the case. That is why Kageyama introduces the predicate CONTROL in the representation of accomplishment verbs. [x CONTROL y] reads, in Kageyama's definition, "x has direct control/influences on y's realization", which does not mean that y's realization necessarily takes place. The interpretation depends on whether the focus lays on x or on y that is whether we have 'focus on action' or 'focus on result'. In the latter reading, CONTROL can be interpreted as CAUSE as well. The action-focused or result-focused readings can explain the different behavior of English and Japanese. Thus, while in English I have a result-focused interpretation, in Japanese the focus lays on the action, y's realization not being necessarily attained. (Kageyama 1996: 85-87).

of some properties of CONTROL is slightly different from Kageyama's. I will point these issues out as they appear in the discussion.

An important issue in the characterization of CONTROL is, in my opinion, that of the causer's responsibility in bringing about the result. Kageyama claims that the use of the CONTROL predicate in the lexical representation of a causative verb emphasizes the fact that the causer bears responsibility for the change of state/location that the causee undergoes. Therefore, CONTROL can be used in the representation of the class of change of state/location verbs, when the causer is fully responsible for the realization of the caused event:

[x CONTROL [BECOME [y BE AT z]]] (after Kageyama 1996)

The causer's responsibility with regard to the realization of the caused event is the differentiating aspect between two types of causation to be found in cognitive accounts of causatives as well. Talmy 1976, 2000 distinguishes between *onset* and *extended* causation in the case of change of location verbs. *Onset causation* characterizes those situations in which a static object receives and impulse following the contact with an external force, and, as a result of the energy influx from the external force, it continues to move in an autonomous manner, becoming independent from the causing force's action. As opposed to that, in *extended causation* the caused event is dependent on the causing force throughout the whole process, from the initial moment until completion. Verbs expressing change of location can be therefore classified into two subgroups, namely one in which the causer bears initial responsibility in producing the effect, and one in which the causer if fully responsible for the production of the effect. I believe that each of these subgroups is characterized by a distinct causative predicate. Based on Talmy's definitions of onset and extended causation and on the properties of CONTROL, as they are found in Kageyama 1996 and Nakamura 2003, the predicate that best describes extended causation is, in our opinion, CONTROL, while onset causation is best characterized by INITIATE (Davidse 1993, Maruta 1998) and to which I will come back in the next section.
The causer's responsibility raises yet another issue, namely that of the causer's animacy. In order for a causer to be responsible for producing a result, I consider that it also needs to be animate. At this point I no longer follow Kageyama, who also includes expressions of external inanimate forces as complement modifiers of the CONTROL predicate:

(12)a. The door opened from pressure. (*atsuryoku de*)
b. The door opened because of a high wind. (*kyoufuu de*)
c. The door opened at a touch. (*sawatta dake de)*
(Kageyama 1996: 145)

In view of the distinction I made in Chapter 2 between causality and causation, I consider such cases to be instances of causality rather than of causation. The emphasis here lies mainly on the result; hence the intransitive verb is preferred over the transitive-causative one. The causer is no longer an agent under whose control the causee entity suffers a change and the instrumental marking in Japanese shows that even clearer than the English prepositional phrase. Unlike English, Japanese does not allow for inanimate causers to bear agent markers (Nominative case or topic markers), but instead has such causers being marked as instruments:

(13) The wind opened the door.
(14) Doa ga kaze de aita.
Door-Nom wind-Instr open (intr)-Past
'The door opened because of the wind'

The use of causation predicates to describe such cases becomes thus irrelevant.

CONTROL can be used however in characterizing in an accurate manner the particular situation of English unergative verbs being used transitively:

(15) a. The horse jumped over the fence.
b. John jumped the horse over the fence.
[John CONTROL [horse DO $_{jump}$ over the fence]]

(16) a. The soldiers marched to the tents.
b. The general marched the soldiers to the tents.
[The general CONTROL [soldiers DO $_{march}$ to the tents]]

The general representation for the transitive use of unergative verbs can be rendered as:
[x CONTROL [y DO]]

In such cases, all the conditions regarding the use of CONTROL are fulfilled. First of all, the durations of the causing event and that of the caused event are coextensive. The causer is necessarily animate and the

causee must be an agent as well, capable of performing an action shown by the presence of the DO predicate incorporated in the representation. However, the action that the causee performs must be a controllable one and that is why unergatives such as 'laugh', 'cry', 'speak', 'play' etc., expressing actions that cannot be controlled by an external force cannot appear in this type of structure.
Japanese offers a different way of expressing such events. Here we no longer have a lexical causative, but a morphological one, with the two actions being expressed by distinct linguistic units. I will refer to this particular case in detail in section 3.2.2.1, where the so-called sociative causation is discussed.

3.2.1.3. INITIATE

Starting from Talmy's distinction between onset and extended causation, Maruta 1998 defines INITIATE as the predicate characterizing onset causation, in which the causer bears responsibility only for initiating the caused event, after which the latter unfolds autonomously, based on the internal properties of its elements. For example, in *John rolled the ball*, what John does is act on *the ball* from the outside and provide it with the impulse and the necessary energy for *rolling*. The entity that completes *the rolling* is actually *the ball* itself and not John. The representation such predicates will be:

[x ACT ON y] INITIATE [y…],
where [y…] represents an autonomous event
(Maruta 1998: 100)

The condition that the causee must satisfy in this case is that the causee must possess 'in itself' that internal property which allows it to get into the result state. INITIATE is thus the predicate that characterizes mainly change of state/location verbs. For example, in the sentence above, *the ball* represents a causee that possesses the necessary properties for rolling. If instead of *the ball* we had an object whose properties make it unable to roll by itself, such as, let's say, a square box, the sentence *John rolled the box* would most likely be analyzed as containing an underlying CONTROL predicate and the type of causation expressed would be extended causation and not onset causation as in the case of *John rolled the ball*. This particular condition was used by Nakamura to explain the impossibility of some verbs to participate in the causative alternation in certain cases. For example, while the verb to break can take part in the

causative alternation when it is used in its literal sense, it does not participate in the causative alternation when it is used figuratively:

(17) a. John broke the vase.
b. The vase broke.
(18) a. John broke the promise.
b. *The promise broke.

While for (17a) the representation involves INITIATE, the vase being a 'breakable' object, the same representation is no longer possible for (18b) as *the promise* is not an object breakable in and by itself (Nakamura 2003).
Extended causation is also referred to briefly in Maruta 1998, as the causation type in which the causer bears full responsibility for the production of the caused event, from its initiation to its completion and in which the caused event is not realized as an autonomous event – a definition that is not very remote from what Kageyama or Nakamura proposed. However, Maruta uses CAUSE in the characterization of extended causation and no reference to CONTROL is to be found whatsoever. As I pointed out in the previous section, I consider that extended causation, as defined in Talmy 1976, 2000, is best characterized by CONTROL. While CAUSE can be used as an umbrella term for all the predicates expressing causation, CONTROL is the predicate that captures exactly the causer's involvement in the production of the result. Furthermore, Maruta considers that the causer in onset causation is actually an Initiator and distinguishes between the External Initiator, the Volitional Initiator and the Effector. The difference between the External Initiator and the Volitional Initiator lies in the presence/absence of agentivity. Thus, while in *The wind rolled the ball down the hill*, *the wind* is an external initiator, in *Bill rolled down the hill*, *Bill* is a volitional initiator. What he does is similar to what *the ball* does in the previous example, but, unlike that, his action is the result of a volitional deed. The volitional initiator is also the role that Maruta uses in order to explain the transitive use of unergative verbs in English. Although he admits that in examples like (15) and (16) above the entity playing the role of grammatical subject is a volitional agent that controls the action of the object (causee), he analyzes such examples as instances of causation within the INITIATE area, with the causer acting as a volitional initiator. While it is true that there are similarities between prototypical examples of INITIATE-based causatives and this particular use of ergative verbs, I believe that the correspondence is not total. In both cases it is the causee that performs and completes the action. However, while in the case of INITIATE-based causatives the causee's action becomes

independent from the causer's action, developing in an autonomous manner, in the case of unergatives used transitively, the causee's action is still dependent on the causer's involvement (most of times even physical involvement) in the realization of the result. Compare the following examples:

(19) John rolled the ball.
(20) John jumped the horse over the fence.

While in (19) the ball keeps rolling after it receives an impulse from John, in (20) both the causer and the causee are involved in completing the action. John can be either riding the horse or just making the horse jump by various means (hitting it, commanding it, etc), but what is important is that the horse does not perform the action independently. Things are similar when the causee is human-volitional. That is why I consider that in the lexical representation of such predicates, the better choice is CONTROL.

3.2.1.4. CAUSE

Before going into a detailed discussion on several aspects characterizing the causative verbs whose underlying predicate is CAUSE, let us make a distinction between the CAUSE predicate used in the prototypical characterization of causative verbs and the CAUSE predicate I are analyzing in this section. In a sum up of the discussion on the nature of the causer, I concluded that the representation of a causative situation can be best rendered as

[x CAUSE [Event]]

The CAUSE predicate used in this representation should be regarded as the prototype of the underlying causative predicates and has been even labeled by some as $CAUSE_{<proto>}$ (Nakamura 2003: 42). $CAUSE_{<proto>}$ covers all the three semantic predicates referred to above, while CAUSE has been used in the characterization of the class of psychological verbs.

It is already a widely accepted fact that within the class of psychological verbs in English one can distinguish between two sub-classes, the *fear* class and the *frighten* class (see among others Belletti and Rizzi 1988, Bouchard 1995, Grimshaw 1990, Pesetsky 1995, Van Voorst 1992, Nakamura 2003). Verbs belonging to the *fear* class take the Experiencer as the grammatical subject and the Theme as the object (ES), while *frighten* verbs take the Theme as the subject and the Experiencer as the object (EO):

(21) John fears bears.
(22) The bear frightened John.

fear verbs: dislike, dread, envy, fear, hate, like, loathe, love, regret, worship, etc.
frighten verbs: amaze, amuse, anger, astonish, bother, disappoint, distress, encourage, fascinate, frighten, horrify, puzzle, satisfy, scare, shock, startle, stun, surprise, etc.

(Nakamura 2003: 63)

For a discussion on causatives, the relevant sub-class is the second one, namely that of *frighten* verbs. While in English such verbs are all instances of lexical causatives, Japanese derives *frighten*-type verbs from *fear*-type roots by morphological means:

(23) Taro ha inu ga kowai.
Taro-Top dog-Nom afraid.
'Taro is afraid of dogs'
(24) Inu ga Taro wo kowagaraseta.
Dog-Nom Taro-Acc afraid-Caus-Past
'The dog made Taro afraid'

The main issue regarding psychological lexical causative verbs is their similarity with change-of-state verbs such as break, characterized by the causative predicate INITIATE:

frighten: [x CAUSE [y BECOME STATE$_{<\text{frightened}>}$]]
break: [x INITIATE [y BECOME STATE$_{<\text{broken}>}$]]

In both cases there is a state occurring as a result of an action-cause, hence the similar segment [y BECOME STATE]. On the other hand, in Vendler's classification, change-of-state verbs are considered accomplishment-type verbs. However, Van Voorst 1992 demonstrates that psychological *frighten* verbs belong to the achievement-type class; the events that they describe are punctual, but the transition to the result state is also captured, just like in other achievement verbs:

frighten:	action		mental state
	⟶		○○○○○ ○○○○○
break:	action	process	end state



(in Nakamura 2003: 72)

Since *frighten* verbs belong to a different class, they are expected to have a different representation from that of change-of-state verbs. The representation proposed for EO pshychological verbs is the following:

[x CAUSE [y BE AT MENTAL STATE]]

(after Nakamura 2003)

What is to be noticed here is that the causer x does not cause *a change of state* – which would require the semantic predicate BECOME, but *the occurrence of a state* – expressed through the use of BE in the representation.

3.2.2. Agentive causers

The agentive causer is either a human entity or an animate non-human entity performing the action intentionally. Deities as well as natural phenomena also belong to this category when invested with human characteristics.

At this level, English and Japanese do not display significant differences, the role of the volitional causer being that of AGENT[13], both in the lexical and in the productive (morphological and periphrastic) causative constructions. However, an interesting point to discuss here is the way in which the causer acts on the causee in order to get the desired result and the reflection of the causer's actions in the choice of one and not another type of causative construction.

3.2.2.1. Direct, indirect and sociative causation

Past studies on causative constructions have demonstrated that the events that can be described by productive causatives include the events that can be described by lexical causatives (Levin&Rappaport Hovav 1995, Shibatani 1976b). To explain the difference in meaning between lexical and productive causative sentences, linguists have frequently resorted to the concept of direct causation as opposed to that of indirect causation. (Comrie 1985, Croft 1991, Dowty 1979, Kemmer and Verhagen 1994, Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995, Shibatani 1976, 1976b). Although they have been widely used, a definition for what the terms "direct/ indirect causation" clearly refer to has not been formulated yet, the meaning of the two terms

[13] By AGENT I understand an entity endowed with volition and acting intentionally.

showing slight variations according to the context in which they have been used by various researchers. Furthermore, other terms have been used to express roughly the same concept: contact/distant causation (Saksena 1982), manipulative/directive causation (Shibatani 1973, 1976b). As Shibatani puts it, direct causation (which he calls manipulative) implies the physical manipulation of an object or a person (the causee) by the causer. The execution of the caused event is thus completely dependent on the causer's action, while the causee's role is that of Patient. The direct interaction between the causer and the causee and the relation of dependency between the causer's action and the occurrence of the caused event also implies that there is a spatio-temporal overlap of the causer's action and the caused event (see also Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002). It is this spatio-temporal configuration which is the defining feature of direct causation. In direct causation the causing event and the caused event share the same spatio-temporal profile, the entire causative situation being perceived as a single event. On the other hand, in indirect causation the causing event and the caused event are generally conceptualized as separate events, with distinct temporal profiles, but not necessarily with distinct spatial profiles.

It has been claimed that the type of causative that expresses direct causation is the lexical causative. Consider the following examples:

(25) John opened the door.
(26) Taro ga himo wo kitta.
Taro-Nom thread-Acc cut (tr)-Past
'Taro cut the thread'

Both in English and in Japanese, the causer's direct action on the non-volitional, patientive causee is the one that brings about the result. Even in the case of human causees, lexical causatives are used to express those situations in which the causee is non-volitional:

(27) Taro ga Hanako wo okoshita.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Acc wake up-Past
'Taro woke Hanako up'

In contrast, causal chains that can be described by productive causatives tend to express indirect causation, that is, the bringing about of the result by means of the causee's action. In this case, the causee also acts as a volitional entity and the causer does not need to get physically involved in

the execution of the caused event, verbal directions being sufficient for the causee to carry out the required activity. Japanese offers support for this claim, since the productive causative forms do not generally allow for inanimate causees:

(28) *Watashi wa hon wo ochisaseta.
I-Top Book-Acc fall-Caus-Past
'I caused the book to fall down'

Furthermore, the same claim may explain the wide range of semantic interpretations that productive causatives can have, from pure coercion to permission. Since the causee's volition plays a part in carrying out the activity, the causer's directions/actions can have various interpretations. While in English the nuances are captured by using different causative verbs, in Japanese the disambiguation is done either by the different case-marking of the causee, in the case of intransitive-based causatives, or is context-dependent, in the case of transitive-based causatives.
As pointed out by Shibatani 1976b, there are however situations where lexical causatives and productive causatives do not align with the distinction direct/indirect causation. The first case occurs when the language does not have the corresponding lexical form or when the lexical causatives permit only a limited type of causee, as in the case of the Japanese lexical causative verb *tateru* ('stand up') which admits only inanimate causees, while its noncausative form admits both animate and inanimate subjects:

(29) Watashi ha boo wo tateta.
I-Top stick-Acc stand up-PAST
"I stood the stick up"
(30)⁎Watashi ha kodomo wo tateta.
I-Top child-Acc stand up-PAST
"I stood the child up".

