Discoursing on 'European' Identity

A Study of Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy in 1990 – 1996

Loretta C. Sălăjan

Presa Universitară Clujeană
2017

LORETTA C. SĂLĂJAN

DISCOURSING ON 'EUROPEAN' IDENTITY

A STUDY OF ROMANIA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN 1990-1996

Referenți științifici:

Prof. univ. dr. Claudiu Porumbăcean

Conf. univ. dr. Cristian Bențe

ISBN 978-606-37-0205-1

Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai
Presa Universitară Clujeană
Director: Codruța Săcelean
Str. Hasdeu nr. 51
400371 Cluj-Napoca, România
Tel./Fax: (+40)-264-597.401
E-mail: editura@editura.ubbcluj.ro
http://www.editura.ubbcluj.ro/

LORETTA C. SĂLĂJAN

DISCOURSING ON 'EUROPEAN' IDENTITY

A STUDY OF ROMANIA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN 1990-1996

PRESA UNIVERSITARĂ CLUJEANĂ

2017

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom).

Aș dori să le mulțumesc părinților mei – Rozetta și Vasile – și bunicii mele Iustina, care prin iubirea și susținerea lor necondiționată m-au ajutat de-a lungul multor ani de studiu. Această carte este dedicată lor și speranței că România va beneficia de un mai mare interes academic și politic la nivel internațional.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The central purpose of this study is to analyse the role of national identity in shaping the story of Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 1996. The investigation explains why and how Romania's aspired Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-definitions and intense discursive negotiation, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions impacted on the state's foreign policy decisions. Romania's post-communist foreign policy had two major goals that marked the evolution of national identity – integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). However, the 'Western' orientation reflected in NATO and EU membership was not necessarily a natural choice for Romania and emerged after domestic contestation among political leaders. The narratives of Romanian national identity and foreign policy are nuanced and far from straightforward, particularly in the period 1990-1996.

The original contribution of this research to the Romanian foreign policy field derives from conceptual and empirical aspects. The book features a multi-dimensional framework of national identity which draws from four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. It is not intended to be a constructivist project, because the empirical material on Romanian identity and foreign policy during 1990-1996 brought to the surface some problematic issues that could not be entirely solved by using constructivist notions and instruments. The insights and lacunae of constructivism have been supplemented by the other literatures, which together help to understand the intricacies of a state's national identity. The inter-disciplinary nature of the ideational framework employed here offers a complex view of national identity that captures its internal and external dynamic. National identity formation represents a two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both domestic and international factors. The internal sources of national identity are the nation and collective memories about the historical past. The external dimension of national identity requires international recognition, which is intertwined with a state's sense of self-esteem.

Another original contribution of this research to the Romanian foreign policy literature is the application of national identity to a discursively rich, yet difficult time frame of the state's post-communist international politics. The period 1990-1996 was very significant for the re-articulation of Romanian identity

and provides key case studies or 'formative moments'.[1] These 'formative moments' are favourable times that allow new meanings to (re)appear and new identities to be (re)established.[2] To identify the themes of Romania's national identity, the project has examined the discourses of elites as the main actors of foreign policy. The seven years following the 1989 Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship were particularly meaningful for Romania as a democratic state and its foreign affairs, since they constituted the opportunity for a fresh start. This time frame contains three case studies showing the re-definitions of national identity and how the latter have influenced foreign policy: the 1991 Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty', the articulation of Romania's 'European' self-image and the complicated Hungarian-Romanian relations that obstructed the signing of a bilateral cooperation treaty until mid-1996.

To organise the analytical content, this introductory chapter has several main objectives. First, it discusses the methodology, as well as the ontological and epistemological stances utilised in the research process. Second, it features the central question which has driven the investigation regarding Romania's national identity and post-communist foreign policy. Third, it presents the overall structure of the book, with brief accounts of what each chapter aims to accomplish. These introductory sections lay out the methodological foundations of the project, which will be followed by the ideational framework on national identity and the empirical analysis of Romanian discourses and foreign policy positions during 1990-1996.

Methodology

This book represents a qualitative research project, which relies on discourse analysis as a methodological tool to interpret the available primary sources. The types of relevant Romanian material include a wide variety of texts that pertain to foreign policy discourses. The body of primary sources compiled for the project consists of the following broad categories: a) the official stances of Romanian political leaders - Presidents, Premiers, Ministers - on the state's foreign policy, expressed through public speeches, statements, interviews or press conferences, most of them being available in libraries or archives and some online; b) legal documents such as the Romanian Constitution, the laws regulating the organisation and activity of the state's external affairs, as well as treaties between Romania and other states; c) other official documents belonging to state institutions – national security strategies, governmental programmes, white papers, press releases - or to political parties and international organisations; d) news articles that help to fill in information blanks and underline how the

[1] A notion taken from Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 77.
[2] Ibid, p. 83.

media reflects discursively the subjects present on the Romanian foreign policy agenda. In order to ensure the triangulation of research findings, the project has also used memoirs, biographies, books with interviews and other useful collections of texts from actors who have occupied state positions significant for Romania's post-communist foreign policy. The Romanian material is examined by applying a certain methodology of discourse analysis, which needs to be discussed at this point.

'Discourse' and 'discourse analysis' are profoundly contested terms, whose definitions range from communication in a particular context to a theoretical framework on the study of language. Michel Foucault, who founded the concept of 'discourse', employed various understandings of it. His broadening of the term 'discourse' was intentional and quite clearly expressed - 'instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word "discourse", I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements'.[3] Foucault's work is not a component of the ideational perspective adopted by this book. But his different meanings of 'discourse' are useful to identify a comprehensive working definition for the term. Throughout the examination of the Romanian empirical material, discourse alternatively illustrated each of Foucault's three notions: 'the general domain of all statements', a specific 'group of statements' (e.g. the Romanian discourse on minority rights in the early 1990s) and 'a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements' (the major discursive theme of Romania's national identity – the self-image of being 'European'). This brings some conceptual ambiguity, yet that is inevitable because discourse has become so deeply ingrained in academic language that finding a suitable replacement to convey its complexity would be an almost impossible task. Discourse and ideas have a strong link, which is relevant for the formation of national identity. Roger Fowler has defined their relationship as follows:

> '"[d]iscourse" is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – "ideology" in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded'.[4]

Depending on how one understands the term 'discourse', discourse analysis might also mean different things. First, it is a methodological instrument by which texts and speech acts are examined. Second, discourse analysis may refer to certain conceptual assumptions, which treat language as more than a

[3] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 90.
[4] Roger Fowler cited in Sara Mills, *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 6.

transparent vehicle of communication; discourse not only constitutes social reality, but is also constructed by it. At the same time, discourse analysis stands for more than a single methodology or a homogeneous theory; it is rather a multi-faceted approach dealing with 'the study of language in use', as well as 'the study of human meaning-making' or 'the production of meaning in social life'.[5] In other words, 'social reality is produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them meaning'.[6] Here it should be noted that this project applies discourse analysis as a research tool. Thus, the methodology of discourse analysis has the following objectives and features -

> 'ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and systematic study of texts (...) Discursive activity does not occur in a vacuum, however, and discourses do not "possess" meaning. Instead, discourses are shared and social, emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is embedded'.[7]

Discourses about a state's national identity and foreign policy are contextual and depend on international events and narratives. These discourses are not 'produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration'; they are 'always connected to other discourses which are produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently'.[8]

A great advantage of discourse analysis as a methodological instrument derives from its flexibility. Instead of applying a fixed mechanism to every empirical example, some discourse scholars use the approach in less constricting ways and 'articulate their concepts in each particular enactment of concrete research'.[9] Sometimes a set procedure of doing discourse analysis limits to an extent the kind of knowledge provided by a case study. The absence of an established step-by-step scheme could be seen as a weak point, yet the interpretive nature of discourse research offers valuable advantages. For instance, content analysis focuses on pre-determined categories that need to explicitly appear in the available material. Compared to content analysis, the more flexible nature of discourse analysis enables the researcher to find both explicit manifestations and implicit meanings or assumptions that may otherwise be overlooked. The enquiry of this book has been guided by two principles put forward by Jutta Weldes, who explains how elites shape self-images, foreign policy representations and identities out of the circulating ideational structures. The first dimension of this process – articulation - has been described as follows:

---

[5] Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, Simeon J. Yates, *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: SAGE in association with the Open University, 2001), p. 3.
[6] Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction* (London: SAGE, 2002), p. 3.
[7] Ibid, p. 4.
[8] Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak cited in ibid.
[9] David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 5.

> '[t]he term "articulation" refers to the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements. In this way, different terms and ideas come to connote or to 'summon' one another, to be welded into associative chains that make up an identifiable, if not a logically consistent, whole (...) With their successful repeated articulation, these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an accurate description of reality'.[10]

To configure stable images, articulation needs to be combined with a second dimension - interpellation - 'a dual process whereby identities or subject-positions are created and concrete individuals are "hailed" into or interpellated by them'.[11] The period 1990-1996 showed an abundance of (re)emerging understandings in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, which formed the patterns and themes of an ideational foundation for the state's post-communist foreign policy.

Moreover, the central research question investigated in this book focuses on what are the re-definitions of Romania's national identity during 1990-1996 and how and why they have influenced the state's foreign policy. By asking both 'how' and 'why-questions', the project departs from the dominant approaches to Romanian foreign policy analysis, which usually deal with answering only *why* certain decisions resulting in concrete actions were taken. Ontologically, 'why-questions' already presuppose a background of meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships.[12] So 'how' and 'what' types of research questions take things a step further by uncovering the way in which Romanian understandings, objects and subjects have been constituted, as well as their impact on foreign policy. With regards to epistemology, Jennifer Milliken has opinionated that discourse researchers have a common rejection of 'epistemic realism'; they employ 'a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying "real causes", concerning itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another'.[13] In more conventional International Relations (IR) terminology, the epistemological position used here is 'understanding' foreign policy behaviour by looking at it through national identity lenses.

As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have noted, the approaches of 'explaining' and 'understanding' should be distinguished because they embody divergent purposes. On the one hand, 'explaining' is about identifying what caused a

---

[10] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 98-99.

[11] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2(3), 1996, p. 287.

[12] Roxanne L. Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37(3), 1993, p. 298.

[13] Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 5(2), 1999, pp. 225-226.

particular event or state of affairs.[14] In order to rigorously establish or dismiss a causal relationship between two variables, a number of cases are examined by generating and testing hypotheses. On the other hand, 'understanding' reflects the search for a meaning, not necessarily the cause. Such a method involves treating history not as a source of information that might falsify a theory, but as a narrative which allows a greater appreciation of the origins, evolution and consequences of an event or state of affairs.[15] After having laid out the methodological underpinnings of the research process, our discussion moves on to the last introductory segment – the analytical plan of the arguments.

Structure of Arguments

This project has a dual concern – theoretical and empirical, which has been translated into its overarching structure. Following the introduction, the book has been divided into four main chapters – one conceptual and three empirical in nature. Chapter I offers background knowledge about Romanian history and politics, which will be necessary to better understand the main analysis of Romania's post-communist national identity and foreign policy. It features a historical survey of important 'formative moments' in Romania's pre-1990 evolution and an overview of the turbulent post-1990 political context.

Chapter II configures the ideational framework of national identity that will be applied to Romanian foreign policy. The conceptualisation of national identity draws from four literatures that relate to constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. The four literatures create a multi-dimensional view on national identity, which stresses its internal and external dimensions. National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological process that encompasses both domestic and international elements. The internal sources of national identity refer to the nation and collective memories or interpretations of the nation's past. The external dimension of national identity is about a state's self-images being internationally recognised, which links to an increased or reduced sense of self-esteem depending on whether or not those self-images are accepted in the global arena.

Chapter III begins the focus on the period 1990-1996 by examining a 'formative moment' that defined Romania's international orientation towards 'Europe', after an episode of domestic contestation among elites – the 1991 Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty'. Political leaders had to answer an existential question for post-communist Romania – to be or not to be 'European'? The Romanian President signed the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty', which implied a

[14] Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 45.
[15] Ibid.

security relationship with the USSR that could have prevented Romania from seeking NATO and EU membership. This 'Eastern' international direction was not shared by the majority of Romanian officials, who envisioned a European identity and future for their state. After opting definitively for 'Europe', the second 'formative moment' of 1990-1996 saw the emergence of Romania's foreign policy imaginary that featured a prominent theme or self-image: being 'European'.

Chapter IV develops the arguments by analysing the third 'formative moment' of Romania's national identity, as the 'European' self-image was very meaningful in 1990-1996 and influenced its problematic relations with Hungary. This case study highlighted for Romania the dynamic of European identity contestation, dialogue and external validation between the self and other. The Romanian-Hungarian treaty could not move beyond the inflexible foreign policy stances of both states, which operated on different conceptions regarding what 'European' identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. As the authoritative 'Europe' was still debating the matter, Romania and Hungary did not sign a bilateral cooperation treaty until mid-1996.

The final chapter contains the concluding remarks concerning the evolution of Romania's national identity and foreign policy between 1990 and 1996.

Chapter I: The Context of Romanian Identity and Politics

A thorough understanding of Romania's post-communist national identity and foreign policy requires a wider knowledge of the state's historical and political background. After 1990 the articulations of Romanian identity and international affairs had historical origins that enabled elites to recover the idealised image of a Western and democratic state. This chapter aims to configure a dual foundation for the future empirical arguments: the history underlying Romanian identity and the political context established after the revolution of 1989. The discussion contains a selective survey of 'formative moments' for Romania's national identity and foreign policy before 1989, with a special focus on the post-1918 time frame which saw the Great Unification of the Romanian state.

The interwar period was very important in defining an aspired Western identity and international orientation for Romania, along with long-standing ideas about the state's relations with salient others like France. The interwar French memory-myth shaped the traditional diplomatic and cultural rapport between the two states, which would again be meaningful after 1990. As the communist dictatorship was officially installed in 1948, Romania was mostly separated from the West for more than fifty years. The chapter also explores the 'formative moment' of Romania's post-communist politics and the events that marked the state's difficult transition to a democratic system. Thus, the chapter has been structured into four main sections: articulating Romanian identity between the West and the East, which includes the French memory-myth; Romania's interwar domestic politics and international relations; Romania under the communist dictatorship; and finally, the turbulent internal context following the Romanian popular revolution of December 1989.

Historical Background – Formative Moments of National Identity

A defining characteristic of Romanian national identity over time is its place between the West and East. The 'dilemma of choice' between these two worlds manifested from the beginning of statehood in the fourteenth century, when the Romanian Principalities (Transilvania, Moldova and Valahia) were created. The West-East encounter arguably occurred even earlier when the Dacians and

Thracians (ancestors of Romanians) came into contact with the ancient Greek cities founded near the Black Sea, then were conquered by Rome in the early second century.[1] Romania became connected with the West through its ethnic descent, neo-Latin language and historical evolution. The East marked Romanian territories via the Orthodox religion and Byzantine Empire, whose legacy shifted to relations with the Serbs and Bulgarians. The aggressive advance of Ottoman Turks in the later fourteenth and fifteenth century forced Valahian and Moldovan princes to make a stand. They identified with Western Europe and participated in Christian crusades to stop the Turks. Ottoman suzerainty eventually encompassed Moldova and Valahia and lasted until the early nineteenth century, which brought the Romanian Principalities closer to the East without completely separating them from Western influence.

As Keith Hitchins has explained, '[t]he Romanians preserved their institutions and social structure and over time exercised greater or lesser degrees of administrative autonomy. Although vassal status prohibited formal relations with foreign powers, neither principality was isolated from the West. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century they carried on trade and maintained diplomatic contacts, even if indirectly, with Central Europe. They were open to varied cultural and intellectual currents from the West'.[2] Ottoman suzerainty had a reduced impact on Valahia and Moldova, since the Turks were satisfied with receiving the agreed tributes from their vassal countries and were not overly concerned with Romanian domestic affairs. This allowed Romanians in the two Principalities to preserve their Orthodox religion, cultural values and identity with limited outside interference. Meanwhile, the Romanians in Transilvania were ruled by the Habsburg and later Austro-Hungarian Empire, struggling for political rights with little success until 1918.[3] Compared to the Ottoman suzerainty in Valahia and Moldova, the Austro-Hungarian administration was much more restrictive for ethnic Romanians and forced many of them to convert to Catholicism. The notion of a Romanian national identity was not fully expressed until all the territories united in 1918.

Moldova and Valahia managed a de facto union by electing the same Prince - Alexandru Ioan Cuza - in 1859, who after seven years was replaced by Prince Carol I of the German Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen dynasty. Domestic political elites thought that building a constitutional monarchy under a foreign king would help to consolidate the de facto union in the international context, hence preventing neighbouring empires from separating Valahia and Moldova. The united Principalities attained independence in 1878 and were recognised as the Romanian Kingdom in 1881.[4] Therefore, the Romanian state emerging in the

[1] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 1-2.
[2] Ibid, p. 2.
[3] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 34.
[4] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005), p. 2.

twentieth century was a synthesis of West and East. It was dramatically altered by the outcomes of World War I, whose aftermath found the Romanian Kingdom in the winning camp. The post-war settlements facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The mid-nineteenth century and interwar period were a noteworthy time in the historical trajectory of Romanian identity and foreign policy, because it was filled with re-definitions of national identity, debates about the state's future development and international direction, as well as long-standing ideas like the French memory-myth which would be re-activated after 1990.

Articulating Romanian Identity between the West and the East

The themes of post-1918 continued the crucial discourses prior to the unification. As a Romanian scholar has argued,

> '[f]rom (...) the beginning of modern Romania, systematically every two to four decades the drama of alternatives has been unleashed. The problem posed during it was, invariably, what path of development to follow. The dispute would flare up overnight and last a good while, then subside in favour of one of the camps (...) But then some major socio-political event would unleash the confrontation again in a new phase of this unbreakable cycle'.[5]

Defining national identity and how that would be embodied in Romania's evolution as a state were the primary concerns of domestic elites. A participant in the process succinctly noted - 'West or East? Europe or the Balkans, urban civilization or the rural spirit? [Since 1860] the questions are still the same'.[6] The great task of the nineteenth century had been the modernisation (understood as Westernisation) of Romania. The challenge was how to change 'a patriarchal and authoritarian system, a society overwhelmingly rural, dominated by landed property, in which the modern stimulating factors of capitalism and democracy were almost completely absent'.[7] National leaders came up with the solution of emulating the Western European political culture. They heavily borrowed institutions like a new Constitution, Parliament, responsible Government and legal codes, which were subsequently implemented in Romania to a more or less successful degree. The literary critic Titu Maiorescu wrote an influential article in 1868, in which he criticised this superficial attitude and described it as incarnating 'forms without substance'.[8] Indeed, a profound transformation of Romanian mentalities and political system needed more than an imitation of the West promoted at elite level. The debates about identity and the state's future course were bound to become more acute after the unification of Great Romania.

---

[5] Zigu Ornea, *Tradiționalism şi modernitate în deceniul al treilea/ Traditionalism and Modernity in the Third Decade* (Bucharest: Eminescu Publishing, 1980), p. 100.

[6] Mihail Sebastian cited in Irina Livezeanu, 'Excerpts from a Troubled Book: An Episode in Romanian Literature', *Cross Currents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, volume 3, 1984, p. 313.

[7] Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), p. 35.

[8] Titu Maiorescu, 'În contra direcției de astăzi în cultura română'/ 'Against the Contemporary Direction of Romanian Culture', *Convorbiri Literare* (1868).

The aftermath of World War I gave Romania the opportunity to fulfil a long-time national aspiration. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, the ethnic Romanians declared their wish to unite with Romania. The Romanian Kingdom was joined by Basarabia (27 March 1918), Bucovina (28 November 1918) and Transilvania (1 December 1918). The result turned out to be a doubling of Romania's population and land.[9] This fragile unification did not make Romania feel more secure, however, as Hungary was not reconciled to the loss of its former territories. The international context was further complicated by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Romania feared that Bolshevism would spread across the borders, which sharpened anti-Russian sentiments and reinforced Western identification. Russia was now firmly the 'barbarous East' and was meant to be opposed by embracing the West.[10] The intellectual and political discourses of interwar Romania were preoccupied with articulating national identity, although not everyone used this exact term. The ultimate objective was to form a consolidated national state, a strong economy and vibrant culture. There were three main groups debating the various representations of Romanian identity – 'westernisers', 'pro-orientals' and the 'third way' supporters.[11] The 'third way' camp was not homogenous and included more Western or Eastern oriented advocates. They all stressed ideas of Romanian exceptionalism that had to be protected from 'the corrupting effects of imported civilizations', especially the Western one.[12] The westernisers and 'third way' promoters held the most intense and extensive debates, which suggests that pro-orientals played a marginal part in the discourse. The persuasiveness of pro-oriental arguments was certainly limited by the negative associations with Bolshevik Russia.

The discussions focussed on more than national identity and Romania's international stance. There were many other themes entangled in the rhetoric of West or East or somewhere in between: whether to opt for industrialisation or remain an agrarian society, the type of democratic regime, the role of religion. This overview of different positions is not exhaustive and only contains the most prominent contributors. First, the pro-orientals (also called at the time the 'Orthodoxists') were represented by Nichifor Crainic:

> '[i]f the mission of the Romanian people is to create a culture after its image and likeness, this implies as well how its orientation must be resolved. Whoever recommends an orientation toward the West speaks nonsense. Orientation contains within itself the notion of Orient and means directing ourselves toward the Orient (...) Everywhere it is said that light comes from the East. And for us, who find ourselves geographically in the Orient and who, through our Orthodox religion, hold to the truths of the Eastern world, there can be no other orientation

[9] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 2.
[10] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, p. 44.
[11] The categories of 'westernisers' and 'pro-orientals' have been drawn from Katherine Verdery's work, to which I added the 'third way' group.
[12] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, p. 47.

> than toward the Orient, toward ourselves (...) Westernisation means the negation of our orientalness; Europeanising nihilism means the negation of our creative potential'.[13]

Here the prevalent Orthodox religion of Romanians invoked an Eastern dimension for national identity. Still, even such a radical pro-oriental voice indicated some sort of 'third way' that was not truly about a complete Romanian identification with the East. The reason is that, until the nineteenth century, Romania was immersed in the Eastern cultural space permeated by Orthodoxism. Once debates about ethno-cultural identity dominated the national discourses, Romanians became much more aware of their ethnic descent – 'an island of Latinity in a Slavic sea'.[14] Russians stopped being 'Orthodox brothers' and the 'shared religious identity seemed to pose an additional danger, threatening to facilitate the assimilation of Romania'.[15]

Second, the 'third way' group included influential figures like the philosopher Lucian Blaga, who advanced the idea of Romanian exceptionalism that retained an Eastern facet -

> '[w]e think ourselves merely Latins... lucid, rational, temperate, lovers of classical form but willingly or not we are more than that. A significant percent of Slavic and Thracian blood flows in our veins. The Romanian spirit may be dominated by Latinity, a peaceful and cultured force, but we have also a rich latent Thraco-Slavic foundation, exuberant and vital, which, no matter how much we oppose it, sometimes (...) rises up powerfully in our consciousness (...) Why should we violate our true nature, corset ourselves in a formula of Latin clarity, when so many other possibilities for development lie within us in that barbarian unconscious?'[16]

'Third way' thinkers agreed that Romania needed to find its own developing path, which was based on 'ruralizing the national essence'.[17]

In contrast to the 'third way' camp, the westerniser group contained moderate promoters like the literary critic Garabet Ibrăileanu, who accepted the already existing Western impact on Romania and wanted to further pursue it:

> '[i]n the twentieth century, history has set Romanians the following problem: will Romania continue to be a semi-asiatic, oriental country or will it enter the ranks of European peoples and European culture? This problem has been answered by history. For various reasons, Romania could not exempt itself from the European influence [that] penetrated into our country. It penetrated through the very fact of its superiority'.[18]

---

[13] Nichifor Crainic, 'Sensul tradiției'/ 'The Meaning of Tradition', *Gândirea*, volume 9(1-2), 1929, p. 3.
[14] Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, p. 37.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Lucian Blaga, 'Revolta fondului nostru nelatin'/ 'The Revolt of Our Non-Latin Consciousness', *Gândirea*, volume 1(1), 1921, pp. 181-182.
[17] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, p. 49.
[18] Garabet Ibrăileanu (1909) cited in Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, p. 50.

