Loretta C. Sălăjan

The Role of National Identity in the Trajectory of Romania's Foreign Policy

(1990-2007)



Presa Universitară Clujeană

LORETTA C. SĂLĂJAN

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE TRAJECTORY OF ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

(1990-2007)

Referenți științifici:

Prof. univ. dr. Ioan Horga

Prof. univ. dr. Claudiu Porumbăcean

ISBN 978-606-37-0501-4

Universitatea Babeş-Bolyai
Presa Universitară Clujeană
Director: Codruța Săcelean
Str. Hasdeu nr. 51
400371 Cluj-Napoca, România
Tel./Fax: (+40)-264-597.401
E-mail: editura@editura.ubbcluj.ro
http://www.editura.ubbcluj.ro/

LORETTA C. SĂLĂJAN

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE TRAJECTORY OF ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

(1990-2007)

PRESA UNIVERSITARĂ CLUJEANĂ

2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my beloved grandmother Iustina and parents, Rozetta and Vasile,
who have always loved and supported me.
I am also very grateful to my supervisors –
Dr. Alistair Shepherd and Dr. Patrick Finney from Aberystwyth University,
whose diligence and encouragement
have helped me throughout the doctoral studies.

The research for this book was funded through a '1+3' grant
from the Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom)

ABSTRACT

This book explores the significance of national identity in shaping the trajectory of Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. It explains why and how Romania's Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-definitions and discursive dialogue prior to the European Union accession on 1 January 2007, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions influenced the state's foreign policy decisions. The research employs a conceptual view of national identity which draws from four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international recognition. National identity formation represents a two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both domestic and international factors. To identify the themes or self-images of national identity, the project has examined the discourses of elites as the primary actors of Romanian foreign policy. The three main self-images of Romania's Euro-Atlantic national identity – 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider' – configured an ideational foundation that impacted on the state's foreign policy throughout 1990 and 2007.

Table of Contents

Chapter I: The General Foundations

The key purpose of my thesis is to explore the importance of national identity in shaping the story of Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The project analyses an empirical puzzle that has preoccupied academics and practitioners alike - how does a state's national identity influence its international relations? In this respect, the thesis explains why and how Romania's Euro-Atlantic national identity was subject to re-definitions and discursive negotiation prior to the EU accession on 1 January 2007, as well as how and why these identity re-definitions impacted on the state's foreign policy decisions. My project is only concerned with highlighting and elucidating the role of national identity in the configuration of Romania's foreign policy, in order to balance the great attention given to pragmatic or material calculations. While I acknowledge the significance of Romanian economic interests in the state's pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration, they are included in the category of rational or material factors, together with realist interests such as physical security and gaining power.

Romania's post-communist foreign policy had two major goals that marked the evolution of national identity – membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in the European Union (EU). Romania became an official NATO member in March 2004 and

an EU one in January 2007. The state's post-1990 foreign policy has been widely examined through realist lenses and there is an ample scope for accounts that are not focused on material interests like power or economic and political benefits. The aim of this introductory chapter is to show the general foundations of the book, which will include the following: underlining the original contribution of my work, laying out the methodological underpinnings of the project and summarising the structure of arguments.

The original contribution of my research to the Romanian foreign policy field derives from conceptual and empirical aspects. This thesis features a multi-dimensional perspective on national identity which draws from four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international recognition. It is not intended to be a constructivist project, because the empirical material on Romanian identity and foreign policy during 1990-2007 brought to the surface some problematic issues that could not be entirely solved by using constructivist notions and instruments. The insights and lacunae of constructivism have been supplemented by the other literatures, which together help to understand the intricacies of a state's national identity. The inter-disciplinary nature of my conceptual standpoints offers a complex view of national identity that captures its internal and external dynamic. National identity formation represents a two-way socio-psychological process that depends on both domestic and international factors. The internal sources of national identity are the nation and collective memories about the historical past. The external dimension of national identity requires international recognition, which is intertwined with a state's sense of self-esteem.

Another original contribution of my thesis to the Romanian foreign policy literature is the application of national identity to a quite large time frame of the state's post-communist international politics. The period 1990-2007 was very significant for the re-articulation of Romanian identity and provides a series of interesting case studies or 'formative moments'.[1] These 'formative moments' are favourable times that allow new meanings to (re)appear and new identities to be (re)established.[2] To identify the themes of Romania's national identity, my project has examined the discourses of elites as the main actors of foreign policy. The seventeen years following the 1989 Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship were particularly meaningful for Romania as a democratic state and its foreign affairs, since they constituted the opportunity for a new beginning. This time frame contains several key case studies that show the re-definitions of national identity and how the latter have influenced foreign policy actions: the main discursive themes of Romania's post-communist foreign policy imaginary; Romania's reactions to the escalating Kosovo crisis and eventual NATO intervention of 1999; the state's support and military involvement in the 2003 Iraq war, as well as the domestic debates in 2006 about maintaining Romanian military presence in Iraq and the post-2005 intensified Atlanticism of national identity and foreign policy. These cases have been discussed individually or as smaller groups in the literature, but not as a sequence of inter-related episodes that have shaped Romanian identity and international stances from 1990 to 2007.

---

[1] A notion taken from Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 77.

[2] Ibid, p. 83.

Methodology

This thesis represents a qualitative research project, which relies on discourse analysis as a methodological tool to interpret the available primary sources. The types of relevant Romanian material include a wide variety of texts that pertain to foreign policy discourses. The body of primary sources compiled for the book consists of the following broad categories: a) the official stances of Romanian political leaders - Presidents, Premiers, Ministers - on the state's foreign policy, expressed through public speeches, statements, interviews or press conferences, most of them being available in libraries or archives and some online; b) the transcripts of parliamentary debates on foreign policy issues, which show the contestation among the views of different political parties and the kinds of arguments used to support them; c) legal documents such as the Romanian Constitution, the laws regulating the organisation and activity of the state's external affairs, as well as treaties between Romania and other states; d) other official documents belonging to state institutions – national security strategies, governmental programmes, white papers, press releases - or to political parties and international organisations; e) news articles that help to fill in information blanks and underline how the media reflects discursively the subjects present on the Romanian foreign policy agenda. In order to ensure the triangulation of research findings, my project has also used memoirs, biographies, books with interviews and other useful collections of texts from actors who have occupied state positions significant for Romania's post-communist foreign policy. The Romanian material is examined by applying a certain methodology of discourse analysis, which needs to be discussed at this point.

'Discourse' and 'discourse analysis' are profoundly contested terms, whose definitions range from communication in a particular context to a theoretical framework on the study of language. Michel Foucault, who founded the concept of 'discourse', employed various understandings of it. His broadening of the term 'discourse' was intentional and quite clearly rationalised - 'instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word "discourse", I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements'.[3] Foucault's work is not a component of the ideational perspective of my thesis. But his different meanings of 'discourse' are useful to identify a comprehensive working definition for the term. Throughout my examination of the Romanian empirical material, discourse alternatively illustrated each of Foucault's three notions: 'the general domain of all statements', a specific 'group of statements' (e.g. Romanian discourse on the Kosovo crisis) and 'a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements' (the main discursive themes of Romania's national identity – 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider').

This brings some conceptual ambiguity, yet that is inevitable because discourse has become so deeply ingrained in academic language that finding a suitable replacement to convey its complexity would be an almost impossible task. Discourse and ideas have a strong link, which is relevant for the formation of national identity. Roger Fowler has defined their relationship as follows:

[3] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 90.

> "'[d]iscourse" is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – "ideology" in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded'.[4]

Depending on how one understands the term 'discourse', discourse analysis might also mean different things. First, it is a methodological instrument by which texts and speech acts are examined. Second, discourse analysis may refer to certain conceptual assumptions, which treat language as more than a transparent vehicle of communication; discourse not only constitutes social reality, but is also constructed by it. At the same time, discourse analysis stands for more than a single methodology or a homogeneous theory; it is rather a multi-faceted approach dealing with 'the study of language in use', as well as 'the study of human meaning-making' or 'the production of meaning in social life'.[5] In other words, 'social reality is produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them meaning'.[6]

---

[4] Roger Fowler cited in Sara Mills, *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 6.

[5] Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, Simeon J. Yates, *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: SAGE in association with the Open University, 2001), p. 3.

[6] Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction* (London: SAGE, 2002), p. 3.