Lexical causatives, on the other hand, can be used in a directive sense, conveying the idea that the causer's interest lies in the purpose associated with the causative situation rather than the causative situation itself, while there is no such implication in the case of productive forms:

(31)
a. I stopped the man in the street.
b. In order to ask for directions, I stopped the man in the street.

c. * In order to ask for directions, I had/made the man stop in the street.

Lexical causatives can express directive causation if the causative situation has a purpose associated with it, and that purpose must be Well-defined and the association must be conventionalized, otherwise the directive sense is not conveyed:

(a) I brought Chomsky to Oxford.
(b) I brought Chomsky to our room.

While in (a) the purpose of bringing a scholar to an academic institution is quite well-defined, that is not the case in (b), so it does not convey the directive meaning.
The claim that one type of causative expresses direct causation while the other encodes situations of indirect causation is also challenged by examples such as the following:

(32) Hahaoya ga kodomo wo asobasete iru.
Mother-Nom child-Acc play-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child play'

Although a productive causative is used, the causer in this example takes part physically/actively in the execution of the caused event. The above-cited example shows semantic characteristics similar with both the lexical and the productive causative. It depicts a situation with two agentive participants (characteristic for morphological causatives) who share the same spatio-temporal profile (characteristic for lexical causatives). While it is true that in the case of productive causatives, although the spatio-temporal overlap between the causer's action and the result is not necessarily required, it may still be found in some cases, the above-cited example differs from examples expressing 'pure' indirect causation in that the causer actively participates in bringing about the result. Such cases were first discussed by Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002 and called "sociative causation". Sociative causation and indirect causation differ in respect to at least two major points:

> "First, when a language allows alternative marking of the causee nominal, the accusative version generally conveys sociative causation, whereas the dative or other oblique marking signals indirect causation. (…) Second, the interpretation of the aspectual form differs between social and

> indirect causatives. In the former, the progressive form is interpreted either as expressing the progressive meaning, i.e., an on-going activity, or a generic activity. In the case of indirect causatives, the progressive form conveys only the generic sense".
>
> (Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002: 151-152).

Shibatani and Pardeshi distinguish three major types of sociative causation:

1) Joint-action

(33) Hahaoya ga kodomo wo asobasete iru.
Mother-Nom child-Acc play-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child play.'

2) Assistive

(34) Hahaoya ga kodomo ni oshikko wo sasete iru.
Mother-Nom child-Dat pee-Acc do-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child pee.'

3) Supervision

(35) Hahaoya ga kodomo ni hon wo yomasete iru.
Mother-Nom child-Dat book-Acc read-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child read a book.'

While in the joint-action and in the assistive types the causer is physically involved, the supervision type is closer to the indirect type of causation, in that the causer and the caused result may not share the same spatial profile. Sociative causation appears thus to be the intermediary link between direct and indirect causation in what the two authors call "the causative continuum".

The existence of sociative causation as a distinct type of causation is demonstrated by Shibatani and Pardeshi in languages such as Marathi, a language spoken in India, Mauritius and Israel, where this type of causation appears to have its own morphological marking. However, in the case of Japanese, there is no distinct marking, its existence being accounted for, as I noticed, only when the causative verb is used in the non-past progressive form. The evidence brought by the two authors in the case of Japanese is rather intuitive though, that is why I tried to analyze how this particular type of causation relates to certain parameters which constituted the basis in defining direct/indirect causation. Furthermore, with respect to

the subject of this book, a question arising naturally would be whether sociative causation manifests itself in English as well, and if so, what are the markers that are used for this purpose.

For the first issue, I will consider the behavior of sociative causatives in respect to adverbial scope and reflexive binding, parameters used by Shibatani 1976b in order to prove that lexical and productive causatives encode different types of events.

Adverbial expressions of place, time, manner and frequency have been shown to describe either both the causing event and the caused event, or only the caused event in the case of productive causatives, which is in consonance with the idea that productive causatives encode the causing event and the caused event as distinct events, with distinct agents/effectors. On the other hand, in the case of lexical causatives, the same adverbials cannot describe the two events separately, evidence that the causing event and the caused event are conceptualized as being merged into a single, complex event. Let us analyze which of the two events each of these adverbial expressions describe in examples of sociative causation.

The claim is that place and time adverbials appear to modify both the causing event and the caused event in the case of joint-action and assistive sociatives, while in the case of supervision sociatives they describe only the caused event (Shibatani and Chung 2001).

Joint action

(36) Hahaoya ga kodomo wo niwa de asobasete-iru.
Mother-nom child-Acc garden-Loc play-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child play in the garden'

Assistive

(37) Hahaoya ga kodomo ni niwa de oshikko wo sasete-iru.
Mother-Nom child-Dat garden-Loc pee-Acc do-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making/helping the child pee in the garden'

Supervision

(38) Hahaoya ga kodomo ni niwa de yomasete-iru.
Mother-Nom child-Dat garden-Loc read-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making/letting the child read in the garden'

In the case of joint-action and assistive causation, the location of the mother and that of the child must coincide, or, better said, there is an overlap between the spatial configuration of the causing event and that of the caused event. In the case of supervision, however, different locations for the causer and for the causee's actions are possible. The mother in (38) can supervise the child's reading from, let's say, a room in the house, by

watching the child from the window. This interpretation would not modify the meaning of the causative construction, which would still be read as expressing supervision. If the same interpretation process is applied to examples (36) and (37), the meaning of the causative construction will change to 'general, habitual action', the sociative nuance being lost. However, even in the case of what is called "joint-action" sociatives, it is possible to postulate distinct locations for the causer and for the causee, although the main verb is in the progressive aspect:

(39) Okasan ha kitchin de ryouri wo tsukutteiru aida, kodomo wo niwa de asobaseteiru.
Mother-Top kitchen-Loc meal-Acc cook-Conj be-Pres while Child-Acc garden-Loc play-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child play in the garden while cooking the meal in the kitchen'

Manner adverbials show a rather different pattern of modification. Shibatani and Chung claim that in joint-action sociatives manner adverbials appear to modify both the causing and the caused event:

(40) Hahaoya ga kodomo wo yukkuri hashirasete-iru.
Mother-Nom child-Acc slowly run-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Mother is making the child run slowly'

In assistive sociatives, however, manner adverbials can modify only the causing event, as shown in the following example:

(41) Taro ga inu wo kagande tabesaseta.
Taro-Nom dog-Acc squatting eat-Caus-Past
'Taro fed the dog while squatting'

Finally, supervision causation maintains the same adverbial modification pattern as in the case of place and time adverbials, with the manner adverbial modifying the caused event.
According to Shibatani and Chung 2001, frequency adverbs modify both the causing event and the caused event in joint-action and assistive sociatives, while in the case of supervision sociatives, they modify either both the causing and the caused event or only the caused event:

(42) Hahaoya wa mainichi kodomo wo koen de asa-yuu nikai asobaseru.

Mother-Top every day child-Acc park-Loc morning-evening two times play-Caus-Pres

'Mother makes the child play in the park two times morning and evening' (Joint-action)

(43) Sensei wa kodomotachi ni uta wo sankai utawaseta.

Teacher-Top children-dat song-Acc three times sing-Caus-Past

'The teacher made the children sing the song three times' (Supervision) (Shibatani and Chung 2001: 121)

These examples are not, however, evidence of the frequency adverbial behavior in sociative causatives. According to its very definition, sociative causation in Japanese manifests in the non-past progressive form, the other causative forms being instances of indirect causation. The above-cited examples do not express sociative causation, but indirect causation. Furthermore, the frequency adverbs that can be used together with the non-past progressive form, where sociative causation is manifest, would actually annihilate the sociative meaning, leading to the 'habitual action' reading:

(44) Hahaoya ga kodomo wo shuu nikai asobasete-iru.

Mother-Nom Child-Acc Iek two times play-Caus-Conj be-Pres

'Mother makes the child play two times a week'.

Therefore, I consider that the behavior of frequency adverbs is not relevant to the analysis of sociative causation.

To conclude, the behavior of time, place and manner adverbials show that it is only in the case of joint-action sociatives that such adverbs modify both the causing and the caused event. In assistive sociatives, manner adverbs can characterize only one of the two events, and in supervision sociatives all the three types of adverbs can modify the two events separately. There is then no uniform adverbial behavior so that one can assert with certainty that sociative causatives, although morphological, behave like lexical causatives. Furthermore, morphological causatives expressing indirect causation can be easily used with place or time adverbials to show that the two events share the same spatio-temporal profile:

(45) Taro ha Hanako ni karaoke box de yu-me- na uta wo utawaseta.

Taro-Top Hanako-Dat karaoke box-Loc famous song-Acc sing-Caus-Past.

'Taro made Hanako sing a famous song at the karaoke'

(46) Taro ha Hanako wo sono ame no hi ni nakaseta.

Taro-Top Hanako-Acc that rain-Poss day-Temp cry-Caus-Past

'Taro made Hanako cry on that rainy day'

Further evidence for an unnecessary distinction between sociative and indirect causation in Japanese comes from the study of reflexive binding. Reflexive binding has been used in past studies on the semantics of causatives to distinguish between direct and indirect causation:

(47) Taro$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ ni jibun$_{i/*j}$ no heya de fuku wo kiseta. (Direct)
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat self-Poss room-Loc clothes-Acc put on-Past
'Taro put the clothes on Hanako in his room'
(48) Taro$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ ni jibun$_{i/j}$ no heya de fuku wo kisaseta. (Indirect)
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat self-Poss room-Loc clothes-Acc put on-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako put on the clothes in his/her room'

In the case of indirect causation, the reflexive nominal *jibun* can refer both to the causer and to the causee. Let us take a look at the antecedent of *jibun* in the three cases of sociative causation:

(49) Taro$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ wo jibun$_{i/j}$ no heya de asobaseteiru.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Acc self-Poss room-Loc play-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Taro is making Hanako play in his/her room'
(50) Taro$_i$ ga byouki no Hanako$_j$ ni jibun$_{i/j}$ no heya de ocha wo nomaseteiru.
Taro-Nom sick-Poss Hanako-Dat self-Poss room-Loc tea-Acc drink-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Taro is making the sick Hanako drink tea in his/her room'
(51) Taro$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ ni jibun$_{i/j}$ no heya de rekishi no hon wo yomaseteiru.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat self-Poss room-Loc history-Poss book-Acc read-Caus-Conj be-Pres
'Taro is making Hanako read the history book in his/her room'

As can easily be seen, again, there is no difference in the behavior of the reflexive nominal in relation to its antecedents in indirect and in sociative causation.

The existence of sociative causation in Japanese as a causation type distinct from indirect causation, cannot be convincingly accounted for. I believe that what Shibatani and Pardeshi called sociative causation in the case of Japanese is actually a reflection of the causative verb's progressive aspect. The semantic causation type expressed is still indirect causation.

I do agree, however, that indirect causation in Japanese can be further sub-categorized and I propose an organization of lexical and morphological causatives based on the parameters of proximity and physical contact between the causer and the causee, which is also consistent with the parameter of causer involvement. Consider the following examples:

(52)Taro ga Jiro no isu wo taoshita.
Taro-Nom Jiro-Poss chair-Acc (make) fall-Past
'Taro knocked down Jiro's chair'
(53)Taro ha kega wo shita Hanako ni/wo yukkuri to arukaseta.
Taro-Top wound-Acc make-Past Hanako-Dat/Acc slowly walk-Caus-Past
'Taro let/made the wounded Hanako walk slowly'
(54)Taro ha byoukino Hanako ni ocha wo nomaseta.
Taro-Top sick Hanako-Dat tea-Acc drink-Caus-Past
'Taro let/helped the sick Hanako drink tea'
(55)Taro ha Hanako ni eigo no hon wo yomaseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat English-Poss book-Acc read-Caus-Past
'Taro made/let Hanako read an English book'
(56)Taro ha Hanako ni chuugaku jidai wo omoidasaseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat middle school period-Acc remember-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako remember the school years'

In (52), Taro must physically touch Jiro's chair to make it fall or, if Taro uses an instrument for this purpose, the connection between Taro and the chair must not be interrupted. In (53), on the other hand, the physical contact is probable but not obligatory. The degree of physical contact decreases even more in (54), though physical contact may stwell occur. In (55) and (56), however, physical contact is no longer needed.
The situations presented in the examples above are summarized in the following table:

Lexical causatives	Morphological causatives			
Direct causation	Indirect causation			
Causer physically manipulates, controls or interacts with the causee	Causer is in the proximity of the cause			Causer is not necessarily in the proximity of the causee
*necessary physical contact (52)	*probable physical contact (53)	*possible physical contact (54)	*no physical contact (55)	* no physical contact (56)

In the case of English, there is one case in which the interpretation associated with the causative construction could be that of sociative, namely the transitive use of unergative verbs:

(57) John jumped the horse over the fence.

All the defining conditions for sociative causation are met, but such verbs are lexical causatives from the very beginning, so a discussion about sociative causation is not applicable. None of the English causative verbs used in the periphrastic causative carries a sociative causation meaning.

3.2.3. Non-agentive causers

At first glance, causation and agentivity seem to have a very deep grammatical correlation, since in many cases both causers and agents are mapped onto the subject position in syntax. However, cause(r) and agent are semantically independent. I can have agents that are not causers, as well as causers that are not agents:

(58) Mary kneaded the dough.
(59) The wind opened the door.

In (58), the subject Mary performs an agentive action, but she is not a causer, while in (59) the wind causes the opening of the door, but it is not an agent.
In Japanese, the distinction between agents and causers is more visible, since non-agentive causers cannot be grammatical subjects:

(60) Doa ga kaze de aita.
Door-Nom wind-Instr open-Past
'The door opened from the wind'

A non-agentive causer necessarily lacks intention in its actions, but it does not necessarily lack volition. We can distinguish then two sub-categories of non-agentive causers: volitional and non-volitional. Non-agentive volitional causers are those entities that lack intention in their actions. In such cases we can talk about *accidental causation*, as opposed to *intentional causation*:

(61) The child broke the vase by bumping into it while running. (accidental causation)
(62) The child broke the vase by kicking it. (intentional causation)

A similar, yet different situation can be found in the so-called "adversative causative" in Japanese, where the entity occupying the subject position in the morphological causative is endowed with volition but lacks intention in its actions and is negatively affected by the event:

(63) Taro ga jiko de musuko wo shinaseta.
Taro-Nom accident-Instr son-Acc die-Caus-Past
'Taro had his son killed in the accident'

The subjects of such sentences do not receive agent interpretations, being understood as experiencers rather than agents, although they occupy the causer position in the causative construction. The situation could be interpreted as an instance of accidental causation, but the emphasis here is on the negative affectation of the subject and not on the causation process. Furthermore, the causer's non-agentive features exclude activity verbs from forming adversity causatives:

(64) Taro ga michi de musuko wo naguraseta.
Taro-Nom street-Loc son-Acc punch-Caus-Past
*'Taro had his son punch in the street'

On the other hand, non-agentive non-volitional causers are those entities that lack both volition and intention and that are represented basically by inanimate causers. It is in such cases that English and Japanese behave differently, with Japanese not allowing such causers to be grammatical subjects. Japanese actually marks in this way the distinction between causality and causation, wherein sentences containing Instrumental-marked inanimate causers are instances of causality and not of causation. English, on the other hand, allows such causers to take the grammatical role of subject, but the mostly debated question is whether these subjects take the semantic role of agent or that of instrument. There is as yet no

definite answer to this question. If I consider that the causer in the causing process is an entity, then, in view of the definition that I adopted for the semantic role of Agent, the non-agentive non-volitional causer must be treated semantically as an instrument and not as an agent. On the other hand, if the causer in the causing process is seen as an event, then we talk about event causation and the distinction agent/instrument is no longer relevant (see also Talmy 2000). However, I consider the use of the term Instrument in the case of entity causers not to be completely adequate, since the semantic role of instrument also implies another entity – agent or not – that makes use of that particular medium in order to perform the action. Obviously, that is not the case in examples such as (60) above. The term "cause" has been also used to refer to such instances, but that might be quite confusing, since "cause" is a rather general notion, and especially since all types of causers are causes at the same time. I will refer to non-agentive non-volitional causers as Forces. My understanding of Force is however different from what this particular term refers to in other studies on causation[14], being strictly applied to causers that lack both volition and intention, such as the natural forces.