There were more enthusiastic westernisers too, such as the writer and diplomat Eugen Filotti, who wholeheartedly embraced the Western influence on Romanian identity -

> '[w]e mean to propagate a sense of culture that is European. Our light comes from the West. We see our deliverance in the occidentalisation of this country (...) Balkanism, our cherished and idealised orientalness (...) now shelters all the brigands who have impeded political purification and opposed uplifting the people from the cultural cesspool in which they flounder (...) [We seek] the affirmation of our genius and specific character in the forms of European culture, in the harmonious and shining framework of the culture of the West'.[19]

Westernisers like Filotti sat at the opposite end of the spectrum from Crainic's pro-oriental stance and were the most persuasive. They treated 'contact with the West as liberating even while they worked for a "truly Romanian tradition" as a result of such contact'.[20]

In this respect, the rhetoric of another westerniser – Eugen Lovinescu - was reminiscent of the kinds of debates about national identity and Romanian foreign policy that post-1990 elites would later express:

> '[i]solated from the rhythm of western civilization by its surroundings and its religion, the Romanian people was unable to develop in its own manner and was detoured from the potentialities of its race (...) Time is on our side and, after ages of alienation and deformation, new prospects have arisen for the creation of a truly Romanian soul. If we seem to some historians melancholy stepchildren of a Romanian-Byzantine-Slavic-Turkish-Phanariot tradition, let us hope that in the eyes of future generations, we will seem venerable forefathers of a true Romanian tradition [through Europe]'.[21]

The communist dictatorship would be portrayed after 1990 as having separated Romania from its aspired Western European identity and international course, which had been configured especially during the interwar years. Indeed, the interwar period brought forward the definite articulation of Romanian identity as Western, while also circulating various meanings about the state's relationship with salient others.

The mid-nineteenth century and interwar years constitute the major formative period of the French memory-myth in Romania's imaginary. Having opted for westernisation, Romanian elites were looking for sources of inspiration to be emulated and applied in national settings. France - 'the great Latin sister' - was by far the most attractive prospect since it was a strong and successful state with an influential civilisation.[22] Belgium also exerted a certain appeal because it was a smaller Francophone state that had adapted the French model to its own needs. Westernised and modernised Romania aimed to adapt the political system

[19] Eugen Filotti (1924) cited in ibid, p. 51.
[20] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism*, p. 51.
[21] Eugen Lovinescu cited in ibid.
[22] Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, p. 160.

of France to its own requirements as well. So the Romanian Constitution of 1866 heavily borrowed from the Belgian one, which led to the frequently used expression of Romania being 'the Belgium of the Orient'.[23] In 1914, a part of national elites showed a 'visceral attachment' to France and wanted to enter the war not necessarily to serve Romanian interests, but rather to 'defend the threatened civilization of France'; quoting from the memoirs of a diplomat,

> '[they] wanted immediate entry into the war (...) and they wanted it only for the love of France, which could not be left to perish, as if its fate lay within our power! In their sincerity they hardly mentioned Transilvania, making the people whole (...) abandoning all the arguments of a national character which drove almost all of us to be against the Central Powers, and calling for entry into the war "pour voler au secours de la France" ["to fly to France's rescue"]!'[24]

The fascination for France had gradually infused Romanian society since 1830. French became the language of culture and any self-respecting intellectual needed to have reasonable knowledge of it. Considering that young Romanians were studying in Paris, 'for more than a century France would provide or influence the training of the greater part of the country's intellectual elite'.[25] Apart from consolidating the French memory-myth, the interwar period was a formative time for Romania's democratic trajectory and international relations.

Romania's Interwar Domestic Politics and International Relations

On a more general note, the interwar period was marked by 'broad trends of political, economic, and social development' which helped modern Romania to reach 'its fullest expression as a nation-state'.[26] During the 1920s, the prospects for a Romanian democracy were promising because the two main parties – the National Peasant Party (PNȚ) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) – committed themselves to building stable parliamentary administrations. There were nine governments, most of them led by either PNȚ or PNL. The driving force behind PNL was a financial oligarchy, which had been 'grouped around large banking and industrial families headed by the Brătianu family and its allies'.[27] PNL leaders presented their party as a promoter of all social classes and their respective interests. Yet the practice of PNL policies differed greatly from Western European liberalism. PNL used whatever means necessary to increase the benefits of its financial oligarchy, which often caused other parts of society to be disadvantaged. The other main interwar party was PNȚ, which had been created in 1926 when the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom (Valahia and Moldova) joined with the National Party of Transilvania. In spite of their contrasting ideologies, prominent figures from the new PNȚ offered a progressive and distinctive governing programme, becoming a credible alternative to PNL:

---

[23] Ibid.
[24] Constantin Argetoianu cited in Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, p. 161.
[25] Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, p. 161.
[26] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 159.
[27] Ibid, p. 168.

> '[PNȚ led by Iuliu Maniu] promised to add explicit guarantees of civil liberties and political rights to the constitution, carry out a decentralization of the state administration, and expand the responsibilities of local government. They recognized the primacy of agriculture and proclaimed their intention to strengthen the independent smallholder and promote the cooperative movement. But they also agreed to encourage industry by giving equal treatment to foreign and domestic capital and by removing burdensome protective tariffs'.[28]

The stability of the Romanian political system was further reinforced by King Ferdinand I, the successor of Carol I. Ferdinand preferred a neutral role in internal politics, although the 1923 Constitution granted the King 'the power to appoint and to dismiss cabinet ministers as well as to veto legislation and to issue discretionary regulations'.[29] The legislative agenda of the 1920s contained land reform, industrialisation and cultural policies, as well as the unification of administrative apparatuses in the newly joined provinces. The task of unifying diverse fiscal, judicial and religious arrangements proved to be very difficult. This was also due to Romania's 'sizeable minorities', 28% compared to the 8% of pre-1918, 'all making claims and looking to outside powers'.[30] Ethnic Hungarians, Jews and other groups did not feel compatible with the ideologies of parties like PNȚ and PNL and felt isolated by the rising Romanian nationalism of the 1920s. They increasingly turned towards the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), which was founded in 1921. Unlike nationalist associations that had many members in the 1920s, PCR was quite unpopular because it advocated that Basarabia 'should be relinquished to the Soviet Union'.[31] In 1924 PCR was outlawed, a fact which was used by party leaders and the USSR as a propaganda weapon to attract more supporters; the attempt was unsuccessful and PCR remained at the periphery of Romanian politics during the 1920s and 1930s.[32]

The 1930s represented a very challenging decade for Romanian democracy. The new King Carol II ascended the throne in 1930 and 'made no secret of his disdain for parliamentary institutions and of his intention to become the undisputed source of power in the state'.[33] As parliamentary democracy was weakening, far right wing nationalism was intensifying to an alarming degree:

> '[t]he world depression exacerbated existing economic problems and sharpened social tensions and thus gave impetus to those forces hostile to the prevailing parliamentary system. The crisis enhanced the appeal of anti-Semitism among certain elements of society, who used it to rally support for their particular brand of nationalism'.[34]

---

[28] Ibid, pp. 169-170.
[29] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 3.
[30] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism*, p. 43.
[31] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 4.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania,* pp. 167-168.
[34] Ibid, p. 167.

One extreme right wing organisation that placed anti-Semitism at the core of its ideology was the Iron Guard, founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Carol II and the mainstream parties opposed the fascism of the Iron Guard that had created a party called 'Everything for the Country'. The Iron Guard retaliated by assassinating Prime Minister Ion G. Duca in 1933. Despite the escalating violence of Iron Guard members, the far right organisation attained its largest popularity in the mid-1930s. In February 1938, things changed dramatically when Carol II established a royal dictatorship by annulling the 1923 Constitution. He decreed the dissolution of all political parties and took drastic action against the Iron Guard, which he viewed as his main enemy; members of the Iron Guard and PCR were jailed and some killed.[35]

With respect to Romania's interwar foreign policy, its primary aim was to defend the borders drawn by the World War I settlements and the Great Unification of 1918. Apart from the communists, all Romanian political parties endorsed the 'Versailles system, a stance which dictated the choice of allies and provided continuity with the foreign policy pursued immediately before the war'.[36] Romania kept cultivating relations with France and, to a lesser extent, with the United Kingdom to preserve the territorial status quo from the revisionist attitudes of major actors like the Soviet Union and Germany or smaller ones like Hungary and Bulgaria.[37] The relationship with France was not simply political - 'it grew out of the Romanians' perception of a general community of interests between the two countries, of mutual comprehension and even affection, feelings that were entirely absent in contacts with Germany'.[38] Yet the lack of French and British military reactions to Adolf Hitler's growing conquest of Central-Eastern Europe forced Romania under King Carol II to reconsider its international alliances. The King tried to reach an agreement with Germany in mid-1939, as the Nazis cooperated with the Iron Guard and other Romanian far right wing organisations too.[39] Hitler's Germany did not provoke the same fear as the Soviet Union who had been the 'hereditary enemy, always present, always a threat' to Romania's existence.[40] Carol II hoped that the Germans would guarantee the state's territorial integrity and not give Basarabia to the USSR. He had no other option since France had been defeated by the German armies in June 1940. Nevertheless, Romanian elites were not aware that the non-aggression pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany on 23 August 1939 contained a secret protocol agreed by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. The protocol mentioned that Basarabia and Northern Bucovina would be annexed by the USSR, a fact which occurred on 28 June 1940. Hitler also forced Romania to accept the renouncement of Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and a large part of Transilvania to Hungary on 30 August 1940.[41]

[35] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 6.
[36] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 195.
[37] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 7.
[38] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania,* pp. 196-197.
[39] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 7.
[40] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 197.
[41] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, pp. 7-8.

Following the loss of Transilvania, Romanian public opinion turned against Carol II, who asked Marshal Ion Antonescu to form a new Government. Carol II intended to save his reign through the advantages of appointing Antonescu as Prime Minister of Romania. According to Keith Hitchins,

> '[Carol II] wanted to use Antonescu's connections with the Iron Guard to bring about a reconciliation between its leaders and the throne, his good relations with the National Peasants and Liberals to neutralize their opposition to the royal dictatorship, and his close contacts with members of the German legation in Bucharest to demonstrate Romania's firm attachment to Hitler's new order in Europe and ensure German support for its king and its political independence'.[42]

But Antonescu, together with the PNȚ and PNL leaders, were determined to remove Carol II and replace him with his young son, Mihai. Carol II abdicated and King Mihai assumed the throne on 6 September 1940, granting Antonescu full powers via decree.[43] Marshal Antonescu created a coalition cabinet in which the Iron Guard was the dominant political force. Iron Guard leaders challenged Antonescu's authority by trying to gain control over state institutions like the police and the army. They formed a separate legionary police to be used specifically against political opponents. The atrocities committed by the 'legionary death squads' of the Iron Guard culminated in November 1940.[44] Among the victims were many former government ministers and other officials, including Nicolae Iorga and Virgil Madgearu. Antonescu eventually eliminated the Iron Guard from the Government and Romanian politics due to the rising violence it perpetrated internally.

By 1941 Romania moved from a royal to a military authoritarian regime. In June 1941, the state 'joined Germany in a declaration of war against the Soviet Union' and Marshal Antonescu maintained his alliance with Germany throughout World War II.[45] His main foreign policy reason to side with Germany was to recover at least Basarabia and Northern Bucovina.[46] By the spring of 1944, key figures of Romania's democratic opposition were covertly negotiating with Western states – especially the United Kingdom and the United States – to avoid Soviet occupation and received disheartening replies. In May 1944, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union divided South-Eastern Europe into military operational zones, which located Romania in the Soviet sphere. On the Romanian front, King Mihai and the democratic opposition organised a coup against Marshal Antonescu in August 1944 and managed to overthrow him. King Mihai immediately announced that Romania had joined the Western Allies against Germany and would mobilise all armed forces to free Transilvania.[47] Even so, the Soviet Army occupied Bucharest on 31 August 1944 and treated Romania as a

[42] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 202.
[43] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 8.
[44] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 206.
[45] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 8.
[46] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 208.
[47] Ibid, pp. 211-215.

conquered country. The Romanian communists led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej were preparing to take over state power. The USSR could not allow new free elections to be held in Romania as -

> '[they] would undoubtedly have prevented the installation of a friendly and docile government in Bucharest. The antipathy which the majority of Romanians felt toward the Soviet Union and their desire to maintain traditional ties to the West made the prospects of a freely elected pro-Soviet regime coming to power extremely remote'.[48]

By 1946 Romania was firmly under a communist administration that had been approved by the Soviet Union. The post-war settlements returned the previously lost part of Transilvania to the Romanian state. King Mihai was forced to abdicate and leave the country in December 1947. And Soviet military troops stayed in Romania until 1958 to ensure the communist control over the state.[49]

Romania under the Communist Dictatorship

The Romanian communists under Gheorghiu-Dej officially rose to power in 1948 and engaged in the state's complete Stalinisation to keep receiving support from the USSR. They had 'no independent source of legitimacy' and their power base was almost exclusively derived from Soviet authority.[50] Romania's Stalinisation was described thus:

> 'the first ten years of Communism were marked by a deep, coercive institutional isomorphic change. Along with nationalizing policies, the abolition of the multiparty system, the imprisonment of a large number of the pre–World War II intellectual and political elites, and the beginning of a rapid industrialization, the "history" of Romania was also revised to show, for instance, the allegedly positive role that Russia had played in Romania's past'.[51]

Gheorghiu-Dej was gradually able to 'blend nationalism and Soviet ideology, turning issues that challenged his authority to political advantage'.[52] He died in 1965, after having infused a nationalist character to Romanian communism which would be augmented by his successor – Nicolae Ceauşescu.

Despite criticising Dej's rule, Ceauşescu continued the former's intention to obtain independence from Moscow. Romania's independent foreign policy stance culminated in 1968 when Ceauşescu refused to join and objected to the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia.[53] Unfortunately, in 1971 he travelled to China and North Korea and was fascinated with their communist models, where the dictators had nearly total control over the state and society. After those official

[48] Ibid, p. 219.
[49] Ibid, p. 224.
[50] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 19.
[51] John F. Ely and Cătălin Augustin Stoica, 'Re-membering Romania' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004), p. 98.
[52] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 41.
[53] John F. Ely and Cătălin Augustin Stoica, 'Re-membering Romania', p. 99.

visits, Ceauşescu transformed the Romanian communist dictatorship into a 'sultanistic' regime, meaning totalitarian with an extreme type of patrimonialism where the supreme leader regarded the country as his personal domain.[54] Romania turned into a distinct example of closed-off society dominated by nationalist communism. Ceauşescu's dictatorship was eventually removed by popular revolution in December 1989. After more than fifty years of communism, Romania could resume its democratic path and re-establish relations with 'the West', represented by NATO and EU states. Unfortunately, Romania underwent a very problematic transition to democracy, which partially accounts for why international discourses circulated many negative representations of the post-communist state.

The Turbulent Domestic Context in the Early 1990s

After 1990, Romania had great difficulty in establishing diplomatic relations with a quite distrustful Euro-Atlantic community. The main reasons derived from the widespread violence associated with the 1989 revolution and questionable transition to democracy: the execution of the dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu, alongside his wife and co-ruler Elena Ceauşescu (25 December 1989); the Jiu Valley miners' extremely violent actions in Bucharest (June 1990 and September 1991). Such turbulent events contrasted strongly with the peaceful transitions occurring in the rest of post-communist Europe. Taking each issue in turn, in December 1989, Romania experienced a violent revolution and began a difficult transition to democratic rule. Small-scale protests, repressed by the regime's security forces, turned into mass demonstrations that eventually removed Ceauşescu's dictatorship.[55] On 23 December 1989, protestors gathered in various places in Bucharest were shot by unidentified 'terrorists'; thousands of people were killed during those street fights.[56] Two days later, the Ceauşescu couple was accused of committing genocide against the Romanian people and sentenced to death by an extraordinary military tribunal. Their execution on 25 December was seen as a 'purifying act' for Romanian society, until the promises of the new regime did not live up to the population's expectations.[57] There is still no definitive conclusion as to whether Romania went through a 'revolution' or a 'coup' in late December 1989. Juliana Geran Pilon argues that a coup orchestrated by second rank communists managed to 'hijack' the Romanian

[54] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 347.
[55] For a detailed account see Peter Siani-Davies, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989* (London: Cornell University Press, 2005).
[56] Tom Gallagher, *Romania after Ceauşescu: The Politics of Intolerance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), p. 96.
[57] Ibid.

revolution.[58] Katherine Verdery and Gail Klingman opine that Ceauşescu's rule could not have been abolished without a popular uprising; a coup would simply not have been sufficient to overthrow the dictatorship.[59] Amidst the disagreement about what prompted the removal of communism, the revolution clearly had a dual significance - consolidating Romania's exceptionalism within the 'velvet' transitions of Central-Eastern Europe and shaping the state's transition to democracy.[60]

The Romanian transition to a democratic system was steered by the National Salvation Front (FSN) led by Ion Iliescu. It emerged in the ambiguous context of the 1989 revolution and initially served as a provisional governing body, until democratic elections were organised. But FSN converted itself into a political party and rhetorically used the revolution to gain popular support in the first post-communist elections (May 1990), with Iliescu as a presidential candidate. They competed against the two 'historic' parties that had been outlawed by communists in 1947: the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNȚCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). Iliescu and his FSN won the elections in May 1990; FSN received 66% of votes cast and Iliescu 85%.[61] The May elections proved to be problematic as well. The FSN had exhibited an undemocratic attitude, prompting the European Parliament to condemn 'all intimidation of opposition parties and their candidates in Romania, organised or condoned by the ruling National Salvation Front'.[62] Steven Roper remarked that -

> 'FSN's electoral success was due primarily to the lack of any real opposition, the manipulation of the mass media and the violent nature of the country's transition. Ironically the FSN (...) benefited the most from Ceausescu's cult of personality (...) which undermined any opposition movement or underground media. Because of the cult of personality, frustrations were focused more on the individual (or in this case the [Ceauşescu] family) than on the institution of the [communist] party'.[63]

It is not surprising that FSN did not know how to act in a democratic manner, considering the lack of substantial change among Romania's post-1990 political elites. Despite being democratically elected, the FSN administration was seen as 'old wine in new bottles', rather than 'advocates of a new order'.[64] Most of its members had been connected in some form or another to the communist regime.

---

[58] Juliana Geran Pilon, *The Bloody Flag: Post-Communist Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992), p. 4.

[59] Katherine Verdery and Gail Klingman, 'Romania after Ceausescu: Post-Communist Communism?' in Ivo Banac (ed.), *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 121.

[60] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005), p. 60.

[61] The University of Essex, 'Romania: 1990 Parliamentary Elections Results', *Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe*; http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc (April 2017).

[62] The European Parliament cited in Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, *Romania and the European Union: From Marginalisation to Membership* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 23.

[63] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 68.

[64] Joseph Harrington and Scott Karns, 'Romania's Ouestpolitik: Bucharest, Europe, and the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, 1990-1998' in Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (eds.), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1999), p. 26.

Unfortunately, violence did not stop in Romania after the revolution and democratic elections, which were further shadowed by the Valea Jiu miners' violent actions in Bucharest (June 1990 and September 1991). Even though FSN and Iliescu had obtained an 'overwhelming electoral victory', they continued to 'treat their opponents in highly undemocratic ways'.[65] On 13 June 1990, President Iliescu made an extremely controversial gesture and called for the people's help to safeguard the new administration from civil opposition groups, who had been protesting in Bucharest against the election results. Approximately 10,000 miners from the Jiu Valley answered the President's request and came to the capital, where they brutally assaulted the demonstrators and vandalised the headquarters of opposition parties.[66] When the miners left Bucharest, Iliescu publicly declared these shocking words -

> 'I thank you for everything you have done these days. I thank you all once again for what you have proved these days: that you are a powerful force, having a high civic and working-class discipline (...) We know that we can rely on you. We should ask for your help whenever it seems necessary!'[67]

This was not the only time the miners interfered with Romania's democratic evolution. In early 1991, as Parliament was debating economic legislation, FSN members did not agree on 'the pace and substance of reform'; the faction supporting Prime Minister Petre Roman wanted a faster pace of reforms than the Iliescu wing did.[68] In September 1991, the same Jiu Valley miners arrived in Bucharest to protest against their declining living standards and against the Government in general. Roman proposed a cabinet reshuffle to prevent another crisis like the one in June 1990, yet was forced by President Iliescu to resign. The miners provided Iliescu once again with the opportunity to get rid of those who opposed his approach to Romanian politics.[69] Nevertheless, FSN remained divided over how to implement economic reforms and several factions decided to split. Iliescu's advocates created a new party – the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) – in March 1992. The second post-revolutionary parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled for September 1992. The largest number of votes went to FDSN - renamed Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in 1993. Iliescu was also reconfirmed as President of Romania and exerted a great influence on the FDSN (PDSR) Government. He played a key role in the state's foreign policy between 1990 and 1996, but could not impose a certain external course and identity for Romania. This was underlined by the domestic contestation about Romania's 'European' choice during the Soviet treaty episode (1991), which is analysed in chapter III.

---

[65] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 361.
[66] Ibid, pp. 361-362.
[67] Ion Iliescu quoted in ibid, p. 362.
[68] Steven D. Roper, *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 70.
[69] Tom Gallagher, *Romania after Ceauşescu: The Politics of Intolerance*, pp. 115-117.

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, Romanian identity has historically been shaped at the intersection between the West and the East. In the evolution of Romanian history, the interwar period was very significant because it defined the Western identity and international orientation of the post-1918 unified Romania. It was a time of internal debates about whether the state's future development should look towards the West or the East. The interwar years also consolidated the traditional friendly relations and cultural affinity between France and Romania, the two Latin sisters sitting at opposite sides of the continent. Having opted for westernisation, Romania wanted to strengthen its Western links and was fascinated by the influential French civilisation. As many young Romanians studied in Paris, France exerted a substantial impact on Romania's intellectual and political elites. This gradually formed the French memory-myth in the Romanian imaginary, which would be relevant after 1990.

Romanian democracy had roots in the interwar period as well. The 1920s were a favourable time for Romania's democratic system, which was then heavily challenged by King Carol II and the rise of the Iron Guard in the 1930s. The complicated context of World War II forced Romania to align with Germany against its great enemy from the East – the USSR. Bucharest was occupied by the Soviet army in 1944, which would soon lead to the installation of the communist dictatorship. Following the 1989 revolution against communist rule, Romania underwent a series of fundamental changes as part of its transition to democracy. The early 1990s provided a turbulent context for the trajectory of Romanian national identity and foreign policy, which will be apparent in the subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter II: Conceptualising National Identity in Romania's Foreign Policy

Identity in its various forms has been intensely analysed in a range of academic fields, shedding interesting light on the way we think about a state's international relations. As Christopher Hill and William Wallace eloquently note,

> '[e]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state's "place in the world", its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them'.[1]

The words of Hill and Wallace resonate with the inter-disciplinary framework of national identity that will be applied in the empirical part of the project. Talking about identity in IR is usually associated with constructivism. The latter school of thought provides very useful insights on the conceptualisation of identity and thus it formed the point of departure for this research endeavour. However, the project was to a large extent empirically driven and the material on Romanian identity and foreign policy between 1990 and 1996 brought up some puzzles which could not be entirely resolved using constructivist notions and tools. Therefore, constructivist tools have been supplemented and modified by drawing on other literatures related to nationalism, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. Each one adds a different element to the conceptual framework, so as to produce a multi-dimensional perspective on national identity. With regards to structure, this chapter has four sections dealing successively with each intellectual field: identity and constructivism; identity and the nation; identity and collective memory; identity, self-esteem and international recognition. After discussing the relevant aspects of identity in the individual sections, the insights drawn from the four literatures are integrated into a working conceptual framework on national identity.