My project applies discourse analysis as a research tool. The methodology of discourse analysis has the following objectives and features -

> 'ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and systematic study of texts (…) Discursive activity does not occur in a vacuum, however, and discourses do not "possess" meaning. Instead, discourses are shared and social, emanating out of interactions between social groups and the complex societal structures in which the discourse is embedded'.[7]

Discourses about a state's national identity and foreign policy are contextual and depend on international events and narratives. These discourses are not 'produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration'; they are 'always connected to other discourses which are produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently'.[8]

A great advantage of discourse analysis as a methodological instrument derives from its flexibility. Instead of applying a fixed mechanism to every empirical example, some discourse scholars use the approach in less constricting ways and 'articulate their concepts in each particular enactment of concrete research'.[9] Sometimes a set procedure of doing discourse analysis limits to an extent the kind of knowledge provided by a case study. The absence of an established step-by-step scheme could be seen as a weak point, yet the interpretive nature of discourse research offers valuable advantages. For instance, content analysis focuses on pre-determined categories

[7] Ibid, p. 4.

[8] Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak cited in ibid.

[9] David R. Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis, *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 5.

that need to explicitly appear in the available material. Compared to content analysis, the more flexible nature of discourse analysis enables the researcher to find both explicit manifestations and implicit meanings or assumptions that may otherwise be overlooked.

The enquiry of my project has been guided by two principles put forward by Jutta Weldes, who explains how elites shape self-images, foreign policy representations and identities out of the circulating ideational structures. The first dimension of this process – articulation - has been described as follows:

> '[t]he term "articulation" refers to the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements. In this way, different terms and ideas come to connote or to 'summon' one another, to be welded into associative chains that make up an identifiable, if not a logically consistent, whole (…) With their successful repeated articulation, these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an accurate description of reality'.[10]

To configure stable images, articulation needs to be combined with a second dimension - interpellation - 'a dual process whereby identities or subject-positions are created and concrete individuals are "hailed" into or interpellated by them'.[11] The period 1990-1996 showed an abundance of (re)emerging understandings in the Romanian foreign

[10] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 98-99.

[11] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2(3), 1996, p. 287.

policy imaginary, which formed the patterns and themes of an ideational foundation for the state's post-communist foreign policy.

Moreover, the central research question investigated here is the following - what are the re-definitions of Romania's national identity during 1990-2007 and how and why have they influenced the state's foreign policy? By asking both 'how' and 'why-questions', my project departs from the dominant approaches to Romanian foreign policy analysis, which usually deal with answering only *why* certain decisions resulting in concrete actions were taken. Ontologically, 'why-questions' already presuppose a background of meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships.[12] So 'how' and 'what' types of research questions take things a step further by uncovering the way in which Romanian understandings, objects and subjects have been constituted, as well as their impact on foreign policy. With regards to epistemology, Jennifer Milliken has opinionated that discourse researchers have a common rejection of 'epistemic realism'; they employ 'a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying "real causes", concerning itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another'.[13]

In more conventional International Relations terminology, the epistemological position of my work is 'understanding' foreign policy behaviour by looking at it through national identity lenses. As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have noted, the approaches of 'explaining' and

[12] Roxanne L. Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37(3), 1993, p. 298.

[13] Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 5(2), 1999, pp. 225-226.

'understanding' should be distinguished because they embody divergent purposes. On the one hand, 'explaining' is about identifying what caused a particular event or state of affairs.[14] In order to rigorously establish or dismiss a causal relationship between two variables, a number of cases are examined by generating and testing hypotheses. On the other hand, 'understanding' reflects the search for a meaning, not necessarily the cause. Such a method involves treating history not as a source of information that might falsify a theory, but as a narrative which allows a greater appreciation of the origins, evolution and consequences of an event or state of affairs.[15] After having laid out the methodological underpinnings of my research, the discussion moves on to the last introductory segment – the analytical plan of my arguments.

Thesis Structure

This book has a primary empirical concern, which has been translated into its overarching structure. Following the introduction, the content has been divided into five chapters – one conceptual and four empirical in nature.

Chapter II configures the theoretical standpoints on national identity that are applied to Romanian foreign policy. The conceptualisation of national identity draws from four literatures that relate to constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and

[14] Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 45.

[15] Ibid.

international recognition. The four literatures create a view on national identity which stresses its internal and external dimensions. National identity formation is a two-way socio-psychological process that encompasses both domestic and international elements. The internal sources of national identity refer to the nation and collective memories or interpretations of the nation's past. The external dimension of national identity is about a state's self-images being internationally recognised, which links to an increased or reduced sense of self-esteem depending on whether or not those self-images are accepted in the global arena.

Chapter III focuses on the period 1990-1996 with an essential 'formative moment' for Romania's national identity, which saw the emergence of the post-communist foreign policy imaginary. It featured three key discursive themes or self-images: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. Romania's 'European' self-image was intensely promoted, while elites tried to dissociate the newly democratic state from the negative representation of 'Eastern' Europe and replace it with a 'Central' European articulation. The discursive engagement with the Balkans showed a combination of rejection and acceptance, with Romania being depicted as 'non-Balkan' yet maintaining traditional friendly relations in the area. The 'security provider' theme was useful in advocating Euro-Atlantic accession, but it also has strong historical roots in the collective imaginary that have defined Romania as defender of Europe and the West. These self-images feeding into national identity constituted an ideational foundation, which fundamentally shaped Romanian international politics between 1990 and 2007.

Chapter IV explores the years 1996-1999, which were predominantly marked by the 'formative moment' of the Kosovo inter-ethnic conflict and NATO's military intervention in 1999. The Alliance had refused to include Romania in the 1997 wave of enlargement, which could have rendered the state even more reluctant to endorse NATO actions in Kosovo. Yet Romania exhibited evolving foreign policy reactions to the Kosovo crisis, which began with partial support for the Alliance in October 1998 and changed to unconditional assistance for NATO's Operation Allied Force in March-April 1999. The initial Romanian position was a middle ground with a dual purpose: first, partial support (airspace access in emergencies) did not undermine the state's Euro-Atlantic identity; second, it accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romania's national identity - whether to act as a 'European' liberal democracy and 'security provider' or choose the traditional Balkan affinity. This foreign policy response was re-defined under the combined impact of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Romania eventually assisted NATO's campaign in Kosovo by providing unrestricted airspace access without armed forces.

Chapter V concentrates on the time frame 2000-2004, which associated a series of 'formative moments' that culminated in a fundamental re-definition of national identity during the 2003 Iraq war. The international discourses of early 1999 on an urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo facilitated the re-articulation of Romanian identity as a pro-active liberal democracy that tried to help the people suffering in totalitarian regimes. Since French-German and US opinions on how to disarm Iraq differed throughout 2002-2003, Central-Eastern European states were forced to make a 'European' or 'Atlantic' choice. Romania's national identity underwent a crisis within

its 'liberal democratic' self-image and the state had to opt whether to act as a 'European' or 'Atlantic' liberal democracy. The tensions in national identity were settled by invoking certain collective memory-myths that reinforced the idea of Romania becoming an 'Atlantic' liberal democracy.

Chapter VI looks at the period 2004-2007, when the Atlantic vocation of Romania's national identity and foreign policy was consolidated and intensified. Although the state was an official NATO member, the self-images of 'security provider' and 'pro-active liberal democracy' continued to be very relevant for its international affairs. The Presidency's Atlantic views shifted Romania's foreign policy efforts from the 'West' to the 'East', where the state could have a significant role in democratising and stabilising the Euro-Atlantic community's neighbourhood, as well as contributing to more distant theatres of operations like Iraq. This intensified Atlanticism was not accepted by all Romanian elites, especially the Prime Minister who tried to rebalance the 'European' self-image and Atlantic dimension of national identity and international politics. The Premier's attempt at contestation was unsuccessful and Romania maintained its military presence in Iraq, along with pursuing an Eastern foreign policy in the Black Sea area.

The arguments of this book end with concluding remarks about the role of national identity in the overarching trajectory of Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 2007.

Chapter II: Unpacking the Concept of National Identity

The central problematic of my thesis is the significance of national identity in shaping the trajectory of Romanian foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The thesis looks at why and how Romania's national identity was subject to re-definitions and contestation prior to the finalising of the EU accession process in January 2007. The link between a state's national identity and its international relations has been summarised by Christopher Hill and William Wallace:

> '[e]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state's "place in the world", its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them'.[1]

In the overall structure of my arguments, this chapter has the main purpose of identifying the theoretical standpoints which are applied in the empirical part of the book. It opens with a discussion of the foreign policy imaginary, followed by the conceptual analysis of national identity with its internal and external dimensions. The core

[1] Christopher Hill and William Wallace, 'Introduction: Actors and Actions' in Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 8.

arguments draw on four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international recognition.[2] After integrating all the insights into a coherent whole, there is a brief overview of the three main identity themes or self-images which circulated in Romania's post-communist foreign policy imaginary. The outline of these discursive themes is a bridge between the theoretical component and the empirical discussion in subsequent chapters.