3.3. The causee

In the causative situation, the causee represents the medium through which the causer performs the action resulting in the caused event. The semantic roles that the causee may take go from Agent to Object depending on various parameters that I will further refer to. Dixon's three semantic parameters relating to the causee - control, volition and affectedness (Dixon 2000) - will be discussed in reference to the two languages I am considering in this book.

In regard to the parameter of control, let us first consider the distinction animate/inanimate in the case of causee. Unlike the situation regarding the causer/causing process, the causee is represented by an entity and not by an event, both in Japanese and in English. Animacy is not marked in either of the languages that I am analyzing, as it happens in Creek[15], for example, but it plays an important role in the selection of the entity functioning as the causee. Inanimate causees lack control and are preferred in the use of lexical causatives in both languages. This fact comes as no surprise, since lexical causatives are fundamentally transitive verbs when used with their

[14] In Talmy 1985, 2000, "force" covers a much larger area, referring both to the causer and to the causee, regarded as Agonist (the focal force entity) and Antagonist (the force element that opposes the Agonist).

[15] Creek appears to have two distinct suffixes marking the presence/absence of control, *-ic* if the causee lacks control, and *–ipa* if the causee has control, respectively (Martin 1991).

basic function – that of expressing direct causation, thus requiring an object. On the other hand, the use of animate causees with lexical causatives expressing direct causation is mostly found in situations where the causee lacks control over his/her actions:

(65) Mother woke her son up.
(66) Taro ha Hanako wo okoshita.
Taro-Top Hanako-Acc wake up-Past
'Taro woke Hanako up'.

Animate causees having control over their actions can be used with lexical causatives expressing direct causation when the (physical) force exerted by the causer is bigger than the resistant force of the causee. Although it exists, the causee's control over his/her actions is limited:

(67) The police stopped the man in the street. (by blocking his way/by physically touching him)
(68) Keisatsukan ga michi de ano hito wo tometa.
Police-Nom road-Loc that man-Acc stop (tr)-Past
'The police stopped that man in the street'

Furthermore, when lexical causatives are not used with their basic function, but in the particular case of expressing indirect/directive causation, the presence of animate causees having control over their actions is possible when there is a well-defined purpose associated with the causing process:

(69) In order to ask for directions, I stopped the man in the street.
(Shibatani 1976b: 36)

Both morphological causatives in Japanese and analytic causatives in English allow for animate causees having control over their actions:

(70) Taro ha Hanako ni/wo Tokyo he ikaseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat/Acc Tokyo-Loc go-Caus-Past
'Taro let/made Hanako go to Tokyo'
(71) John made/let/had/got Mary (to) go to Paris.

The situation of inanimate causees (lacking control) is however different in the two cases. While Japanese morphological causatives do not allow for inanimate causees, in English the situation is not uniform for all causative verbs. The use of *have* as a causative verb appears to require an animate

causee, while the other causative verbs allow for the presence of inanimate causees to a greater or lesser extent, other parameters being simultaneously involved. For example, while causative verbs such as *make* or *cause to* seem to cover the widest range in regard to the type of causees that they accept, *let* also requires the lack of involvement on the part of the causer; *get*, on the other hand, implies the existence of resistance on the part of the causee. Once that resistance is overcome, the process goes on 'by itself', being an illustration of the onset causation described earlier in this book:

(72) I let the ball roll.
(73) He got the engine working./He got the ball rolling.

The emphasis in (72) is on the causer's lack of involvement in the process. However, the situation is not that of onset causation, as in (73), since the ball's rolling has been already initiated, not necessarily by the causer, but by a third party. The causer in this case is more of an observer, merely allowing/not interfering with the ball's movement. In (73), however, the causer must overcome a resistance on the part of the engine/ball, after which the process unfolds, with the causee completing the action.

While animacy (and, consequently, control) cannot be simply ignored when discussing causative constructions, animacy alone cannot account for other aspects regarding the causee's behavior. Most often, animacy is the necessary characteristic for defining what I consider to be the most relevant parameter in the analysis of the causee, namely volition, together with its symbiotic element – intention. Volition/intention is not marked in either of the two types of causatives in English. In the case of analytic causatives, I maintain the same observation as the one for animacy, namely that the causee's volition, although not marked, influences the selection of the causative verb. *Make* seems to require the lack of volition/intention on the part of the causee; *let*, on the other hand, requires the opposite, namely a causee willing to do the action.

The presence/absence of volition is known to be marked however in Japanese, by assigning a different case to the causee in the two situations. The choice is between Dative (*ni*-causative) and Accusative (*wo*-causative), with the Dative case signalling the causee's willingness to perform the action, while the Accusative case shows an unwilling causee. For transitive-based causatives, the only possible case marking for the causee is the Dative, since the Direct Object position is already occupied. The semantic interpretation is either context-dependent or can be achieved by the use of various adverbs:

(74) Taro ha Hanako ni muriyari ni rekishi no hon wo yomaseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat forcefully history-Poss book-Acc read-Caus-Past
'Taro forced Hanako to read the history book'

In intransitive-based causatives, however, the causee can be marked either with the Accusative or with the Dative case.
The distinction of the two causative types based on the property of volition seems to be the most long-standing and popular one. Kuroda 1965 was the first to distinguish the two causatives by the notion of willingness, noting that the *ni*-causative involves the causee's willingness in the action. Kuno 1973 agrees that in *ni*-causatives the causee is willing to perform the action, but adds that in *wo*-causatives the causee is forced to perform the action. It is quite obvious that Kuno's comment does not stand as a general feature for morphological causatives. Consider the following examples from Kitagawa 1974:

(75) Sensei ha tsukarete naki-dasu kodomotachi wo sousouni ie ni kaeraseta.
Teacher-Top tired-Conj cry-start children-Acc soon home-Loc go back-Caus-Past
'The teacher let the children who were tired and starting to cry go home soon'

(76) Mou uma wo tsurete kaeru jikan data ga, amari yukaisouni kakoi no naka wo hashitte iru node Taro ha sono mama uma wo hashiraseta.
Already horse-Acc take back go back time be-Past but very joyously arena-Poss inside-Loc run-Conj be-Pres because Taro-Top as such horse-Acc run-Caus-Past
'Although it was already the time that Taro took the horse back home, because the horse was running so joyously in the arena, Taro let the horse run (for a while)'

Such examples prove that although the causee is marked with the Accusative case, it is not forced to perform the action.
Shibatani (Shibatani 1973, 1976) claims that the difference between the two types of causatives represents a matter of degree in the directness of causation, with *wo*-causatives expressing a more direct and causation and *ni*-causatives expressing a less direct causation. Furthermore, Shibatani is the first to introduce the notions of coercion and permission, stating that

wo-causatives express coercive causation while *ni*-causatives express permissive causation. I will return to this distinction in the next chapter.
Harada 1973 resorts to the notion of intention in distinguishing the two causatives, with the *ni*-causative requiring the presence of the causee's intention and, although not mentioned as such, with the *wo*-causative implying the absence of the causee's intention. However, what I find of great importance in Harada's account is the observation that the *ni*-causative requires its complement verb to express a self-controllable action. That is why a verb such as *kizestu-suru* (to faint) cannot be used with a Dative-marked causee, since it expresses an action that is not self-controllable:

(77) *Taro ha Hanako ni kizestu saseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat faint-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako faint'

Taking into consideration such analyses, it becomes then clear that a purely syntactic account for the different case marking of the causee in this case no longer holds. I agree with Kemmer and Verhagen 1994, who claim that in such cases the variation in case marking is associated with semantic principles rather than with syntactic ones, the meanings of the case markers and not the formal hierarchy being involved here. This is also supported by the fact that the different marking of the causee (instrumental/dative/accusative) occurs in many languages, of various origins[16]. That constituted a rather difficult issue for generative grammar to solve, since the case assignment in a causative sentence does not seem to be strictly related to the case hierarchy, but seems to be determined by the theta roles reflected by particular cases. The semantic properties of case markers are closely related to the directness and indirectness of causation:

[16] In Kannada, for instance, the causee may be marked either by instrumental or by dative, with the instrumental marking implying that the causee's role is not purely 'ingestive', but that the agentivity of the causee is important:

(1) Avaninda tinnisiyee bidutteene.
He-Instr eat-Caus-Emp aspect
'I shall make him eat, get him to eat (not feed him)' (Cole and Sridhar 1977)

Comrie has shown that in Hungarian the accusative marking of the causee implies lower degree of control in comparison with the instrumental case:

(2) Én köhögtettem a gyerek-et.
I caused-to-cough the child-Acc
(3) Én köhögtettem a gyerek-kel.
I caused-to-cough the child-Instr (Comrie 1981: 167)

In (2), the child's coughing could be induced by, for example, a slap on the back, while in (3), the child could have been asked to cough.

the more indirect the causation, the more peripheral the causee is. Furthermore, following Saksena 1980, Kemmer and Verhagen also claim that the participants' affectedness[17] is also of great importance in determining the case marking of the causee:

> "[…] the more affected the participant, the more object-like and therefore central it is to the event as a whole. Thus agentive and instrumental marking […] are consistently associated with more peripheral participants, which have more control over their actions and are less directly affected, while dative and accusative participants are more central participants with less independence of action and a greater degree of conceived affectedness. The dative is intermediate in terms of these properties, while the accusative is the polar opposite to the instrumental and/or agentive."
>
> (Kemmer and Verhagen 1994: 133-134)

However, Kemmer and Verhagen's discussion on affectedness does not focus necessarily on the relation agentivity-affectedness, but regards affectedness from the perspective of its relation to the conceptual integration of the causer/causee in the event. A higher degree of integration leads to a high degree of affectedness and topicality and to a low degree of autonomy/agentivity of the causee. Although the two authors do not offer a definition of what they understand by integration in the event, it can be easily understood that integration is highly connected to the distinction direct/indirect causation – the more direct the causation, the more integrated the causee is, therefore the more affected it is. Correlated with case-marking, that means Accusative-marked causee. On the other hand, the more indirect the causation, the less integrated/affected the causee, corresponding to an instrumental/agentive marking. The Dative-marked causee occupies an intermediate position in terms of integration, being neither the agent/instrument, nor the object, but the beneficiary/recipient of the causer's action. For Japanese, such features can

[17] Affectedness is defined as change of state as a result of being involved in an event. The relatively understudied notion of affected agent, introduced by Saksena 1980, turns out to bear important impact on different grammatical processes. Affected Agents are by definition those which are significantly affected by the event they volitionally instigate; events involving an Affected Agent are 'eating', 'drinking' and other situations described by so called 'ingestive' verbs, also including such predicates as 'learn', 'see', 'put on', 'read' etc. These verbs are characterized by emphasizing the effect of the event on the participant it is instigated by; the Agent's goal in such situations is rather to achieve a certain change of his or her own state, than bringing out a change in the Patient.

be regarded as complementary to the main distinction applicable in the case of intransitive-based causatives (the volitional/non-volitional causee). There is as yet no final consensus on what semantic features of the causee determine the choice of one and not the other case marking. The most widely spread opinion is that according to which the different case assignment is motivated by the presence/absence of volition and intention in the causee and most of the native speakers that I consulted confirmed that such an interpretation is plausible. However, parameters such as control or affectedness seem to play a role as well, although they may not weigh as much as the intention parameter. In any case, the results of the analyses of all these semantic parameters in the case of Japanese are not contradictory, but come to the same conclusion: if the causee is perceived as more of an object (less volition/intention, less control, more affected), then the chosen case will be the Accusative. On the other hand, if the causee is perceived as more of a beneficiary/recipient (more volition/intention, more control, less affected), then the Dative case is the choice. Such a combination of parameters comes in line with Dixon's remark that the semantic parameters that he defined can (and actually do) occur in combination and that there are conditions that must be met in applying them. For example, in the case of Japanese, we cannot talk about the role that volition plays if we do not first check if the parameter of control is applied.

3.4. The result

The discussion concerned with the third element of the causative situation will mainly focus on issues regarding the aspectual class of the verbs expressing the result of a causation process. In section **3.2.1** above I presented the three main semantic predicates that characterize the causing process. I will now try to analyze what kind of result – in the view of the aspectual properties of the verb expressing the result – can occur with each of the three underlying predicates discussed.

I will resort to the distinction made by Dowty 1979 between the *aspectual form* of a verb and the *aspectual class* of a verb, namely between that use of the term "aspect" that serves to distinguish such things as whether the beginning, the middle or the end of an event is being referred to, whether the event is a single one or a repeated one or whether the event is completed or left incomplete, and the other use of the same term, employed in referring to the semantic differences inherent in the meaning of the verbs themselves, causing them to have different interpretations or to have restrictions when combined with "true" aspect markers or with various time adverbials. Our discussion will revolve around the aspectual class of

verbs, although at times I may touch on certain features related to the aspectual form of verbs.

Drawing on Dowty 1979, I will briefly present the main moments that marked the development of verb classification from the aspectual class perspective and the conclusions that were reached. Perhaps the first observations regarding differences in the inherent meaning of verbs are to be found in Aristotle (Metaphysics IX.3), who, noticing that the meanings of some verbs necessarily involve an "end" or "result" in a way that other verbs do not, distinguishes between "movement/change" and "actuality". The distinction roughly corresponds to what was later labeled as activities/states and accomplishments.

Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1949) is the one who introduces the term *achievements*, for actions happening at a particular moment (such as win, find, cure, etc.), as opposed to *activities*, which are seen as lasting throughout a longer period of time (hold, listen, etc.). Ryle also noticed that in the case of achievements there can be distinguished two further subcategories, namely those achievements that are necessarily preceded by the performance of a task and those that do not have this feature – the so-called "purely luck achievements". To illustrate the first subcategory, the verb *to win* is given as an example: for a runner to win, he must run and, at the same time, his competitors must arrive later than him; on the other hand, pure achievements are actions such as *hit*, for which a prior task to be performed is not necessary.

Revisiting the problem of achievements, Anthony Kenny (Kenny 1963) suggests the distinction between activities and states, although he uses a different terminology. For Kenny, Ryle's achievements are regarded as performance verbs and he opposes them to activity verbs, the difference lying in the completion of the action. Thus, if X is a performance verb (*to build*, for example), then the sentence "A is (now) X-ing" implies that "A has not (yet) X-ed", while if X is an activity verb (*to live*, for example) – in Kenny's terminology – then "A is (now) X-ing" entails "A has X-ed". Kenny's performance verbs include accomplishments and achievements, which will be treated as distinct later.