Identity and Constructivism

The emergence of constructivism in IR can be traced back to the 1980s, within the larger context of the so-called 'third debate'. The latter encapsulated an attempt by post-positivist scholars to contradict the dominant approaches in

[1] Christopher Hill and William Wallace, 'Introduction: Actors and Actions' in Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 8.

the field at that time, on the grounds of their scientific methodology.[2] Constructivists favoured a middle position in the debate, seeking to bridge the gap between positivists (who believed that true results could only be obtained through natural science emulated empirical tests) and post-positivists (who argued that objective, neutral, value-free research was not possible). Constructivism, the ontological position which posits that 'all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context', was used to counter various essentialist definitions of social actors as immutable and constant through time and space.[3] Since the 1980s, constructivism has developed into a well established IR framework that gradually incorporated new issues and strands, resulting in an ever increasing and varied body of work. Some authors even claim that it should be treated as a 'meta-theoretical standpoint in the study of social phenomena', rather than a specific theory of international politics.[4] As an IR school that draws from various ideas on international relations, constructivism has few general or overarching assumptions, which means that its researchers might advance a palette of very different readings of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. Regardless of these many variations on the constructivist theme, all converge around the core understanding that reality and knowledge are socially constructed.[5] Constructivists also emphasise that '[t]he social environment in which we find ourselves defines ("constitutes") who we are, our identities as social beings'.[6]

The most useful constructivist contributions for the conceptual dimension of this book are the ideational foundations of identity and the move away from exclusively rationalist approaches. Constructivism occupies the 'middle ground' between two very distinct and opposing groups: rationalists (e.g. realists, neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists) and supporters of interpretive epistemologies (e.g. postmodernists, poststructuralists, critical theorists like the Frankfurt school, feminist scholars).[7] Rationalists tend to treat identity as unproblematic, hence excluding or marginalising it from empirical research agendas. They assume that all states have a series of fixed and objective preferences - usually physical security, accumulating power or wealth - which form their identity and national interest. In this vein, accounts of a state's foreign policy indicate that the

[2] Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Rafferty, *Introduction to Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 31-32.
[3] Michael J. Crotty, *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process* (London: Sage, 2003), p. 42.
[4] Walter Carlsnaes, 'Foreign Policy' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), p. 339.
[5] Stefano Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 6(2), 2000, p. 149.
[6] Thomas Risse, 'Social Constructivism and European Integration' in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.) *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 161.
[7] Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 3(3), 1997, pp. 319-320.

ideas and choices contained in national identities 'are governed by the material constraints elites face in a given situation'.[8] By contrast, the post-modern subject has 'no fixed, essential or permanent identity'; subjectivity is 'formed and transformed in a continuous process that takes place in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed and alongside the production and reproduction of the social'.[9] For interpretive epistemologies, identity does not exist outside the structures of discourse.

As advocates of the middle ground, some constructivist scholars define identity in deceptively simple terms. Ted Hopf explains how identity fulfils two necessary functions - on the one hand, expressing to the self and others who the self is; on the other hand, communicating to the self who others are.[10] The first function of identity includes a 'set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains and with respect to particular actors'.[11] So a state's identity influences its conduct towards other members and circumstances in the international system. For example, the interest to uphold norms of human rights is closely linked to a state's identity as liberal democracy.[12] The second function entails that a 'state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice'.[13] Hopf's view on identity is deceptively simple since it clarifies what identity does, without actually saying what identity is and what elements constitute it.

Both conventional and critical constructivism have been preoccupied with finding a definition of identity. Alexander Wendt is a good starting point as his conventional constructivist work has triggered a lot of identity debates. Wendt defines state identity as the product of inter-subjective processes of meaning creation, 'a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions'.[14] Yet, consistent with the neorealist tradition, he regards states via the 'black box' metaphor, their domestic factors being irrelevant to the construction of identities. Wendt has argued that the meanings which states attach to phenomena and subsequently their interests and identities are shaped through inter-state interaction.[15] This does reflect an important facet of identity formation, but also neglects the historical and internal contexts in which national

---

[8] Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 4.
[9] Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back in* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 22.
[10] Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security,* volume 23(1), 1998, p. 175.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Karin Fierke, 'Constructivism' in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 171.
[13] Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', p. 175.
[14] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 224.
[15] Ibid, p. 401.

identities are deeply embedded, because the interpretations that impact them cannot be restricted to the meanings and ideas stemming from inter-state dynamics. After all, a state's national identity is inextricably related to the domestic actors that take decisions in its name. These agents internalise the norms characterising the international realm, yet they also approach politics with an already formed appreciation of the world, the international system and the position of their state within it.[16] Their articulations necessarily derive from collective understandings that have origins at least partly in domestic political and cultural settings. In the words of Edward Said, society is the 'locale in which a continuous contest between adherents of different ideas about what constitutes the national identity is taking place'.[17] Erik Ringmar summarises this problematic aspect of Wendt's theory by arguing that it is –

> 'fundamentally one-sided: the problem of identity formation is constantly seen from the perspective of the system and never as a problem each state and each statesman has to grapple with. He can tell us why a certain identity is recognized, but not what that identity is'.[18]

Moreover, relying on systemic premises does not offer guidance as to 'how each state, nation or other "unit" has to create its own terms or rationales, its identity and foreign policy'.[19] Under both internal and external influences, the 'content' of identity comes into being through difference. Here critical constructivism has made substantial and provocative contributions, stressing the boundaries marked by identity and its connections to foreign policy. For instance, according to Roxanne Doty, the discourses promoting democracy and human rights produce two categories - a morally superior identity of 'democratic' compared to the inferior one of 'non-democratic', which construct 'the very differences that transformation would ostensibly eliminate'.[20] David Campbell's monograph on the United States' identity and foreign policy rejects the conventional understanding of foreign policy as the 'external orientation of pre-established states with secure identities'; instead it reverses the causal chain between state identity and foreign policy.[21] In his opinion, national states are 'paradoxical entities which do not possess prediscursive stable identities'.[22] Since such identities constantly undergo some process of transformation, 'for a state to end its practices of

---

[16] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2(3), 1996, p. 280.
[17] Edward Said, 'The Phony Islamic Threat', *New York Times Magazine* (21 November 1993), p. 65.
[18] Erik Ringmar, 'Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History' in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 283.
[19] Ole Wæver, 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory' in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002), p. 21.
[20] Roxanne L. Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 136.
[21] David Campbell, *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 75.
[22] Ibid, p. 11.

representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations'.[23] Campbell reconceptualises a state's identity as the 'outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with threats identified and located on the "outside"'.[24]

Therefore, the conceptual framework employed in this project starts from the constructivist principle that identities have an ideational basis and fluid nature, being defined and re-defined under the impact of systemic and internal factors. Another essential part of the framework is the critical constructivist tenet that the content of national identity incorporates self-other relations. Still, while national identities can be subject to constant renegotiation, the ideational perspective adopted here does not align with Campbell's stance and other critical discursive approaches for two main reasons. First, the present conceptual framework subscribes to the idea that identity formation comes before and shapes the manifestation of a state's international conduct, without seeing any causal relationship between identity and foreign policy. Second, this multi-dimensional view argues that national identity is a construct with a stable core, which draws meaning from a few continuously perpetuated self-images of the nation. These self-images originate in enduring historical traditions and collective memories. David Taylor makes an interesting point here – '[l]ong-standing historical notions of identity are not rendered irrelevant for all the arguments that they may be "mythical" or "imagined"'; such 'imagined essences of identity are potent social forces'.[25]

A key area where this book's framework disagrees with constructivism is the latter's excessive rejection of rationalism. National identity and rational motivations should not be treated as competing explanations for foreign policy. Instead, they offer complementary accounts of a state's international behaviour. Romania's wish to join the EU and NATO was partly a rational foreign policy choice. NATO and EU accession would bring material advantages such as increased security and prosperity. Yet Euro-Atlantic integration was also about the international recognition of Romania's national identity, about returning to the Western community from which it had been separated by communism. Thus, national identity and rationalism supplement rather than oppose each other to advance a complex picture of Romanian international rhetoric and actions.

Another difference between this conceptual framework on national identity and critical constructivism relates to the relationship between the self and others. The working of boundaries between 'us' and 'them' was initially discussed by social psychology and identification theories, which summarise the process as follows -

---

[23] Ibid, pp. 11-12.
[24] Ibid, p. 75.
[25] David Taylor, 'Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with Postmodern Theory', *Journal of Social Policy*, volume 27(3), 1998, pp. 345-346.

> '[a] differentiation arises between oneselves, the we-group or in-group, and everybody else or the other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it'.[26]

Similarly, some critical constructivists see the self-other dichotomy in terms of opposition and even hostility, whereby the other is endowed with a series of negative potentially threatening traits and the self with positive ones. The other may not necessarily be a different social entity, only being the self of the past, like the example of post-war West Germany who configured its identity largely in contrast to Nazi Germany.[27] The 'imagined other' could also be constructed as a threat to the unity and intransigence of the self, its most radical embodiments being used as justification for ethnic cleansing.[28]

Jennifer Milliken allows for more variation when analysing the Unite States' identity during the Cold War, which was constituted on the dissimilarities between the non-American West and the member-states of the 'Free World'; American identity was represented by deploying a 'leader-follower' analogy.[29] In such a respect, this book's ideational perspective concurs that the self-images feeding into national identity are based on the self-other nexus, which is in turn constituted via difference. It also prefers a more accommodating and less inimical position on difference and the self-other dichotomy, which derives from the arguments put forward by Bahar Rumelili: 'the constitution of identities in relation to difference does not necessitate a behavioural relationship between self (the bearer of identity) and other (the bearer of difference) that is characterised by mutual exclusion and the perception and representation of the other as a threat to one's identity'.[30] This premise opens up a wide variety of possibilities and relations on the self-other spectrum of difference. Having established the fundamental nature of identity, the next stage tackles the 'content' or the elements that contribute towards its formation.

This is where the foreign policy imaginary comes into play, a concept that draws inspiration from Jutta Weldes' notion of 'security imaginary', but takes things a step further by identifying the 'real' and 'imagined' basis of national identity. She introduces the security imaginary in her framework concerning the emergence of national interests – 'A security imaginary is, quite simply, a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which

---

[26] Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 17.

[27] Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[28] David Taylor, 'Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with Postmodern Theory', p. 346.

[29] Jennifer Milliken, 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea' in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 114-115.

[30] Bahar Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(1), 2004, p. 29.

representations of the world of international relations are created'.[31] Both adaptations originate from the 'social imaginary' of Cornelius Castoriadis, who starts with the conviction that the symbolic carries understandings which take into account the 'real-rational', but also includes an imaginary dimension which ultimately comes 'from the original faculty of positioning or presenting oneself with things and relations that do not exist, in the form of representation (things and relations that are not or have never been given in perception)'.[32] Consequently, the 'social imaginary' is conceptualised as 'an original investment by society of the world and itself with meaning - meanings which are not "dictated" by real factors since it is instead this meaning that attributes to these real factors a particular importance and a particular place in the universe constituted by a given society'.[33]

To put it more simply, the foreign policy imaginary enables answers to existential questions like '[w]ho are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want (…) what are we lacking?'[34] Such questions need a reply because ultimately:

> 'society must define its "identity", its articulation, the world, its relation to the world and to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires. Without the "answer" to these "questions", without these "definitions", there can be no human world, no society, no culture - for everything would be undifferentiated chaos'.[35]

So the foreign policy imaginary offers 'the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international system are constructed'.[36] For the identity framework of this book, the foreign policy imaginary (defined as a 'structure of well established meanings') is basically an ideational foundation, which contains those stable self-images rooted in the nation's memories of historical past and configuring national identity at present. Building on Castoriadis' reasoning, one can argue that the self-images feeding into national identity have a 'real' (somewhat objectively identifiable) core – language and ethnicity, an 'imagined' basis or a combination of the two categories. This point will be expanded upon in the subsequent section, since it relates to how the literature on nationalism can address one of the lacunae in constructivism. Regardless of the 'real' or 'imagined' essences of national identity, the foreign policy imaginary as ideational structure influences how elites think about or perceive themselves and the state they represent. It conditions agents to an extent, yet they do retain freedom of action and choice. The foreign policy imaginary is not a fixed structure and has a variety of articulations, which allows decision-makers to modify meanings or select the appropriate ones depending on the circumstances.

---

[31] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 10.
[32] Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 127.
[33] Ibid, p. 128.
[34] Ibid, p. 146.
[35] Ibid, p. 147.
[36] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 10.

Furthermore, before officials can act for their state, they need to engage with a process of interpretation. This enables them to understand both what situation the state faces and how they should respond to it. The process of interpretation requires a language shared at least by those state elites involved in determining state conduct, as well as by the audience for whom state action must be accepted as legitimate.[37] That is why intersubjectivity plays an essential role in the multi-dimensional social process out of which foreign policy self-images emerge. For the representations of political reality expressed by elites (governing or opposition) to be legitimate or simply accepted, they have to be conceived with reference to the collective imaginary that dominates the intended recipient society; otherwise, they risk being marginalised or just ignored completely.[38] So the meanings promoted become legitimate if they are publicly validated by the media, civil society representatives and the population in general. In the words of Friedrich Kratochwil, reality 'is not the thing described but rather the intersubjective *validity* of a characterization upon which reasonable persons can agree'.[39] What the concept of intersubjectivity contributes to the understanding of foreign policy and national identity is a specific take on reality. The political world and, more narrowly, the imaginary to which they refer have not been contoured in an isolated manner by one individual or a group of select few. No matter how powerful their authority might be, in democratic states it is not a question of 'selling' ideas to a passive or potentially ignorant audience. Those understandings derive from a complex combination of top and lower level social interactions during which the values, preferences and aspirations of a society are not only taken into account, but play an integral part in the formative process. Yet it should be noted that national identity is intersubjectively configured both internally and externally - 'one's attitude, or disposition, toward another only emerges in that state's encounter with its significant Other, and therefore, who or what a state becomes is the outcome of many intersecting and overlapping sequences of action and response [between the Self and Others]'.[40] The international recognition aspect of identity verification will be dealt with in the last section of this chapter on conceptual framework, where the socio-psychological issues of national identity formation are examined in detail.

To sum up this first section, constructivism has informed the national identity framework adopted here to a significant extent, but also contains some important lacunae which need to be supplemented with other literatures. The present research project employs the following general constructivist insights: the

[37] Ibid, pp. 9-10.

[38] Karin M. Fierke, 'Critical Methodology and Constructivism' in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation* (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2001), p. 124.

[39] Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 229.

[40] Michelle K. Murray, 'Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm, 2011), p. 134.

changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without actually imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a feature of identity creation. Looking at each one separately, having a certain identity entails an inextricably linked array of appropriate foreign policy choices, responses and conduct. Constructivist theory has introduced the identity puzzle in IR, by rejecting the assumptions of rationalism which regard national identities and interests as fixed and unproblematic. By its lights, these should not be swept under the all encompassing umbrella of material constraints or pursuits (physical security, power and economic gains). On the contrary, identities have an ideational basis and do not possess a static nature, being defined and re-defined under the impact of both external (systemic) and internal factors. Inter-state socialisation as well as specific domestic contexts like cultural values and interpretations of history shape national identity. Despite its fluid nature, national identity draws self-images from long-standing meanings and articulations originating in the remembered historical past. These self-images and in turn national identity are constituted on the self-other nexus, being dependent on difference. The relationship between the self and others is not necessarily antagonistic and can range from friendliness or indifference to hostility.

Nevertheless, this study is not intended to be a constructivist project because of two reasons: the complete separation of constructivism from rationalism and the former's lacunae when analysing national identity. First, identity and rationalist motivations are viewed here as complementary rather than opposing explanations for foreign policy. Rationalism may offer a basic account of why Romanian elites chose a Euro-Atlantic direction for their state and wanted to curry favour with the EU and NATO or their prominent member states. Yet that is only part of the story and cannot unpack the nuances of Romania's foreign policy responses. This is where national identity comes in to show that deciding on an external stance is not a straightforward or objective answer. Foreign policy decision-making is often subject to domestic contestation among elites. Second, some constructivists have explored the 'national' component of national identity but with certain limitations. Weldes talks about American national identity and uniqueness as a construct created by discursive and non-linguistic practices such as waving the United States flag, singing the national anthem, citizenship rites, establishing and patrolling borders around the national territory.[41] Yet such accounts neglect to mention the fundamental domestic sources of the nation and national identity. Does the nation have a core that distinguishes it from others and can be somewhat objectively identified? What role do ethnicity, common ancestry and shared historical memories play in

[41] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 110-111.

the emergence of national identity? Constructivism does not provide all the necessary resources to examine Romanian exceptionalism, which stresses its Western European heritage through the Roman ethnic descent and Latin language. Consequently, by necessity and choice, this ideational framework must draw from other intellectual fields to specify both the internal and external elements of national identity. The logical next step is to think about national identity in relation to its first domestic source - 'the nation', how the latter's origins and constitutive aspects shape a state's national identity.

Identity and the Nation

The literature on nationalism analyses the national foundation of identity, which contributes to the dynamic relationship between a state's national identity and foreign policy by clarifying the former's internal basis and components. The combined insights of scholars like Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith shed light on the imagined nature of national identity which still retains a stable ethno-cultural core (same ancestry, language, territory, historical myths and memories). Within nationalism studies, primordialists (or essentialists) and modernists (or constructionists) have contrasting opinions on the nation.[42] Primordialists treat nations as communities bound together by common biology and culture over centuries of a shared past. This perspective, which characterised most of the earlier literature on nationalism, says that nations are objective units and can be scientifically examined as a basic human group that has persisted throughout history.[43] Primordialism regards national identity as an entity whose origins can be traced back to the 'mythical times of the community'; it is considered a product of biological features, as well as social and cultural propensities. As Clifford Geertz points out,

> '[b]y primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens" - or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens" - of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves'.[44]

---

[42] For an overview see Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[43] Representatives of essentialist approaches include primordialists like Harold Isaacs, *The Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and socio-biological theories like those of Pierre van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York: Elsevier, 1981).

[44] Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States' in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *In Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 109.

Furthermore, Geertz's elements and in turn national identity have both an essentialist and perennial nature. Here Kathryn Woodward unequivocally notes: an 'essentialist definition of identity suggests that there is one authentic set of characteristics which all share and which do not alter across time'.[45] Such a stance entails that identity is a 'primordial given' which the modern social actor completely embraces or not at all. More contemporary studies question the reification and objective nature of nations, instead arguing that they are constructed social entities which emerge out of specific social practices and contexts. Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, who stand at the opposite side of the spectrum to primordialism, view the nation as a purely modern phenomenon and a product of social engineering. Using Gellner's words, '[nationalism] invents nations where they do not exist'.[46] Hobsbawm goes even further and describes nationalism as a fabrication of elite groups; whereas Gellner accepts the sociological reality of nations and nationalism once they have been formed, Hobsbawm dismisses their reality as purely artificial and invented.[47] Aspects of these two positions are synthesised in ethno-symbolism, represented prominently by Anthony Smith. He claims that, even though modern nations are constructed, they have stable historical roots in the ethnic groups ('ethnies'); ethnies provide the shared 'myths, memories, values and symbols'[48] which are necessary for the formation of nations. Despite its elaborate presentation, Smith's argument has been criticised for not giving a sufficiently persuasive reason to see 'ethnies' as less constructed than 'nations'.[49]

This gap has opened the way for alternative approaches to analysing the nation, one of the most challenging being through discourse. The discursive conceptualisation of nations refers in many ways to Benedict Anderson's contributions, another advocate of modernism. He regards nations as an 'imagined' phenomenon because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'.[50] Printed standardised language helped to spread and forge the idea of a nation. As Anderson put it, 'the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation'.[51] In terms of national identity, the modernist school attempts to minimise the primordial notion of

---

[45] Kathryn Woodward, *Identity and Difference* (London: SAGE, 1997), p. 11.
[46] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 55-56.
[47] Eric Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1–14.
[48] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 15.
[49] Richard Mole, 'Discursive Identities/ Identity Discourses and Political Power' in Richard C.M. Mole (ed.), *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 7.
[50] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 6.
[51] Ibid, p. 46.

previously set and perennial traits, which become a fundamental property of national identity. According to Stuart Hall, national identity is a perpetually unfinished process of reconstruction: 'perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as "a production" which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation'.[52] Madan Sarup agrees that 'identity is a construction, a consequence of a process of interaction between people, institutions and practices'.[53] This position thus embodies the idea of change, flexibility, fluidity, the negotiation of national identity in relation to social change and dominant cultural aspects.

How are these debates from the literature on nationalism useful for the identity framework utilised in this book? Primordialism has a very restrictive viewpoint on the origins of national identity, which does not accept the possibility of change. A quite severe critique concluded that '[a] more unintelligible and unsociological concept would be hard to imagine (...) a variety of sources from sociology, anthropology, and psychology (...) render the concept theoretically vacuous and empirically indefensible'.[54] The modernist camp is much more accommodating towards change, yet its members disagree on the degree of construction or invention at work within national identity. For our purposes, a combination of insights from Anderson and Smith is most helpful for understanding Romanian national identity. If nations are 'imagined communities', then national identity is also 'imagined'; it is not determined by material circumstances or objectified reference points, but rather emerges out of the agents' interpretation of existing ideational structures. While Anderson emphasises how central the continuous issue of identity building is ('the imagining of the community'), he does not imply that nations are fictitious. On the contrary, they are a genuine phenomenon rooted in historical processes.[55] Smith's ethno-symbolism similarly conceives nations as 'historical phenomena, not only in the generic sense that they are embedded in particular collective pasts and emerge (...) through specific historical processes, but also because, by definition, they embody shared memories, traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation'.[56] National identities are usually grounded in and 'presume some prior community of territory, language, or culture, which provide the raw materials for the intellectual project of nationality'.[57] Therefore, from Anderson the present

[52] Stuart Hall, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora' in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998), p. 22.
[53] Madan Sarup, *Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p. 11.
[54] Jack D. Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, 'The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, volume 16(2), 1993, p. 187.
[55] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chapters II and III.
[56] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 10.
[57] Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, 'Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation' in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 9

study adopts the imagined essence of the nation and national identity. From Smith, it takes the concept of 'ethnie' to identify an ethno-cultural core for national identity. They fit with the constructivist premise of identity being shaped by internal factors, but supplement it by clarifying what are the fundamental domestic sources of national identity.