The Foreign Policy Imaginary

To begin with, the foreign policy imaginary is a key concept of my thesis and draws inspiration from Jutta Weldes' notion of 'security imaginary'. It constitutes 'a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created'.[3] Both adaptations derive from the 'social imaginary' of Cornelius Castoriadis, who starts with the conviction that the symbolic carries understandings which take into account the 'real-rational', but also an imaginary dimension or 'representation'.[4] That is why the foreign policy imaginary relates to the 'investment by society of the world and itself with meaning - meanings which are not "dictated" by real factors since it is instead this meaning that attributes to these real factors a particular importance and a particular place in the universe constituted by a given society'.[5]

---

[2] Part of this material has been previously published in Loretta C. Salajan, *Discoursing on European Identity: A Study of Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy* (Cluj: Presa Universitara Clujeana, 2017).

[3] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 10.

[4] Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 127.

[5] Ibid, p. 128.

The foreign policy imaginary enables answers to existential questions like '[w]ho are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want (…) what are we lacking?'[6] Such questions need a reply because ultimately:

> 'society must define its "identity", its articulation, the world, its relation to the world and to the objects it contains, its needs and its desires. Without the "answer" to these "questions", without these "definitions", there can be no human world, no society, no culture - for everything would be undifferentiated chaos'.[7]

So the foreign policy imaginary as ideational structure influences how elites think about or perceive themselves and the state they represent. It conditions agents to an extent, yet they do retain freedom of action and choice. The foreign policy imaginary is not a fixed structure and has a variety of articulations and self-images about the state, which allows decision-makers to modify meanings or select the appropriate ones depending on the circumstances.

The main function of Weldes' 'security imaginary' is to offer 'the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international system are constructed'.[8] Building on the works of Castoriadis and Weldes, the foreign policy imaginary takes things a step further by identifying the 'real' and 'imagined' basis of the meanings forming national identity. My conceptual arguments hold that the self-images and understandings feeding into national identity, which circulate in the foreign policy imaginary, have a 'real' (somewhat objectively

---

[6] Ibid, p. 146.
[7] Ibid, p. 147.
[8] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 10.

identifiable) core – language and ethnicity, an 'imagined' basis or a combination of the previous two components. These sources of national identity come from within (interpretations of the nation's historical past) and from the outside (inter-state socialisation). The core theoretical standpoints are elaborated by drawing on four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international recognition.

The Internal and External Dimensions of National Identity

Broadly defined, constructivism is the ontological position which posits that 'all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context'.[9] In the field of International Relations, the constructivist school of thought has few general or overarching assumptions, which translates into radically different views about identity and foreign policy. The most useful constructivist contributions for the conceptual dimension of my thesis are the ideational foundations of national identity and the move away from exclusively rationalist approaches.

The ideational foundations of identity have been highlighted by Alexander Wendt, who defines state identity as the product of inter-subjective processes of meaning creation, 'a property of intentional

[9] Michael J. Crotty, *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process* (London: Sage, 2003), p. 42.

actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions'.[10] Wendt has argued that the meanings which states attach to phenomena and subsequently their interests and identities are shaped through inter-state interaction.[11] Systemic socialisation reflects an important part of identity formation, yet it neglects the historical and internal contexts in which national identities have been deeply embedded.

A state's national identity cannot be separated from the domestic actors that take decisions in its name. These agents internalise the norms characterising the international realm, while also approaching politics with an already formed appreciation of the world, the international system and the position of their state within it.[12] The configuration of identity is ultimately 'a problem each state and each statesman has to grapple with. [Wendt] can tell us why a certain identity is recognized, but not what that identity is'.[13]

This brings us to the content feeding into national identity, which relies on the self-other dichotomy or what distinguishes the self from more or less salient others. As Bahar Rumelili explains, '[i]dentities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not (...) [which] does not necessitate a behavioural relationship between self (the bearer of identity) and other (the bearer of difference) that is characterised by

---

[10] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 224.

[11] Ibid, p. 401.

[12] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2(3), 1996, p. 280.

[13] Erik Ringmar, 'Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History' in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 283.

mutual exclusion and the perception and representation of the other as a threat to one's identity'.[14] Such a premise opens up a variety of possibilities and relations on the self-other spectrum of difference. The self can feel hostility, compatibility, friendship or indifference towards others. For instance, chapter III examines the Romanian foreign policy imaginary in 1990-1996, showing how Romanian self-images and overall national identity have been shaped vis-à-vis a crucial self ('Europe') and salient other ('the Balkans').

Another useful constructivist contribution is the move away from an exclusively rationalist perspective, though I do not consider national identity and rational motivations to be competing explanations for foreign policy. Instead, they offer complementary accounts of a state's international behaviour. Romania's wish to join the EU and NATO was partly a rational foreign policy choice. NATO and EU accession would bring material advantages such as increased security and prosperity. At times, the external position of Romanian elites regarding critical events (e.g. Kosovo, Iraq) tried to please prominent NATO and EU members to some extent, in order to help gain membership in the two institutions. But that does not tell the whole story of Romanian foreign policy. Euro-Atlantic integration was also about the international recognition of Romania's national identity, about returning to the Western community from which it had been separated by communism.

Chapter IV discusses how rationalism cannot explain why Romania did not give unconditional assistance to NATO actions in

[14] Bahar Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(1), 2004, p. 29.

Kosovo from the very beginning. In October 1998, the Romanian response to a potential Alliance intervention in Kosovo was nuanced and granted partial support. NATO requested unrestricted airspace access and domestic leaders decided only on humanitarian relief efforts and approving airspace access in case of emergencies. It was a somewhat neutral stance for Romania which accommodated the tensions inherent in its national identity – whether to act as a European liberal democracy or prioritise the traditional Balkan affinity. A rational cost-benefit calculation would simply make Romania comply with NATO's demands unconditionally, so as to prove its adequacy as an Alliance candidate. Then national identity and rationalism supplement rather than oppose each other, to advance a complex picture of Romanian international rhetoric and actions.

Therefore, my conceptual standpoint starts from the constructivist principle that identities have an ideational basis and fluid nature based on the self-other nexus. I subscribe to the idea that identity formation comes before and shapes the manifestation of a state's international conduct, although I do not see any causal relationship between national identity and foreign policy. Identities change or are revised if a certain set of circumstances occur. An important foreign policy situation or crisis - the Kosovo intervention, 9/11, the Iraq war - could facilitate a shift in the discourses and ideational structures dominating the international environment. The discursive modifications at international level may prompt the re-articulation of a state's national identity, or bring a specific facet of identity to the forefront and render it more relevant in that foreign policy context. At various more or less critical points between 1990 and 2007, Romania's discourses and actions changed under the combined influence of national identity, rational motivations and shifting international

context. The whole process is part of the nuances of foreign policy decision-making, where national identity complements the basic account of rational interests and addresses their explanatory gaps.

To unpack the formation of national identity, it is imperative to specify the sources of the key representations present in the foreign policy imaginary. Although national identity is subject to re-definitions, it retains a stable core, which draws meaning from a few perpetuated self-images of the nation. These self-images originate in enduring historical traditions and collective interpretations of the past. David Taylor makes an interesting point – '[l]ong-standing historical notions of identity are not rendered irrelevant for all the arguments that they may be "mythical" or "imagined"'; such 'imagined essences of identity are potent social forces'.[15] For example, the long term construct of Romanian exceptionalism – re-defined in the post-communist foreign policy imaginary during 1990-1996 – has stressed Romania's Western European identity through the Roman ethnic descent and Latin language, together with the self-image as historical defender of Europe and the West. Here the literatures on nationalism and memory studies are useful in pinpointing the domestic content of national identity.

Within the literature on nationalism, the combined insights of Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith underline the imagined nature of national identity, which still has a stable ethno-cultural core based on ancestry, language, territory, historical myths and memories. Anderson regards nations as an 'imagined' phenomenon because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their

[15] David Taylor, 'Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with Postmodern Theory', *Journal of Social Policy*, volume 27(3), 1998, pp. 345-346.

fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'.[16] Anderson emphasises the continuous issue of identity building ('the imagining of the community'), without implying that nations are fictitious. They are a genuine phenomenon rooted in historical processes.[17]

Despite modern nations being constructed, Smith claims they have stable historical roots in the 'ethnies', which provide the shared 'myths, memories, values and symbols' necessary for the formation of nations.[18] Smith's 'ethnie' sets up a core for national identity - 'a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among élites'.[19] From Anderson, my thesis adopts the imagined essence of the nation and national identity. From Smith, it takes the concept of 'ethnie' to identify an ethno-cultural core for national identity. They fit with the constructivist premise of identity having ideational foundations and supplement it by clarifying one of the fundamental domestic sources of national identity.