Zeno Vendler (Vendler 1969) is however the first to make a clear distinction between four classes of verbs, based on their restrictions imposed on time adverbials, on various tenses and logical entailments. Vendler distinguishes between *states (*know, believe, have, desire, love*)*, *activities (*run, walk, swim*)*, *accomplishments (*paint a picture, make a chair, deliver a sermon, draw a circle, recover from wellness*)* and *achievements (*recognize, spot, find, lose, reach, die*),* suggesting that states and achievements may belong to one group, while activities and accomplishments constitute another

group, based on the fact that the first two cannot be used in progressive tenses, while the others can. Dowty (Dowty 1979) analyzes each of the four classes and offers a characterization of each class, based on various tests regarding syntactic and semantic aspects. The results are summarized in the following table:

	Criterion	States	Activities	Accomplishments	Achievements
1.	meets non-stative tests[18]	no	yes	yes	?
2.	has habitual interpretation in simple present:	no	yes	yes	yes
3.	*ø for an hour, spend an hour øing*	OK	OK	OK	bad
4.	*ø in an hour, take an hour to ø*	bad	bad	OK	OK
5.	*ø for an hour* entails *ø at all times in the hour*	yes	yes	no	d.n.a.
6.	*x is øing* entails *x has øed*	d.n.a.	yes	no	d.n.a.
7.	complement of *stop*	OK	OK	OK	bad
8.	complement of *finish*	bad	bad	OK	bad
9.	ambiguity with *almost*	no	no	yes	no
10.	*x øed in an hour* entails *x was øing during that hour*	d.n.a.	d.n.a.	yes	no
11.	occurs with *studiously, attentively, carefully, etc.*	bad	OK	OK	bad

OK = the sentence is grammatical, semantically normal
bad = the sentence is ungrammatical, semantically anomalous
d.n.a. = the test does not apply to verbs of this class
(after Dowty 1979: 60)

[18] - Occur in the progressive;
- Occur as complements of *force* and *persuade*;
- Occur as imperatives;
- Co-occur with the adverbs *deliberately, carefully*
- Appear in pseudo-cleft constructions;

To summarize, states denote situations where no change occurs (know, love); activities denote situations where a change occurs but without manifesting any inherent ending for this change, that is atelic situations (run, swim). It is not that activities lack an ending point, but that this point depends on the agent's will, being virtually possible for such events to go on indefinitely. Accomplishments represent changing situations with an intrinsic natural culmination (*build, destroy*). They have an inherent ending point, denoting the time when the result comes about. The duration of the event up to the endpoint coincides with the process that leads to the occurrence of the result. However, this process is not lexically specified by the verb. Finally, achievements denote situations where the inherent end is instantaneously achieved (*explode, win*).

Kindaichi's (Kindaichi 1967) aspectual classification of Japanese verbs is slightly different from Vendler's. His main criterion is whether a verb can occur in the *–te iru* form:

a. Stative: aru (be), dekiru (can do), hanaseru (can speak), mieru (be visible), yoo-suru (require).
b. Continuative: yomu (read), kaku (write), warau (laugh), utau (sing), aruku (walk), miru (see), nomu (drink).
c. Instantaneous: shinu (die), kieru (go off, disappear), sawaru (touch), kimaru (decide), sameru (wake).
d. Type 4: sobieru (tower), sugureru (be outstanding), zubanukeru (outstanding).

Stative verbs do not appear in the *–te iru* form. Continuative and instantaneous verbs can occur in the *–te iru* form, but the interpretations are different: a continuative verb in the *–te iru* form gets a progressive interpretation, while an instantaneous verb in the *–te iru* form has a resultative reading. Type 4 verbs are those verbs that necessarily occur in the *–te iru* form.

The aspectual nature of Kindaichi's classification surfaces in the interpretations of the *–te iru* verb form. There are also other similarities between Kindaichi's verb classes and the Vendler/Dowty classification: stative verbs correspond to states and instantaneous correspond to achievements. Furthermore, Kindaichi's continuative verbs cover activities and accomplishments, but since the only criterion is the *–te iru* form, the aspectual ambiguities in its interpretation (progressive or resultative) make a clear distinction between activities and accomplishments difficult:

(78) Chichi ga (ima) hon wo kaite-iru.

Father-Nom (now) book-Acc write-Conj-be-Pres
'Father is writing a book now'

(79) Chichi ga (mou) hon wo go satsu mo kaite-iru.
Father-Nom (already) books-Acc five volumes as many write-Conj-be-Pres
'Father has already written as many as five books'
(Tsujimura 1996: 369)

Although research into lexical semantics has not shown yet a systematic correlation between causative constructions and aspectual meanings, causatives have been generally regarded as accomplishments, as both causatives and accomplishments denote complex situations consisting of two events related causally. At this point, I need to underline the fact that the discussion on the aspectual class to which causatives may belong regards lexical causatives only. Morphological or periphrastic causatives, being a productive causative type, can apply to all aspectual classes of verbs, so such an analysis is not relevant.
The internal structure of accomplishments, as well as that of causatives, consists of two sub-events, with one causing the occurrence of the other. As mentioned earlier, the super-event is not specified by the verb but it can be represented in the lexical structure by means of the semantic predicates that I analyzed in section 3.2.1. However, regardless of the semantic predicate that can be postulated, the super-event is basically an activity:

(80) John cooled the soup.
[John DO SOMETHING] CONTROL [the soup BECOME STATE $_{\text{cool}}$]

(81) John rolled the ball down the hill.
[John DO SOMETHING] INITIATE [the ball DO $_{\text{roll down the hill}}$]

Although causative, EO psychological verbs have been proved to be achievements rather than accomplishments (see Van Voorst 1992). Nevertheless, the internal structure of such verbs can still be represented as comprising two sub-events.

(82) John frightened Mary.
[John DO SOMETHING] CAUSE [Mary BE AT STATE $_{\text{frightened}}$]

The idea that not all causatives are accomplishments is also found in Levin 2007. She claims that causation cannot be reduced to any aspectual notions, since verbs of every aspectual class have related causatives. Furthermore, Levin brings evidence that "causatives of *certain* atelic non-change of state verbs are also atelic:

(83) Robin flew the kite for an hour / *in an hour.
(84) Pat bounced the ball for an hour / *in an hour."
(Levin 2007: 13)

Levin does not however state clearly which atelic non-change of state verbs are taken into account here. Our supposition is that the class of verbs that Levin refers to includes those verbs that contain INITIATE in their lexical representation. INITIATE characterizes onset causation, in which the causer's responsibility does not lie in completing the action, but merely in initiating it, being theoretically possible that the action could go on indefinitely. Telicity tests apply to most verbs in this category[19].
In most causative verbs, the sub-event in the structure of the result verb is a state (BE), since most causative verbs imply a change of state as a result of a causing process. However, the sub-event is not limited to states, but can also include achievements (BECOME) – as in the case of EO psychological verbs, or activities (DO) – in the case of INITIATE-characterized verbs or of the English unergative verbs used transitively, which are characterized by the CONTROL operator. Schematically, the situation is as follows:

Activity	CAUSE	State
Activity	CAUSE	Achievement (EO psychological verbs)
Activity	CAUSE	Activity (INITIATE-verbs; unergative verbs used transitively)

3.5. Causing event – Result

Aside from the various semantic distinctions that can be drawn in the area governed by causation, and from the corresponding formal representations (lexical, morphological, periphrastic), there is also the idea that the bigger the conceptual distance between the causing event and the result, the bigger the formal distance between the two. Haiman's iconicity principle (Haiman 1983: 783-788) postulates that there is some degree of similarity between the form and the content of many linguistic phenomena. Although not necessarily formulated in an explicit manner, the same idea is found in many studies regarding causatives. The COMPACT and the AND causative types in Song's classification (Song 1996) are very good illustrations of the relation between formal distance and conceptual distance. Dixon (Dixon 2000) also offers a scale of compactness, with lexical causatives expressing conceptually more compact situations, while periphrastic causatives are at the other end of the scale, the middle position

[19] The "for" test (atelic predicates take **for + temporal NP**)

being occupied by morphological causatives and complex predicates (serial verb constructions). In our view on causatives, the notion of compactness represents the linking element between semantic causation types such as direct/indirect causation and their syntactic representations. The case of morphological causatives is, in our opinion, the most interesting of all for a possible investigation, since its intermediary position makes it open to diverging interpretations. Shibatani and Pardeshi's postulation of sociative causation was based exactly on this property of morphological causatives of being interpreted as either closer to a lexical causative or to a syntactic causative. As I pointed out, I do not consider what is called "sociative causation" in Japanese to be actually a distinct causation type, but I believe that the sociative nuance comes from the progressive aspect. However, compactness in the case of Japanese morphological causatives might be investigated in relation to the different cause marking of the causee; more specifically, in the colloquial usage of the construction, where certain case particles can be omitted. For example, in the following sentence, the causee has no explicit case marking:

(85) Kodomo, benkyo saseta no.
Child study-Caus-Past Inter
'Did you make the child study?'

According to several Japanese native speakers, it is highly improbable that the omitted case particle be the Dative marker *ni*. Although I have not investigated the matter in great detail, this kind of evidence is consistent with the fact that certain *wo*-causatives can be interpreted syntactically as involving a monoclausal[20], hence more compact structure, resembling lexical causatives in this respect.

[20] See section 4.3.3.3.4.

CHAPTER 4
SYNTAX OF CAUSATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

In the previous chapter I focused on various semantic aspects regarding the three main elements of the causative situation: the causer, the causee and the result. Although I did not always follow it closely, I used Dixon's semantic framework as a guiding structure, discussing those semantic parameters that I considered relevant for the causative constructions in Japanese and English. In the present chapter I will resort to some of the syntactic aspects of Dixon's typology presented in Chapter 2 and I will discuss in detail the issue of Japanese morphological causatives, namely whether they are mono-clausal or bi-clausal. I presented Dixon's transitivity-based syntactic analysis of causative constructions and I will now focus only on the causative constructions as they appear in English and in Japanese.

4.1. Lexical causatives

4.1.1. The derivation of lexical causatives

In both of the languages that I am considering, lexical causatives are essentially transitive verbs. The main issue concerning the syntax of lexical causatives relates to the way in which causatives are derived. There are basically two main groups of opinions: one that claims that the intransitive form is basic and the transitive/causative form is derived (causativization process) (see Dowty 1979, Parson 1990, Pesetsky 1995), and the other that claims the contrary, considering the transitive form to be the basic one and the intransitive form as the derived one (de-transitivization/de-causativization process) (see Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995, Chierchia 1989). According to the first view, which is based on Dowty 1979 and developed by Parson 1990, the semantic basis is represented by the adjective; the intransitive verb is related to it by the addition of a 'become' relation and of a 'theme' argument. Furthermore, the transitive/causative verb is related in its turn to the intransitive verb by the addition of a 'cause' relation and of an 'agent' argument. The second view, whose main advocates are Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995, claims that both the intransitive and the transitive verbs have the same semantic representation, both including a 'cause' relation, the difference between them lying in the way in which arguments are mapped onto semantic roles, the causer of the intransitive verb becoming "lexically bound" and thus not being expressed in the syntax. Based mainly on English examples, Dowty and Parsons's view has the major shortcoming of not being able to explain, within this

framework, the existence of certain transitive verbs that lack an intransitive counterpart (for example, *dirty* (adj) – *to dirty* (tr) - * *to dirty* (intr)). Levin&Rappaport-Hovav's account solves the above-mentioned problem by stating the following condition on the detransitivization of a (causative) intransitive verb: "an externally caused verb can leave its argument unexpressed only if the nature of the causing event is left completely unspecified" (Levin&Rappaport-Hovav 1995: 107). However, aside from the fact that this condition is rather general, implying that any specification of the nature of the causing event will block the derivation, it is also not clear what exactly the specification of the nature of the causing event refers to. Furthermore, the claim that both the intransitive and the transitive verbs share the same semantic representation implies that the intransitive verb is also causative (and dyadic), which is rather difficult to account for. There are other more recent studies that actually conclude that inchoative verbs are not dyadic and are not causative (see Härtl 2000, Piñón 2001, for example). Both approaches appear to have their merits and shortcomings, explaining and, at the same time, leaving certain aspects unexplained. A satisfactory cross-linguistic account has not been provided yet and the situation of Japanese and English is no exception. For example, if we take a look at the internal morphology of the pairs of transitive/intransitive verbs in Japanese, it is rather difficult to decide which group is actually morphologically marked, making it difficult to determine whether the transitive is derived from the intransitive or vice-versa. While suffixes such as *–ar* and *–as* are usually associated with intransitivity and transitivity, respectively, the suffix *–e*, for example, has a rather inconsistent behavior with respect to transitivity: it functions as a transitivizer for certain verbs and as an intransitivizer for others. The transitivity of a verb appears thus to be difficult to predict on the sole basis of the derivational suffix. The only observation that I can make is that the transitive verbs which are morphologically marked seem to be more numerous than the intransitive ones, supporting the view based on the causativization process. For English, on the other hand, morphology is not of real help and any possible explanations must be also based on a semantic interpretation, which makes it very difficult to provide a formal representation.

Alexiadou, Anagnostopoulu and Schäfer 2005 (hereinafter referred to as A,A&Sch) suggest a different approach in the analysis of verbs participating in the causative alternation, considering that the above-mentioned derivational approaches cannot offer a proper account, since cross-linguistic data provide evidence both for causativization and for de-causativization/de-transitivization. Their approach builds on the syntactic decomposition of change of state verbs into a Voice and a CAUS

component. This structure is taken to be the core structure of all change of state verbs:

[Voice [CAUS [Root]]] (A,A&Sch 2005: 16)

CAUS introduces a causal relation between a causing event and the resultant state denoted by the verbal root and a theme. Voice, on the other hand, introduces the external argument and bears features related to agentivity and manner. It is the different properties of Voice that are involved in the formation of causatives and anticausatives and passives[21]. The presence of features such as [+intent] and [+caus] distinguishes between the agentive and the causative interpretation of the external argument, for example. An agentive Voice licenses Agents and instrumental PPs, while a non-agentive voice licenses Causers. In anticausatives, there are two options available, one in which Voice is totally absent and one in which it is realized as non-agentive with implicit Causer. The authors claim that in English, the VOICE [-AG] is possible in passives and that requires that anticausatives should appear without VOICE. On the other hand, there are languages where the passive is necessarily agentive and the VOICE [-AG] head can be used in an anticausative interpretation. The benefit of such an approach is that it offers an alternative that is not based on the derivation of one form from the other (causative from anticausative or vice versa), and thus solves some of the problems occurring in the derivational approaches.

4.1.2. The syntactic structure of lexical causatives

While the derivation of causatives posed quite a number of problems, the syntactic structure of lexical causative verbs is, in our opinion, best described by the VP shell model to be found in Radford 2004. VP shells deal with the internal constituent of verb phrases. Thus, a VP is considered to be a complex structure which contains "an outer VP shell and an inner VP core" (Radford 2004: 336), with some arguments (AGENT) originating in the outer VP shell. Beginning with the observation that while for simple verb phrases headed by a verb with a single complement there is no problem in explaining the underlying structure, with three-place predicates

[21] In their article, the three authors also discuss issues related to passive constructions, considering passives to be representative for the change of state verbs that they are examining. HoIver, I will only present those features regarding causatives and anticausatives.

(which have a subject and two complements) various problems appear when analyzed within the binary-branching framework[22]:

(1) He *rolled* [the ball] [down the hill].

Example (1) has a ternary-branching structure:



However, the above structure does not allow the interpretation of *the ball down the hill* as a constituent, making the coordination with a similar string impossible. However, example (2) proves the contrary:

(2) He rolled the ball down the hill and the acorn up the mountain.
(Radford 2004: 337)

To overcome these problems, Radford suggests that transitive structures like *He rolled the ball down the hill* have a complex internal structure similar to that of a periphrastic causative structure like *He made the ball roll down the hill*. Thus, *the ball roll down the hill* is a VP complement of an abstract causative light verb which is supposed to be affixal in nature. The verb *roll* is raised to adjoin to the causative verb, producing a structure like *He made [roll[the ball roll down the hill]]*. The transitive structure *[roll the ball down the hill]* is analyzed as a counterpart of the intransitive structure *[the ball roll down the hill]* based on the capacity of the verb *to roll* to take part in the causative alternation:

(3) a. He rolled the ball down the hill.
b. The ball rolled down the hill.

"*The ball*" seems to play the same thematic role with respect to the predicate in both cases; it is the theme of *roll* in both (a) and (b), that entity which undergoes the action. Going further on with this idea, Radford resorts to Baker's 1988 Uniform Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)[23] to prove that "*the ball*", which plays the thematic role in both cases, must originate as

[22] Merger operations, by which words are combined together to form phrases and sentences, are considered to be binary operations.