Within mainstream interpretations of the nation, many authoritative voices have tried to unpack the specific basis of national identity. Smith's notion of 'ethnie' has utility in highlighting a core for national identity - 'a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among élites'.[58] Elsewhere, Smith lists historical territory, common myths and collective memories, mass public culture, common legal rights and obligations and common economy as sources for national identity.[59] William Bloom also underlines the role of internalised national symbols[60]; Hall again mentions the impact of national culture[61], while Ernest Rennan discusses the contribution of remembering and forgetting in creating the nation's story.[62] These distinct yet inter-related issues are relevant to our ideational framework because they circle around the ethno-cultural core of national identity taken from Smith. The ethnic component of national identity has resonated especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where the national consciousness of ethnic groups developed before they could institutionalise their nation as a sovereign state, since they belonged to different multinational empires.[63] In this respect, Miroslav Hroch elaborates on the national movements in the region as follows:

> '[their] goals covered three main groups of demands, which corresponded to felt deficits of national existence: (1) the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its normal use in education, administration and economic life; (2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence; (3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group'.[64]

The ethno-cultural basis of the Romanian nation – language, ethnic descent, territory, collective memory - played a vital part in the contemporary articulation of national identity, considering that the modern state of Romania

---

[58] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, p. 13.
[59] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Penguin Books: London, 1991), pp. 9-14.
[60] William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 52.
[61] Stuart Hall, 'Introduction: Who Needs "Identity"?' in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 12.
[62] Ernest Renan, 'What Is a Nation?' in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 11.
[63] Anthony D. Smith, 'State Making and Nation-Building' in John A. Hall (ed.), *The State: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, volume 2 (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 67–68.
[64] Miroslav Hroch, 'From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe' in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996), p. 81.

was achieved only in the early twentieth century (1918). At first, language unified the divided ethnic group and facilitated communication between those who eventually identified themselves as Romanians, being invoked even now as a putatively objective proof of the nation's Roman ancestors and Western European heritage. The common language consolidated the idea of Latin origins in the Romanian consciousness, which meant that the Romanian nation had the same ethnic descent as the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese nations. The ancient Romanian land of Dacia had been conquered by Rome in the second century and then divided into three main historical provinces. Despite being separated into different territories and under the rule of various empires, the Romanian nation was bound by long-standing collective memories that circulated as shared historical narratives and symbols. Collective memories of past events are crucial to the transmission of national identity through time. They shape national identity from within (internal level) by giving meanings and articulations which reside and are interpreted in the state's foreign policy imaginary. Yet constructivism and nationalism studies do not deal with these aspects in sufficient detail. So, to fully understand the internal dynamic of national identity, this framework turns to the literature on collective memory.

Identity and Collective Memory

Why is collective memory essential to the formation of national identity? Simply because a nation's history and how the past has been remembered inform the very fabric and foundations of its national identity. In the words of Robert Bellah and his co-authors,

> '[c]ommunities (...) have a history - in an important sense are constituted by their past - and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a "community of memory", one that does not forget its past. In order not to forget that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, its constitutive narrative'.[65]

Common values, ideas and interpretations of events, stories of ancient descent situate 'the collectivity inside a shared history', which is 'constantly reaffirmed and reproduced through resonant rituals and symbols'.[66] Broadly defined, collective memory is 'how members of society remember and interpret events, how the meaning of the past is constructed, and how it is modified over time'; it refers to the dissemination of beliefs, feelings, moral judgments and knowledge about the past, both for self-understanding and for winning power in an ever-changing reality.[67] According to Maurice Halbwachs, the first social scientist to provide a systematic analysis of this concept, collective memory is a social construction

[65] Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen et al, *Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 153.
[66] Duncan S.A. Bell, 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', *British Journal of Sociology*, volume 54(1), 2003, pp. 69-70.
[67] Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 3-5.

that develops in specific social contexts which he termed 'the social framework (*cadres sociaux*) of memory'.[68] For Halbwachs, studying memory is not a matter of reflecting on the properties of the subjective mind; rather, memory is a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are structured by social arrangements:

> '[i]t is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories'.[69]

Halbwachs has thus pointed out that it is impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of their group contexts. Group memberships provide the materials for memory and prod the individual into recalling particular events and forgetting others.[70] That is why the social group to which the individuals belong influences and conditions their memories of the past.

Moreover, collective memory originates from shared communications about the meanings of the past, anchored in the lives of individuals who participate in the life of a specific collective.[71] Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan talk about 'collective remembrance' rather than 'collective memory', with an emphasis on social agency, activity and creativity.[72] Their perspective is concerned with the middle ground -

> 'between those who argue that private memories are ineffable and individual, and those who see them as entirely socially determined, and therefore present whether or not anyone acts on them (…) In between is the palpable, messy activity which produces collective remembrance'.[73]

Compared to Halbwachs' collective memory, Winter and Sivan's concept captures 'an individualist notion of memory that underpins the collective acts of remembrance'.[74] So collective memory or remembrance is 'the result of the process whereby individuals interact socially to articulate their memories – of lost relatives, of protest and dissent, of days gone by'.[75] Rafael Narvaez explains that '[c]ollective memory is not only about remembering (the past) or about social order and action (the present), but, critically, it is about how social groups project themselves toward the future'.[76] Consequently, in our identity framework, collective memory is a group-based subjective perception of the past, which gives meaning to the group's existence and conveys potential future aspirations. That

---

[68] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 35.
[69] Ibid, p. 38.
[70] Ibid, p. 40.
[71] Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, 'Setting the Framework' in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 9-10.
[72] Ibid, p. 9.
[73] Ibid, p. 10.
[74] Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 33.
[75] Duncan Bell, 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', p. 72.
[76] Rafael F. Narvaez, 'Embodiment, Collective Memory and Time', *Body & Society*, volume 12(3), 2006, p. 67.

is why a nation's contemporary self-images feeding into national identity are based on memories about past accomplishments and trajectories. Similarly to the individual level, group memory combines the past, present and future to define the group's identity.[77]

How states portray themselves, what they believe in and their reactions to more or less critical foreign policy situations are guided by the manner in which past experiences have been remembered. Stressing the close relationship between identity and memory, John Gillis notes that:

> 'the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa. The core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity'.[78]

Collective memory can be described as 'a powerful cohesive force, binding the disparate members of a nation together'; it draws boundaries between the self and others, being 'passed from generation to generation' and 'transmitted across multiple historical contexts'.[79] Duncan Bell advances an interesting take on 'the fluid interface between memory and political identity'; as identities are contested, memories are used 'to defend unity and coherence, to shore up a sense of self and community'.[80] A state's national identity promoted from within may or may not receive external validation from fellow members in the international system. If its national identity is confronted with lack of recognition, the state falls back on the domestic source where more ideas about the self have been circulating. The purpose is to both reinforce national identity and hopefully find further arguments which will convince others to accept that self-image or national identity. It is worth clarifying that collective memories do not structurally determine a particular national identity or foreign policy behaviour. Instead, they are ideational structures whose meanings are interpreted and re-interpreted by elites. Collective memories internally influence national identity and the foreign policy imaginary, which is reflected in the state's international relations. Thomas Berger's words capture this aspect as he elaborates on the 'practical function' of collective memories:

> '[t]hey provide the collectivity with an identity and a common myth of origin. They endow it with emotional and normative underpinning. They simplify the task of organising collective action by providing its members with a common language and set of understandings about how the world functions and ought to function'.[81]

---

[77] Friedrich Kratochwil, 'History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the "Second" Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 12(1), 2006, p. 16.

[78] John R. Gillis, 'Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship' in John R. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 3.

[79] Duncan Bell, 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', p. 70.

[80] Duncan Bell, 'Introduction' in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (London: Palgrave, 2006), p. 6.

[81] Thomas Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945' in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 80.

When analysing the link between memory and national identity, Bell argues against the widespread 'running together (and even conflation) of memory and mythology'.[82] He particularly disagrees with Anthony Smith who has persistently illustrated the 'relationship of shared memories to collective cultural identities: memory, almost by definition is integral to cultural identity, and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities'.[83] For instance, Romania's National Day (December 1) celebrating the Great Unification of 1918 helps to re-inscribe identification with the nation, whether or not people are actually old enough to remember the original day. Bell prefers to call this type of example a myth, a narrative which gives meaning to notable events, people and locations. He conceptualises a nationalist myth as 'a story that simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation's past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past'.[84] The ideational perspective adopted here subscribes to a broader sense of memory, which is prevalent in the related literature, while acknowledging that there is a mythological dimension to the historical narratives transmitted as collective memories in the nation's evolution. By bringing the two sides together, collective memory-myths enable our framework to indicate how these stories about the historical past serve to anchor people's identities within an overarching national identity. At the same time, collective memory-myths about history allow the multiple individual selves to be situated within wider temporal contexts of meaning and belonging. The 'Roman foundation myth'[85] has a special resonance for Romanians that contributes to the articulation of their present Euro-Atlantic national identity, clarifying in a simple and selective manner their Latin origins and Western European ancestry.

All these insights have been useful to find a definition for collective memory-myths, to show how they operate over time by binding the nation together and internally shaping national identity. The literature on collective memory has supplemented the framework of this research project by providing the second domestic source of national identity. While examining the latter's first internal factor (the nation), nationalism studies mentioned collective memories as part of the ethno-cultural basis of the nation, yet did not explain in sufficient detail how their contribution to national identity works. Although collective memory-myths suggest how a nation orientates itself towards the remembered past, the memory literature has a limitation when dealing with an identity framework that looks both within and outside for elements impacting on national identity. The formation of national identity is a two-level process where a domestic self-image needs to be validated by external audiences. Nationalism and

[82] Duncan Bell, 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', p.70.
[83] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, p. 10.
[84] Ibid, p. 75.
[85] Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, p. 85.

collective memory studies have configured the internal components of national identity. Now the discussion needs to be brought back to IR and the literatures that contain the two external and final dimensions of our perspective – the role of self-esteem and international recognition in shaping national identity.

Identity, Self-Esteem and International Recognition

Almost all strands of political theory can benefit from psychology in explaining or supplementing what is not easily accounted for by the dominant rational model of decision-making.[86] Political psychology enriches the study of international relations 'by advancing our understanding of the individual and social cognitive and emotional mechanisms'.[87] Perhaps the most straightforward justification for making connections between psychology and IR theory is that, in many respects, states behave just like individuals. This can certainly be a useful premise in foreign policy analysis, considering that the idea of states acting as people has become 'so deeply embedded in our common sense that it is difficult to imagine how international politics might be conceptualized or conducted without it'.[88] It is also unavoidable to treat states as individuals for another crucial reason - 'unlike many of the other things that we commonly tend to anthropomorphize, states are actually governed by people in the form of their individual leaders'.[89] Nevertheless, whether the state as a subject is comparable to a person has been contested on the grounds that this view embodies 'an explicitly Eurocentric argument', with ideational roots in the international system of late Renaissance Europe.[90] Parallels between states and people are obviously problematic since a state 'has no unified consciousness, no single memory, and no subjective will'.[91] A convincing way of settling the dispute is that the subjectivity of states has been enshrined and become routine in international law, where a state is 'a subject endowed with rights and obligations, and it is an actor who can think rationally and be held responsible for the consequences of its actions'.[92] That is why our framework adopts the conception of states as subjects, as well as the idea that their national identity and rationality are very significant for foreign policy decision-making.

---

[86] James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, 'Psychology and International Relations Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science*, volume 4(1), 2001, p. 68.

[87] Elif Erişen, 'An Introduction to Political Psychology for International Relations Scholars', *Perceptions*, volume XVII (3), 2012, p. 18.

[88] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 196; also see Alexander Wendt, 'The State as Person in International Theory', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(2), 2004, pp. 289–316.

[89] Brian Greenhill, 'Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 14(2), 2008, p. 346.

[90] Erik Ringmar, 'The International Politics of Recognition' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), pp. 4-5.

[91] Ibid, p. 4.

[92] Ibid, p. 5.

Having established the subjectivity of states, the framework in this book needs to introduce the social identity approach as a psychological stepping stone and then focus mainly on the IR literature concerning self-esteem and international recognition. During the 1970s and 1980s, drawing on sociological and psychological insights, the social identity approach (social identity and self-categorisation theories) conceptualised the notion of 'identity' as the product of socio-cognitive processes of self-identification and categorisation, with particular relevance to explaining intergroup behaviour.[93] This perspective argued that identity was based on being the member of a specific social group, thus creating boundaries between the self and others. Talking about the psychological foundations of identity, Richard Mole mentions that, at its simplest, identity seeks to 'convey who we are or are perceived to be' and how we 'locate ourselves and others in the social world', either as individuals or groups.[94] Therefore, according to the social identity approach, national identity can be defined as a form of collective self-identification which derives from membership in a social group called the nation. Although not a revolutionary deduction, this nonetheless lays the necessary groundwork for opening up another aspect of the identity puzzle.

Romania as a state and its citizens proclaiming to have a Romanian national identity is not surprising. But what if Romania is internally portrayed as part of a group ('Europe') and its national identity self-identifies with European identity, yet neither assumption is validated by external audiences? National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological process that requires recognition, the latter being intertwined with self-esteem. The social identity approach has strongly incorporated self-esteem as a motivator for outcomes. While it has not always been empirically clear that self-esteem is important, studies have shown that group memberships are often a source of self-esteem.[95] As Alicia Cast and Peter Burke conclude, self-esteem comes from and is a key ingredient in the process of identity verification or recognition.[96] In a number of projects, Burke and Jan Stets have researched the effects of failing to verify an identity on people's emotions. When identities are verified by the responses of others, people experience positive emotions and generally have enhanced self-esteem; when an identity is not recognised, individuals feel distress, anxiety and other negative emotions, including lowered self-esteem.[97] Since this study is

---

[93] Originally formulated and expanded by Henri Tajfel, 'Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour', *Social Science Information,* volume 12, number 2, 1974, pp. 65-93; Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); further developed by John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg et al, *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (New York: Blackwell, 1987).

[94] Richard Mole, 'Discursive Identities/ Identity Discourses and Political Power', p. 3.

[95] Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 70.

[96] Alicia D. Cast and Peter Burke, 'A Theory of Self-Esteem', *Social Forces*, volume 80(3), 2002, pp. 1041-1068.

[97] Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, 'Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification', *Social Psychological Quarterly*, volume 62(4), 1999, p. 347.

primarily based in IR, it seems natural to explore and draw from intellectual applications of self-esteem and recognition to international politics, which are two separate literatures that can be fruitfully interpolated into a multi-dimensional view of national identity.

Some IR authors have sought to mix psychological theory with constructivism, albeit not in an extensive manner.[98] Ted Hopf engages with cognitive psychology to conceptualise identities as social cognitive structures shaped by internal factors. The result is a richly detailed study of Russian identity, which takes into account the impact of history and partly addresses the shortcomings inherent in Wendt's purely systemic view.[99] Hopf's stance, however, favours a structural account of how identity influences conduct, neglecting agency and the possibility of identity change or re-definitions – 'the unthinking, unintentional, automatic, everyday reproduction of the Self and Other through a collection of discursive practices that relies neither on the need for the denial and suppression of the Other nor on the conscious selection of behaviour based on a particular norm'.[100] As mentioned earlier in this chapter, our framework adopts a middle position in the agent-structure debate. The foreign policy imaginary as ideational structure affects and sets certain parameters within which decision-makers interpret and respond to international situations. Still, it does not constrain actors to take a specific course of action; they have a variety of meanings and possibilities from which to choose.

Anne Clunan has tried to remedy Hopf's overtly structural and determinist approach by putting forward 'aspirational constructivism'. Her monograph on Russia's foreign policy starts with a theory building exercise, bringing together social psychology and constructivism to locate both external and domestic sources of national identity.[101] This kind of dual focus on identity resonates with the conceptual blend applied here, although there is an area where our stances diverge. Clunan explains how various competing self-images are introduced into the discourse, then tested for practicality (being effective given the prevailing environment) and historical legitimacy. The self-image that best fits both criteria becomes dominant, enabling elites to define national identity.[102] She analyses at length the internal sources of national self-images and management strategies employed by the bearer of identity (Russia). Thus, the domestic context is implicitly given priority over external factors like identity verification or recognition by others. The present framework pays equal attention to the internal

[98] This trend has been called 'psychological constructivism' by Jacques E.C. Hymans, 'The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism', *International Theory*, volume 2(3), 2010, pp. 461-467.
[99] Ted Hopf, *The Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
[100] Ibid, p. 11.
[101] Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
[102] Ibid, p. 11.

and external dimensions of national identity, especially how self-images are negotiated between Romania and its significant Euro-Atlantic selves (EU, NATO, the United States and Western European states in general).

Clunan's 'aspirational constructivism' shares a common ground with another IR literature analysing self-esteem, prestige and status as general drivers of state foreign policy. Richard Ned Lebow introduces a cultural approach that takes a closer look at changes in norms, beliefs and values and how these changes are often brought about by factors called the motives - appetite, spirit, fear and reason - which may dominate political decision-making in societies.[103] Lebow argues that the spirit aspires to esteem through honour and standing, which renders self-esteem an important element in the formation of identity.[104] Nationalities, nations and other cultural entities seek, at least to some degree, enhanced self-esteem through their victories and suffer a loss of esteem, even humiliation, when experiencing setbacks.[105] For the ancient Greeks, honour was a status which described the outward recognition given by others in response to Greek excellence.[106] Here Lebow touches on the connection between honour (self-esteem) and external recognition, although not in the explicit sense of identity validation which is necessary in our framework.

Andrei Tsygankov's first book on the evolving identity and foreign policy of Russia successfully integrated the key components of national identity. He argues that 'interactions with external environment, as well as local conditions, establish identity as a relatively stable system of meanings with a well-consolidated context in which to act'.[107] Apart from the two-level view on national identity, Tsygankov does not reject the input of rationalist theories and chooses to regard them as not 'fully satisfactory' in explaining the changes and continuity of Russian foreign policy.[108] He does subscribe to social constructivism though, indicating that the national interest 'is about social adaptation to the constantly changing international and local conditions, and it is about recognition by the identified significant Other'.[109] In a more recent monograph on Russian foreign policy, Tsygankov also places honour at the core of his analysis, in order to better understand the state's perceptions and actions. He affirms that honour 'defines what is a "good" and "virtuous" course of action in the international system vis-à-vis the relevant other', hence containing 'standards of appropriate behavior'.[110]

---

[103] Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 5.
[104] Ibid, p. 90.
[105] Ibid, p. 17.
[106] Ibid, p. 64.
[107] Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), p. 16.
[108] Ibid, p. 20.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 4.

Lebow and Tsygankov's work reinforces the intrinsic link between identity, self-esteem and a state's external attitude, which is part of our multi-dimensional framework.

On a similar note, Liah Greenfeld has said that national identity 'is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity'.[111] In other words, national identity is driven by the desire of the community to justify itself and legitimise its standing, at the minimum protecting what has been achieved, but ultimately seeking to enhance one's position and credentials. This IR literature nicely bridges the gap between psychology and international relations, with self-esteem as a defining element for national identity and foreign policy. Even so, with the exception of Tsygangov's contribution, a recurring question remains – what about the external validation of identity? A state's national identity does not circulate in a social vacuum and is highly dependent on whether other actors like fellow states accept it or not. Otherwise, that identity simply does not exist as a social construct in their bilateral or multi-lateral interaction. Together with self-esteem, should we not see international recognition as a motivator for state conduct? After all, 'not only physical, but also social survival is at stake' in international politics.[112]

Social survival in the international system means having a stable national identity, which is not contested by others. In his path breaking study, Axel Honneth emphasises the key role of recognition in developing a stable identity which involved a basic sense of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.[113] That is why, in an anarchic international environment, one of the main motivations of states is to gain recognition for their self-images and identity.[114] Recognition can be defined as 'a social act that ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other, and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing'.[115] Thomas Lindemann further describes that if 'there is a rough equivalence between our asserted self-image and how we are treated, meaning that if others treat us according to what we consider ourselves to be, our self-image is recognized'.[116] The configuration of national identity is hence understood as an intersubjective negotiation and dialogue between the self and legitimate others. As succinctly put by Ringmar, 'all stories require audiences' and the latter

[111] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 491.
[112] Erik Ringmar, 'The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West', *Cooperation and Conflict*, volume 37(2), 2002, p. 116.
[113] Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
[114] Michelle K. Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics: Security, Identity, and the Quest for Power* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 40.
[115] Michelle K. Murray, 'Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco', p. 134.
[116] Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition* (University of Essex: European Consortium for Political Research Press, 2010), p. 9.

must agree with the self-images and narratives expressed by a state.[117] The categories of audiences include variations on the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy, whether allies or enemies, partners or rivals. For example, representing a state as a liberal democracy would not be meaningful without some form of confirmation from fellow liberal democracies. There must be 'visible signs' for being part of a certain group so as to enable identification, because 'we belong together if we simultaneously perform the same acts or utter the same words, and if we are aware that others are doing the same together with us'.[118]

Furthermore, this external dimension of having self-images validated becomes vital because it renders the entire social process effective in practice. If external actors recognise the roles, ideas and identity internally attributed to a state, they give invaluable credibility to that domestic collective imaginary. In their search for the international recognition of national identity, political elites might attempt to not only present their state in accordance with national societal demands, but also constantly adapt the articulations depending on outside reactions conveying support, threat or simply indifference. So recognition is fundamental to securing a healthy sense of subjectivity; without it, actors are liable to feel shame and humiliation and taken further still, from a cognitive perspective, having one's identity recognised and confirmed by others can be fundamental to establishing a sense of self in the first place.[119] This is another reason why it is only possible for identities to develop a sense of self in dialogical relationships with external others.[120] Non-recognition can be a significant source of psychological anxiety and anguish to the extent that it threatens an actor's sense of self-esteem and self image.[121]

Indeed, at a collective level and taken to the extreme, non-recognition represents a challenge to the symbolic existence of the group or nation. More usually, however, non-recognition adopts the form of positive self-images not being verified by salient others, leaving the self with the dilemma to either redouble efforts to secure future acceptance of claims made about the self, or to take non-recognition to heart via the renegotiation of a new narrative for the self.[122] That is why the state may engage in processes of re-narration and re-constitution by projecting an alternative biography of the self, perceived as being more suitable for the new situation and in turn establishing a new set of meanings and concomitant identity claims supportive of the new position. As a synthesis, Ringmar elaborates on three options that states have when confronted

---

[117] Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, p. 79.
[118] Ibid, p. 87.
[119] Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 2.
[120] Arash Abizadeh, 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, volume 99(1), 2005, pp. 47-48.
[121] Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 24.
[122] Erik Ringmar, 'The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West', pp. 115-136.

with denial of recognition. First, simply give up and find 'an alternative self-description and re-brand itself as something else', without any guarantees that a second attempt will be successful.[123] Second, 'accept the verdict of the audience' and maintain the self-images in question, at the same time 'embarking on a program of self-reformation' (adopting the missing traits to hopefully be recognised).[124] Third, preserve the national narratives, self-images and identity by trying to convince others of their validity.[125] These strategies and general dynamics of international recognition will be seen as particularly relevant to Romania's national identity and foreign policy. They underline how Romania reacted to having a 'European' self-image at least partially denied, since the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct post-communist candidate states as 'liminal Europe' or 'Europe but not quite Europe'.[126]

Conclusions of a Multi-Dimensional View on National Identity

To conclude this outline of our conceptual framework, the different sources and their useful insights need to be integrated into a coherent whole. A student of IR interested in identity tends to first make contact with a vast and rich constructivist body of work. Constructivism was the initial step towards finding the suitable conceptual blend for understanding Romanian national identity and foreign policy. This project employs the following general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without actually imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a feature of identity creation. Taking each one in turn, identities are fluid and grounded in a shifting ideational basis, at the same time guiding a state's foreign policy conduct without causally determining it. They might be subject to constant re-definition under the influence of both systemic and internal factors. More specifically, national identity is shaped by inter-state socialisation and domestic aspects such as cultural values and interpretations of the nation's historical past. Although it has a changing nature, national identity draws self-images from a series of enduring meanings and articulations prevalent in the nation's distant or more recent history. The self-images feeding into national identity are based on the self-other dichotomy, being dependent on what distinguishes them from more or less salient others. As Bahar Rumelili states, '[i]dentities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not'.[127] Such a stance does not necessarily involve an

[123] Erik Ringmar, 'The International Politics of Recognition', p. 8.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 57.
[127] Bahar Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference', p. 29.

antagonistic behavioural relationship between the self and others or their mutual exclusion. On the contrary, the scale of perception ranges from friendly to threatening others.