The ethno-cultural basis of the Romanian nation – language, ethnic descent, territory, collective interpretations of the past - played a vital part in the contemporary articulation of national identity, considering that the modern state of Romania was achieved only in the early twentieth century (1918). At first, language unified the

[16] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 6.
[17] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chapters II and III.
[18] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 15.
[19] Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 13.

divided ethnic group and facilitated communication between those who eventually identified themselves as Romanians, being invoked as a putatively objective proof of the nation's Roman ancestors and Western European heritage. The common language consolidated the idea of Latin origins in the Romanian consciousness, which meant that the Romanian nation had the same ethnic descent as the French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese nations. Though separated into different territories and under the rule of various empires, the Romanian nation was bound by long-standing meanings that circulated as shared historical narratives, values and symbols. Collective interpretations of past events are crucial to the transmission of self-images about the nation through time, which leads to another fundamental internal source of national identity – memory.

Broadly speaking, memory studies have been preoccupied with 'how members of society remember and interpret events, how the meaning of the past is constructed, and how it is modified over time', the dissemination of beliefs, feelings, moral judgments and knowledge about the past, both for self-understanding and gaining status in an ever-changing reality.[20] Collective memory - understood as shared narratives of the past – is 'a powerful cohesive force, binding the disparate members of a nation together'; it draws boundaries between the self and others, being 'passed from generation to generation' and 'transmitted across multiple historical contexts'.[21] Thomas Berger has mentioned the 'practical function' of these collective interpretations in terms of foreign policy:

---

[20] Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 3-5.

[21] Duncan Bell, 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', *British Journal of Sociology*, volume 54(1), 2003, p. 70.

> '[t]hey provide the collectivity with an identity and a common myth of origin. They endow it with emotional and normative underpinning. They simplify the task of organising collective action by providing its members with a common language and set of understandings about how the world functions and ought to function'.[22]

Nevertheless, Duncan Bell cautions against confusing memory with mythology. He views a nationalist myth as 'a story that simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation's past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past'.[23] My thesis subscribes to a broader sense of memory which is prevalent in the related literature, without denying that there is a mythical dimension to the historical narratives transmitted as collective memories in the nation's evolution – hence the preferred term 'memory-myth'. Bell has also noted 'the fluid interface between memory and political identity'; as identities are contested, memories are used 'to defend unity and coherence, to shore up a sense of self and community'.[24]

A state's national identity promoted from within may or may not receive external validation from fellow members in the international system. If its national identity is confronted with lack of recognition, the state falls back on the domestic source where representations about the self have been circulating. The purpose is to both reinforce

---

[22] Thomas Berger, 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945' in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 80.

[23] Duncan Bell, 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', p. 75.

[24] Duncan Bell, 'Introduction' in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (London: Palgrave, 2006), p. 6.

national identity and hopefully find further arguments to convince others to accept that self-image or national identity. The bottom line is that 'not only physical, but also social survival is at stake'[25] in international politics, which brings us to the external source of national identity formation – recognition.

Social survival in the international system means having a stable national identity, which is not contested by others. In his path breaking study, Axel Honneth emphasises the key role of recognition in developing a stable identity which involved a sense of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.[26] That is why, in an anarchic international environment, one of the main motivations of states is to gain recognition for their self-images and identity.[27] Recognition can be defined as 'a social act that ascribes to a state some positive status, whereby its identity is acknowledged and reinforced as meaningful by a significant Other, and thus the state is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing'.[28] Thomas Lindemann adds that if 'there is a rough equivalence between our asserted self-image and how we are treated, meaning that if others treat us according to what we consider ourselves to be, our self-image is recognized'.[29]

---

[25] Erik Ringmar, 'The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West', *Cooperation and Conflict*, volume 37(2), 2002, p. 116.

[26] Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

[27] Michelle K. Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics: Security, Identity, and the Quest for Power* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 40.

[28] Michelle K. Murray, 'Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), p. 134.

[29] Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition* (University of Essex: European Consortium for Political Research Press, 2010), p. 9.

Then the configuration of national identity is understood as an inter-subjective negotiation and dialogue between the self and legitimate others. As succinctly put by Ringmar, 'all stories require audiences' and the latter must agree with the self-images and narratives expressed by a state.[30] The categories of audiences include variations on the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy, whether allies or enemies, partners or rivals. There must be 'visible signs' for being part of a certain group so as to enable identification, because 'we belong together if we simultaneously perform the same acts or utter the same words, and if we are aware that others are doing the same together with us'.[31] The external dimension of having self-images validated becomes vital because it renders the entire social process effective in practice. If other actors recognise the roles, ideas and identity internally attributed to a state, they give invaluable credibility to that domestic collective imaginary. In their search for the international recognition of identity, political elites might attempt to not only represent their state in accordance with national societal demands, but also constantly adapt the articulations depending on outside reactions conveying support, threat or simply indifference.

Recognition is fundamental to securing a healthy sense of subjectivity; without it, actors are liable to feel shame and humiliation and taken further still, from a cognitive perspective, having one's identity recognised and confirmed by others can be fundamental to establishing a sense of self in the first place.[32] This is another reason why it is only possible for identities to develop a sense of self in

[30] Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 79.
[31] Ibid, p. 87.
[32] Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 2.

dialogical relationships with external others.[33] Non-recognition can be a significant source of psychological anxiety and anguish to the extent that it threatens an actor's sense of self-esteem and self image.[34] Indeed, at a collective level and taken to the extreme, non-recognition represents a challenge to the symbolic existence of the group or nation. More usually, non-recognition adopts the form of positive self-images not being verified by salient others, leaving the self with the dilemma to either redouble efforts to secure future acceptance of claims made about the self, or to take non-recognition to heart via the renegotiation of a new narrative for the self.[35]

That is why the state may engage in processes of re-narration and re-constitution by projecting an alternative biography of the self, perceived as being more suitable for the new situation and in turn establishing a new set of meanings and concomitant identity claims supportive of the new position. As a synthesis, Ringmar elaborates on three options that states have when confronted with denial of recognition. First, simply give up and find 'an alternative self-description and re-brand itself as something else', without any guarantees that a second attempt will be successful.[36] Second, 'accept the verdict of the audience' and maintain the self-images in question, at the same time 'embarking on a program of self-reformation' (adopting the missing traits to hopefully be recognised).[37] Third, preserve the national narratives, self-images and identity by trying to

---

[33] Arash Abizadeh, 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, volume 99(1), 2005, pp. 47-48.

[34] Thomas Lindemann, *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition*, p. 24.

[35] Erik Ringmar, 'The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West', pp. 115-136.

[36] Erik Ringmar, 'The International Politics of Recognition', p. 8.

[37] Ibid.

convince others of their validity.[38] These strategies and general dynamics of international recognition have been particularly relevant to Romania's national identity and foreign policy. They underline how Romania reacted to having a 'European' self-image at least partially denied, since the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct post-communist candidate states as 'liminal Europe' or 'Europe but not quite Europe'.[39]

Unpacking National Identity – A Synthesis

To conclude this overview of my conceptual standpoints, the different sources and their useful insights need to be integrated into a coherent whole. Constructivism was my initial step towards finding the suitable conceptual blend for understanding Romanian national identity and foreign policy. This thesis employs the following general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without actually imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation and the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus. Taking each one in turn, identities are fluid and grounded in a shifting ideational basis, at the same time guiding a state's foreign policy conduct without causally determining it. They might be subject to constant re-definition under the influence of both systemic and internal factors.

---

[38] Ibid.

[39] Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 57.

More specifically, national identity is shaped by inter-state socialisation and domestic aspects such as interpretations of the nation's historical past. Although it has a changing nature, national identity draws self-images from a series of enduring meanings and articulations prevalent in the nation's distant or more recent history. The self-images feeding into national identity are based on the self-other dichotomy, being dependent on what distinguishes them from more or less salient others. Such a stance does not necessarily involve an antagonistic behavioural relationship between the self and others or their mutual exclusion. On the contrary, the scale of perception ranges from friendly to threatening others.

Moreover, all these understandings relevant to identity circulate in a discursive space called the foreign policy imaginary - a key notion adapted from Weldes. This represents a structure of well established meanings, a reservoir which contains the long-standing self-images derived from a nation's interpretations of the remembered past. The foreign policy imaginary influences national identity by affecting how elites perceive their state and decide the appropriate responses to international events. Yet leaders enjoy freedom of choice and action, since the foreign policy imaginary offers many articulations and potential interpretive avenues, which may be selected depending on the actors and circumstances involved. On a related note, the foreign policy imaginary and national identity draw meaning and content both from within and outside. So the logical next step is to identify the internal factors of national identity formation, followed by the external ones.