[23] "Two arguments which fulfill the same thematic function with respect to a given predicate must be merged in the same position in syntax" (Radford 2004: 338)

subject of the verb *"to roll"* in both sentences, since it is obvious that it is the subject of *"roll"* in (b). However, the problem which arises now is why *"the ball"* (subject) in (a) occurs after the verb, when it would be natural to occur before the verb, since it plays the syntactic role if the subject. The answer is that the verb moves from its original position into a higher position to the left of *"the ball"* to adjoin the null light verb with the causative interpretation. I will illustrate the structure of the above examples and the derivation of (a) from (b):

The ball rolled down the hill



The VP is then merged with a null INFL constituent and *"the ball"* is raised to Spec-IP to check its Nominative case:



He rolled the ball down the hill.

Once the VP structure is formed, it is merged with the abstract causative light verb, which will make the verb *"to roll"* rise to adjoin to it. The

resulting structure is then merged with the subject *he*, which is assigned the θ-role of AGENT by the causative verb:



The vp then merges with an abstract INFL constituent and the subject he raises into Spec-IP to check its Nominative case:



4.2. Periphrastic causatives

While the syntax of lexical causatives has touched mainly on the direction of derivation in the causative alternation and upon the decomposition of the lexical causative verb in an attempt to provide a formal representation of the event structure encoded by a lexical causative, in regard to the syntax of the periphrastic causatives[24] researchers have generally agreed that the English periphrastic/analytic/syntactic causative is bi-clausal, comprising a causative verb that takes a sentential complement. Causative verbs such as *make, cause, force, persuade, get, have* or *let* can combine with virtually any lexical verb, regardless of its transitivity. The bi-clausal periphrastic causative in English is basically a control structure. A module of GB framework, control theory assumes that a particular argument of one clause – generally the subordinate clause – is omitted, and this missing argument is interpreted as referring to a particular argument of some other clause – usually the matrix clause. In the case of periphrastic causatives, the object of the matrix clause is interpreted as referring to the subject of the subordinate clause:

(4) John made Mary cry.
(5) John caused Mary to cry.
(6) John had Mary cry. / John had the engine work/working.
(7) John got Mary to cry. / John got the engine to start/starting.

In all of the above sentences, the object of the causative verb (*Mary, the engine*) is also the subject of the complement clause. Let us consider the representation of (5), which is representative for all English periphrastic causatives:

$John_i$ [VP caused $Mary_j$ [S` [S PRO_j to cry]]]

[24] In the discussion regarding the syntax of periphrastic causatives I will only refer to the English analytic causative construction. Although there are researchers who also consider Japanese to have periphrastic causatives, I will restrict to the classification found in Dixon 2000, where the *–(s)ase* causative in Japanese is considered an instance of morphological causative construction. The interpretation according to which the *–(s)ase* causative is a periphrastic causative follows from the verbal features that the causative morpheme still seems to preserve. On the other hand, the presence of certain morphological traits in the transitive/intransitive pairs in Japanese was regarded as a sufficient condition to postulate the existence, beside the periphrastic *–(s)ase* causative, of morphological causatives as well. However, I believe that the morphology found in the transitive/intransitive pairs is too irregular to allow for the postulation of a causative morpheme, therefore I treat such linguistic units as lexical causatives.

PRO is an empty pronominal element that lacks phonological features in the surface structure and that stands for the missing subject of the infinitive. The controller is the DP (Mary) in the main clause, which is also the object of the causative verb. Before the invention of PRO, older versions of transformational grammar required a second occurrence of the controller in deep structure, deleted by the "Equivalent NP deletion" or "Equi" rule (see also Denison 1993).

The control relation that is found in the English periphrastic causative is "lexically determined" (Kroeger 2004: 104-105)[25], in that the causative verb requires a non-finite clausal complement, and this complement clause also involves a control relation. In Bresnan's 1982 terms, the type of control to be found in causatives is *functional control*[26], with the subject of the complement clause being functionally identified with the object in the matrix clause:

(8) John made Mary read a book.



The English verbs of causation can take various types of complements. A schematic account of the types of complements headed by the main causative verbs in English is found in Baron 1974, although her exemplification does not clearly distinguish between pure causatives and resultatives:

[25] Lexically determined control structures are contrasted with syntactically determined control structures, which is a control structure associated with a specific construction type rather than with a particular word.

[26] Functional control involves a dual assignment of grammatical relations: a single NP functions as an argument of both the subordinate clause and the matrix clause, and bears a grammatical relation on both clauses.

Complements		**Periphrastic**		
noun +		HAVE	MAKE	GET
(a)	Infinitive	The doctor has his patient breathe deeply	The doctor made his patient breathe deeply	The doctor got his patient to breathe deeply
(b)	present participle	The actress had her director eating out of her hand	*The actress made her director eating out of her hand	The actress got her director eating out of her hand
(c)	Clause	I asked my lawyer to have it so that the case would not come up for another month	I asked all of my subjects to make it so that the blue dot was above the red dot	?I asked my subjects to get it so that the blue dot was above the red dot
(d)	Noun	The army will have you a soldier in two month	The army will make you a soldier	*The army will get you a soldier
(e)	Adjective	The cook had the water hot in a jiffy	The cook made the water hot	The cook got the water hot
(f)	past participle	The candidate had his name cleared	The candidate made his poIr felt	The candidate got his name cleared
(g)	Locative	The provost had the students out of his office in ten minutes	*The provost made the students out of his office	The provost got the students out of his office

(Baron 1974: 308)

An interesting aspect to be analyzed concerns the verbs *make* and *have* and their choice of the bare infinitive. According to Cornilescu 2003, bare infinitive clauses are best treated as VPs devoid of all functional projections. The complement is a verbal small clause denoting an event (see also Lightfoot 1991, Guéron & Hoeckstra 1995). Regarding the issue of control, although the use of *make* implies a stronger sense of control in a semantic perspective since the causee is acting against his/her will, from a syntactic point of view, the causative verb *make* is not always a control verb. Like many control verbs, *make* undergoes VP ellipsis (see Lobeck 1991, Radford 2004), while *have* does not. Consider the following examples from Cornilescu 2003:

(9) Mary will make John leave, but I don't think she'll make Max--.
(10) *?Mary will have Max stay, but I don't think she'll have Sue--.

On the other hand, both *make* and *have* allow objective expletives, like raising verbs[27]:

(11) a. John made it appear that everything was out of control.
b. She made there be no doubt in my mind about the finality of her decision.
c. It might be pleasant to them to remember upon Christmas day who made lame beggars walk and blind men see.

(12) a. I'll have it appear that nothing was wrong.
b. The army had there be an explosion outside the capital precisely when the president arrived.
c. John had it be said that no one could leave the building once they had entered.

(Cornilescu 2003: 342)

Such examples show that *make* is both a control verb and a raising verb. Mittwoch 1990 distinguishes between two semantically distinct verbs *make*: one which has the meaning 'cause' or 'force', implying that there is some resistance that must be overcome, and the second one, which is actually the control verb (allowing ellipsis), with the meaning of 'force', but also with an agentive reading. The first meaning is illustrated in (13a) and the second one in (13b):

(13) a. The rain made the mushrooms come out.
b. She made me clean the floor.

(Cornilescu 2003: 342)

Have also has two meanings: 'cause', as in (14a) and 'experience', as in (14b):

(14) a. I'll have him do it.
b. She had a book stolen from her library.

[27] Raising verbs are verbs such as *seem*, which induce the raising of the subject of the lower clause of a sentence out of the clause and moved into a higher clause:
It seems that [*they* have underestimated her]
They seem [to have underestimated her]
Raising and control show certain similarities: the lower verb has no overt subject; the subject of the higher verb is semantically related to the lower verb; the lower verb is infinitival. The difference however is that while in raising the subject is not semantically related to the higher verb (raising verbs have one fewer semantic arguments than syntactic arguments), in control the subject and the higher verb are semantically related.

Although (14b) can be interpreted as a pure causative ('She had a book stolen (by somebody else) from her library' = 'She made somebody steal a book from her library'), the meaning of (14b) is actually slightly different from the pure causative in (14a), in that it is semantically closer to a passive structure. That can be supported with various other arguments: the form of the main verb is that of passive ("stolen") and the preposition "by" can be used to indicate the agent. Furthermore, if we consider the way in which the two meanings are expressed in Japanese, the distinction is even clearer, since Japanese uses two distinct syntactic structures – passive in the case of the 'experience' reading and causative in the case of the 'cause' reading:

(15) Kanojo ha shosai kara hon wo nusumareta.
She-Top library from book-Acc steal-Pass-Past
'She had a book stolen from her library'
(16) Kanojo ha shosai kara hon wo nusumaseta.
She-Top library from book-Acc Steal-Caus-Past
'She had a book stolen from her library (by somebody else)'

The two interpretations of *have* can be represented as follows:
Causative *have*: have + NP + V inf
Experience/Passive *have*: have + NP + V-ed

The same dual interpretation is also found in the case of *get*. Like *have*, *get* can also govern an infinitive, a past participle or a present participle. The difference between the use of the infinitive and that of the present participle lies in the duration of the action: the infinitive refers to one specific event, while the use of present participle implies a repeated or continuous action. The use of the past participle with *get* poses the same problems as in the case of *have*:

(17) I got our roof blown off.

(17) can be interpreted either as having a passive, affected meaning or as a pure causative reading.

4.3. Morphological causatives

The causative construction which poses the most interesting problems to a syntactic analysis is however the morphological causative[28]. The reason why morphological causatives are so difficult to analyze is that although they 'look' like a single word, there is evidence that the causative morpheme *–(s)ase* also exhibits verbal characteristics, which has made many scholars wonder whether the Japanese morphological causative is indeed one single lexical unit, derived in the lexicon and obeying the rules that apply to lexical items or it is some kind of structure to be dealt with at a syntactic level rather than at the lexical one.

In the following sections I will present and analyze the main theories and their arguments regarding the wordhood of the Japanese morphological causative. That in turn leads us to the question of whether the Japanese morphological causative is a structure consisting of only one clause, since in the interpretation according to which the *–(s)ase* causative is not a lexical unit, there is the possibility that the causee play the syntactic role of subject, thus conferring the causative construction a bi-clausal structure. Our discussion builds on Cipollone 2001.

4.3.1. *(s)ase* causative ~ lexical item

The Japanese morphological causative has been considered by some to behave in the same manner as lexical items do. The morpheme *–(s)ase* is given no verbal interpretation and the arguments supporting this theory cover a rather large area, from phonology to syntax. Let us examine some of the most popular arguments in favor of a lexical interpretation of the Japanese morphological causative.

4.3.1.1. Phonological arguments

Starting from the hypothesis that the original accent position is the one found in the past tense and that in the present tense construction the accent is "attracted" by the present tense morpheme *–ru,* Miyagawa 1989 demonstrates that causative verbs behave exactly like a simple stem verb in their accentuation, leading to the conclusion that causative verbs should be treated as lexical items. In Japanese, between the present[29] and the past tense forms of the verbs there is an accent shift:

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[28] The discussion on morphological causatives will cover only the Japanese *–(s)ase* causative. The English so-called morphological causatives (i.e., causative verbs formed with the help of affixes such as en-, *–ize, -ify* or *–en*) are treated in this paper as instances of lexical causative verbs.

[29] In Section 3.3.1.1 I preserved Miyagawa's grammatical terminology. Thus, the term "present tense" here refers to what I call "non-past".

tabé – ru ('eat')
tábe – ta ('ate')
This accent shift has been explained in terms of lexical morphology:

(i) the tense morphemes *–ru* (present) and *–ta* (past) are attached in the lexicon
(ii) *-ru* is a level I morpheme, *-ta* is a level II morpheme
(iii) an accentuation rule that accents the penultimate mora[30] of an accented verb applies at level I (after *–ru* is attached)

(Miyagawa 1989: 114)

In the case of the verb *taberu* (to eat), first of all we must point out that the verb 'eat' is accented; when the suffix *–ru* is attached to the stem verb *tabe*, the penultimate mora becomes accented, giving the form *tabéru*. If the suffix *–ru* does not attach to the stem, then at level I the only thing that happens is the accentuation of the verb and at level II the suffix *–ta* attaches to this accented stem, giving the form *tábeta*.
The causative morpheme attaches inside the tense morpheme, this insertion being an indication of the fact that the causative morpheme attaches in the lexicon. Moreover, the rules of accentuation discussed above also apply in the case of causative forms:

1. Level I: (i) *–ru* attachment — *tabe-sase-ru* 'eat-Caus-Pres'
   (ii) penultimate accentuation — *tabe-sasé-ru*
   Level II: ----------
2. Level I: penultimate accentuation — *tabe-sáse*
   Level II: *-ta* attachment — *tabe-sáse-ta*

(Miyagawa 1989: 115)

If the present tense suffix *–ru* attaches at level I, the penultimate accentuation rule applies to the entire causative construction (as in (1)); however, if *–ru* does not attach at level I, the accentuation rule applies to the causative stem, and the past tense suffix *–ta* attaches to this accented form at level II (as in (2)).

Although apparently well articulated, Miyagawa's account poses some problems should it be considered a general rule applying to all Japanese

[30] Mora – generally defined as a unit of duration in Japanese, where it is used to measure the length of words and utterances. The words *Tokyo, Amazon* and *America* are considered to have the same number of mora – four, regardless of the number of syllables involved: to-o-kyo-o, a-ma-zo-n, a-me-ri-ca (see Kubozono 1996).

verbs. Firstly, the very form "*tabe-sáse-ta*", with the accent falling on *sa*, seems to be questionable for some native speakers, the more common form being "*tabe-sasé-ta*". Moreover, the unacceptability of such an accentuation pattern is even higher in shorter second group verbs[31], such as *kiru* (dress somebody): (?) *ki- sáse-ta vs. ki- sasé-ta.* Furthermore, Miyagawa completely leaves out the verbs belonging to other groups, where the attachment of the past tense suffix is accompanied by other phonological changes, and the accentuation pattern in (2) is even more difficult to find. Let us consider the case of the verb *aruku* (to walk)

1.	Level I:	(i) *–ru* attachment	*aruk-ase-ru* 'walk-Caus-PRES'
		(ii) penultimate accentuation	*aruk-asé-ru*
	Level II:	----------	
2.	Level I:	penultimate accentuation	(?) *aruk-áse*
	Level II:	*-ta* attachment	(??) *aruk-áse-ta*

Phonological arguments alone do not suffice for demonstrating the causative construction's lexicality. Therefore, more complex explanations have been proposed, the next level being that of morphology.