Moreover, all these understandings relevant to identity circulate in a discursive space called the foreign policy imaginary - a key notion adapted from Weldes. This represents a structure of well established meanings, a reservoir which contains the long-standing self-images derived from a nation's interpretations of the remembered past. The foreign policy imaginary influences national identity by affecting how elites perceive their state and decide the appropriate responses to international events. Yet leaders enjoy freedom of choice and action, since the foreign policy imaginary offers many articulations and potential interpretive avenues, which may be selected depending on the actors and circumstances involved. Thus, this book favours a middle position in the agent-structure debate. On a related note, the foreign policy imaginary just like national identity is shaped both from within and outside. So the logical next step is to identify the internal factors of national identity formation, followed by the external ones. The nation constitutes a fairly obvious domestic source of national identity and has been the traditional concern of nationalism scholars. The debates in nationalism studies shed light on the imagined essence of the nation, which does not imply that nations are fictitious. They stem from and retain a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The combined insights of Anderson and Smith not only configure a foundation for the nation and national identity, they also indicate another intellectual gap. The first three constitutive features of national identity (ethnic descent, language, territory) are quite straightforward in the Romanian case. But the concept of collective memory is much more problematic and represents a second internal factor of national identity creation.

Generally speaking, this framework considers collective memory to be a subjective interpretation of the nation's remembered past, which gives meaning to the self-images that make up national identity and conveys future aspirations. The term collective memory-myths is preferable here, since they can be understood as historical narratives and symbols that bind members of a nation together under a common national identity over a very long period of time. Having pointed out the two domestic sources of national identity, what has been left is the external dimension of the identity process: self-esteem and recognition. The present study incorporates socio-psychological insights and it is premised on the subjectivity of states; in other words, states behave like individuals and their national identity and rationality are essential to foreign policy. Self-images and in turn national identity also require validation by others to be effective in social practice. Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem, which is an important motivator in foreign policy decision-making. If identities are validated

by the responses of others, this mechanism results in positive emotions and enhanced self-esteem. If a state's national identity is not accepted by external audiences, then people and political elites by extension experience a host of negative feelings, including lowered self-esteem. Social survival and the pursuit of self-esteem explain why states seek to gain international recognition for their identities. Self-images and national identity are negotiated between the self and its significant others. If they are not internationally recognised, the state resorts to different coping strategies such as trying to adapt or re-define its self-images, in order to convince external audiences of their validity. While not denying the utility of Realpolitik, this multi-dimensional framework has compiled a conceptual toolbox for 'a new *Identitätsproblematik*'[128], which will show a different kind of perspective on Romania's foreign policy.

Transitioning towards the empirical material, our analysis based on national identity becomes particularly meaningful in the context of post-communist Europe. The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union generated a radical shift in the balance of constraints, freedom and ideas for countries in the affected regions. These changes produced critical ruptures that destabilised the boundaries of national identities, since the previously dominant Cold War representations were no longer valid. At the same time, the need for new ideational foundations and the shaping of more stable identities became imminent. That is why the seven years following the Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship (1990-1996) could be regarded as a series of 'formative moments' – a notion borrowed from Ringmar.[129] He argues that in 'normal times' the matter of identity is simply taken for granted, yet there are also 'formative moments' or certain periods in the life of individuals and societies when pre-assumed issues come under scrutiny. Formative moments should be seen as favourable times which allow new meanings to appear and new identities to be established.[130] This project adopts the concept of 'formative moment' as symbolising a period in which the transformation of identity becomes more likely if compared to other times with less significant or smaller re-definitions. According to Ringmar, formative moments often appear as times of 'unprecedented poetic freedom', when actors believe they can 'become whatever they want to be'.[131]

Post-communist Romania was finally free to reject its totalitarian past and pursue the self-images it deemed appropriate in international politics. Among the different facets or self-images of Romanian national identity, the 'European' one was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and meant to show the state's

[128] Erik Ringmar, 'The International Politics of Recognition', pp. 3-4.
[129] Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, p. 77.
[130] Ibid, p. 83.
[131] Ibid, p. 86.

Western heritage. That is why, especially in the period 1990-1996, Romania was very frequently depicted as a 'European' state. National foreign policy elites discursively reinforced the 'European' self-image to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a collective identity with the West or the Euro-Atlantic community, represented by two key institutions: NATO and the EU. Yet the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self did not recognise or only partially accepted Romania's articulations, which prompted a story of identity negotiation that influenced the state's foreign policy until 1996 and further on.

Chapter III: To Be or Not to Be 'European'?

The years 1990-1996 were one of the key formative periods of Romania's post-communist national identity and they exhibited an array of emerging and re-emerging ideas. The restoration of democracy provided Romania with the opportunity to freely choose a new international direction, after more than fifty years under an incredibly oppressive communist dictatorship. As Eva Hoffman observed, Romanian history has been shaped by 'discontinuity more than continuities, by oppression more than independence, by various forms of authoritarianism more than by liberalism'.[1] This chapter aims to explore how Romania chose a European orientation, despite internal contestation over this foreign policy decision. Another objective is to analyse some of the complexities entailed in that choice, by discussing how the 'European' self-image was constructed in the foreign policy imaginary. These configure two interlinked 'formative moments' for Romanian identity and foreign policy during 1990-1996.

The first one defined the state's international course towards 'Europe'. Political leaders had to decide whether post-communist Romania would become closer to the Euro-Atlantic community or opt for Russian influence. In this context, the 1991 Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' was a controversial foreign policy move that was contested among domestic elites. President Iliescu's support for the treaty was not shared by the majority of state officials, who envisioned a European identity and future for Romania. Having made the definitive choice for Europe, the second crucial 'formative moment' articulated the 'European' self-image of Romania's national identity. The latter was intensely re-defined in the period 1990-1996, impacting on the state's problematic relations with Hungary, which will be discussed at length in chapter IV.

Romania and the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' (1991)

After many decades of communist dictatorship, Romania's political elites had the opportunity to freely find the answer to an existential question: to be or not to be 'European'? Should the new democratic state become closer to the

[1] Eva Hoffman, *Exit into History. A Journey through the New Eastern Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 293.

Euro-Atlantic community or gravitate towards Russian influence? The answer was not straightforward, at least not for all the actors involved, and the years 1990-1991 showed a degree of internal contestation regarding Romania's national identity and external direction. The most compelling evidence in this respect was the Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty', which was negotiated by Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Năstase in March 1991, signed by President Ion Iliescu during his official visit to the USSR in early April, yet never ratified by Romania's Parliament.

Romania was the only post-communist country that signed a 'Friendship Treaty' with the USSR. The document triggered intense international speculation about relations between the two states, including the idea that Bucharest identified with the filo-Russian group from the Balkan area, together with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.[2] At a domestic level, the main controversy surrounding the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' stemmed from the inclusion of a few vague 'security clauses', which could have impacted on Romanian foreign policy actions. Three articles proved to be the most problematic. First, Romania and the USSR agreed not to participate in 'any kind of alliances against each other'.[3] Second, other parties would not be allowed to use the signatories' territory 'for committing aggression against each other'.[4] Third, if Romania or the USSR entered an armed conflict with a third state, neither the Romanian nor the Soviet side would 'give any type of assistance to such a state'.[5] Consequently, by signing the terms set in the 'Friendship Treaty', Romania consented not to be involved in any organisation, alliance or security arrangement which went against Soviet interests. This obstructed and potentially jeopardised the state's independent foreign policy decision-making. In other words, an alarming reading of the document was that Romania would not be able to choose its European identity, or pursue the latter's external recognition by seeking NATO and EU membership without Soviet approval. Finalising the treaty and having it ratified in Parliament would have arguably 'mortgaged' Romania's future and condemned it to the Russian sphere of influence for a long time, if not irrevocably.[6]

To this day, many aspects concerning the episode of the aborted 1991 Romanian-Soviet treaty remain somewhat mysterious. Why would some political

---

[2] Emil Hurezeanu, 'NATO după NATO'/'NATO after NATO' in Gabriel Andreescu (ed.), *România versus România* (Bucharest: Clavis, 1996), pp.143-149.

[3] Vladimir Socor, 'The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and Its Regional Implications', *Report on Eastern Europe*, volume 2(18), 3 May 1991, pp. 26-27.

[4] Florin Abraham, *Transformarea României: 1989-2006. Rolul factorilor externi/ The Transformation of Romania: 1989-2006. The Role of External Factors* (Bucharest: INST, 2006), pp. 188-189.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Şerban Papacostea, 'Sfârşitul unei tiranii şi începutul unei mistificări istorice. Revelațiile unui document ignorat'/ 'The End of a Tyranny and the Beginning of a Historical Mystification. The Revelations of an Ignored Document' in *Revista 22*, number 1085 and Special issue, December 2011 – January 2012; http://www.revista22.ro/sfrsitul-unei-tiranii-si-nceputul-unei-mistificari-istorice-revelatiile-unui-document-ignorat-9584.html (April 2017).

leaders (i.e. President Iliescu and Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase) accept stipulations that could have prevented Romania from joining NATO and the EU? Other post-communist states rejected such articles in their treaties with the Soviet Union, specifically on the grounds of those restrictive 'security clauses'. Instead, they later signed bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation: the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1 April 1992), Poland (22 May 1992) and Bulgaria (4 August 1992). The memoirs and statements of relevant Romanian elites contain contradictory stories that are further complicated by the scarcity of available official documents. The Romanian Prime Minister - Petre Roman (1990-1991) - accused Minister Năstase of 'duplicity and premeditated misinformation' about the negotiations for the treaty's content; the Premier was allegedly trying to persuade Iliescu that the document should not be adopted, a request which was apparently refused by the President.[7] Roman also described his premiership as a 'de facto cohabitation'; he thought that the 'two opposing wills, one installed at the presidency, the other within the government' were the reasons behind 'the hesitancies and ambiguity' noticed by foreign observers.[8]

Although Minister Năstase conducted the treaty negotiations in 1991, the directives and final say belonged to President Iliescu. The latter argued that the document had been misinterpreted and it was only meant to build a different 'positive' relationship with the USSR, based on 'the principles of international law and the new post-Cold War realities'.[9] He denied the idea that the Soviet Union was effectively given the right to veto Romania's alliances and NATO accession; in the same context, Iliescu declared that his signing the 'Friendship Treaty' was a collective decision from all the main state institutions – Government and Parliament.[10] The President also pointed out that, throughout 1992, NATO representatives had stopped considering 'Russia' as 'an adversary', which eventually materialised in 'the NATO-Russia special partnership'.[11] This does not take into account the fact that, for the Euro-Atlantic community, the Soviet Union (a dictatorship) was a very different and much less acceptable ally compared to the Russian Federation (a state supposedly undergoing democratisation). Regardless of how one interprets the treaty - in a more or less alarming light, the fact remains that Romania through President Iliescu was the only post-communist state to accept such a controversial text. So it was not

[7] Adrian Severin, *Lacrimile dimineții. Slăbiciunile guvernului Roman/ Morning Tears. The Weaknesses of the Roman Government* (Bucharest: SCRIPTA, 1995), p. 157.

[8] Petre Roman – Prime Minister of Romania (December 1989 - September 1991), *Libertatea ca datorie/ Freedom as Duty* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1994), p. 127.

[9] Ion Iliescu – President of Romania (May 1990 – September 1992; September 1992 – November 1996), *Momente de istorie. Documente, alocuțiuni, interviuri, comentarii: septembrie 1991–octombrie 1992/ Moments of History. Documents, Speeches, Interviews, Commentaries: September 1991-October 1992* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1996), pp. 251-252.

[10] Ion Iliescu, 'Drept la replică'/ 'Right of Reply' in *Historia*, number 117, September 2011; available at http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/actualitate/articol/ion-iliescu-reactioneaza-nu-le-datorez-nimic-presedintelui-gorbacio (April 2017).

[11] Ibid.

surprising that, after the treaty's signing and content were made public, a large part of the Romanian media accused Iliescu of favouring a close relationship with the USSR and ignoring the will of Romanians who overwhelmingly aspired to a European future.[12]

Another controversial piece of evidence about President Iliescu's motivations for signing the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' was found in the Russian archives. It was a note containing the detailed minutes of a meeting between Vadim Zagladin (Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's adviser) and his Romanian counterpart - Ioan Paşcu (presidential foreign affairs counsellor 1990-1992) on 9 February 1991.[13] The meeting had been requested by Romania's Presidency to directly convey 'Iliescu's message' to the USSR leader.[14] Several topics were apparently discussed such as Romanian-Soviet relations, the domestic situation in Romania, the Republic of Moldova and the Gulf War. Concerning the future, Paşcu allegedly said that President Iliescu believed in the deepening of political and economic cooperation between Romania and the Soviet Union. Romania was not attempting to weaken its ties with the USSR; on the contrary, it 'expected the Soviet side to replace the Warsaw Pact with a "new strategic initiative"' and become more involved in post-communist Europe.[15] These aspects indicate that pre-1992 Iliescu's perspective on Romanian foreign policy leaned towards the Soviet Union/Russia, in spite of his public declarations about Romania being 'European' and developing ties with the Euro-Atlantic community. Romania following a European course did not exclude a diplomatic or even moderately friendly rapport with the USSR and later Russia. But it would have been impossible for the state to enter a security alliance with both NATO and the USSR.

That said, clarity on what transpired in Moscow is not easy to attain. Minister Paşcu has disputed the authenticity of this note and offered another version of what was discussed with Zagladin on 9 February 1991. According to Paşcu, the meeting had also been witnessed by the Romanian ambassador to the USSR - Vasile Şandru. Paşcu stated that the topic under discussion did not deal with Soviet-Romanian relations, but rather 'the situation of military operations in the Gulf' and a Romanian request for the USSR to fulfil its commitment in delivering a specific amount of gas.[16] He stressed that, 'at least on the Romanian side, no one can verify the document's authenticity' and it simply constituted a

---

[12] Şerban Papacostea, 'Sfârşitul unei tiranii şi începutul unei mistificări istorice'.

[13] Document reproduced in Simion Gheorghiu, 'Politica externă post-decembristă a României (1991)'/ 'Romania's Post-December Foreign Policy (1991)' in The Romanian Academy (ed.), *Studii şi materiale de istorie contemporană*, volume IX (Bucharest: Institutul de Istorie 'Nicolae Iorga', 2010), pp. 231-235.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid, p. 233; the phrase 'new strategic initiative' was a direct quote of Paşcu noted by Zagladin in the meeting minutes.

[16] Ioan M. Paşcu, 'Un document fabricat (Drept la replică)'/ 'A Fabricated Document (Right to Reply)' in *Revista 22*, number 1097, 15-21 March 2011; available at http://www.revista22.ro/un-document-fabricat-drept-la-replic259-10157.html (April 2017).

means of spreading falsehood.[17] Simion Gheorghiu is the researcher who found the note in the Archives of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Research (the Gorbachev section), while undergoing archival work for his doctoral project. He gave full reference details when publishing the Romanian translation of his findings and explained there was no apparent reason to suspect the document's authenticity.[18]

Amidst conflicting claims, the purpose and topic of the Moscow meeting remain impossible to verify definitively with the evidence available currently. If the note in question is authentic, it reinforces the idea that President Iliescu was pro-active in pursuing a close security relationship with the Soviet Union. This went against the wishes of domestic public opinion and the proclaimed intentions of other foreign policy leaders like the Prime Minister, who aimed to validate Romania's European and Euro-Atlantic identity through EU and NATO integration. If the note is indeed fabricated, then the context goes back to the contradictory statements of key actors (President, Premier, Parliament members), who have told different stories about the same event. This adds another unclear layer to the obscure circumstances surrounding the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty'. Yet whatever the precise truth of what occurred and the individuals' motives, the treaty was widely regarded as a moment of foreign policy decision which was internally contested.

Thus far, the treaty narrative emerges as an intriguing and quite elusive puzzle. President Iliescu's main argument for signing it was that he implemented a decision made together with Parliament and Government representatives. If the text was indeed agreed upon by all major institutions, then why not take the next step and legalise it through parliamentary ratification? Despite Iliescu's claims of unanimity, important parliamentary figures and members of the governmental party stated that they had no knowledge of the treaty prior to its signing. The role of the legislative body was discussed by two members who had been involved in those events: Alexandru Bârlădeanu, senator from the National Salvation Front (FSN – governmental party) and chairman of the Senate (the higher chamber of Parliament), and Sabin Ivan – senator from the National Liberal Party (opposition). Bârlădeanu said he was not aware of such a treaty with the USSR and had not been informed of President Iliescu's decisions.[19] He had heard about it from Cornel Mănescu, another FSN senator and head of the Parliament's Foreign Policy Commission.[20] Mănescu had read the treaty text and wanted

[17] Ibid.

[18] Simion Gheorghiu, 'Precizări pe marginea unei replici'/ 'Remarks concerning a Reply', *Revista 22*, number 1097, 15-21 March 2011; available at http://www.revista22.ro/preciz259ri-pe-marginea-unei-replici-10160.html (April 2017).

[19] Sabin Ivan, *Radiografii parlamentare. De vorbă cu Alexandru Bârlădeanu/ Parliamentary X-Rays. Talking with Alexandru Bârlădeanu* (Constanța: Ex Ponto, 1998), p. 164.

[20] Sabin Ivan, 'Ion Iliescu în oglinda istoriei: Interviu cu Alexandru Bârlădeanu'/ 'Ion Iliescu in the Mirror of History: Interview with Alexandru Bârlădeanu', *Memoria*, 68-69, 2009; available at http://revista.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=1026 (April 2017).

Bârlădeanu's support to block its ratification in Parliament, mainly because the document did not denounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.[21] Bârlădeanu advised Mănescu to speak with President Iliescu about his serious objections and the matter was not brought up again in their discussions.[22] Besides, Ivan concluded from various conversations with FSN members of Parliament around March-April 1991 that they disagreed with the USSR treaty and would have voted against it.[23] He speculated that Mănescu had explained to President Iliescu the governmental party's widespread negative reaction, which prompted Iliescu to stop pursuing the controversial treaty.[24]

Therefore, how should one interpret Romania signing the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty'? Realist scholars think that the state displayed the typical behaviour of a 'minor power', who was 'hedging' or simultaneously balancing between the two regional hegemons (NATO and the USSR/Russia).[25] However, such an account is not persuasive since it operates on two problematic assumptions. First, realists avoid opening the 'black box' of the state and do not explore what happens inside it. Close security cooperation with the Soviet Union was clearly not a unanimous option among Romanian elites. Second, it seems that some Romanian leaders (i.e. President Iliescu) were not hedging, but making a rather firm choice to gravitate towards Moscow. On that note, the available documents do not allow us to identify without doubt the President's intentions. After establishing a close security relationship with the USSR, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to shift Romania's international direction towards the Euro-Atlantic community.[26] The bottom line remains that President Iliescu endorsed a treaty with the USSR, being the first post-communist leader from Central-Eastern Europe to openly and officially treat the Soviet Union as a security partner.

Here an analysis based on national identity broadens our understanding of the Soviet treaty episode, which constituted a 'formative moment' that defined for Romania an essential question: to be or not to be 'European'. The ideational framework adopted in this study helps to differentiate between the articulations promoted by the international and Romanian discourses. The international situation had changed substantially after Gorbachev became President of the USSR in 1985. He fundamentally revised the Soviet Union's attitude and foreign policy towards NATO, implementing an initial concept called the 'Common European House'. The notion of a 'Common European House' symbolizes 'the knowledge of a certain integrality, even if states belonging to different social

[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Simona Soare, 'Romania's National Security Strategy – A Critical Approach of Transformational Politics', *Monitor Strategic*, number 1-2, 2008, p. 56.
[26] Armand Goşu, 'Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005'/ 'Romania's Eastern Policy: 1990-2005', *Contrafort*, number 1(135), January 2006; available at http://www.contrafort.md/old/2006/135/958.html (April 2017).

systems and military-political blocs are involved'.[27] This theme 'acquired greater substance when it was combined from 1988 onwards with two other concepts, the New Thinking (...) in international security affairs and the principle of Freedom of Choice (...) for the countries of central and south-eastern Europe'.[28]

The end of the Cold War accelerated the process of international change. Since the Warsaw Pact (a military alliance between the USSR and its satellite socialist states) was declared disbanded in February 1991, the Soviet Union adopted a set of initiatives towards the newly democratic Central-Eastern Europe. It aimed to pay greater attention to Europe's post-communist states and prevent them from becoming 'sources of anti-Soviet sentiments', while also intending to keep them 'free of foreign military bases and forces'.[29] The USSR seemed interested to establish some sort of cooperative arrangement both with NATO and Central-Eastern Europe. As a result of these Soviet foreign policy changes, President Gorbachev and NATO representatives talked at length about the future close cooperation between the two previously opposing blocs. Such a discursive shift also suggested that Russia would be eventually included in the wider European community. Consequently, President Iliescu made a relevant point in his justification of the Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty', by arguing that NATO was reconsidering its stance and did not see Gorbachev's USSR as an opponent. Under the umbrella of a 'Common European House', Romania did not necessarily have to choose between the West (Euro-Atlantic world) and the Soviet Union/Russia.

Even so, Romania's dominant internal discourses conveyed the inevitability of such a choice because Russia was not considered to be 'Western' or even 'European'. Historically, Russia has been constructed as Europe's other.[30] In the Romanian case, Russia in its various incarnations had been articulated as the 'barbarous East' since the interwar years; at the time, Romanians had feared that Bolshevism would spread or be forcefully installed in Central-Eastern Europe, which increased their anti-Russian views and reinforced their identification with the West.[31] In the Romanian collective memory-myths, the interwar period has been constructed as a time of stability and prosperity, when Romania was internationally acknowledged as a Western European state. It was a defining moment for the Romanian people as the aftermath of World War I facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The historical provinces of Basarabia,

---

[27] Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale contemporane/ Geopolitics and Geostrategy in the Analysis of International Relations* (Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2005), p. 92.

[28] Roland Dannreuther, *Russian Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance. Final Report for NATO 1995-1997* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1997), p. 6; available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/dannreut.pdf (April 2017).

[29] Armand Goşu, 'Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005'.

[30] Iver B. Neumann, 'Russia as Europe's Other', *Journal of Area Studies*, volume 6(12), 1998, pp. 26-73.

[31] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, p. 44.

Bucovina and Transilvania joined the Romanian Kingdom, made up of Valahia and Moldova that had already united in 1859. Unfortunately, by 1946 Romania was under a dictatorship approved by the USSR and Soviet military troops stayed in Romanian territory until 1958 to ensure communist control over the state.[32]

Moreover, the construct of Russia as the dangerous 'barbarous East' circulated in the post-1990 Romanian discourses, stemming from traumatic historical events as well as the violent revolution needed to remove communist rule in December 1989. Romania's newly democratic foreign policy imaginary featured the re-emergence of interwar representations about its identity, where the state aspired to belong, its suitable allies and long-standing threatening 'others'.[33] These ideas and historical landmarks had been perpetuated and reinterpreted as part of the Romanian collective memory-myths. The prevalent identity remained that of Romania as a Western European state, very different from and even hostile to 'Eastern' Russia, hence the general public outrage and opposition to the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' in 1991.

Bearing in mind all these aspects, most Romanians were suspicious about a rapprochement with either the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. An alarming reading of the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' was dominant in Romanian discourses, because having a close security relationship with Russia was the equivalent of embracing an 'Eastern' orientation, which had historically excluded 'the West'. Romania's past experiences of Russian aggressive international conduct were too painful to envision a harmonious 'Common European House'. This interpretation became so influential that key political actors wrote their memoirs as if 'the West' constituted Romania's natural international choice from the very beginning:

> '[e]ven in December 1989 it was clear to us that the European dimension of Romanian foreign policy was to become a priority. There was domestic consensus, both political and at society's level, regarding the need to detach ourselves from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence (…) and one way or the other return to the interwar foreign policy traditions which sought to anchor Romania within the western European bloc'.[34]

Regardless of how one views or remembers the early 1990s, the Romanian-Soviet treaty was a 'formative moment' which helped to crystallise Romania's desired identity and foreign policy direction. The state's aspiration towards a Western European identity, recognised in the international arena through Euro-Atlantic accession, emerged after an episode of intense domestic contestation. Romania through President Iliescu remained the only post-communist state to

---

[32] Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania*, p. 224.

[33] Loretta C. Salajan, *The Role of National Identity in the Trajectory of Romania's Foreign Policy (1990-2007)* (Cadair: Aberystwyth University, 2014), p. 82.