The nation constitutes a fairly obvious domestic source of national identity and has been the traditional concern of nationalism scholars. The works of Anderson and Smith shed light on the imagined or constructed essence of the nation, which does not imply

that nations are fictitious. They stem from and retain a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The first three constitutive features of national identity (ethnic descent, language, territory) are quite straightforward in the Romanian case. But the concept of collective memory is rather vague and reflects another internal factor of national identity creation.

My theoretical standpoint considers collective memories to be subjective interpretations of the nation's remembered past, which give meaning to the self-images that make up national identity and convey future aspirations. I find the term collective memory-myths to be more suitable, since there is a mythical quality to the stories passed down from generation to generation. These memory-myths represent historical narratives and symbols that bind members of a nation together under a common national identity over a long period of time. If the nation and memory-myths about the past configure the internal dimension of national identity, international recognition constitutes its external component.

Self-images and in turn national identity require validation by others to be effective in social practice. Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem which is an important motivator in foreign policy decision-making. Social survival and the pursuit of self-esteem explain why states seek to gain international recognition for their identities. Self-images and national identity are negotiated between the self and its significant others. If they are not internationally recognised, the state resorts to different coping strategies such as trying to adapt or re-define its self-images, in order to convince external audiences of their validity.

While not denying the utility of Realpolitik, my theoretical arguments have compiled a conceptual toolbox for 'a new *Identitätsproblematik*'[40], which shows a different kind of perspective on Romania's foreign policy. These views on national identity are prefigured in the following bridge section, which introduces the key themes of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary that will be explored in more depth in the rest of the thesis.

An Outline of Romania's Foreign Policy Imaginary

The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union generated a tectonic shift in the balance of constraints, freedom and ideas for countries in the affected regions. These changes produced critical ruptures that destabilised the boundaries of national identities, since the previously dominant Cold War representations were no longer valid. At the same time, the need for new ideational foundations and the shaping of more stable identities became imminent. That is why the seventeen years following the Romanian popular revolution against the communist dictatorship (1990-2007) could be regarded as a series of 'formative moments' – a notion borrowed from Ringmar.[41] He argues that in 'normal times' the matter of identity is simply taken for granted, yet there are also 'formative moments' or certain periods in the life of individuals and societies when pre-conceived issues come under scrutiny.

[40] Erik Ringmar, 'The International Politics of Recognition', pp. 3-4.

[41] Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, p. 77.

Formative moments should be seen as opportunities for new meanings to appear and new identities to be established.[42] My thesis adopts the concept of 'formative moment' as symbolising a period in which the transformation of identity becomes more likely if compared to other times with less significant or smaller re-definitions. According to Ringmar, formative moments often appear as times of 'unprecedented poetic freedom' when actors believe they can 'become whatever they want to be'.[43] Post-communist Romania was finally free to reject its totalitarian past and pursue the self-images it deemed appropriate in international politics.

Before outlining the main themes present in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, some conceptual clarifications are in order about the connection between self-images and national identity. Peter Burke and Jan Stets affirm that the self 'emerges in social interaction within the context of a complex differentiated society'.[44] Because a state has several social positions in the international system, it needs to 'reflect this differentiation into components' or 'multiple selves'.[45] Each of these smaller selves or self-images feeds into an overall national identity. The self-image might be called an identity in its own right, but it also subsumes hierarchically to a larger identity. Looking at the Romanian case, the 'Euro-Atlantic' identity has become the supreme or overarching national identity. Post-communist Romania has come to view itself as part of the Euro-Atlantic community or Western world, which comprises of two key institutions: NATO and the EU. Romania's 'Euro-Atlantic' identity then encompasses three self-

[42] Ibid, p. 83.
[43] Ibid, p. 86.
[44] Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 10.
[45] Ibid.

images: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. These are the main themes of Romania's foreign policy imaginary, which formed an ideational foundation that influenced external relations between 1990 and 2007.

After the restoration of democracy in 1990, Romanian foreign policy decision-makers gradually advocated that accession to Euro-Atlantic structures would be their state's only 'natural' international orientation. The idea received strong support from political parties and the majority of the population. According to the Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Năstase,

> '[e]ven in December 1989 it was clear to us that the European dimension of Romanian foreign policy was to become a priority. There was domestic consensus, both political and at society's level, regarding the need to detach ourselves from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence (...) and one way or the other return to the interwar foreign policy traditions which sought to anchor Romania within the Western European bloc'.[46]

Năstase's words introduce a few aspects related to Romania's 'European' identity, which is the first self-image of its national identity. Among the different facets of Romanian identity, the 'European' one was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and meant to show the state's Western heritage. That is why, especially in the period 1990-1996, Romania was very frequently depicted as a 'European' state.

[46] Adrian Năstase – Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 1990 – November 1992), *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe/ Romania after Malta. 875 Days at Foreign Affairs*, volume 1 (Bucharest: Fundația Titulescu, 2006), p. 28.

The articulation started taking shape immediately after the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the provisional Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac underlined in January 1990: 'Romania is a European country. That is something given by our history and spirituality'.[47] Romania returning to Europe was seen as a natural direction because it resonated with the state's interwar identity and foreign policy. In the realm of collective memory-myths, the interwar period has been constructed as a time of stability and prosperity, when Romania was internationally acknowledged as a European state. It was a defining moment for the Romanian people as the aftermath of World War I facilitated the unification of Great Romania in 1918. The historical provinces of Basarabia, Bucovina and Transilvania joined the Romanian Kingdom, made up of Valahia and Moldova that had already united in 1859. The interwar years are still remembered and perceived as a time when Romania had a national identity worthy of its people's neo-Latin origins. Therefore, national foreign policy elites discursively reinforced the 'European' self-image to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a collective identity with the West.

Secondly, Romania's relationship with 'the Balkans' embodied a mixture of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-makers put intensive efforts into conveying that Romania was not part of the Balkans, particularly to international audiences. In October 1993, Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Meleşcanu argued that geography constituted Romania as a 'non-Balkan' state – 'Romania, being located north of the Danube, does not belong geographically to the Balkan

[47] Sergiu Celac – Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (December 1989 - June 1990) cited in *Lumea/ The World*, number 2, 11 January 1990, p. 3.

region'.[48] Such articulations aimed to detach the Romanian state from the negative connotations that had been associated with the Balkan region. The outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s brought the proliferation of pejorative imagery and stereotypes in the West concerning the Balkan area. Romania's national identity vis-à-vis the Balkans illustrates quite meaningfully how self-images are based on difference, without necessarily entailing animosity or depicting the other as threatening. Thus, the Romanian self-image of 'non-Balkan' coexisted with amicable representations (e.g. 'our friends to the south').[49] Yugoslavia had been viewed as a long-time ally in the region, whether in its past political form or contemporary individual entities.

Regarding the third key theme of Romania's Euro-Atlantic identity, the post-1992 foreign policy discourse contained a range of interconnected self-images: 'security provider', 'source of stability', 'reliable partner'. Romanian officials frequently mentioned their state's contribution towards promoting stability among turbulent neighbours. For example, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu said that:

> 'Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of European security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The fact that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO'.[50]

---

[48] Teodor Meleşcanu – Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (November 1992 – November 1996), 'Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game', *NATO Review*, volume 41(5), October 1993; http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-3.htm (March 2014).

[49] Ibid.

[50] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania as a Security Provider' (Washington, 15-17 July 1996) in *Renaşterea diplomaţiei româneşti/ The Re-Birth of Romanian Diplomacy* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002), pp. 134-135.

The self-image of 'security provider' did not simply emerge as a response to NATO's discursive influence. Its ideational roots were closely linked to an enduring articulation of Romania as defender of Europe or the West, which features prominently among the Romanian collective memory-myths about the national past.

Apart from highlighting the identity palette within Romania's foreign policy imaginary and their internal ideational sources, my conceptual framework will also help to explain why and how certain self-images become more visible in the state's international affairs. As the general context of ideas shifted in the global system under the impact of powerful events (e.g. the Kosovo intervention, 9/11 and the Iraq war), Romanian leaders needed to respond by re-interpreting the meanings of their foreign policy imaginary. Such systemic 'formative moments' have engendered considerable contestation or dialogue between the Romanian self-images and its salient selves and others. At various points throughout its foreign policy course, Romania's national identity and its self-images were denied recognition or were only partially accepted by the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self; hence begins a Romanian story of identity re-definition and negotiation, which shaped foreign policy until 2007.

Chapter III: Romania's Foreign Policy Imaginary (1990-1996)

The years 1990-1996 were one of the key formative periods of Romania's post-communist national identity and they exhibited a bewildering array of emerging and re-emerging ideas. The restoration of democracy provided Romania with the opportunity to freely choose a new international vision, which accounts for the surge in identity articulations.