4.3.1.2. Morphological arguments

4.3.1.2.1. *(s)ase*-bound morpheme

The first thing to be pointed out when it comes to morphology is the fact that the causative morpheme *(s)ase* is considered by many to be a bound morpheme. It has two different manifestations, depending on the end of the preceding verb stem: after vowel-final stems it appears as *(s)ase* and after consonant-final stems it appears as *ase*:

1. *tabe-sase-ru*
   eat-caus-nonpast
   ki-sase-ru
   dress-caus-nonpast
   shime-sase-ru
   close-caus-nonpast
2. *nom-ase-ru*
   drink-caus-nonpast
   ik-ase-ru
   go-caus-nonpast
   araw-ase-ru

[31] In Japanese, verbs are divided into three morphological groups: Group 1 (root ending in consonant), Group 2 (root ending in vowel), Group 3 (irregular verbs).

wash-caus-nonpast

Thus, *(s)ase* appears to be a morpheme with two allomorphs, this being an indication of its affixal nature. The structure stem verb+*(s)ase* is thus a single lexical unit.
Kuroda 1981, however, claimed that *(s)ase* can appear as an independent verb, thus undermining the proposal made by lexicalists:

(9) Taroo ga Jiro ni utai mo sase-ta.
Taroo-Nom Jiro-Dat sing also cause-Past
'Taroo made/let Jiro sing as well'

Kuroda's argument is that in the previous example, the particle *mo* ('also') can occur between the verb stem *utai* and the causative independent verb *sase*. The lexicalists' response to Kuroda's argument was that the causative form *sase* in Kuroda's example is not a simple verb, but a complex one, composed of the verb *s-* ('do') and the causative morpheme *–ase: s-ase-ta* (do-caus-past). They based their claim on the impossibility of parallel passive and desiderative forms of the allegedly independent verb *sase* to produce grammatical sentences:

(10) Taroo wa Jiro ni utai mo s-are/ *rare-ta.
Taroo-Top Jiro-Dat sing also do-Pass/Pass-Past
'Taroo was troubled also by Jiro's singing'
(11) Boku wa utai mo si-tai/*tai.
I-Top sing also do-want/want
'I want to sing as well'

The parallelism with the behavior of the passive and desiderative forms is justified, all these constructions having the same morphological structure (V+morpheme). Furthermore, the lexicalists' analysis of *sase* as a complex structure also finds etymological support, since historically speaking, the causative morpheme seems to have evolved from the verb *su* ('do') (Narrog 2004). Morphological causatives started to be used in Late Old Japanese (9th-11th century) and were based on lexical causative forms coming from Old Japanese (6th-8th century). Old Japanese had a set of lexical causative (transitive) verbs ending in *–s.u* that are possibly related to Late Old Japanese productive causative suffix *–(s)asu*, which, in turn, developed into the Modern Japanese *(-s)aseru*. Apparently there Ire two types of constructions formed with the *–su* ending: constructions based on nominal roots (*su*[1]) and constructions based on verbal roots (*su*[2]). Lexical formations

on *su*[1] in Old Japanese did not give way to the new productive causative formative *(-s)asu* in Late Old Japanese. They are still in use as lexical items in Modern Japanese and they are part of the transitive/intransitive pairs of verbs, and they coexist with productive morphological causative forms: *kura* ('dark')-*su* <> *kure-sase-ru*. On the other hand, instances of *su* [2] in Old Japanese include verbs such as *mi-su* ('show'), *ki-su* ('dress'), *opo-su* ('make carry'/'burden'), *shira-su* ('tell'/'let know'), *apa-su* ('put together'/'let meet') and *kika-su* ('tell'/'let hear'). Formations based on *su*[2] do not constitute a simple pattern of transitivization of intransitive verbs, since the non-causative counterpart of the causativized verbs is already transitive:

mi-ru ('see') ~ *mi-su* ('show')

Furthermore, a distinction between the causing and the caused event can be perceived in the use of these complex structures, which is very similar to the indirect causation expressed by Modern Japanese morphological causatives. *su*[2] appears thus to be a better candidate for the Late Old Japanese causative morpheme *(-s)asu*. However, regardless of their different behavior, both *su*[1] and *su*[2] go back to the verb *su* ('do') (Narrog 2004). On the one hand, that may explain some of the verbal features of the *–(s)ase* morpheme, and, on the other hand, it supports the lexicalists' theory according to which *–(s)ase* can be further decomposed into the verb *s-* ('do') and a causative morpheme.

4.3.1.2.2. The potential

One way of expressing modal possibility in Japanese is by using the so-called potential form – a complex construction composed of a verb stem and the potential suffix *-(rar)e*. The potential construction allows for its direct object to be marked with either the particle *wo* (Accusative) or *ga* (Nominative), the latter generally being the particle reserved for subjects:

(13) Hanako wa romaji wo/*ga yomu.
Hanako-Top alphabet-Acc/*Nom read
'Hanako reads the alphabet'

(13) Hanako wa romaji wo/ga yomeru.
Hanako-Top alphabet-Acc/Nom read-Pot
'Hanako can read the alphabet'

In the case of causatives, the potential suffix *-(r)are* attaches to the whole causative form and not to *–(s)ase* alone, as it also happens with tense, voice or aspect markers. Furthermore, potential forms if causatives have the same property of allowing either the Accusative or the Nominative marking of

the direct object, that indicating that the causative construction behaves like a lexical item when the potential morpheme is introduced:

(14)Taro ga Hanako ni shinbun wo/*ga yomaseru.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat newspaper-Acc/*Nom read-Caus-Nonpast
'Taro makes Hanako read the newspaper'
(15)Taro ga Hanako ni shinbun wo/ga yomaserareru.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat newspaper-Acc/Nom read-Caus-Pot-Nonpast
'Taro can make Hanako read the newspaper'

4.3.1.3. Lexical arguments

4.3.1.3.1. Reduplication (Cipollone 2001)

Japanese allows the reduplication of verb stems in order to denote the repetition of an action or the fact that an action was performed to a great degree. Although the mechanism of verb stem reduplication is not so frequent in present day Japanese, it can still occur in certain contexts:

gohan wo *tabe* *tabe*
rice-Acc eat eat
'eat rice repeatedly'
aruki aruki
walk walk
'walk a lot'

If the stem verb combines with the causative morpheme, reduplication is possible. However, *(s)ase* alone cannot be reduplicated, this being another indication that causatives can be treated as lexical units, since reduplication is a lexical process:

gohan wo *tabesase* *tabesase*
rice-Acc eat-caus eat-caus
'make someone eat rice repeatedly'

**gohan wo* *tabe sase sase*
rice-Acc eat-caus caus

4.3.1.3.2. Blocking (Miyagawa 1989)

According to Miyagawa's blocking theory, the existence of lexical causatives in Japanese can either block the formation of morphologically complex causatives with very similar meanings or forces these complex causatives to take on specialized meanings. The concepts of blocking, as Well as that of meaning specialization, occur in the lexicon and are not specific to causatives. Miyagawa exemplifies it with nominal formation: the suffix *–ity* attaches to a *X-ous* adjective to form a nominal:

X-ous	**Nominal**	**-ity**
Various	-------	variety
Curious	-------	curiosity
Glorious	glory	*gloriosity
Furious	fury	*furiosity

(Miyagawa 1989: 117)

There is only one slot for the nominal corresponding semantically to the X-*ous* adjective. If that slot is already occupied by a simple nominal form (*glory, fury*), then the morphologically complex *-ity* form is no longer available, being blocked from entering the slot and, subsequently, not being able to enter the language. In the lexicon, verbs are organized according to their meaning and to the number of arguments that they take; the "paradigmatic structure (PDS)" (Miyagawa 1989:117) of a verb has three slots: intransitive, transitive and ditransitive. Only one lexical item can occupy a particular slot, blocking any other item from entering that particular slot. Since it is morphologically the simplest form, a verb stem naturally occupies a PDS-slot. The assumption is thus that before any other morphological derivations takes place all PDS-slots that are filled have verb stems. On the other hand, a verb stem is part of the permanent lexicon by nature. The relation between PDS and being a member of the permanent lexicon is such that a lexical item must fill a PDS-slot in order to become a member of the permanent lexicon. Lexical items that are blocked from occupying a PDS slot cannot enter the lexicon.

However, the PDS hypothesis also predicts that if a morphologically complex word has more than one possible meaning, and the occurrence with one of the interpretations is blocked, it can still enter the language with its second meaning. This is the case of the English suffix *–er*, which attaches to verbs in order to form nominals with either agentive (*write-writer*) or instrumental (*erase-eraser*) interpretations. The nominal *cooker* potentially has both interpretations, but in reality only the instrumental

interpretation is available, since the agentive reading is blocked by the simple nominal *cook*.

There is still a third possibility which characterizes the relation between blocking and the occurrence in the language. This is the situation when an affix has two possible interpretations, but only one of the interpretations finds a slot in the lexicon, the other one being "outside the domain of the lexical semantic slots" (Miyagawa 1989: 120). The prediction for a word with such an affix is the following: if it is not blocked, it will enter the permanent lexicon; if it is blocked, it will not enter the permanent lexicon, but it can, however, occur in the language with the "nonlexical" interpretation. This last possibility is illustrated by the Japanese morphological causatives. The example given is that of the verbs *agaru* (rise-intransitive), *ageru* (raise-transitive; lexical causative) and *agaraseru* (morphological causative, formed from the intransitive member). These three verbs have the following distribution in the lexicon (Miyagawa 1989: 121):

INTR	TR	DITR
Agaru	*ageru*	*agaraseru* (blocked)

The form *agaraseru* is blocked by the simple form *ageru*, but it still occurs in the language. The explanation lies in the different meanings that the two forms express: the lexical causative (*ageru*) allows the Causee to be either animate or inanimate, whereas the Causee of *agaraseru* (morphological causative) can be only animate (see also Shibatani 1976b). Miyagawa concludes that it is the availability of the 'indirect' (Shibatani's "directive") causation that allows such a verb to occur in the language. The demonstration goes on with the assumption that if a blocked causative verb enters the permanent lexicon, then this is an indication that the lexicon has an analytical causative slot into which such a verb can fit; if, on the other hand, no such evidence is found, then a blocked causative occurs in the language without being registered in the permanent lexicon. Miyagawa considers the latter case as representative for Japanese and he demonstrates that starting from the assumption that if such a blocked item is excluded from the permanent lexicon, then it must be excluded from the lexical processes such as idiomatization or nominalization in which only the members of the permanent lexicon can take place.

4.3.1.4. Syntactic arguments

4.3.1.4.1. Subject honorification

Subject honorification refers to the process in which the main verb becomes part of a construction (*o-V ni naru*), the subject of which is interpreted as being respected or deserving honor. These honorific forms cannot be used to describe the actions of a person whose social status is equal or inferior to that of the speaker:

(16) Sensei ga kono hon wo o yomi ni naru.
Teacher-Nom this book-Acc read-Hon
'The teacher will (honorably) read this book'
(17) *Imoto ga kono hon wo o yomi ni naru.
(my) younger sister-Nom this book-Acc read-Hon
'My younger sister will (honorably) read this book'

The *o-V ni naru* structure applies only to the causativized form of the main verb and not to *-(s)ase* alone to turn it into a honorific form:

(18) Sensei ga imoto ni hon wo o yom-ase-ni naru.
Teacher-Nom (my) younger sister-Dat book-Acc read-Caus-Hon
'The teacher will make my younger sister read a book'
(19) *Sensei ga imoto ni hon wo o yomi o sase ni naru.

Causative predicates appear thus to be formed lexically since they cannot be split apart by syntactic processes.

4.3.1.4.2. Question-answer pairs

Among the various ways in which a question can be answered in Japanese there is the possibility of repeating the verb in either the affirmative or the negative form. However, only matrix verbs can be repeated in answering to biclausal questions:

(20) A: Michi wo kiita no?
Way-Acc ask-Past Int
'Have you asked the way?'
B: Kiita yo.
Ask-Past Emph
'Yes, I have'

In the case of a causative, the entire predicate and not only *(s)ase* must be repeated in order to provide an acceptable answer:

(21) A: Taro wo ikaseta?

Taro-acc go-caus-past
'Have (you) caused Taro to go?'
B: Ikaseta.
go-caus-past
'Yes, I have' (lit. 'caused to go')
B: *Saseta.
caus-past

Such answers are regarded as an indication of the fact that *(s)ase* cannot function as a matrix verb, since in that case it could have been used as a possible answer to questions like the one above.

4.3.2. *(s)ase* causative ~ non-lexical item

Despite the arguments brought in favor of a lexical interpretation of the Japanese morphological causatives, there are several aspects regarding the causative morpheme which allow us to claim that the V-(s)ase construction does not behave like a lexical item, but like a complex construction consisting of two distinct predicates, with (s)ase functioning as a causative verb and not as a morpheme.

4.3.2.1. Reflexive binding

The reflexive item *jibun* ('self') in Japanese take subject nouns as their antecedents (Shibatani 1976b: 20). Consequently, when a sentence contains just one subject, the reflexive element refers uniquely to that subject:

(22) Taro$_i$ ga jibun$_{i/*j}$ no heya de Hanako$_j$ ni hon wo yomaseta.
Taro-Nom self-Poss room-Loc Hanako-Dat book-Acc read-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako read a book in his/*her room'

However, a slight modification in the word order brings about two possible readings for *jibun:*

(23) Taro$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ ni jibun$_{i/j}$ no heya de hon wo yomaseta.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat self-Poss room-Loc book-Acc read-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako read a book in his/her room'

When the adverbial phrase containing the reflexive occurs to the right of the causee, both Taro and Hanako can bind *jibun*, strongly suggesting that the causee is a subject as well. If the causative verb were lexical and the causee were an object, then it could not function as an antecedent of *jibun*. Consider the following examples employing a genuine lexical causative verb (*okosu*-wake up):

(24) Taro$_i$ ga jibun$_{i/*j}$ no heya de Hanako$_j$ wo okoshita.

Taro-Nom self-Poss room-Loc Hanako-Acc wake up-Past
'Taro woke up Hanako in his/*her room'

(25) Taro$_i$ ga Hanako$_j$ wo jibun$_{i/*j}$ no heya de okoshita.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Acc self-Poss room-Loc wake up-Past
'Taro woke up Hanako in his/*her room'

The ambiguity in finding the antecedent of the reflexive nominal in the case of morphological causatives suggest that both the causer and the causee are subjects, with the causer being the higher subject and the causee the subject of the embedded clause.

4.3.2.2. Adjunct and quantifier scope

Adjuncts and quantifiers normally take scope over syntactic nodes. If the morphological causative were a lexical item functioning as a single predicate, we would expect adjuncts and quantifiers to modify only the entire causative predicate. However, if we consider the following examples we can easily notice that in the case of *–(s)ase* causatives, adjuncts and quantifiers can modify either the entire causative predicate or only the predicate expressed by the verb stem:

Adjuncts:

(26) Taro ga Hanako wo hitori de arukaseta.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Acc alone walk-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako walk alone/by herself' or 'Taro alone/by himself made Hanako walk'

(27) Taro ga Hanako ni yukkuri ocha wo nomaseta.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat slowly tea-Acc drink-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako drink the tea slowly' or 'Taro slowly made Hanako drink the tea'

Quantifiers:

(28) Sensei ga san nin no gakusei ni ko-toya-do de hashiraseta.
Teacher-Nom three people-Poss students-Dat courtyard-Loc run-Caus-Past
'There are three (particular) students whom the teacher made run in the courtyard' or 'The teacher made three students run in the courtyard'

(29) Sensei ga gakusei ni sansatsu no hon wo yomaseta.
Teacher-Nom students-Dat three volumes-Poss book-Acc read-Caus-Past

'There were three books that the teacher made the students read' or
'The teacher made it so that there were/caused there to be three books that the students read'

Since adjuncts and quantifiers can either modify the verb itself or the entire causative predicate, the lexical interpretation of the morphological causative becomes extremely problematic.

4.3.2.3. Subject honorification

Aside from reflexive binding and adjunct and quantifier scope, subject honorification provides evidence for, this time, the causee's functioning as a subject and, consequently, for the interpretation of causative constructions as complex predicates. Gunji 1999 analyzes causative constructions formed from the honorific forms of verbs and he reaches the conclusion that it is the causee and not the causer who is being honored in this case:

(30) Taro ga Suzuki sensei wo o aruki ni naraseta.
Taro-Nom Suzuki teacher-Acc walk-Hon-Caus-Past
'Taro made prof. Suzuki (honorably) walk'

(31) *Suzuki sensei gaTaro wo o aruki ni naraseta.
Suzuki teacher-Nom Taro-Acc walk-Hon-Caus-Past
*'Prof. Suzuki made Taro (honorably) walk'

Since it has been widely accepted that verbs in the structure *o-V-ni naru* mark the subject as being honored, it becomes necessary to consider the causee to be a subject as Well.