[34] Adrian Năstase, *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe/ Romania after Malta. 875 Days at Foreign Affairs*, volume 1 (Bucharest: Fundația Titulescu, 2006), p. 28.

sign a controversial treaty with the USSR. The memoirs and statements of relevant legislative actors indicate that they disagreed with the President's action and the treaty content. Yet it cannot be objectively determined whether those prominent parliamentary members were completely truthful, or subsequently re-evaluated their position to present themselves in a more favourable light.

That is why the most concrete evidence of internal contestation about Romania's identity and international course is the fact that the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' was not ratified in Parliament. If all state institutions had consented to its signing, the governmental party's majority would have presumably made the ratification process smooth and quick. Although the President endorsed the document, the dominant opinion among foreign policy decision-makers and the general public did not support a potentially non-Western European vision for Romania. Whatever his personal affiliation or convictions, President Iliescu needed to adapt to what the elites and popular majorities wanted - a Western European identity confirmed via NATO and EU membership. Following the USSR dissolution in December 1991, the 'Friendship Treaty' became obsolete. During 1992-1996, diplomatic exchanges with the Russian Federation were tentative at best and the negotiations for another bilateral agreement fell through. The internal contestation surrounding the Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' marked the emergence of Romania's firm European choice. Thus, the years 1990-1996 resonate especially with Romania's European orientation and the meanings of national identity and international conduct it translated into.

The 'European' Self-Image of Romania's National Identity

Among the self-images circulating in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, the European one was the most frequently expressed during 1990-1996. The reason is quite simple, as Romanian national identity tends to be first associated with a European representation by both elites and the general population. Broadly defined, being a 'European' state or having a European identity refers to being known and accepted as a Western European inspired liberal democracy, which upholds two key principles – the organisation of regular democratic elections and the protection of human and civil rights and liberties. Romania's European self-image was subjected to particularly frequent re-definitions because it had to simultaneously converse with influential domestic and international discourses. The articulation started taking shape immediately after the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the provisional Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac underlined in January 1990: 'Romania is a European country. That is something given by our history and spirituality'.[35]

[35] Sergiu Celac – Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (December 1989 - June 1990) cited in *Lumea/ The World*, number 2, 11 January 1990, p. 3.

Point nine of the statement proposal issued by the National Salvation Front in December 1989 had already hinted at a European direction for Romania: '[t]he country's entire foreign policy is to promote good neighbourly relations, friendship and peace in the world, integrating itself in the construction process of a united Europe'.[36] The 'European' self-image was circulated by the prominent foreign policy actors. For instance, Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase stated in the wake of Romania's first free post-communist elections (May 1990) - '[t]o my view, things are clear. Romania is a European state'.[37] At the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in November 1990, President Iliescu gave a clear indication of the state's identity and international politics goals: '[t]he new Romania resulting from the Revolution of December 1989 has adopted a policy oriented towards re-establishing historical and traditional relations with the other countries of Europe and North America, as well as towards developing relations with states sharing the same Latin culture and civilisation'.[38]

Romania's second post-1989 democratic elections in September 1992 reconfirmed Iliescu as President and placed the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in government. Throughout the electoral campaign for a new mandate, Iliescu argued that his main vision of the state's external trajectory was 'integration into (...) the structures dominating the European and Euro-Atlantic area'.[39] The message delivered in Parliament by the re-elected President indicated the same foreign policy choice, as he stressed that '[Romania's] long-term interests demand (...) the development of privileged relations with the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France and with all the other European states'.[40] President Iliescu later summed up what European identity meant for the Romanian state historically and in terms of values -

> '[d]ue to its culture, civilisation and political tradition, Romania decidedly belongs to classical Europe, inheriting both the ancient Greek-Roman tradition and the modern principles of statehood – citizenship, freedom, fundamental human rights, the separation of powers within the state, the rule of law'.[41]

The official discourse evolved in 1992-1996 towards the recurring representation of NATO and EU accession as Romania's 'natural' direction. Teodor Meleşcanu, the Foreign Affairs Minister appointed in November 1992, declared

---

[36] The National Salvation Front, 'Statement towards the Country', initially broadcast on the national television and radio, then published in *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number I(1), 22 December 1989.

[37] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview for the Romanian National Radio' (Bucharest, 14 July 1990) in *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe*, volume 1, p. 96.

[38] Ion Iliescu, 'Speech at the CSCE Summit' (Paris, 21 November 1990) in *Adevărul/ The Truth*, number I-239, p. 3.

[39] Ion Iliescu, *Cred în schimbarea în bine a României/ I Believe in the Positive Change of Romania* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992), p. 12.

[40] Ion Iliescu, *Address at the Investiture as President of Romania* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992), p. 14.

[41] Ion Iliescu, 'We Need One Another, as All of Us Need a United Europe, a Europe of the Nations' – Speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 3 November 1994), in *Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy* (Bucharest: Redacția publicațiilor pentru străinătate, 1995), p. 94.

the following: '[t]he option of Euro-Atlantic integration is a natural choice. It is a well known fact that the institutions, the political, cultural and economic life of modern Romania have (...) been an intrinsic part of European civilisation'.[42] President Iliescu expressed similar ideas in November 1994:

> '[t]he central orientation of Romanian foreign policy is based on the decision adopted during the first day of the Romanian revolution and supported, then and now, by all political forces in the country – full integration into the political, economic and security structures of democratic Europe. This decision was nothing short of natural, considering that, through its civilisation, culture, history and geographical position, the Romanian nation has always been an inseparable part of European culture and civilisation'.[43]

In terms of targeted audiences, Romania's decision-makers were addressing such speeches primarily to external recipients. Their messages indirectly aimed to remind the Euro-Atlantic community of the 'kidnapped, displaced West', the European peoples who had not abandoned their identity despite the oppression of communism.[44] This notion of 'natural' choice certainly belied the range of foreign policy and security alternatives actually available to post-communist Romania and Central-Eastern Europe in general, which included 'a reformed alliance with the former Soviet Union, neutrality or non-alignment, regional security cooperation within Eastern Europe, pan-European collective or common security through the CSCE, a realpolitik balance of power or reliance on national defence'.[45] Even so, the Euro-Atlantic orientation was domestically validated 'with an impressive unanimity by the entire political elite' gathered for consultations at Snagov in 1993.[46]

If Romania had a range of international security options, why did the post-1992 official discourse construct Euro-Atlantic accession as natural? NATO and EU membership provided the means by which Romania could receive international recognition for its desired Euro-Atlantic identity. The Western self would thus validate that the Romanian other was part of the Euro-Atlantic community, both in civilisational and institutional meanings. Among the discursive facets of Romanian national identity, the 'European' self-image was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and was meant to show the country's Western origins. Since the Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct candidate states (including Romania) as 'liminal Europe' or 'Europe but not quite Europe'[47], the foreign policy imaginary needed to be re-defined in reaction to Western representations.

---

[42] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Speech on Romania's Journey towards Euro-Atlantic Integration' (Athens, July 1996) in *Renaşterea diplomaţiei româneşti/ The Re-Birth of Romanian Diplomacy* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002), p. 144.

[43] Ion Iliescu, 'Speech delivered at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union' (Paris, 29 November 1994) in *Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy*, p. 142.

[44] Milan Kundera, 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', *New York Review of Books*, volume 31(7), 26 April 1984, p. 2.

[45] Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 13.

[46] Andrei Miroiu, 'National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The Romanian Case', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, volume 2(2), 2002, p. 103.

[47] Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries*, p. 57.

Concluding Remarks

The period 1990-1996 was quite fertile for Romania's national identity and foreign policy. It featured a series of re-emerging meanings and key 'formative moments'. The first one defined the state's international orientation towards 'Europe'. The newly restored Romanian democracy provided the political leaders with the opportunity to answer an existential question: to be or not to be 'European'? Should post-communist Romania look towards the Euro-Atlantic community or opt for the Russian sphere of influence? The 1991 Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' is an important episode of foreign policy decision which was internally contested. The available evidence makes it difficult to establish whether or not President Iliescu had a non-European agenda on Romanian identity and international relations. But his endorsement of the Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' was not shared by the majority of elites, who wanted a Euro-Atlantic future for Romania. Although signed by the President in April 1991, the treaty was never ratified by the Romanian Parliament and became obsolete when the USSR disintegrated in December 1991.

The second 'formative moment' underlined the articulation of Romania's 'European' self-image. Romanian national identity tends to be associated with Western European subjectivity first and foremost. That is why the state's European identity took centre stage during the foreign policy decision-making of 1990-1996. Having firmly selected 'Europe' in 1991, Romanian discourses gradually moved towards illustrating Euro-Atlantic or Western integration as the 'natural' international option. Realistically, Romania had a few alternatives in terms of security arrangements, some more compelling than others. Yet only NATO and EU membership granted the institutional and identificational means by which Romania would be internationally acknowledged as a Western European inspired liberal democracy.

After analysing how Romania unequivocally chose 'Europe' and the 'West', alongside establishing the ideational parameters of the state's 'European' self-image, the focus of the next chapter shifts to the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty. It was one of Romania's most important foreign policy accomplishments during 1990-1996 and a product of difficult negotiations. The official document brought the long awaited, though still tentative, historical reconciliation between the two states in 1996. The treaty story is a natural extension of the European self-image, which highlights the key role of external recognition in legitimating Romanian national identity. Romania chose and professed to be 'European', but only the self ('Europe') had the authority to validate such an identity in the international realm.

Chapter IV:

What does 'European' Identity Mean?

The third 'formative moment' of Romanian identity and foreign policy in 1990-1996 focuses on the process of European identity contestation, dialogue and external recognition between the self and other. This chapter reveals the story of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty as the clash of three discourses – international (Euro-Atlantic), Hungarian and Romanian, which said different things about Romania's European self-image. That is why the arguments have been structured in two main sections: a) the international narratives on human rights and Romania and b) the Hungarian vis-à-vis Romanian meanings on minority rights and 'European' identity. The international narratives had gradually evolved towards placing human rights outside the domestic jurisdiction of states. Euro-Atlantic discourses also portrayed Romania as not fully complying with liberal democratic norms in terms of minority rights.

Romanian leaders in turn challenged the European meanings on minority rights by depicting them as an internal affair. At stake were two contrasting views of what 'European' identity meant with respect to minority rights. Romania argued that its democratic Constitution, individual rights and extensive minority language provisions were sufficient to protect ethnic minorities. For Hungary, collective rights and some form of ethnic autonomy for its co-nationals living abroad was the appropriate European standard. As these aspects were still debated by the authoritative 'Europe', the inflexible stances of both Romania and Hungary prevented the signing of a bilateral treaty until mid-1996.

Narratives around 'The Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood'

The basic bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary reflects their problematic and sometimes conflictual post-1989 relations. Treaty negotiations did not actually start until mid-1995, due to the inflexible foreign policy positions of both Hungary and Romania. Additionally, the international context was in a state of flux. During 1989-1994, the EU lacked a coherent policy towards Central-Eastern European states seeking membership in the organisation. The

EU's uncertain attitude is understandable, considering the divergent internal opinions as to whether it should enlarge at all. Instead, the EU initially decided not to differentiate between post-communist candidate states.[1] In the Romanian case, a Trade and Cooperation Agreement had initially been planned for June 1990. But the EU postponed it when the Jiu Valley miners attacked democratic protestors in Bucharest. Romania and the EU eventually signed the Trade Agreement in October 1990 and the Association one later in February 1993.

At the EU level, there was a much clearer stance towards Central-Eastern Europe after 1993. The 'Stability Pact' - introduced by French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur (1993) - established the requirements of good neighbourliness, ethnic minority rights protection and the resolution of any disputes as compulsory conditions for EU accession or simply 'European respectability'.[2] The Stability Pact or Balladur Plan was the result of France being frustrated with 'the EU's inability to bring about a diplomatic end to the Yugoslav wars'; it was 'positively received in EU capitals' and finalised in December 1993 as 'the first Joint Action of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy'.[3] The pact aimed to prevent the reoccurrence of ethnic conflicts such as the Yugoslav wars in post-communist Europe. The EU candidate states were supposed to sign bilateral Treaties of 'Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood', which would codify their mutual agreement that issues regarding borders and ethnic minorities had been settled.

The treaty between Romania and Hungary is significant because it encapsulates the meeting point of three discourses: international (NATO, EU, other Euro-Atlantic voices), Hungarian and Romanian, which told different stories about Romania's European self-image. The case is a micro study of what it means to be 'European', through the lens of minority rights. No matter how intensely national leaders promoted the European facet of their state's national identity, only the European self held the authority to recognise that the Romanian other identified with 'Europe'. In that respect, the international narratives described Romania as not fully embracing liberal values and being unstable due to ethnic tensions, which contrasted with and did not validate the state's internal European self-image. International discourses also constructed human and minority rights as not being the exclusive domain of state jurisdiction.

Romania challenged the European meanings on minority rights by portraying the latter to be a domestic affair. The state further contested European opinion trends by saying that its democratic Constitution, individual rights and extensive minority language provisions were sufficient to protect ethnic

[1] Milada A. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 98-99.
[2] Ibid, p. 149.
[3] Ibid.

minorities. Thus, it fulfilled the criteria of being 'European' and faced no danger of inter-ethnic conflict. But Hungary had a very different set of definitions of what 'European' identity meant, advocating collective minority rights and some type of territorial autonomy based on ethnic grounds. So negotiations for the much anticipated basic treaty between the two states could not move beyond their intransigent positions on ethnic minorities particularly and divergent views on European identity more generally.

In the early 1990s, Western Europe did not have a definitive interpretation about what being European meant in these terms – the concept of minority rights and its implications were still under discussion. In this sense, Romania and Hungary were active agents in the struggle to define European identity with respect to minority rights. The undisputed European stance and appropriate meanings for minority rights were not clarified by the international and European community until 1996. Without the discursive intervention of the authoritative European self, it is highly doubtful that that the two aspiring European states would have reached a mutually agreeable compromise.

a. *The International Narratives on Human Rights and Romania*

After two devastating world wars, the international community evolved towards a conception of human rights that envisaged the individual as the focal point of societal development. Matters related to the protection and promotion of human rights were gradually transferred from the domestic realm to the international level. The United Nations (UN) Charter signed in June 1945 stipulates at article 2.7 that nothing will authorise interference in 'matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.[4] But subsequent amendments placed human rights outside national sovereignty, at least in normative terms. In December 1946, during the first session of the UN General Assembly, Resolution 96(I) was passed on genocide, which officially became a crime against international law; its punishment was defined as 'a matter of international concern'.[5]

On 10 December 1948, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and addressed three main categories of rights: the integrity of the human being or freedom from state intervention against the individual, political and civil liberties and social and economic rights. Article 30 concluded that '[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person

[4] United Nations, 'Chapter I: Purposes and Principles', *Charter of the United Nations*; available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (April 2017).

[5] Patrick Thornberry cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West* (Bucharest: Editura Universității din Bucureşti, 1999), p. 129.

any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein'.[6] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proved to be a source of inspiration for another relevant document - the Helsinki Final Act. The latter was drafted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE later OSCE) in August 1975. The Helsinki negotiations lasted three years and resulted in ten principles that were supposed to characterise inter-state relations: i) 'sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty'; ii) 'refraining from the threat or use of force'; iii) 'inviolability of frontiers'; iv) 'territorial integrity of states'; v) 'peaceful settlement of disputes'; vi) 'non-intervention in internal affairs'; vii) 'respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief'; viii) 'equal rights and self-determination of peoples'; ix) 'co-operation among states'; x) 'fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law'.[7]

The first principle dealt specifically with sovereignty – '[t]he participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State'.[8] The seventh principle tried to ensure respect for human and minority rights, as well as certain provisions to foster them: '[t]he participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere'.[9] Both the United States and Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act, but it was not legally binding. As Sarah Snyder noted, 'it was a declaration of intention, and therefore the obligations therein were only moral and political'.[10] She also argues that 'a transnational Helsinki network' was gradually developed, where individual and groups across state borders 'pressed for adherence to the human rights and human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Final Act'.[11]

The end of the Cold War brought increased international concern about human and minority rights. Several catalysts that had been emerging since the 1970s culminated in this intensified Western interest. Soviet and Central-Eastern European dissidents talked about the abuses of communist dictatorships. The United States' foreign policy had undergone a liberal shift after the disastrous Vietnam war (1954-1975), whereas Europe was searching for a new post-Cold

[6] United Nations, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*; available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (April 2017).
[7] The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Final Act* (Helsinki, 1975); available at http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true (April 2017).
[8] Ibid, p. 6
[9] Ibid.
[10] Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 5.
[11] Ibid, p. 8.

War identity.[12] The international context of post-1989 facilitated the appearance of normative changes regarding human rights.

Other texts underlying the international dimension of human rights continued to be drafted. Even more significantly, Resolution 688 of the UN Security Council explicitly linked adherence to human rights with maintaining international peace and security.[13] This resolution authorised the 1991 intervention in Iraq of a multi-national coalition under the UN flag; its humanitarian purpose aimed to protect the Kurdish minority who had been repressed by the Iraqi government.[14] The many humanitarian crises occurring in the last decades showed the diminishing of rhetorical support for the rule of non-intervention, particularly in the case of states that visibly perpetrate violence against their citizens. It could even be argued that 'modern attempts to breach the principle of non-intervention, in order to foster fundamental human rights, invariably undermined the foundation of the sovereignty doctrine'.[15] As a UN special rapporteur aptly concluded in 1992, the stipulations of article 2.7 in the Charter 'are not applicable to issues pertaining to international protection of human rights (…) human rights are a matter of international concern and do not fall under the internal jurisdiction of states'.[16]

To reflect these changing international norms, CSCE specifically engaged with minority rights:

> '[i]ssues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute *exclusively* an internal affair of the respective State'.[17]

The topic of protecting minority rights and preventing ethnic conflict was particularly sensitive in the European context, where the atrocities of the Yugoslav wars brought increased humanitarian awareness and a more pro-active attitude to avoid such tragic developments. Similarly, other organisations re-defined their perspectives on 'security' or 'security risks'. The Western European Union signed a declaration with post-communist states (including Romania) in June 1992, which noted that - 'security in its broadest sense encompasses not

---

[12] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (London: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 8.

[13] The United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 688 (1991)*; available at http://fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm (April 2017).

[14] David J. Scheffer, 'Use of Force after the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order' in Louis Henkin (ed.), *Right versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 145.

[15] James Mayall cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West*, p. 130.

[16] Erica-Irene A. Daes cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West*, p. 131.

[17] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities* (Geneva, 1991), paragraph II, p. 3 – emphasis added; available at www.osce.org/hcnm/14588 (April 2017).

only military but also political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and environmental aspects'.[18] NATO's 1991 strategic concept was elaborated to incorporate the new post-Cold War environment and security challenges, as evidenced by paragraphs 9 and 15:

> '[r]isks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe (...) Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged'.[19]

From the discourse promoted by the strategic concept, it was quite clear that NATO would only consider 'stable' post-communist states as suitable candidates for accession, meaning those not posing any potential security risks such as 'ethnic rivalries' and/or 'territorial disputes'. This was underlined by Warren Christopher's succinct claim that 'a future new member will have to demonstrate that it complies with the principles of democracy, individual freedom and respect for human rights (...) in short, the values that NATO embodies'.[20] The EU followed the same line and had proclaimed to be founded on principles like human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights; all of these norms formed the ideational basis for the integration and cooperation criteria applied to EU candidates.[21]

However, Romania was generally found wanting by the standards of international benchmarks. The international narratives on Romania were far from describing a European-inspired liberal democracy or a stable state upholding minority rights. In his 1990 article on European security, John Mearsheimer discussed 'the serious tensions', which had the potential of a 'future war'[22], between Hungary and Romania over the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transilvania. The communist era had displayed two radically different approaches to engaging with the Hungarian minority. The first two decades brought a moderate stance, which organised a complete educational system (including university) in their mother tongue for the Hungarian community. In the late 1970s, the communist dictatorship adopted an aggressive nationalist policy to surmount its legitimacy crisis and harshly restricted native language

---

[18] The Western European Union, *Declaration of the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe* - Point 3 (Bonn, 19 June 1992); see 'Key Texts' at www.weu.int (April 2017).

[19] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* (8 November 1991); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (April 2017).

[20] Warren Christopher, 'NATO Plus', *Washington Post* (9 January 1994), p. 6.

[21] The European Union, *Human Rights*; http://europa.eu/pol/rights/index_en.htm (April 2017).

[22] John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, volume 15(1), Summer 1990, p. 33.

education.[23] European institutions were aware of the negative turn taken by the Romanian state under Ceauşescu towards handling minority issues. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had opined that human rights violations in communist Romania were 'more specifically directed against the Hungarian and the Tzigane minorities'.[24] Post-1990, Mearsheimer's war scenario between Hungary and Romania was too pessimistic, yet his opinion on highly strained inter-ethnic dynamics was shared by many international observers.

For example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published a report which argued that:

> '[o]ver the past three years, Romania has developed a tremendous sense of insecurity from the existence of such a large Hungarian minority in Transylvania and has gone to extraordinary lengths to defend itself from Hungarian charges of discrimination. However, there is a great deal of evidence that over the past two years inter-ethnic relations in the region have polarized dramatically and that much of the trouble has been caused by Romanian extremists, working with the "approval" of seemingly compliant officials'.[25]

Other external sources reinforced the same image of instability and volatile minority problems. This ranged from 'nationalist tensions have not disappeared (…) both the Romanian and Hungarian sides are guilty of instigation'[26] to Romania being depicted as a 'potential theatre of inter-ethnic conflicts like in the former Yugoslavia'.[27] The mildest representations were present in the Association Agreement signed by the European Community/EU and Romania on 1 February 1993. Its main objective was to help prepare the state for future membership. The document highlighted 'the importance of the traditional links existing between the Community, its Member States and Romania and the common values that they share'.[28] Nevertheless, it identified 'the need to continue and complete, with the assistance of the Community, Romania's transition towards a new political and economic system which respects the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'.[29]

---

[23] Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*, p. 106.

[24] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, *Recommendation 1114 (1989) on the Situation of Minorities in Romania* (26 September 1989); http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta89/erec1114.htm (April 2017).

[25] Stephen I. Griffiths, 'Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security', *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Report No. 5* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 23; books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR05.pdf (April 2017).

[26] Dominique Rosenberg cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West*, p. 255.

[27] Michael E. Brown cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West*, p. 255.

[28] Parliament of Romania, 'Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Communities, Their Member States and Romania', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 73, 12 April 1993.

[29] Ibid.