This chapter analyses the core meanings circulating in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary between 1990 and 1996, which gravitated around three main discursive themes: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'.[1] These self-images of national identity shaped Romanian international behaviour throughout the post-communist period, becoming particularly relevant during critical events like the 1999 Kosovo crisis and 2003 Iraq war.

Romania's 'European' Self-Image

Among the three main self-images circulating in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, the European one was the most intensely re-articulated during 1990-1996. The reason is quite simple, as

[1] A modified version of this chapter has been previously published in Loretta C. Salajan, 'National Identity and International Politics: An Analysis of Romania's Post-Communist Foreign Policy Imaginary (1990-1996), *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, volume 16(3), 2016, pp. 357-375.

Romanian national identity tends to be first associated with a European representation by both elites and the general population. Broadly defined, being a 'European' state or having a European identity refers to being known and accepted as a Western European inspired liberal democracy, which upholds two key principles – the organisation of regular democratic elections and the protection of human and civil rights and liberties. In this time frame, the European self-image was subjected to particularly frequent re-definitions because it had to simultaneously converse with influential domestic and international discourses.

Thus, point nine of the statement proposal issued by the National Salvation Front in December 1989 hinted at a European direction for Romania: '[t]he country's entire foreign policy is to promote good neighbourly relations, friendship and peace in the world, integrating itself in the construction process of a united Europe'.[2] Following the first post-communist parliamentary and presidential elections of May 1990, at the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Summit in November, President Ion Iliescu gave a clear indication of the state's foreign policy goals: '[t]he new Romania resulting from the Revolution of December 1989 has adopted a policy oriented towards re-establishing historical and traditional relations with the other countries of Europe and North America, as well as towards developing relations with states sharing the same Latin culture and civilisation'.[3]

---

[2] The National Salvation Front, 'Statement towards the Country', initially broadcast on the national television and radio, then published in *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number I(1), 22 December 1989.

[3] Ion Iliescu, 'Speech at the CSCE Summit' (Paris, 21 November 1990) in *Adevărul/ The Truth*, number I-239, p. 3.

Romania's second post-1989 democratic elections in September 1992 reconfirmed Iliescu as President and placed the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) in government. Throughout the electoral campaign for a new mandate, Iliescu argued that his main vision of the country's external trajectory was 'integration into (…) the structures dominating the European and Euro-Atlantic area'.[4] The message delivered in Parliament by the re-elected President indicated the same foreign policy choice, as he stressed that '[Romania's] long-term interests demand, in my opinion, the development of privileged relations with the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France and with all the other European states'.[5]

The official discourse evolved in 1992-1996 towards the recurring representation of NATO and EU accession as Romania's 'natural' direction. Teodor Meleşcanu, the new Foreign Affairs Minister appointed in November 1992, declared that: 'the option of Euro-Atlantic integration is a natural choice. It is a well known fact that the institutions, the political, cultural and economic life of modern Romania have always – with the exception of the Cold War period – been an intrinsic part of European civilisation'.[6] Or as President Iliescu explained in November 1994 -

> '[t]he central orientation of Romanian foreign policy is based on the decision adopted in the first day of the Romanian revolution and supported, then and now, by all political forces in the country – full integration into the political, economic and security structures of

[4] Ion Iliescu, *Cred în schimbarea în bine a României/ I Believe in the Positive Change of Romania* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992), p. 12.

[5] Ion Iliescu, *Address at the Investiture as President of Romania* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992), p. 14.

[6] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Speech on Romania's Journey towards Euro-Atlantic Integration' (Athens, July 1996) in *Renaşterea diplomației româneşti*, p. 144.

democratic Europe. This decision was nothing short of natural, considering that, through its civilisation, culture, history and geographical position, the Romanian nation has always been an inseparable part of European culture and civilisation'.[7]

In terms of targeted audiences, Romania's decision-makers were addressing such speeches to mostly external recipients. Their messages intended to remind the Euro-Atlantic community of the 'kidnapped, displaced West', the European peoples who had not abandoned their identity even during communism.[8] This notion of 'natural' choice certainly belied the range of foreign policy and security alternatives actually available to post-communist Romania and Central-Eastern Europe in general, which included 'a reformed alliance with the former Soviet Union, neutrality or non-alignment, regional security cooperation within Eastern Europe, pan-European collective or common security through the CSCE, a realpolitik balance of power or reliance on national defence'.[9] Yet the Euro-Atlantic orientation was domestically validated 'with an impressive unanimity by the entire political elite' gathered for consultations at Snagov in 1993.[10]

If Romania had a range of international security options, why did the post-1992 official discourse construct Euro-Atlantic accession as natural? NATO and EU membership provided the surest way in which Romania could receive international recognition for its desired Euro-

---

[7] Ion Iliescu, 'Speech delivered at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union' (Paris, 29 November 1994) in *Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy* (Bucharest: Redacția publicațiilor pentru străinătate, 1995), p. 142.

[8] Milan Kundera, 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', *New York Review of Books*, volume 31(7), 26 April 1984, p. 2.

[9] Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 13.

[10] Andrei Miroiu, 'National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The Romanian Case', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, volume 2(2), 2002, p. 103.

Atlantic identity. The Western self would thus validate unequivocally that the Romanian other was part of the Euro-Atlantic community in both civilisational and institutional meanings. Among the different discursive facets of Romanian identity, the 'European' self-image was deeply rooted in the foreign policy imaginary and was meant to show the country's Western origins. Since the Euro-Atlantic self continued to construct candidate states (including Romania) as 'liminal Europe' or 'Europe but not quite Europe'[11], the foreign policy imaginary needed to be re-defined in reaction to Western representations.

In the 1990-1996 official discourses, Romania was very frequently depicted as a 'European' state. This self-image started taking shape soon after the fall of the communist dictatorship, as the newly appointed Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Năstase stated in the wake of Romania's first free elections (May 1990) - '[t]o my view, things are clear. Romania is a European state'.[12] President Iliescu also summed up what this identity meant for the country historically and in terms of values:

> '[d]ue to its culture, civilisation and political tradition, Romania decidedly belongs to classical Europe, inheriting both the ancient Greek-Roman tradition and the modern principles of statehood – citizenship, freedom, fundamental human rights, the separation of powers within the state, the rule of law'.[13]

---

[11] Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 57.

[12] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview for the Romanian National Radio' (Bucharest, 14 July 1990) in *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe*, volume 1, p. 96.

[13] Ion Iliescu, 'We Need One Another, just like All of Us Need a United Europe, a Europe of the Nations' – Speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 3 November 1994), in *Toamna diplomatică/ The Autumn of Diplomacy* (Bucharest: Redacția publicațiilor pentru străinătate, 1995), p. 94.

When studying the evolution of Romania's post-communist foreign policy articulations, two recurring and interconnected themes become apparent - recovering the 'European' identity and 'returning to Europe', both politically and economically. This was definitely not a unique approach, as obtaining Euro-Atlantic membership was the general aspiration for Central and Eastern European states, while most of their leaders gradually incorporated in speeches the concept of 'European identity'.[14] Despite the common theme, there were specific nuances and meanings associated with the overarching European identity in each state. In the Romanian case, the official discourse articulated several variations ('European', 'Western', 'Latin'), all of which were meant to dissociate the new state from its communist past and promote a collective identity with the West.

The latter two are inextricably linked, if one takes into account the shared ethnic, cultural and linguistic origins of the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian peoples as descendants of the ancient Romans. The Latin identity of Romanians was portrayed as 'an undeniable sign of our connection to the great family of Western European peoples'.[15] The state's Western subjectivity and 'return to Europe' were associated with key moments of European history –

> '[t]he generation of 1848 and that of the Union [1918] linked the Romanians' country to Western civilisation, extricating it from Oriental rule. The current generation of the Romanian nation will re-adopt that tradition'.[16]

---

[14] Petr Drulák, 'The Return of Identity to European Politics' in Petr Drulák (ed.), *National and European Identities in EU Enlargement: Views from Central and Eastern Europe* (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2001), pp. 11-20.

[15] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania Has Refused to Give Up Its European Identity even in the Context of Bipolar Confrontation' (Excerpts from Speeches of late 1995) in *Renaşterea diplomației românești*, p. 115.

[16] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'The Romanian Diplomacy's Contribution to the Union of Principalities' (Focşani, 24 January 1996) in *Renaşterea diplomației românești*, p. 23.