4.3.3. Syntactic analyses of morphological causatives

The two different ways in which Japanese morphological causatives can be interpreted lead in turn to the development of two major directions of syntactic analyses. The first attempts to analyze *–(s)ase* causatives from a syntactic point of view ignored almost any argument in favor of a lexical interpretation and considered morphological causatives to be biclausal, with *-(s)ase* functioning as an independent verb that takes a sentential complement. Later on, the properties which make morphological causatives look like lexical items were brought into the light and *–(s)ase* causatives were analyzed as having a monoclausal structure. The construction *V-(s)ase* was now considered to be formed in the lexicon and all the arguments in favor of a biclausal analysis were either simply ignored or, when their existence is admitted, put aside to be explained by

resorting to other principles and theories. However, a third direction also emerged, considering morphological causatives to be a kind of hybrid construction, with both biclausal and monoclausal readings, depending on various other factors, most of them of a semantic nature. I will shortly present what I consider to be the representative accounts for each of the three directions, at the same time discussing the strong points and the shortcomings of each.

4.3.3.1. Biclausal analyses

Most of the early analyses of causative constructions have been biclausal, assuming that *(s)ase* is an independent verb which takes a sentential complement. A typical causative sentence would have a structure similar to the following:

(32) Taro wa Hanako ni hon wo yomaseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat book-Acc read-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako read the book'



(adapted after Vinka and Hirota 1995)

All the transformational approaches have analyzed both types of causatives (*wo*-causatives and *ni*-causatives) as involving sentential complements. The main representatives of the biclausal approach are mostly the

transformationalists, among whom Kuroda 1965, Kuno 1973 and Shibatani 1973 provided the classical examples of biclausal analyses.

4.3.3.1.1. Kuroda 1965

The main point in Kuroda's biclausal analysis is, in our view, his attempt to explain the existence of only the ni-causative in the case of transitive-based morphological causatives. The structure of the Japanese morphological causatives is as follows:

Intransitive-based:

(33) a. Taro ha Hanako wo hatarak-ase-ta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Acc work-Caus-Past
b. Taro Hanako (Hanako hatarak) sase-ta.

(34) a. Taro ha Hanako ni hatarak-ase-ta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat work-Caus-Past
b. Taro (Hanako hatarak) sase-ta.

Transitive-based:

(35) a. Taro ha Hanako ni hatake wo tagayas-ase-ta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat field-Acc cultivate-Caus-Past
b. Taro Hanako (Hanako hatake tagayas) sase-ta.

(36) a. Taro ha Hanako ni hatake wo tagayas-ase-ta.
Taro-Top Hanako-Dat field-Acc cultivate-Caus-Past
b. Taro (Hanako hatake tagayas) sase-ta.

In each of the above-listed cases, the a-sentences are derived from the corresponding b-sentences. In deriving (35a) – which shows no difference to (36a), Kuroda applies the Equi NP Deletion[32], deleting the matrix object under the identity with the subject of the embedded clause, and, at the same time, attaches the Dative particle *ni* to the subject of the embedded clause by Agentive *ni* Attachment. When the base verb is transitive, this triggers the merging of the surface structure of a *wo*-causative with that of a *ni*-causative. Kuroda's argument for this merger is that since the two types of causative constructions – *wo* and *ni* – can be distinguished when the base verb is intransitive, it should be reasonable to assume that the two distinct structures also exist in the case of transitive-based causatives and that they merge at surface structure.

[32] "[…]a deletion rule that wipes out the copy of a noun phrase in the matrix clause under the control of the coreferential copy of the same noun phrase in the embedded clause" (Kuroda 1978: 222).

Convenient as it may seem, Kuroda's explanation cannot account for the impossibility of marking the causee of psychological verbs with the Dative case:

(37) Hanako ha Jiro no shi wo kanashinda.
Hanako-Top Jiro-Poss death-Acc grieve-Past
'Hanako grieved over Jiro's death'

(38) Taro ha Hanako *ni/wo Jiro no shi wo kanashimaseta.
Taro-Top Hanako-*Dat/Acc Jiro-poss death-Acc grieve-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako grieve over Jiro's death'
(Tonoike 1978: 12)

In sentences such as (38), in which the action described by the verb is not controllable, the Dative-marking of the causee is not acceptable. The explanation for that lies, in our opinion, in the Double-wo Constraint, which rules out as well-formed any transitive-based *wo*-causative, since it contains more than one NP marked with the Accusative particle in the surface structure.

4.3.3.1.2. Kuno 1973

Kuno's analysis of *wo*-causatives as having a structure in which the direct object of the matrix clause triggers Equi NP Deletion of the subject of the embedded clause is very similar to Kuroda's. In *ni*-causatives, the higher predicate is intransitive and the lower subject has no role in the matrix clause. The structures of the two types of causatives are as follows (Kuno 1973):

Wo-causatives:

(39) Syota ga Kyoko wo ikaseta.
Syota-Nom Kyoko-Acc go-Caus-Past
'Syota made Kyoko go'



Ni-causatives:

(40) Syota ga Kyoko ni ikaseta.
Syota-Nom Kyoko-Dat go-Caus-Past
'Syota let Kyoko go'



The distinct structures for the two types of causatives are motivated partly by semantic considerations and partly by the passivizability of each type of causative. In the case of *wo*-causatives there is a direct object in the matrix clause which corresponds to the lower subject; since it is the direct object of the causative verb, it is natural that it receives the accusative case and also a patient-like (coercive) interpretation, which is characteristic to the *wo*-causatives. When the embedded verb is transitive and has an object marked with the accusative, the direct object in the matrix clause receives the dative case, due to the double-*wo* constraint. The causee of the *wo*-causatives can be raised to the subject position (passivized) because it is a direct object of the matrix/causative verb. *Ni*-causatives, on the other hand, receive a more agentive interpretation (volitional, intentional), because the causee is not an argument of the causative verb. Furthermore, the causee of the *ni*-causative cannot be passivized because it is located inside the embedded clause and has no corresponding NP in the higher clause at the underlying structure (Uda 1994: 240).

4.3.3.1.3. Shibatani 1973

Shibatani starts from the assumption that both the lexical causative and the morphological causative construction are derived from the same underlying structure:

(41) a. Taro ga Jiro wo tomar-ase-ta.
Taro-Nom Jiro-Acc stop-Caus-Past
'Taro made Jiro stop'
b. Taro ga Jiro wo tome-ta.
Taro-Nom Jiro-Acc stop-Past
'Taro stopped Jiro'

The derivation of the two sentences is as follows:



(Shibatani 1976: 18)

The two distinct types of causatives are thus explained by Predicate Raising: if Lexical Insertion takes place before Predicate Raising, then the morphological form *tomar-ase* surfaces, while the lexical form *tome* occurs when Lexical Insertion takes place after Predicate Raising.

4.3.3.2. Monoclausal analyses

The common idea lying at the basis of monoclausal analyses is the assumption that the morphologically complex causatives are derived in the lexicon by means of a morphological rule of affixation. The valency of the original verb is increased by one and the added argument becomes the

matrix subject, playing the causer role. In the lexicalist perspective, the causative sentence (32) has the following structure:



Monoclausal analyses consider that both *wo*-causatives and *ni*-causatives have the same syntactic structure and the differences are purely semantic. Miyagawa's 1989 analysis presented in Section 4.3.1.3.2 represents, to the best of our knowledge, one of the fundamental works for the lexicalist approaches. I will not refer to it again here, but I will only point out the fact that, although interesting and well-articulated within its theoretical framework, Miyagwa's account simply ignores all the evidence leading to a biclausal structure of morphological causatives and thus proves unable to provide a comprehensive explanation.

4.3.3.3. Complex analyses

The defenders of both the biclausality and the monoclausality of morphological causatives have brought solid arguments to support their theories, but each group has mostly ignored the others' arguments, leaving the question of whether *–(s)ase* causatives are one word or a complex predicate open. There is however a third line of approaches, which tries to reconcile the previous two by addressing both issues.

4.3.3.3.1. Kitagawa 1986

Kitagawa proposes an affix raising approach to account for the dual nature of causatives. Biclausality and monoclausality occur on different levels of derivation. The stem verb and the causative morpheme *(s)ase* are derived in the lexicon and they begin at D-structure as a complex constituent, forming a V^0 and maintain this constituency until S-structure. This explains the lexical properties of the causative. The non-lexical properties are accounted

for by the raising of *(s)ase* on the way to LF. However, Kitagawa does not consider *wo*-causatives and *ni*-causatives as syntactically distinct:

(42) Taro ga Hanako ni hon wo yomaseta.
Taro-Nom Hanako-Dat book-Acc read-Caus-Past
'Taro made Hanako read the book'

a. S-structure



b. Pre-LF



c. LF



(adapted after Uda 1994)

Kitagawa's approach reconciles lexical and syntactic theories, both monoclausality and biclausality being attained at different levels. Although he was later accused that his approach does not obey the boundary between syntax and morphology (when *(s)ase* is raised to derive the LF in (c), it has to move out of the V domain), his approach opened the way to a much deeper understanding of Japanese causatives. The major shortcoming of Kitagawa's work is his leaving aside the difference between the *wo*- and the *ni*-causatives.

4.3.3.3.2. Uda 1994

Working within the HPSG framework, Uda addresses the difference between coercive vs permissive interpretation for causatives, as well as the different case marking of the causee. The *wo*-causative is analyzed as a lexical causative, the causative morpheme *(s)ase* functioning as a derivational affix. The lexical rule which derives this type of causative applies only to intransitive verbs and to transitive verbs that mark their direct object with the Dative case. The *ni*-causative is analyzed as part of a control structure, with the causative morpheme *(s)ase* functioning as a verb – the same process as in the case of the English periphrastic causatives. Uda also resorts to Subject and Object honorification to prove that the causee of the *wo*-causative is not a syntactic subject, while that of the *ni*-causative is. However, although she mentions them, she does not analyze any of the

other arguments generally discussed in relation to a biclausal structure for the *ni*-causative (adjunct/quantifier scope, reflexive binding). Within the boundaries of her analysis, Uda's approach seems to be valid, but it is however incomplete. Although she rightly assumes that the distinct case markings may be connected to two different syntactic structures, she does not go further into investigating the issue against more problematic arguments.

4.3.3.3.3. Gunji 1999

Like Kitagawa's, Gunji's analysis reconciles monoclausality and biclausality by considering them to be attained at different levels. The bicalusal structure is present in the constituent structure of the morphological causative, while the monoclausal structure is available at the morpho-phonological level. His explanation follows the distinction found in Dowty 1996 between phenogrammar and tectogrammar: the phenogrammatical structure is the structure that has as its main organizational principle the horizontal structure of a sentence - the surface word order, while the tectogrammatical structure is a structure that reflects the vertical structure of a sentence – the head/dependent structure, examples including the deep structure from the GB Theory, LFG's f-structure or HPSG's argument structure. In Gunji's view on causatives, the biclausal nature of the construction shows up at the tectogrammatical level, while monoclausality is attained at the phenogrammatical level. The phenogrammatical level is sensitive to adjacency and subcategorization and it is via adjacency and not subcategorization that *(-s)ase*, which is considered to be an independent lexical unit, selects a verb stem and takes on all its arguments. At the phenogrammatical level the bond between *(-s)ase* and the verb stem is very strong, so nothing can penetrate it. However, at the tectogrammatical level, the two entities remain separate, which can explain word-internal adjunct/quantifier scope, reflexive binding and subject honorification.

Just like in Kitagawa's case, the opponents of Gunji's theory have mainly claimed that his analysis violates the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis[33]. However, applying the LIH strictly in any type of analysis has proved to be problematic sometimes, hence the many variants that LIH has taken over the years. For example, one of the major problems concerning the LIH is

[33] Lexical Integrity Hypothesis (LIH) is one of the basic principles of generative morphology. It comes in a number of different formulations, but the basic claim is the syntax and morphology belong to different levels and that no syntactic rule can refer to elements of the morphological structure.

posed by inflectional morphemes: while some consider that verbs are inserted in the syntax in their bare uninflected form, others take only fully inflected verbal forms to constitute formatives in syntax. Therefore, two versions of LIH emerge, a weak Lexicalist Hypothesis – which does not include inflection in the morphology, and a Strong Lexicalist Hypothesis – which adds inflection to the domain of the LIH. In the same way, one can follow the lexicalist line of considering the morphological causative as being generated in the lexicon, so the lexical integrity is maintained. On the other hand, the same assumption would not be able to provide reasonable answers to the problems posed by adjunct/quantifier scope or reflexive binding. Although not explicitly stated, Gunji's postulation of two distinct levels of analysis may be seen as the way in which LIH and syntactic rules can be reconciled. However, like Kitagawa, Gunji does not address the issue of the different case marking of the causee either.

4.3.3.3.4. Matsumoto 1996

Matsumoto works in the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG), which considers that the different kinds of linguistic information - grammatical functions, thematic roles, etc. - are encoded at different levels and the relations between the various aspects are not of a derivational nature, but are available simultaneously. The levels of representation that Matsumoto takes into account are: lexical-semantic structure, argument structure, functional structure and constituent structure. Each of these levels has its own criteria of wordhood and a given construction can be regarded as a word at some levels and as a non-lexical item at other levels:

> "Constituent structure (c-structure) is the surface phrase structure of a sentence with syntactic categories of terminal strings and phrases. Functional structure (f-structure) encodes the grammatical functions of expressions in a sentence, represented in an "attribute-value" structure. Argument structure (a-structure) represents (thematic) arguments of a predicate, usually with thematic roles labels. Semantic structure (s-structure) represents more detailed meanings of various expressions."
>
> (Matsumoto 1996: 2)

When discussing the mono/biclausality of morphological causatives, Matusmoto is not directly concerned with reconciling the morpho-phonological unity of *(s)ase* causatives with their syntactic complexity, since these data belong to different levels. The novelty in Matusmoto's work, if

compared to previous research, is that he does not treat all morphological causative uniformly in terms of their mono/biclausal properties. He acknowledges the existence of two different case marking patterns of the causee – the Accusative vs. the Dative-marked causee – and, building on previous works (Kuroda 1965, Kuno 1973, Shibatani 1976b), he proposes a more refined semantic classification of morphological causatives. First he distinguishes between inducing and permissive causation: in inducing causation the causer's action is one of persuasion, ordering, psychologically pressuring or physically manipulating a causee, while in permissive causation it is the causee that initiates the action, the causer's role being only to approve or tacitly permit the causee's actions. Going further, Matsumoto refers to the observation made by Shibatani 1976b, who claimed that both *wo*-causatives and *ni*-causatives can represent inducing, as well as permissive causation, with slight differences in meaning. Therefore, a more detailed distinction is made between persuasive/coercive causation in the case of inducing causatives, and explicit/implicit causation in the case of permissive causatives. Inducing causation is persuasive when a causer appeals to the will of the causee to bring about the caused event, the caused event being thus causee-controlled; the coercive interpretation of inducing causation is activated when a causer brings about the caused event by force, authority, psychological pressure, or physical manipulation, without appealing to the causee's will, the caused event being in this case causer-controlled. Permissive causation, on the other hand, is explicit when a causer willingly approves the permitted process by resorting to some kind of permission-granting act and implicit when a causer unwillingly gives tacit consent to the permitted action, refraining from some interfering act. These distinctions are represented schematically as follows:



The distinct semantic causative types will behave differently regarding the issue of biclausality. Matsumoto looks into subject honorification, reflexive binding, control, adjunct scope and verbal anaphora in both intransitive and transitive-based morphological causatives. The pattern of subject honorification is similar in the intransitive-based and the transitive-based causatives: in the case of permissive causation, both Dative- and Accusative-marked causees can be the beneficiary of respect, and hence they are functionally subjects:

(43) a. Sensei ni wa [manzoku ga iku made] o-yasumi ni nar-asete oku no ga ii deshou.
Teacher-Dat-Top satisfaction-Nom go twell rest-Hon-Caus-Conj leave-Nmz-Nom good-Mod
'It would be good to leave the teacher to have a rest till he/she is satisfied'

b. Sensei wo [manzoku ga iku made] o-yasumi ni nar-asete oku no ga ii deshou.
Teacher-Acc satisfaction-Nom go twell rest-Hon-Caus-Conj leave-Nmz-Nom good-Mod
'It would be good to leave the teacher to have a rest till he/she is satisfied'

(Matsumoto 1996: 135)

(44) Sensei ni wa [manzoku ga iku made] sono hon wo o-yomi ni narasete okimashou.