To sum up, between 1990 and 1994, the international narratives on Romania contained mostly negative articulations that had been fuelled from within by the state's violent and somewhat questionable transition to a democratic regime. A common point of alarming criticism in these external voices configured Romania as not fully complying with liberal democratic values and being unstable due to ethnic tensions that could degenerate into conflict. While international norms evolved towards placing human rights outside the internal jurisdiction of states, the CSCE stated that minority rights were not the exclusive concern of domestic affairs. These dominant Euro-Atlantic discourses need to be kept in mind to understand Romania's foreign policy reactions, as well as how national identity and its European self-image were discursively negotiated between the self and other. Romania challenged European meanings by arguing against the internationalisation of ethnic and minority issues. It is interesting to note that, although the broader trend internationalised human and minority rights, Romania was eventually successful in promoting a narrower interpretation of such aspects. The state also contested the international narratives which constructed it as not being sufficiently 'Western European'. That is why Romanian-Hungarian relations constitute a narrative of 'European' identity with contrasting notions, acceptance and rejection, dialogue and ultimately reaching a rather unexpected agreement.

b. The Treaty Story: Hungarian vis-à-vis Romanian Meanings on Minority Rights and European Identity

The story of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty spanned the period 1990-1996, being alternatively marked by regression and tentative progress. Throughout his electoral campaign in May 1990, the future Hungarian Premier József Antall announced on several occasions that he would like to be the prime minister 'in spirit' of fifteen million Hungarians.[30] This figure far exceeded the people residing within national borders, made up of approximately ten million citizens. After being elected, Antall organised the Secretariat of Hungarians Abroad, which was under the direct coordination of the Hungarian Prime Minister's office. The initiative became a concrete example of the Hungarian administration's external agenda and its claim that 'it was entitled to defend the interests of co-nationals' in neighbouring countries and the rest of the world.[31]

The Antall government prioritised the improvement of status and treatment for ethnic Hungarians living abroad, which took precedence even over domestic reforms. The main targets were territories redistributed by the Treaty of Trianon

[30] József Antall (May 1990 – December 1993) cited in László Valki, 'Hungary: Understanding Western Messages' in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.), *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 296.
[31] Tom Gallagher, *Romania after Ceauşescu: The Politics of Intolerance*, p. 119.

signed at the end of World War I (1920); the territories were mostly returned to contemporary Romania, Slovakia and the former Yugoslavia.[32] Thus, President Arpad Göncz defined 'the enforcement of *collective and personal rights* for the Magyars[33] living in the Carpathian Basin' as the main objective of Hungary's foreign policy.[34] State Secretary Géza Entz added that 'ethnic Hungarians beyond borders form an integral part of the Hungarian nation'.[35] The discourse gradually gained more momentum and conveyed the Hungarian nation's re-birth, recently freed from communism and which could not be fulfilled without at least the spiritual reunification of the pre-1920 Great Hungary.

On 25 September 1991, in front of the UN Security Council, Foreign Affairs Minister Géza Jeszenszky declared the following: 'We must resolutely condemn any efforts or attempts at the forcible change of borders, external and internal alike'.[36] Here Jeszenszky only denounced the *forceful* reconfiguration of borders, which indirectly suggested the possibility for a peaceful revision of the Trianon Treaty and post-war settlements. This would allow the Hungarian state to recover some of the lands given to Romania and Czechoslovakia. In 1992 Defence Minister Lajos Für further said that 'the safeguarding of Hungarians everywhere is inseparable from the nation's security' and that 'the Hungarian government and parliament should do everything in their power, using all legal and diplomatic means, to end the threat to the minority and to guarantee their survival'.[37] The Antall government refused to sign bilateral agreements or basic treaties with its neighbours, unless the documents guaranteed collective rights for ethnic minorities.[38] As Jeszenszky underlined using quite radical language in 1993, external relations would depend on 'when and which of our neighbors recognize the need to abandon the policy of oppression (…) petty restrictions on Hungarian minorities and of trying to create homogeneous nation-states'.[39] All these aspects prompted academics like László Kiss to talk about the 'ethnification' of Hungary's foreign policy.[40]

---

[32] Péter Kende, 'The Trianon Syndrome: Hungarians and Their Neighbors' in Béla K. Király (ed.), *Lawful Revolution in Hungary 1989-1994* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1995), pp. 475-492.

[33] 'Magyar' is synonymous with 'Hungarian', being derived from the native name of Hungary – 'Magyarorszag' ('The Magyar Country').

[34] Arpad Göncz cited in Janusz Bugajski, *Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe* (London: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 168-169 – emphasis added.

[35] Géza Entz cited in ibid.

[36] Géza Jeszenszky (May 1990 – July 1994) cited in Pál Dunay, 'Hungary: Defining the Boundaries of Security' in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 129.

[37] Lajos Für (1990-1994) cited in Tom Gallagher, 'Danube Détente: Romania's Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996', *Balkanologie. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires*, volume 1(2), December 1997; available at http://balkanologie.revues.org/index222.html (April 2017).

[38] Vasile Puşcaş et al., 'The Romanian-Hungarian Treaty (1996) and the National Minority Issue – A Case Study' in Vasile Puşcaş (ed.), *Central Europe since 1989. Concepts and Developments* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2000), p. 128.

[39] Géza Jeszenszky, 'Hungary's Foreign Policy Dilemmas', *The Hungarian Quarterly,* volume 34(130), Summer 1993, p. 11.

[40] László Kiss, 'Hungary' in Hanspeter Neuhold et al (eds.), *Political and Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 245.

However, the so-called 'petty restrictions' derived from a much more problematic issue – the legal difference between individual and collective minority rights. A long-standing and still not fully resolved matter is whether the minority rights stipulated by international conventions, declarations and other frameworks should be awarded to the group as a whole or only to its members as individual right-holders.[41] The fundamental legal basis for minority protection is article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in March 1976. It says that:

> '[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language'.[42]

A recurring phrase in all such international or regional documents is 'persons belonging to', which configured the individual nature of minority rights. The more recent UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was adopted in December 1992. Although the Declaration on Minorities is not legally binding, article 1 'goes beyond the tentative article 27' before reverting to the 'cumbersome "persons belonging to" formula'[43] –

> '[s]tates shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity'.[44]

Patrick Thornberry argued that this Declaration contained a limited collective dimension for minority rights, which represented 'a via media between the rights of individuals and full collective rights'.[45]

Narrowing things down to the European level, the Council of Europe made some attempts to differentiate between individual and collective minority rights, but they remained inconclusive. Its Parliamentary Assembly issued Recommendation 1134 (1990), which introduced the following minimum principles on the rights of minorities:

> '10.1 every citizen must have equal access to the courts and be afforded the rights safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights including the right of individual petition set forth in Article 25; 10.2 introduction of a general non-

---

[41] Douglas Sanders, 'Collective Rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, volume 13(3), August 1991, p. 368.

[42] The United Nations General Assembly, *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966); available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (April 2017).

[43] Miodrag Jovanovic, 'Recognizing Minority Identities through Collective Rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, volume 27(2), May 2005, p. 628.

[44] The United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*, A/RES/47/135 (18 December 1992); available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm (April 2017).

[45] Patrick Thornberry, 'The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations and an Update' in Alan Philips and Allan Rosas (eds.), *Universal Minority Rights* ('Åbo Akademi' University Institute for Human Rights, 1995), p. 54.

> discrimination clause in the European Convention on Human Rights; 10.3 the special situation of a given minority may justify special measures in its favour; 10.4 minorities shall be allowed to have free and unimpeded peaceful contacts with citizens of other states with which they share a common origin or heritage, without, however, infringing the principle of the territorial integrity of states'.[46]

The text carefully balanced between a minority's 'special situation' calling for potential 'special measures' and the state's territorial integrity, in order to avoid legitimising separatist movements. Recommendation 1134 further gave 'national minorities' a range of rights - 'the right to be recognised as such by the states in which they live'; 'the right to maintain and develop their culture'; 'the right to maintain their own educational, religious and cultural institutions'; for this purpose, 'the right to solicit voluntary financial and other contributions including public assistance'; 'the right to participate fully in decision-making about matters which affect the preservation and development of their identity and in the implementation of those decisions'; 'every person belonging to a national minority is required to comply with the obligations resulting from his citizenship or residence in a European state'.[47]

Even so, the subsequent Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) re-introduced the phrase 'persons belonging to', even in those areas where Recommendation 1134 had identified the rights of 'national minorities'.[48] Its article 3(2) states that: '[p]ersons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in community with others'.[49] All in all, international law advocates an individual emphasis on minority rights, because the ongoing debates about collective rights focus on 'the perceived threat to state security that these would entail', like irredentism or secessionism.[50]

The Hungarian views on minority rights were simultaneously shaped at an external level (through the elites of Hungary) and at an internal level in Romania. There were domestic voices who wanted collective rights for the Hungarian minority in Transilvania. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) played an important role in the treaty story. It had been established as a political entity representing the Hungarian minority and had gained seats in the Romanian Parliament since 1990. In late 1993, UDMR intensified its ethnic

---

[46] The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1134 (1990) Rights of Minorities* (1 October 1990); available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=15168&lang=EN (April 2017).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Miodrag Jovanovic, 'Recognizing Minority Identities through Collective Rights', p. 629.

[49] The Council of Europe, *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (Strasbourg, 1995); http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm (April 2017).

[50] Helen O'Nions, *Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), p. 19.

programme and demanded the 'territorial autonomy' of certain counties in Transilvania, where a larger proportion of the Hungarian minority resided. To this end, UDMR submitted a 'Draft Law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities' to Parliament in November 1993.

The text defined a national minority of Romania as an 'autonomous community' that exercised its 'rights according to the principles of self-determination'.[51] UDMR depicted the Magyar ethnic group as 'a constitutive factor', having the same function of 'political subject' like that of the state. The current Romanian Constitution limits state authority through the rule of law and individual human rights; if the UDMR project were to be applied, the Romanian state would have to compete with an 'autonomous Magyar entity' and this would inevitably cause the fragmentation of sovereignty.[52] Both Romania's government and political opposition found unclear the logic underlying the draft law and had suspicions about the idea of minority self-determination. Any form of minority autonomy was considered an unacceptable challenge to Romania as a unitary state because it was associated in the collective imaginary with possible separatism and even annexation of Romanian lands by Hungary.[53]

With regards to the Romanian foreign policy discourses, the state challenged European meanings on minority rights by constructing the latter as an internal affair. Romania also rejected the international narratives which portrayed it as not embracing European liberal values and being plagued by instability due to ethnic tensions. To begin with, article 6.1 in the 1991 Romanian Constitution stipulated individual minority rights – '[t]he State recognises and guarantees to persons belonging to national minorities the right to maintain, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity'.[54] The non-discriminatory treatment of people belonging to minority groups is conveyed by article 4.2: 'Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any discrimination in terms of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social origin'.[55]

The Hungarian government's rhetoric on minorities in general and collective rights in particular was interpreted as threatening by Romanian elites. As noted by presidential adviser Paşcu, 'one of our former allies Hungary has

---

[51] UDMR, *Draft Law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities* (November 1993); available at www.usefoundation.org/view/509 (December 2016).

[52] Gabriel Andreescu, Valentin Stan and Renate Weber, *Concepția UDMR privind Drepturile Minorităților Naționale – Analiza Critică a Documentelor UDMR/ The UDMR Perspective on the Rights of National Minorities – A Critical Analysis of the UDMR Documents* (Bucharest: Centrul pentru Drepturile Omului, 1994), pp. 13-16.

[53] Zsuzsa Csergo, *Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 66.

[54] The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania (1991)*; available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/act_show?ida=1 (April 2017).

[55] Ibid.

transformed herself openly into a potential enemy'; he invoked as evidence 'statements and actions that interfere in Romania's domestic politics'.[56] At the CSCE meeting in March 1992, Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase highlighted that ethnic minorities needed to respect the territorial integrity of states, while insisting that minority rights were already codified in the Romanian Constitution and international law.[57] Elaborating upon Năstase's arguments, in April 1993 President Iliescu described the internal situation as follows:

> 'the Romanian legislative level has the most extensive rights for minorities in political and cultural practices. I do not believe you will find many states in Europe where national minorities have representatives in the country's Parliament. Not to mention their representation in the local administration and native language education. The Hungarians at least enjoy [the latter] from primary education to university. An entire network of schools exists in the areas where they live, along with cultural institutes, magazines, newspapers, radio and television programmes exclusive to the Hungarian population. So, from this point of view, no restrictions are in place'.[58]

The above excerpt remained a meaningful indication of President Iliescu's foreign policy discourse on Hungarian minority rights in Romania. It basically suggested that the state had not only adopted European values, but had gone a step beyond them via the presence of UDMR in Parliament. Article 32.3 in the Romanian Constitution stressed the educational rights of minorities quite strongly, ensuring the teaching of the mother tongue in compulsory school, as well as making arrangements for minorities' full education in their native language – [t]he right of persons belonging to national minorities to learn their mother tongue, and their right to be educated in this language are guaranteed; the ways to exercise these rights are established by law'.[59] Apart from educational and linguistic rights, ethnic minorities benefited from political representation in Parliament and local authorities.

The Council of Europe invited Romania to join in July 1993 at the recommendation of the König report, which made some proposals -

> '[b]ecause of the often difficult relationship between Romania and its Hungarian minority (...) further confidence could be built if the Romanian Parliament adopted legislation on the rights of minorities and on education. If Romania, as emphasised by members of the government and several political parties, already grants many rights to its minorities de facto, the adoption of these texts, which are already pending before parliament, should not pose insurmountable difficulties'.[60]

---

[56] Ioan M. Paşcu, 'Romania's Response to a Structured World' in Daniel Nelson (ed.), *Romania after Tyranny* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 278-279.

[57] Edith Oltay, 'Minorities as Stumbling Block in Relations with Neighbours', *RFE-RL Research Report*, volume 1, number 19, 8 May 1992, p. 27.

[58] Ion Iliescu cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West*, p. 253.

[59] The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania (1991).*

[60] Friedrich König, 'Report on the Application by Romania for Membership of the Council of Europe', *Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly,* Doc. 6901, 1403-15/7/93-2-E (19 July 1993); http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefDocDetails_E.asp?FileID=7253 (April 2017).

The Council of Europe acknowledged that Romania granted several minority rights, but also recommended the adoption of separate laws in this respect. It received assurances that the Romanian authorities would base 'their policy regarding the protection of minorities on the principles laid down in Recommendation 1201 (1993)'.[61]

Yet, in February 1995, the Parliament of Romania issued an official declaration that clearly configured its position concerning minority rights and UDMR demands for Hungarian autonomy:

> 'the citizens [of national states], regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy the same rights, same protection on the part of the state and are the bearers of national sovereignty (…) The Romanian state has never undertaken any measures to assimilate its citizens belonging to national minorities and neither does it have such aims'.[62]

The text mentioned the 'internationalisation' of minority problems in disapproving terms – '[w]e believe that statements according to which the matter of minorities cannot be solved in Romania denote the attempt to "internationalise" this issue at a time when the image of Romania's stability can be decisive to its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures'.[63] President Iliescu reinforced a similar idea in April 1995: 'in our country tendencies have appeared that exaggerate local misunderstandings, convert them into "inter-ethnic conflicts" at national level, even internationalise the so-called "ethnic problems"'.[64]

Within a relatively short complex sentence, there are several linguistic devices that downplay the seriousness of ethnic minority topics - the articulation of the Romanian story through words such as 'exaggerate', 'misunderstandings', the juxtaposition of contrasting notions ('local' versus 'national'), the use of inverted commas to emphasise with a hint of irony the inaccurate nature of the phrases in question. The President seemed to disapprove of actors trying to 'internationalise "ethnic problems"', which again contested the European narrative on minority rights. Moreover, in the same context, Iliescu indirectly referred to the main problematic aspects of the basic treaty with Hungary. He did not see any reason to move beyond the existing democratic legislation and qualified as 'unacceptable' the territorial autonomy advocated by UDMR -

> '[t]he democratic system ensures the right of minorities to preserve and express their ethnic identity in the existing legal framework, rejecting any discrimination which could affect fundamental human rights. In this sense, we consider unacceptable the tendencies to institute forms of isolation or "autonomy" based on ethnic criteria that lead to ethnic segregation'.[65]

---

[61] Ibid.

[62] The Parliament of Romania, 'Declaration' (13 February 1995), *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 35, 16 February 1995, p. 2.

[63] Ibid, p. 4.

[64] Ion Iliescu, 'Allocution' (Bucharest, 6 April 1995) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=499&_PRID=arh (April 2017).

[65] Ibid.

Consequently, the Romanian and Hungarian foreign policy imaginaries operated on two different conceptions of ethnic minority rights - individual versus collective, which also reflected different notions of what being 'European' entailed. For Romania, having a European identity meant that a democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide native language regulations were sufficient provisions for minorities. Hungary and UDMR disagreed with such ideas, refusing to acknowledge Romania's European identity because they viewed collective rights and some form of ethnic autonomy as the appropriate European standard. The inflexible stances of both Hungary and Romania led to heightened tensions between the two states, as well as the inability to start a proper dialogue on the bilateral treaty throughout 1990-1993.

The year 1994 brought several shifts in the international context and the foreign policies of individual states. The Stability Pact or Balladur Plan, adopted by the EU in December 1993, began to exert a more solid pressure on the EU candidates. The plan represented 'the solemn commitment of all the governments of post-Cold War Europe to political stability and abstention from war to solve conflicts and disputes over borders, territory and national minority problems'.[66] Post-communist Europe welcomed the pact 'to manifest both compliance with Western values and their commitment to act as reliable partners', hence working towards the prospect of EU membership.[67] Alluding to the inexistent Romanian-Hungarian treaty, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu subtly recalled that 'a considerable part of Romania's roads towards Europe pass through Hungary'.[68] Poland managed to establish a good relationship with its neighbours, while also supporting Polish minority groups who resided in those states. The Czech Republic remained largely indifferent, since it had few ethnic minorities either at home or abroad.[69] In Hungary, the Antall government's focus on collective rights and vague statements about the peaceful revision of borders did not sit well with the objective of EU and NATO integration. By 1994, some international officials and journalists 'hinted that Hungary was no longer on the list of states likely to join NATO in the first wave'.[70]

Considering the problematic status of Hungary's NATO and EU candidacy, it is not surprising that a new socialist administration led by Prime Minister Gyula Horn was elected in July 1994. He underlined in an address to Hungary's Parliament – 'this government will complete the process of accession to the EU and NATO (…) [it] will subordinate everything else to this end'.[71] Horn even

---

[66] Fulvio Attina, 'The Security-Culture Divide in the Mediterranean' in Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, Federica Bicchi and Rafaella Del Sarto (eds.), *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 252.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Teodor Meleşcanu cited in David Phinnemore, 'Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?' in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds.), *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 256.

[69] Milada A. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism*, p. 149.

[70] Ibid, p. 150.

[71] Gyula Horn (July 1994 – July 1998) cited in Ivanka N. Atanassova, 'The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe', *Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press* (June 1999), p. 50.

declared that Hungary 'is ready to begin discussions regarding those basic treaties that could contain the reciprocal renunciation of territorial demands and the recognition of present borders (…), as well as the commitment to ensure the recognition, guarantee and practical application of national minorities' rights living in their countries, in accordance with EU norms'.[72] The new socialist-liberal coalition renounced the militant foreign policy of the Antall government and espoused more moderate attitudes. It also unequivocally gave up talks about territorial claims and the peaceful revisions of borders. This facilitated the signing of a basic treaty with Slovakia in March 1995, where Budapest denied any 'irredentist notions' and Bratislava granted more extensive rights (albeit not collective ones) to its ethnic Hungarians.[73] Arguably, the criteria of Euro-Atlantic integration acted as an incentive for both states to settle their long-standing disputes, before the conference on the EU's Stability Pact in Europe (1995). But EU and NATO conditionality did not work so well in the Romanian-Hungarian case, since the two countries were unable to reach a mutually agreeable solution at that time. The individual or collective dimension of minority rights was still pending. And the ambiguous content of Recommendation 1201 from the Council of Europe had to be clarified as well.

On the one hand, Hungary insisted on including Recommendation 1201 in the treaty text because it viewed the document as 'the acceptable standard for the protection of national minorities'.[74] On the other hand, Romania's government and political opposition had serious concerns about the content of article 11:

> '[i]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state'.[75]

Certain phrases like 'autonomous authorities' and 'special status' were associated in the Romanian imaginary with UDMR articulations for a Hungarian minority's 'special status' and 'autonomous community'. Territorial autonomy based on ethnicity had been constructed as unacceptable by Romanian official discourses and perceived as a challenge to the unitary state. Domestic anxieties about the potential implications of Recommendation 1201 were so great that the last part of article 11 did not register – 'in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state'.

---

[72] Gyula Horn cited in Mihai-Romulus Vădean, *Relaţiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile europene şi euroatlantice/ Romanian-Hungarian Relations in the Context of European and Euroatlantic Integration* (Iaşi: Lumen, 2011), p. 73.

[73] Sabrina P. Ramet, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. 133.

[74] Paul Roe, 'Misperception and Minority Rights: Romania's Security Dilemma' in European Academy (ed.), *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, volume 1 (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 260.

[75] The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1201 (1993) - Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights*;http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1201.htm (April 2017).

Some academics like Valentin Stan argued that, in practice, these stipulations 'offer the possibility to *choose*, depending on the respective country's *internal legislation* and the political will of the state, between three variants: *local authorities*, *autonomous authorities* and *special status*'.[76] Romanian negative interpretations were reinforced by the fact that Hungary abruptly changed its moderate foreign policy rhetoric. On 4 July 1996, Prime Minister Horn held a meeting with the representatives of Hungarian organisations abroad. At the end, a 'Joint Declaration' was published which called for 'establishing local governments and granting autonomy' to Hungarians living abroad; concrete measures were discussed in order to develop a 'national strategy' for achieving such a goal in neighbouring states.[77]

The above Hungarian declaration seemed to prompt the international community to finally clarify its narratives on minority rights. This indicates that both Romania and Hungary were active participants in defining what being European meant with regards to minority rights. In late July 1996, the American State Department rejected the concept of territorial autonomy based on ethnic grounds and expressed hope that Hungary was not changing its government policy.[78] To address Romanian and Slovakian concerns about Hungary's external attitude, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities sent a letter to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister in August 1996. Its content dealt extensively with minority rights, the Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201 and territorial autonomy:

> '[m]y hope and expectation is that Hungary, in trying to promote the interests of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, will respect the limits drawn by international law, including bilateral treaties, and will equally respect the constitution and the laws of the neighbouring states (...) I noted that article 3 of the Joint Declaration refers to autonomy as a means of settlement of the situation of the Hungarian communities abroad based on constitutional equality. In this context I permit myself to underline that even the right provided in article 11 of Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, according to the expert interpretation of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), "does not imply for States either its acceptance of an organised ethnic entity within their territories, or adherence to the concept of ethnic pluralism as a component of the people or the nation, a concept which might affect any unitarity of the State".'[79]

[76] Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West*, p. 225, emphasis in original.
[77] Andrew Felkay, *Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the West* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997), pp. 121-122.
[78] Tom Gallagher, 'Danube Détente: Romania's Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996'.
[79] The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, *Letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary* (13 August 1996); available at http://www.cilevics.eu/minelres/count/hungary/960813r.htm (April 2017).

Indeed, on 25 June 1996, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1300 on the protection of minority rights. It considered the opinion of the Venice Commission on interpreting article 11 of Recommendation 1201 as 'a most important reference document'.[80] The Venice Commission in turn had concluded that -

> 'international law cannot in principle impose on States any territorial solutions to the problem of minorities and that States are not in principle required to introduce any forms of decentralisation for minorities'.[81]

Both the OSCE and the Council of Europe based their perspectives on the Venice Commission, which had the legal and political authority to impose certain European understandings of minority rights. It removed any possible basis for collective rights and any obligation for states to grant territorial autonomy. For once, European narratives validated Romania's foreign policy discourse on what were the sufficient provisions for ethnic minorities.

So the European self-image of Romanian national identity was partially recognised by the shifting discourses at international level. Full external recognition would only be attained through EU membership more than a decade later. Since the international community clarified these matters on minority rights, the Romanian-Hungarian treaty negotiations were finalised in September 1996. The two states compromised by introducing Recommendation 1201 as an annexe and by including a footnote to it. Romania used the footnote to state that - '[t]he Contracting Parties agree that Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights, nor does it impose upon them the obligation to grant to the concerned persons any right to a special status of territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria'.[82] Long-standing differences of opinion were resolved in a few weeks and in a rather anticlimactic manner.

Key Insights from the Treaty Story

What does the Romanian-Hungarian treaty story tell us about Romania's foreign policy and identity? No matter how intensely Romanian elites promoted the 'natural' Euro-Atlantic orientation and the European self-image of national identity, the latter was not accepted by external audiences. Only the European self held the authority to legitimate that the Romanian other was part of 'Europe' in both identity and institutional terms. Yet Western Europe preferred to

---

[80] The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1300 (1996)*; available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/EREC1300.htm (April 2017).

[81] The Venice Commission, 'Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights appended to Recommendation 1201 (1993)' – Appendix IV in Council of Europe, *Protection of the Rights of Minorities*, Doc. 7572 (5 June 1996); http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=7510&Language=EN (April 2017).