And the approximately fifty years of communism were seen as a period which had forcefully separated Romania from its Western family, or 'a sort of parenthesis in the country's historical destiny'.[17]

In early 1991, a pivotal shift occurred in the foreign policy discourse, which attempted to distance Romania from its traditional 'Eastern European' representation, moving towards that of 'Central European'. The motivations behind the change in terminology could be attributed to the fact that 'Eastern Europe' had acquired specific political and ideological connotations during the Cold War, primarily defining the Soviet Union's satellite states.[18] It should be noted that the political entity of 'Eastern Europe' had been created in the aftermath of the Yalta Conference (1945), where the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom discussed and controversially decided the reconfiguration of war-torn Europe. The concept of 'Eastern Europe' was invented by Western Europe as its other half in the Enlightenment (eighteenth century), the imagined space where 'European' civilisation encountered 'Oriental' barbarism.[19] During the Cold War, NATO and the EU defined their eastern boundary as a defence line for 'European unity', which enabled them to construct a superior Western identity based on shared democratic values.[20]

---

[17] Ion Iliescu, 'Interview for "Le Point"' (2 April 1994) in *Romania in Europe and in the World*, p. 184.

[18] Christian-Radu Chereji, 'The Concept of Central Europe in the 90s' in Vasile Puşcaş (ed.), *Central Europe since 1989. Concepts and Developments* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2000), pp. 13-14.

[19] Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 5.

[20] Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), p. 8.

Or, to adapt the Orientalism of Edward Said, the Euro-Atlantic community developed a 'Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over' Eastern Europe.[21] Being articulated as part of 'Eastern Europe' did not help the efforts of a state aspiring to form a collective identity with the West. Romania's discursive responses were a combination of acceptance and resistance: accepting the authority of the Western European self yet refusing to be placed in the 'East'. Therefore, the official discourse started describing Romania as 'Central European'. The re-defined self-image became most obvious in foreign policy documents - '[Romania's] geopolitical location is that of a country belonging to Central Europe'.[22] In April 1992, Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase defined 'Central European' states to be all those forcefully placed behind the borders of the extended Soviet empire.[23]

As the contemporary articulation and heir of 'Mitteleuropa', this notion of 'Central Europe' was advocated by candidate states in the early stages of NATO and EU enlargement, trying to symbolise a stronger European subjectivity.[24] It had been first revived in February 1991 by three post-communist states (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), in an attempt to stand out among fellow Euro-Atlantic aspirants. They formed the 'Visegrad Group', which 'reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a

---

[21] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 3.

[22] White Chart of Romania's Foreign Affairs Ministry (January 1991 - May 1992) in *Lumea/ The World*, number 25-26, 25 June 1992.

[23] Adrian Năstase, 'A New Architecture for Central and Eastern Europe' (Geneva, 29 April 1992) in *România şi noua arhitectură mondială. Studii, Alocuțiuni, Interviuri 1990-1996/ Romania and the New Global Architecture. Studies, Speeches, Interviews 1990-1996* (Bucharest: Asociația Română pentru Educație Democratică, 1996), p. 132.

[24] Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 236-237.

number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration'.[25]

Romania opposed the Visegrad Group's discursive differentiation and exclusive appropriation of 'Central Europe'. On 19 June 1992, the Western European Union (WEU later incorporated into the EU) issued a statement in which it included all post-communist states as part of 'Central Europe'.[26] Talking about the WEU declaration, Foreign Affairs Minister Năstase mentioned the importance of external validation and clarified what being 'Central European' meant for Romania:

> 'I think that things are now better because this document certifies our philosophy concerning the area where we are situated, so there can be no more discussions about a division between Central (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) and Eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria and, perhaps, the Baltic states). We have managed to express our view: the area between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe is a unitary zone, which is indivisible from the security perspective and must be treated as such (...) all these countries belong to Central Europe'.[27]

The next years highlighted the articulation of different versions on the 'Central European' theme, which showed the fluid process of national identity formation and how the discourse did not crystallise a specific image. For example, according to President Iliescu, Romania

---

[25] The Visegrad Group, *About the Visegrad Group*; http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about (April 2014).

[26] The Western European Union, *Declaration after the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe* (Bonn, 19 June 2002); available within 'Key Texts' at http://www.weu.int/ (April 2014).

[27] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview' in *Lumea/ The World*, number 25-26, 25 June 1992, p. 3.

'is an intrinsic part of the Central-European area'[28]; and since 'the map of Europe' stretched 'from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea', Romania was located 'not only in the centre of Europe, but even in the centre of Central Europe'.[29] Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu reinforced a similar line in 1996 – 'Romania is situated at an equal distance from the western and northern, as well as the eastern borders of Europe (…) [it] is the second largest country in Central Europe after Poland'.[30] As prefigured in chapter II, another main self-image feeding into the Romanian national identity derives from the state's complex relationship with the Balkans. This self-image was part of a wider international context that shaped the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, especially Western perceptions of the Yugoslav wars.

Romania's Self-Image as 'Non-Balkan'

In July 1990, NATO invited the Central-Eastern European states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria) and the Soviet Union to create regular diplomatic relations with the Alliance. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was founded in 1991 as another step in the institutionalised dialogue between NATO and the post-communist states. Since the USSR disintegrated later that year, NACC became the suitable mechanism through which to enhance cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe. By the early

[28] Ion Iliescu, *Revoluție şi reformă/ Revolution and Reform* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1994), p. 264.

[29] Ion Iliescu, 'Address at the Crans-Montana Forum' (Bucharest, 21 April 1994) in *Romania in Europe and in the World*, pp. 55-56.

[30] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania as a Security Provider' (Washington, 15-17 July 1996), in *Renaşterea diplomației româneşti*, p. 136.

1990s, many post-communist states had expressed their wish to join NATO. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO faced an 'identity crisis' and 'had to reassess its strategic concept, its views of the types of war or hostilities it could expect to deter and fight and, more broadly, re-evaluate its role in international security and politics'.[31]

Given this post-Cold War identity crisis, some argued that enlargement would provide NATO with a new purpose. Alliance expansion to newly democratic Central-Eastern Europe sparked a lot of debate and the first wave would eventually occur in 1999. Meanwhile, the EU was re-considering its identity as well. Post-1990 the supranational organisation had to decide whether it aimed to be something more than a 'problem-solving entity' that only promoted the interests of its member states.[32] The collapse of communism confronted the EU with the opportunity to become a 'value-based community', which would extend its principles and form a common identity with Central-Eastern Europe.[33] At the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the EU decided to enlarge and drafted a set of political and economic criteria that candidate states would have to fulfil to obtain membership. Yet both the EU and NATO proved to be unprepared to deal with what was happening in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Federation had six constituent republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. By 1990 Yugoslavia was undergoing drastic transformations. Croatia

---

[31] Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 11.

[32] Helene Sjursen, 'Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity' in Helene Sjursen (ed.), *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 2.

[33] Ibid.

and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. The Serbs living in these republics retaliated and were supported by Belgrade, leading to armed inter-ethnic conflicts. The timing of such outbreaks relates to the wider global context. When the international order maintaining a certain level of regional security disappears, individuals search for security in their national or ethnic identity.[34] The revolutions in communist Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped to break down the dictatorial system ensuring a tentative stability in the Balkan area. Long-standing inter-ethnic tensions resurfaced and turned into the Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s.

Unfortunately, the 'well established derogatory connotations' also re-emerged, as 'the fighting precipitated by the break-up of Yugoslavia has probably left these more entrenched in the popular imagination than ever'; not only communism was 'blamed for the mass violence, but ethnic diversity itself, and historical cleavages between religions and cultures'.[35] Nevertheless, the causes of the Yugoslav wars are complex and varied. One of them was the aspiration of Balkan peoples to create viable nation-states, which differed little from what the rest of Europe had experienced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As Gale Stokes has explained,

> '[r]emapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the major threads of post-French Revolutionary European history. The process began with the unifications of Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of World War I, and had its most

[34] Jack Snyder, 'Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State' in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 79-101.

[35] Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day* (London: Phoenix, 2001), p. 6.

> catastrophic outcomes (…) with the Holocaust and the [later] expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe (…) [T]he wars of Yugoslav succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they are the last stages of a process of European redefinition that has been going on since the French revolution'.[36]

Another cause of the Yugoslav wars referred to controversial figures like Slobodan Milošević, who manipulated national sentiments for their personal gains or for what they perceived to be the benefit of their ethnic group. Since Western political elites 'struggled to make sense of an otherwise perplexing conflict', simplistic accounts of the Yugoslav wars became increasingly appealing.[37] These explanations were rooted in negative stereotypes of 'the Balkans', which had been articulated as 'Balkan ghosts, ancient Balkan enmities, primordial Balkan cultural patterns and proverbial Balkan turmoil'.[38] The negative imagery of 'the Balkans' dated back to the early 1900s and gradually intensified to the point that even World War II was seen as the Balkans' fault.[39] For example, the journalist Robert Kaplan said that - 'Nazism (…) can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously'.[40]

---

[36] Gale Stokes, 'The Unpalatable Paradox', *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, volume 27(2), 1999, pp. 327-329.