Teacher-Dat-Top satisfaction-Nom go twell that book-Acc read-Hon-Caus-Conj leave-Imp
'Let's let the teacher read that book till he/she is satisfied'
(Matsumoto 1996: 145)

In the case of inducing causation, the honorific marking can be placed on the causativized verb as a whole, in which case the semantic reading is that of inducing coercive causative:

(45) a. Sensei wa John wo muriyari o hashir-ase ni nat-ta.
Teacher-Top John-Acc forcibly run-Hon-Caus-Past
'The teacher forcibly made John run'
b. Sensei wa John ni sono hon wo o-yom-ase ni nat-ta.
Teacher-Top John-Dat that book-Acc read-Hon-Caus-Past
'The teacher honorably made John read that book'

(45a) is an example of an intransitive-based causative, while (45b) is an example of a transitive-based causative.
Matsumoto claims that, in spite of the theory according to which it is impossible to place the honorific marking on the base verb in the case of inducing causation (see Shibatani 1978, Kuno 1983), one can still find acceptable examples if the honorific marker is also placed on the causative morpheme, so that we will not get pragmatically infelicitous situations in which a non-honorable person makes an honorable person do something. Compare the following examples:

(46) *Karera wa [shiburu] sensei ni mo soko made o-hashiri ni nar-ase-ta.
They-Top hesitate teacher-Dat too there as far as run-Hon-Caus-Past
'They made the hesitant teacher run there too'

(47) ? Kantoku wa kinori shinai Tanaka-sensei ni mo soko made o-hashiri ni nar-ase-rare-mashita.
Manager-Top unwilling Tanaka-teacher-Dat too there as far as run-Hon-Caus-Pol-Past
'The manager made the unwilling teacher Tanaka run there too'

However, the honorific marking of the base verb is possible only in the case of inducing persuasive causation:

(48) *Sono sensei wa Yamada-sensei ni sono hon wo muriyari o-yomi ni nar-ase-rare-mashita.

That teacher-Top Yamada-teacher-Dat that book-Acc forcibly read-Hon-Caus-Pol-Past
'That teacher forced the teacher Yamada to read that book'

Based on such data, Matsumoto concludes that inducing coercive causatives are functionally monoclausal, while inducing persuasive causatives, as well as permissive causatives (both explicit and implicit) are functionally biclausal. His proposal finds further support from all the arguments brought by the previous researchers: reflexive binding, adjunct scope, verbal anaphora (the 'do so' test), control, desiderativization, passivization.

Matsumoto's analysis is even more complex, since he reconsiders the differences between lexical and morphological causatives, both in syntactic and semantic terms. The different semantic types of morphological causatives also have different argument structures. Thus, while inducing causatives and explicit permissive causative take a causer, a causee and an event as their thematic arguments, the implicit permissive causatives take only a causer and an event argument. Nevertheless, all morphological causatives are biclausal at a-structure, while at f-structure their mono/biclausality cannot be accounted for in a uniform manner.

The 'hybrid' analyses of Japanese morphological causatives offer, in our opinion, the best way to explain the contradicting features in the behavior of this construction. LFG's multi-level analysis seems suitable to accommodate all types of arguments that previous research has brought under different linguistic theories. Moreover, it addresses a major problem in causatives, namely the semantic interpretation of the two different case markings of the causee. It appears thus that an account of causative constructions must necessarily include both syntactic and semantic aspects, with different meaning interpretations being reflected in different syntactic representations.

CHAPTER 5
FINAL REMARKS

The primary objective of this book is to provide an account of causative constructions in Japanese and English, based on a contrastive analysis of those semantic and syntactic aspects that I considered relevant for my aim. Although the two levels of analysis are separated for methodological reasons, I reached the conclusion that, in the specific case of causative constructions, a purely semantic or a purely syntactic analysis is not possible or, if carried out, may lead to controversial and more often than not contradicting results. Therefore, the necessity of an approach that reconciles the two levels of language became imperative. To take only one example, the semantic causation types of direct and indirect causation correspond to different formal representations within the same language, one involving a monoclausal structure while the other involves a biclausal structure. Furthermore, the different case marking of the causee in the case of Japanese morphological causatives is directly connected to the different semantic interpretations that the causee can have. Examples such as these made it impossible for us to remain within only one of the two levels, hence the complexity of the approach. On the other hand, trying to cover both the syntax and the semantics of causative constructions at the same time has proved to be rather difficult at times, given the number of problems arising from the vastness of the domain. That is why the selection of the issues to be investigated might have left aside details that need further study and, at the same time, prevented us from going into very specific details in certain cases.

A major difficulty I was confronted with was the lack of a clear definition of causative constructions, especially in regard to the conceptual area that they cover. Therefore, drawing on the philosophical distinction between causality and causation proposed by M. Hulswit I extended it onto the linguistic domain and I identified the linguistic expressions specialized in encoding each of the two concepts. Causative constructions are, in this light, those linguistic constructions that express causation, understood as the production of an effect in an entity by a cause/causing agent. This is, in my opinion, one of the important contributions that our paper brings. The choice of causative constructions as expressions of causation was motivated by the possibility of singularizing the causer/causing event and also the various types of causing events – INITIATE, CONTROL and CAUSE - within the structure of causative constructions. This evidence shows that in causative constructions the emphasis is laid on the effect-producing *process*

rather than on the simple cause-effect *relation*, as is the case in the expressions encoding causal relations solely.
As regards the findings related to each of the three formal causative types, the results are briefly summarized hereunder.

Lexical causatives (Japanese and English)
Both in English and in Japanese, lexical causatives are treated as lexical transitive verbs carrying a causative meaning. Therefore, while their syntactic structure can be represented in the same manner as with transitive verbs, the semantics of lexical causatives poses interesting and difficult questions. The syntactic structure of a lexical causative is explained by introducing an abstract causative light verb that takes a VP complement headed by the base verb, which is then raised to adjoin the abstract predicate.
The great degree of compactness in lexical causatives makes it difficult to separate the causing process and the result formally, and the description of the elements of the causative situation requires in this case that the predicate be decomposed into several semantic constituents. By predicate decomposition we obtain the Lexical Conceptual Structure for the various types of lexical causatives:

- [x CONTROL [BECOME [y BE AT z]]] for lexical causatives expressing extended causation, with animate causers.
- [x ACT ON y] INITIATE [y…], where [y…] represents an autonomous event, for lexical causatives expressing onset causation.
- [x CAUSE [Event]], for EO psychological verbs.

As regards the semantic distinction between direct and indirect causation, lexical causatives have been proven to express direct causation, which is closely related to their formal compactness. The incorporation of the causing event and of the result into a single lexical unit is much better suited to illustrate the spatial and temporal overlap of the causing event with the result, required by the direct causation.
The causee of a lexical causative is generally inanimate, displaying no volition and no control. That is consistent with the properties that lexical causatives share with transitive verbs, since such a causee type can be easily interpreted as an object. Animate causees are allowed with lexical causatives, but in situations where they lack control over their actions.
The result component of a lexical causative is usually of the accomplishment type in Vendler's 1967 classification. The sub-event in the structure of the result verb can be represented by using the following predicates: BE, implying a change of state, BECOME, in the case of EO pshychological verbs or DO, in the case of verbs whose semantic predicate

of the causing process is INITIATE or, in English, unergative verbs used transitively.

Periphrastic causatives (English)

Periphrastic causatives stand at the other end of the compactness scale as compared to lexical causatives. The causing event and the result are expressed by two different verbs, which makes the delimitation of the causing event from the result easier. Syntactically, I analyzed periphrastic causatives as biclausal control structures, with the causative verb taking a sentential complement. More specifically, it is the lexically determined type of control that applies in the case of English periphrastic causatives, with the causative verb taking a non-finite clausal complement (Kroeger 2004). At the same time, the object of the matrix clause being identical with the subject of the embedded clause allows us to categorize the type of control active in periphrastic causatives as functional control (Bresnan 1982). However, *make* and *have* also behave like raising verbs, in allowing objective expletives. *Make* can be thus interpreted as either a pure control verb, with the meaning 'force' or as a raising verb, with the meaning 'cause something by overcoming some sort of resistance'. *Have* also has a distinct function besides that of pure causative, namely that of showing experience and being closer to a passive structure in this respect. The English *have* covers what in Japanese is rendered by two distinct structures – causative and passive.

Semantically, periphrastic causatives express indirect causation, the two distinct predicates being the formal expression of distinct events. With English periphrastic causatives, the causer can be either agentive or non-agentive, while the behavior of the causee differs according to the causative verb used. Animate causees are allowed with all causative verbs, *have*, in particular, showing a great affinity for animate causees. Aside from animacy, parameters such as causer involvement or causee resistance are also present in the selection of a specific causative verb: for example, *let* requires lack of causer involvement while the choice of *get* suggests the presence of causee resistance.

Morphological causatives (Japanese)

In terms of compactness, morphological causatives are in an intermediary position, between lexical and periphrastic causatives. This intermediary placement poses interesting problems both in the semantic and in the syntactic analysis.

Syntactically, morphological causatives have been initially described as involving either a biclausal or a monoclausal structure, as the causative

morpheme *(s)ase* shows verbal characteristics, while, at the same time, the cluster V-*(s)ase* looks like a lexical unit and also behaves like a lexical unit in certain cases. After considering the arguments that have been brought in favor of or against a lexical interpretation of morphological causatives, I discussed the main directions in analyzing said constructions from a syntactic point of view. The two main directions mentioned above were presented by discussing the representative contributions brought by linguists working in each line of research. At the same time, I tried to point out both the valid arguments and the shortcomings of each contribution. The main problems arise from the fact that each of the two major sides involved has generally ignored the others' arguments and has tried to prove that morphological causatives are exclusively monoclausal or exclusively biclausal. A new research line was opened in the '80s and continued during the 90's with the so-called "hybrid" analyses, which investigated the matter of mono/biclausality of morphological causatives on different levels of the language, trying to reconcile the lexical and the non-lexical properties of the construction. A very coherent account is that of Matsumoto's, who, in a complex study concerning the wordhood of various complex predicates in Japanese (Matsumoto 1996), analyzes morphological causatives starting from their semantic properties. He proves that the Japanese *(s)ase* causative can be both monoclausal and biclausal at the same time, depending on the semantic interpretation that they have. Furthermore, working in LFG, he claims that linguistic constructions can be monoclausal at some level of the language and biclausal at other levels. Thus, the *(s)ase* causative does not behave uniformly, hence the impossibility of a uniform treatment in terms of its syntactic structure. The four semantic types of morphological causatives get the following syntactic characterization: inducing coercive causatives are monoclausal at f-structure, while inducing persuasive causatives, as well as explicit and implicit permissive causatives are biclausal at the same functional structure. However, in terms of argument structure, they are all biclausal.

As regards the semantics of morphological causatives, the main aspects that I discussed concerned the type of causation expressed by *(s)ase* causatives, as well as the semantic parameters behind the different case marking of the causee. Our findings have shown that morphological causatives express indirect causation, although further distinctions within the area of indirect causation are necessary. I examined the notion of sociative causation as it is defined in Shibatani and Pardeshi 2002 and I concluded that in the case of Japanese, although certain uses of morphological causatives can get a reading that is close to what the two

authors call sociative causation, there is no formal evidence to support the postulation of sociative causation as a distinct causation type in Japanese. I believe that a classification based on the parameter of (physical) contact is more appropriate in this case, but the semantic causation type is still indirect causation.

In regard to the different case marking that the causee can get in intransitive-based morphological causatives, following a well-established tradition, I considered the parameter of volition as the main criterion for the case selection. Thus, the Dative-marking implies a volitional causee, while an Accusative-marking signals an unwilling causee. Other parameters, such as animacy, control or affectedness can also be considered as playing a part in the semantics of the causee in Japanese, but the most prominent seems to be, however, volition/intention.

The essential characteristics of the three types of causative constructions in Japanese and English can be schematically represented as follows:

	Lexical causatives	**Morphological causatives**	**Periphrastic causatives**
	Japanese and English	*Japanese*	*English*
SYNTACTIC ASPECTS	• transitive verbs carrying a causative meaning • monoclausal	• display both monoclausal and biclausal features; the distinctive factor lies in the semantic properties.	• basically control structures, although some causative verbs also display properties characteristic to raising verbs • biclausal

	Lexical causatives	**Morphological causatives**	**Periphrastic causatives**
	Japanese and English	*Japanese*	*English*
SEMANTIC ASPECTS	• express direct causation • causee is non-volitional and lacks control • the causing event component can be represented by means of predicate decomposition, through the postulation of various semantic predicates. • the result event component is generally of the accomplishment type.	• express indirect causation • the presence/absence of the causee's volition/intention influences the causee's case marking.	• express indirect causation • the parameters of animacy and resistance (related to the causee) influence the choice of the causative verb.

Our analysis built on and extended past theories of causative constructions in a critical manner. While the research method adopted in the present study is rather theoretical, it contributes to a deeped understanding of causatives, offering a unitary and organized view on causatives and causation. The distinctions that I made in the conceptual domain of causatives, for example, can be further used in more specific studies on causality and causation and their corresponding linguistic expressions. Furthermore, an interesting topic to develop would be the way in which the notion of compactness is reflected in everyday use of causatives. Of particular interest would be the difference between the uses of *wo*-causatives and *ni*-causatives. Although at this point I do not have enough data to support my assumption, there may be a correlation between the monoclausal reading of the *wo*-causative and the omission of the Accusative particle in certain conversational situations:

Taro ne, *Hanako* ikaseta.
Taro Well Hanako go-Caus-Past
'Well, Taro made Hanako leave'

In colloquial speech, the causee Hanako may not bear an explicit case marking. However, in the absence of a case marker, the first reading would

be the coercive one and the implicit case would be the Accusative. It is less probable that the omitted case is the Dative in such circumstances. This kind of evidence would support the idea of a correlation between monoclausality – compactness – direct causation.

The contribution that our analysis brings to a better understanding of causative constructions in Japanese and English can be summarized as follows: firstly, to the best of our knowledge there is no such contrastive account of causative constructions in Romania. In my analysis I covered a vast area of issues concerning causatives, both from a syntactic and from a semantic perspective. In doing so, I tried to point out the problematic aspects in each of these areas as they appear in the literature on causatives. At the same time, drawing on existing theories, I filled in the theoretical gaps that I encountered, thus providing a more clearly organized and a much more comprehensive account of causative constructions. One of these gaps was the very definition of what causative constructions are. Since it addresses the concepts of causation and causality, my proposal goes beyond the two particular languages that I worked on and can be used and applied in any study on causative constructions. While the conceptual distinction between causality and causation has been used in philosophy, its application on language and the identification of the linguistic devices used to express each concept belongs to us. Furthermore, I challenged some recent theories concerning the semantics of Japanese causatives and I proved that, in the case of Japanese, they are not sustainable. It is the case of the so-called sociative causation which, although present and overtly marked in other languages, does not actually occur in Japanese as a distinct causation type. By applying various tests (see section 3.2.2.1), I demonstrated that the active causation type in Japanese is actually indirect causation, the sociative nuance coming from the properties of the aspectual form of the verb.

The ideas presented in the book can be used as a source of documentation by other researchers who can find a vast amount of information organized in a unitary structure. At the same time, they also pose some questions that can be explored in future research. The question of whether the compactness or the monoclausality of the inductive coercive causative is reflected in the omission of the Accusative particle in spoken Japanese can extend the research towards a very vivid domain, that of the spoken language.

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