[82] *The Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood*; http://www.gyula.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=50107 (August 2014).

construct its post-communist candidate states as 'liminal Europe' or 'Europe but not quite Europe'. Thus, in the treaty context, Romania was viewed as a democratising state with possible instability due to ethnic tensions; an aspiring European liberal democracy that needed to work further on minority rights.

On the one hand, Hungary agreed with such assessments and advocated that collective rights leading to potential territorial autonomy would settle the pending minority issues. On the other hand, Romanian officials argued that their state's democratic Constitution, individual rights and wide Hungarian language regulations were sufficient provisions for minorities and complied with European values; autonomy based on ethnicity was considered unacceptable and a threat to Romania as a unitary entity. All three narratives contained valid points to a certain extent.

Although Romania implemented constitutional minority rights concerning native language education, these had to be separately stipulated in the national legislation. Romanian decision-makers could also have been more open to alleviate the concerns of ethnic minorities, who had been subject to assimilationist treatments during communism. But where to draw the line and obtain European acknowledgement that the state was a stable liberal democracy upholding adequate minority rights and had a partially recognised European identity?

Here European institutions like the Council of Europe showed double standards at times, since it was not clear what being 'European' actually entailed. As previously mentioned, the Council of Europe was reluctant to codify collective rights as an appropriate form of protecting national minorities. It still refused to partially validate Romania's European identity and compliance with liberal values, even though prominent members like France did not recognise minority languages and provided limited legislation to foster ethnic diversity and bilingual education.[83] In addition to this, many liberal democracies did not offer even 'limited ethnic autonomy' and refused to be forced to do so.[84]

Therefore, Romania was somewhat justified in challenging the ambiguous European position on minority rights – individual or collective rights? Yes or no to territorial autonomy? Which of these elements defined 'Europe' in the end? Clarifying the European meanings on minority rights was essential both in moving forward the Romanian-Hungarian treaty and in partially legitimating Romania's European self-image. On this occasion, international discourses agreed with Romania that individual minority rights without territorial autonomy were sufficient to protect ethnic minorities and constituted the 'European' standard.

---

[83] Stephen May, *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 171.

[84] Robert Weiner, 'Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004), p. 495.

To conclude, after Romania chose the European course and re-articulated its 'European' self-image, this facet of national identity had to engage in a process of verification, where it was contested by and negotiated with external audiences. Romanian foreign policy discourses consistently constructed the state's European identity between 1990 and 1996. Yet the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty underlined the problematic aspects of obtaining partial identity validation from the authoritative European self. Hungary and Romania had two contrasting conceptions of what European identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights, which influenced their intransigent positions on the treaty text until late 1996. Sometimes compared to the historical reconciliation between Germany and France, the signing and parliamentary ratification of the Hungarian-Romanian treaty was 'a very clear signal' that their relations would finally be 'normal or rather "European"'.[85]

[85] Mihai-Romulus Vădean, *Relațiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile europene şi euroatlantice/ Romanian-Hungarian Relations in the Context of European and Euroatlantic Integration*, p. 80.

Conclusions regarding Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy (1990-1996)

This study has explored the significance of national identity in shaping the evolution of Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 1996. To accomplish its aims, the project has employed a multi-dimensional framework of national identity, which draws from four literatures related to constructivism, nationalism scholarship, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. The framework has applied the following general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus; inter-subjectivity as a feature of identity creation.

Nationalism and memory studies have been used to identify the internal sources of national identity. A fairly obvious domestic factor is the nation. The debates in the field of nationalism shed light on the imagined essence of the nation, which does not imply that nations are fictitious. They have a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The second internal source of national identity refers to collective memory-myths, which are subjective interpretations of the nation's remembered past. They give meaning to the self-images feeding into national identity and convey future aspirations.

Together with the two domestic factors of national identity, there is an external dimension at play in the process of identity formation - self-esteem and international recognition. Self-images and national identity require validation by others from the international realm. Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem, which illustrates an important motivator for a state's social survival and foreign policy. Self-images and national identity are negotiated between the self (the state) and its salient others. If self-images are not internationally recognised, the state appeals to different strategies such as identity re-definitions to convince external audiences of their validity. This multi-dimensional view of national identity has provided some very interesting and unique insights in the case of Romania's post-communist foreign policy.

Thus, the years 1990-1996 featured a rich palette of re-emerging meanings and three key 'formative moments' for Romania's national identity and foreign policy. The first 'formative moment' configured the state's international orientation towards 'Europe'. Political leaders had to answer an existential question for the newly democratic Romania – to be or not to be 'European'? The 1991 Romanian-Soviet 'Friendship Treaty' was a crucial episode of domestic contestation about the state's future identity and international course. The President's endorsement of the treaty, which created a controversial security relationship with the Soviet Union, was not shared by the majority of elites who wanted a Euro-Atlantic course for Romania. Despite being signed by the President, the treaty was not ratified by the Romanian Parliament and eventually became obsolete.

Having chosen the European direction, the second 'formative moment' of 1990-1996 underlined how Romania's 'European' self-image was contested by and negotiated with external audiences. Despite internally constructing the state's European identity, the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty showed the problematic aspects of gaining only partial recognition from the authoritative European self. Romania and Hungary had opposing conceptions of what European identity meant in terms of ethnic minority rights. For Romania, European identity entailed a democratic Constitution, individual rights and native language provisions as appropriate protection for minorities. By contrast, Hungary and the UDMR considered collective rights and a form of ethnic autonomy to be the adequate standards for European identity. As these issues were still in flux at the 'European' level, Romania and Hungary were active participants in defining what European identity meant with respect to minority rights. Once the international community clarified its perspective, the two states reached a mutually acceptable compromise for the treaty text in 1996.

Bibliography

Primary Material

Iliescu, Ion. *Address at the Investiture as President of Romania* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992)

Iliescu, Ion. *Cred în schimbarea în bine a României* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992)

Iliescu, Ion. *Fragmente de viață şi de istorie trăită* (Bucharest: Litera Internațional, 2011)

Iliescu, Ion. *Momente de istorie. Documente, alocuțiuni, interviuri, comentarii: septembrie 1991–octombrie 1992* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1996)

Iliescu, Ion. *Renaşterea speranței* (Bucharest: Mondo Media, 2001)

Iliescu, Ion. *Revoluție şi reformă* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1994)

Iliescu, Ion. *Romania in Europe and in the World* (Bucharest: The Foreign Languages Press Group, 1994)

Iliescu, Ion. *Toamna diplomatică* (Bucharest: Redacția publicațiilor pentru străinătate, 1995)

Ivan, Sabin. *Radiografii parlamentare. De vorbă cu Alexandru Bârlădeanu* (Constanța: Ex Ponto, 1998)

Meleşcanu, Teodor. *Renaşterea diplomației româneşti* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002)

Năstase, Adrian. *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe*, volumes I-II (Bucharest: Fundația Titulescu, 2006)

Năstase, Adrian. *România şi noua arhitectură mondială. Studii, Alocuțiuni, Interviuri 1990-1996* (Bucharest: Asociația Română pentru Educație Democratică, 1996)

Roman, Petre. *Libertatea ca datorie* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1994)

Severin, Adrian. *Lacrimile dimineții. Slăbiciunile guvernului Roman* (Bucharest: SCRIPTA, 1995)

The Archives of Romania's Presidency – www.presidency.ro

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Final Act* (Helsinki, 1975); available at http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true (April 2014)

The Council of Europe, *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (Strasbourg, 1995); available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm (April 2014)

The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1114 (1989) on the Situation of Minorities in Romania* (26 September 1989); http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta89/erec1114.htm (April 2014)

The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1134 (1990) - Rights of Minorities* (1 October 1990); http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=15168&lang=EN (April 2014)

The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1201 (1993) - Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights*; available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1201.htm (April 2014)

The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1300 (1996)*; http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/EREC1300.htm (April 2014)

The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), *Draft Law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities* (November 1993); www.usefoundation.org/view/509 (April 2014)

The Government of Romania, *Cartea Albă: România–NATO* (Bucharest: Romcartexim, 1996)

The National Salvation Front, 'Statement towards the Country', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number I(1), 22 December 1989

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities* (Geneva, 1991); www.osce.org/hcnm/14588 (April 2014)

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, *Letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary* (13 August 1996); available at http://www.cilevics.eu/minelres/count/hungary/960813r.htm (April 2014)

The Parliament of Romania, 'Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Communities, Their Member States and Romania', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 73, 12 April 1993

The Parliament of Romania, 'Declaration' (13 February 1995), *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 35, 16 February 1995

The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania* (1991) - http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339 (April 2017)

The Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood (1996); http://www.gyula.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=50107 (August 2012)

The United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*, A/RES/47/135 (18 December 1992); http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm (April 2014)

The United Nations General Assembly, *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966); http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (April 2014)

The United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 688 (1991)*; available at http://fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm (April 2014)

The Venice Commission, 'Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights appended to Recommendation 1201 (1993)' – Appendix IV in Council of Europe, *Protection of the Rights of Minorities*, Doc. 7572 (5 June 1996); http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=7510&Language=EN (April 2014)

Secondary Sources

Abizadeh, Arash. 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, volume 99(1), 2005, pp. 45-60

Abraham, Florin. *Transformarea României: 1989-2006. Rolul factorilor externi* (Bucharest: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006)

Adler, Emanuel. 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 3(3), 1997, pp. 319-363

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006)

Andreescu, Gabriel, Stan, Valentin and Weber, Renate. *Concepția UDMR privind Drepturile Minorităților Naționale – Analiza Critică a Documentelor UDMR* (Bucharest: Centrul pentru Drepturile Omului, 1994)

Atanassova, Ivanka N. 'The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe', *Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press* (June 1999)

Attina, Fulvio. 'The Security-Culture Divide in the Mediterranean' in Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, Federica Bicchi and Rafaella Del Sarto (eds.), *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (London: University of Toronto Press, 2006)

Bell, Duncan. 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', *British Journal of Sociology*, volume 54(1), 2003, pp. 63-81

Bell, Duncan. 'Introduction' in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (London: Palgrave, 2006)

Bellah, Robert N., Madsen, Richard et al. *Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)

Berger, Thomas. 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945' in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

van den Berghe, Pierre. *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York: Elsevier, 1981)

Blaga, Lucian. 'Revolta fondului nostru nelatin', *Gândirea*, volume 1(1), 1921, pp. 181-182

Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

Boia, Lucian. *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001)

Brown, Michael E. 'Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict' in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)

Bugajski, Janusz. *Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe* (London: Westview Press, 1995)

Burke, Peter J. and Stets, Jan E. *Identity Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

Burke, Peter J. and Stets, Jan E. 'Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification', *Social Psychological Quarterly*, volume 62(4), 1999, pp. 347-360

Campbell, David. *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992)

Carlsnaes, Walter. 'Foreign Policy' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002)

Cast, Alicia D. and Burke, Peter. 'A Theory of Self-Esteem', *Social Forces*, volume 80(3), 2002, pp. 1041-1068

Castoriadis, Cornelius. *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987)

Christopher, Warren. 'NATO Plus', *Washington Post* (9 January 1994)

Clunan, Anne L. *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009)

Cottey, Andrew. *East-Central Europe after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995)

Crainic, Nichifor. 'Sensul tradiției', *Gândirea*, volume 9(1-2), 1929, pp. 1-11

Crotty, Michael J. *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process* (London: Sage, 2003)

Csergo, Zsuzsa. *Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007)

Daes, Erica-Irene A. *Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law: Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and International Levels* (New York: United Nations, 1992)

Dannreuther, Roland. *Russian Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance. Final Report for NATO 1995-1997* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1997)

Doty, Roxanne L. 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37(3), 1993, pp. 297-320

Doty, Roxanne L. *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996)

Dunay, Pál. 'Hungary: Defining the Boundaries of Security' in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)

Edkins, Jenny. *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back in* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999)

Edkins, Jenny. *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Eley, Geoff and Suny, Ronald G. 'Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation' in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

Eller, Jack D. and Coughlan, Reed M. 'The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, volume 16(2), 1993, pp. 183-201

Ely, John F. and Stoica, Cătălin Augustin. 'Re-membering Romania' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004)

Erişen, Elif. 'An Introduction to Political Psychology for International Relations Scholars', *Perceptions*, volume XVII (3), 2012, pp. 9-28

Felkay, Andrew. *Out of Russian Orbit: Hungary Gravitates to the West* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997)

Fierke, Karin M. 'Critical Methodology and Constructivism' in Karin M. Fierke and Knud E. Jorgensen (eds.), *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation* (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2001)

Fierke, Karin M. 'Constructivism' in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2002)

Gallagher, Tom. *Romania after Ceauşescu: The Politics of Intolerance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995)

Gallagher, Tom. 'A Feeble Embrace: Romania's Engagement with democracy, 1989-94', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, volume 12, 1996, pp. 145-172

Gallagher, Tom. 'Danube Détente: Romania's Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996', *Balkanologie. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires*, volume 1(2), December 1997

Geertz, Clifford. 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States' in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *In Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1963)

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)

Geran Pilon, Juliana. *The Bloody Flag: Post-Communist Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992)

Gheorghiu, Simion. 'Politica externă post-decembristă a României (1991)' in The Romanian Academy (ed.), *Studii şi materiale de istorie contemporană/ Studies and Material of Contemporary History*, volume IX (Bucharest: Institutul de Istorie 'Nicolae Iorga', 2010)

Gheorghiu, Simion. 'Precizări pe marginea unei replici'/ 'Remarks concerning a Reply', *Revista 22*, number 1097, 15-21 March 2011

Gillis, John R. 'Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship' in John R. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994)

Goldgeier, James M. and Tetlock, Philip E. 'Psychology and International Relations Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science*, volume 4(1), 2001, pp. 67-92

Goşu, Armand. 'Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005', *Contrafort*, number 1(135), January 2006

Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995)

Greenhill, Brian. 'Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 14(2), 2008, pp. 343-368

Griffiths, Stephen I. 'Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security', *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Report No. 5* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)

Guzzini, Stefano. 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 6(2), 2000, pp. 147-182

Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1992)

Hall, Stuart. 'Introduction: Who Needs "Identity"?' in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity* (London: Sage, 1996)

Hall, Stuart. 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora' in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998)

Harrington, Joseph and Karns, Scott. 'Romania's Ouestpolitik: Bucharest, Europe, and the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, 1990-1998' in Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (eds.), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1999)

Hill, Christopher and Wallace, William. 'Introduction: Actors and Actions' in Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2002)

Hitchins, Keith. *A Concise History of Romania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

Hlihor, Constantin. *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale contemporane/ Geopolitics and Geostrategy in the Analysis of International Relations* (Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2005)

Hobsbawm, Eric. 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)

Hoffman, Eva. *Exit into History. A Journey through the New Eastern Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 1993)

Hogg, Michael A. and Abrams, Dominic. *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (London: Routledge, 1988)

Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990)

Honneth, Axel. *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (London: Polity Press, 1996)

Hopf, Ted. 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, volume 23(1), 1998, pp. 171-200

Hopf, Ted. *The Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002)

Howarth, David R., Norval, Aletta J. and Stavrakakis, Yannis. *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)

Hroch, Miroslav. 'From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe' in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996)

Hurezeanu, Emil. 'NATO după NATO' in Gabriel Andreescu (ed.), *România versus România* (Bucharest: Clavis, 1996)

Hymans, Jacques E.C. 'The Arrival of Psychological Constructivism', International Theory, volume 2(3), 2010, pp. 461-467

Isaacs, Harold. *The Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975)

Ivan, Sabin. 'Ion Iliescu în oglinda istoriei: Interviu cu Alexandru Bârlădeanu'/ 'Ion Iliescu in the Mirror of History: Interview with Alexandru Bârlădeanu', *Memoria*, 68-69, 2009

Jeszenszky, Géza. 'Hungary's Foreign Policy Dilemmas', *The Hungarian Quarterly,* volume 34(130), Summer 1993, pp. 3-13

Jovanovic, Miodrag. 'Recognizing Minority Identities through Collective Rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, volume 27(2), May 2005, pp. 625-651

Kende, Péter. 'The Trianon Syndrome: Hungarians and Their Neighbors' in Béla K. Király (ed.), *Lawful Revolution in Hungary 1989-1994* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1995)

Kiss, László. 'Hungary' in Hanspeter Neuhold et al (eds.), *Political and Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995)

König, Friedrich. 'Report on the Application by Romania for Membership of the Council of Europe', *Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly,* Doc. 6901, 1403-15/7/93-2-E (19 July 1993)

Kratochwil, Friedrich. *Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)

Kratochwil, Friedrich. 'History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the "Second" Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 12(1), 2006, pp. 5-29

Kundera, Milan. 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', *New York Review of Books*, volume 31(7), 26 April 1984

Lebow, Richard N. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Lindemann, Thomas. *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition* (University of Essex: European Consortium for Political Research Press, 2010)

Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996)

Livezeanu, Irina. 'Excerpts from a Troubled Book: An Episode in Romanian Literature', *Cross Currents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, volume 3, 1984, pp. 297-320

Maiorescu, Titu. 'În contra direcției de astăzi în cultura română', *Convorbiri Literare* (1868)

Mälksoo, Maria. *The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2010)

Mansbach, Richard W. and Rafferty, Kirsten L. *Introduction to Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2008)

May, Stephen. *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language* (London: Routledge, 2012)

Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

Mearsheimer, John J. 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, volume 15(1), Summer 1990, pp. 5-56

Milliken, Jennifer. 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 5(2), 1999, pp. 225-254

Milliken, Jennifer. 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea' in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Mills, Sara. *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2001)

Miroiu, Andrei. 'National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The Romanian Case', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, volume 2(2), 2002, pp. 88-113

Mole, Richard. 'Discursive Identities/ Identity Discourses and Political Power' in Richard C.M. Mole (ed.), *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

Moyn, Samuel. *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (London: Harvard University Press, 2010)

Murray, Michelle K. 'Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm, 2011)

Murray, Michelle K. *The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics: Security, Identity, and the Quest for Power* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008)

Narvaez, Rafael F. 'Embodiment, Collective Memory and Time', *Body & Society*, volume 12(3), 2006, pp. 51-73

Neumann, Iver B. 'Russia as Europe's Other', *Journal of Area Studies*, volume 6(12), 1998, pp. 26-73

Oltay, Edith. 'Minorities as Stumbling Block in Relations with Neighbours', *RFE-RL Research Report*, volume 1, number 19, 8 May 1992, pp. 26-33

O'Nions, Helen. *Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007)

Ornea, Zigu. *Tradiționalism şi modernitate în deceniul al treilea* (Bucharest: Eminescu Publishing, 1980)

Özkirimli, Umut. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

Papacostea, Şerban. 'Sfârşitul unei tiranii şi începutul unei mistificări istorice. Revelațiile unui document ignorat' in *Revista 22*, number 1085 and Special issue, December 2011 – January 2012

Papadimitriou, Dimitris and Phinnemore, David. *Romania and the European Union: From Marginalisation to Membership* (London: Routledge, 2008)

Paşcu, Ioan M. 'Romania's Response to a Structured World' in Daniel Nelson (ed.), *Romania after Tyranny* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992)

Paşcu, Ioan M. 'Un document fabricat (Drept la replică')/ 'A Fabricated Document (Right to Reply)' in *Revista 22*, number 1097, 15-21 March 2011

Phillips, Nelson and Hardy, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction* (London: SAGE, 2002)

Phinnemore, David. 'Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?' in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds.), *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)

Puşcaş, Vasile et al. 'The Romanian-Hungarian Treaty (1996) and the National Minority Issue – A Case Study' in Vasile Puşcaş (ed.), *Central Europe since 1989. Concepts and Developments* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2000)

Ramet, Sabrina P. *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997)

Renan, Ernest. 'What Is a Nation?' in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990)

Ringmar, Erik. 'Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History' in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London: Routledge, 1997)

Ringmar, Erik. *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

Ringmar, Erik. 'The International Politics of Recognition' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2011)

Ringmar, Erik. 'The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West', *Cooperation and Conflict*, volume 37(2), 2002, pp. 115-136

Risse, Thomas. 'Social Constructivism and European Integration' in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.) *European Integration Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

Roe, Paul. 'Misperception and Minority Rights: Romania's Security Dilemma' in European Academy (ed.), *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, volume 1 (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003)

Roper, Steven D. *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005)

Rosenberg, Dominique. 'Les minorités nationales et le défi de la sécurité en Europe', *UNIDIR Travaux de Recherche No. 21* (New York: United Nations, 1993)

Rumelili, Bahar. 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(1), 2004, pp. 27-47

Said, Edward. 'The Phony Islamic Threat', *New York Times Magazine* (21 November 1993), pp. 62-68

Sanders, Douglas. 'Collective Rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, volume 13(3), August 1991, pp. 368-386

Sarup, Madan. *Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996)

Scheffer, David J. 'Use of Force after the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order' in Louis Henkin (ed.), *Right versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991)

Siani-Davies, Peter. *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989* (London: Cornell University Press, 2005)

Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity* (Penguin Books: London, 1991)

Smith, Anthony D. 'State Making and Nation-Building' in John A. Hall (ed.), *The State: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, volume 2 (London: Routledge, 1994)

Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991)

Snyder, Sarah B. *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

Soare, Simona. 'Romania's National Security Strategy – A Critical Approach of Transformational Politics', *Monitor Strategic*, number 1-2, 2008, pp. 53-66

Socor, Vladimir. 'The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and Its Regional Implications', *Report on Eastern Europe*, volume 2(18), 3 May 1991, pp. 25-33

Stan, Valentin. *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest* (Bucharest: Editura Universității din Bucureşti, 1999)

Tajfel, Henri. *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)

Tajfel, Henri. 'Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour', *Social Science Information,* volume 12, number 2, 1974, pp. 65-93

Taylor, David. 'Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with Postmodern Theory', *Journal of Social Policy*, volume 27(3), 1998, pp. 329-350

Thornberry, Patrick. *International Law and the Rights of Minorities* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)

Thornberry, Patrick. 'The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations and an Update' in Alan Philips and Allan Rosas (eds.), *Universal Minority Rights* ('Åbo Akademi' University Institute for Human Rights, 1995)

Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010)

Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Turner, John C., Hogg, Michael A. et al. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (New York: Blackwell, 1987)

Vachudova, Milada A. *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Valki, László. 'Hungary: Understanding Western Messages' in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (eds.), *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)

Vădean, Mihai-Romulus. *Relațiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile europene şi euroatlantice* (Iaşi: Lumen, 2011)

Verdery, Katherine. *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)

Verdery, Katherine and Klingman, Gail. 'Romania after Ceausescu: Post-Communist Communism?' in Ivo Banac (ed.), *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992)

Wæver, Ole. 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory' in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002)

Weiner, Robert. 'Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary: 1989-2002' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004)

Weldes, Jutta. 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2(3), 1996, pp. 275-318

Weldes, Jutta. *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

Wendt, Alexander. 'The State as Person in International Theory', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(2), 2004, pp. 289–316

Wetherell, Margaret, Taylor, Stephanie and Yates, Simeon J. *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: SAGE in association with the Open University, 2001)

Winter, Jay and Sivan, Emmanuel. 'Setting the Framework' in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

Woodward, Kathryn. *Identity and Difference* (London: SAGE, 1997)

Zehfuss, Maja. *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Zerubavel, Yael. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)

LORETTA C. SĂLĂJAN

Researcher specialised in foreign policy analysis, International Relations theory, European security and Romania's postcommunist context. She holds a BA in International Relations and Politics from the University of Sheffield, a MA degree in International Relations Theory and a PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth University. Her doctoral project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council in the United Kingdom, which resulted in a monograph on The Role of National Identity in the Trajectory of Romania's Foreign Policy (1990-2007). She has worked as a teaching assistant at Aberystwyth University and is currently an associate lecturer at the Western University "Vasile Goldiș". Her research articles have been published in Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review (2016) and Society and Politics (2017).

ISBN: 978-606-37-0205-1