[37] Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 48.

[38] Maria N. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 186.

[39] Ibid, pp. 118-119.

[40] Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts. A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. xxiii.

In the case of the Yugoslav wars, such pejorative stereotypes and derogatory remarks proliferated. Ioan Paşcu regretfully noted that:

> 'the conflict is usually viewed as another irrefutable instance of the perpetual violence and proverbial lack of civilization characterizing a region incapable of overcoming its traditional condition as Europe's powder keg. In today's vocabulary, these terms imply a judgement that Balkan peoples exhibit a total incapacity to learn and practice democracy and market economy'.[41]

As State Secretary in the Ministry of National Defence, Paşcu elaborated upon Romania's stance on the Yugoslav wars in 1994:

> 'Romania's official position with regard to the Yugoslav conflict has three major components. First, we hold the view that the only viable solution is to be reached by the parties which are directly involved. Regardless how impatient the outside world might become – and for good reason – its main mission would be *to create conditions for bringing the parties to the negotiating table and to facilitate their agreement*. (...) Second, *Romania has firmly abstained from any military involvement in the conflict* (...) Third, *Romania has declared that she is disposed to explore diplomatic solutions to Yugoslav wars.* Romania is thus materializing her uncontested advantages (lack of any interest in the conflict itself, good relations with practically all former Yugoslav republics, and a relatively correct understanding of the situation, given her knowledge of the Balkan region)'.[42]

The Yugoslav wars and their connection to 'the Balkans' impacted on the Romanian foreign policy imaginary and a key self-image of national identity - Romania as 'non-Balkan'.

---

[41] Ioan M. Paşcu, 'Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict', *European Security*, volume 3(1), 1994, p. 154.

[42] Ibid, pp. 159-160, emphasis in original.

Romania's discursive relationship with 'the Balkans' has been an interesting combination of rejection and acceptance. Foreign policy decision-makers put great effort into explaining that Romania was not part of the Balkans, particularly to international audiences.[43] They promoted instead the subjectivity of a Central European state neighbouring or 'in immediate proximity' to that region.[44] Similarly to the 'Eastern European' articulation, Romania's post-communist national identity was dissociated from representations like 'Oriental', 'Byzantine' or 'Balkan', which were harshly described as 'biased' and 'bad faithed' categorisations with the intent of 'stigmatizing the perspectives of our [democratic] evolution'.[45] In October 1993, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu argued that not only geography constituted Romania as a 'non-Balkan' state – '[w]e Romanians prefer to describe ourselves as a Central European country close to the Balkans (…) Romania, being located north of the Danube, does not belong geographically to the Balkan region'; since a 'country belongs to the area where its problems lie', Romania's 'well-known' good relations with 'any Balkan or successor states in the former Yugoslavia' lead to the conclusion that Romania cannot be Balkan.[46] Within the same context, Meleşcanu went on to add: '[t]his clarification might help *our friends to the south* to understand that the way we characterize Romania implies neither a denial of enduring economic, political and

[43] Tom Gallagher, 'To Be or Not to Be Balkan: Romania's Quest for Self-Definition', *Daedalus*, volume 126(3), 1997, p. 69.

[44] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'The Perspectives of Peace in the Balkans' (Bucharest, 22 April 1994) in *Renaşterea diplomației românești 1994-1996*, p. 202.

[45] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania's Option for Integration with the West: Historical and Present Grounds', *Romanian Journal of International Affairs*, volume 1(2), 1995, p. 13.

[46] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game', *NATO Review*, volume 41(5), October 1993, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-3.htm (April 2014).

cultural ties, nor a diminution of the important Balkan dimension of our foreign policy'.[47]

In the light of such constructs, Romania shaped its national identity to be different from two significant others – 'Eastern' and 'Balkan'. Like the underlying Orientalism of Western narratives, Balkanism explores a more geographically specific but equally problematic and negative representation of 'otherness'. Maria Todorova aptly concludes in this respect: '[a]s in the case of the Orient, the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European" and the "West" has been constructed'.[48] The urgency of Romanian efforts to dissociate national identity from the label 'Balkan' was related to international Western debates about the 'Balkan' character and the Yugoslav wars, which abounded in negative stereotypes. A key text of this Balkanist pejorative discourse, influential in the West, was Kaplan's 'Balkan Ghosts' based on his travels in several countries including Romania. For Kaplan and his growing number of readers, Romania was emphatically 'Balkan'.

Upon closer examination of the Romanian foreign policy discourses, the self-image of 'non-Balkan' coexisted with articulations like 'our friends to the south'. The long-time 'friend' in the region was Yugoslavia, whether in its past political form or contemporary individual entities. President Iliescu clarified and reinforced those understandings:

> '[w]e have a good tradition in terms of relations with Yugoslavia. We could even say that Yugoslavia was our *best neighbour*, the history of our relations having never known any conflict. We had permanent

[47] Ibid, emphasis added.
[48] Maria N. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 188.

> communication and supported each other; a *solidarity* based on *common history* was created. We are very sensitive from that point of view. The Romanian people show a certain *solidarity* and a feeling of frustration because of this tragedy[49] affecting a heroic people with a tumultuous past'.[50]

The representations of Balkan states as 'friends', 'best neighbour', two mentions of 'solidarity' in succession and 'common history' suggest that Romania's national identity was not constructed by applying a mutually exclusive and hostile relationship of otherness vis-à-vis the Balkans. Romanian identity was defined as 'non-Balkan', yet retained a Balkan affinity and traditional friendly rapport with the Balkans.

Once Romania was accepted as an EU and NATO candidate, its official discourses gradually encountered external sources that promoted different articulations about Romanian identity. It is essential to remember that national identity formation involves both self-projection and external recognition. In other words, Romanian discursive attempts to portray the state as 'non-Balkan' would be unsuccessful without Western validation. So, even though Romanian political leaders sought to dissociate their state from 'the Balkans' by invoking geographic, historical and cultural arguments, their representation was partially supported by international narratives. Many external audiences did not seem inclined to differentiate between Romania and the Balkan region. So their influence needed to be accommodated by national discourses, shaping modified meanings for Romanian identity. From 1994 onwards, Romania was often depicted as 'marking the border of different, even divergent, areas of

[49] Here Iliescu referred to the conflict in Bosnia.

[50] Ion Iliescu, 'Interview with Dominique Audibert for "Le Point"' (Bucharest, 2 April 1994) in *Romania in Europe and in the World*, p. 161 – emphasis added.

civilization: Central, but also South-Eastern Europe'.[51] Apart from the 'European' and 'non-Balkan' self-images, Romanian national identity had historically resonated with the idea of being a 'security provider'.

Romania's Self-Image as a 'Security Provider'

The third discursive theme of Romania's foreign policy imaginary is that of 'security provider'. The post-1992 Romanian discourse showed a range of interconnected articulations like 'source of stability' and 'reliable partner'. Romanian elites explicitly mentioned or suggested their state's contribution to generating stability among its troubled neighbours. For instance, Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu stressed the following:

> '[Romania's] internal stability and responsible, predictable international conduct have so far made it possible to physically separate two areas of open or latent conflict. The mutual reinforcement of the eastern and the southern "arcs of crises" has been prevented. Had this not happened, the problems currently confronting the European Union, NATO and the WEU [Western European Union] would have been considerably greater, perhaps even unsolvable'.[52]

President Iliescu said that 'we are deeply concerned with the tragic developments in the former Yugoslavia' and that Romania, 'situated in the immediate vicinity to areas with high possibility for conflict', can play an important role in ensuring regional security.[53]

---

[51] Zoe Petre, 'The Role of the President in Romania's Approach to NATO Integration' in Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (eds.), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iaşi: The Centre for Romanian Studies, 1999), p. 95.

[52] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania – Factor of Stability in the New Europe', Speech delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs 'Chatham House' (London, 28 June 1994) in *Renaşterea diplomaţiei româneşti*, p. 42.

[53] Ion Iliescu, 'Speech delivered at the NATO Headquarters' (Brussels, February 1993) in *Romania in Europe and in the World*, pp. 70-71.

Even though variations on this theme circulated in the foreign policy imaginary pre-1992, Romania's official discourse indicated a notable emphasis on the 'security provider' self-image after November 1992, when Meleşcanu came into office at Foreign Affairs. He insisted on depicting Romania as a 'security generator' that could export democratic stability to the Balkans. Such external efforts would be supported by the 'unbiased' and 'traditional good relations' with former Yugoslav states -

> '(...) Romania has been perceived more and more by all its southern neighbours as a factor of stability for the Balkans (...) Romania does not intend to comfortably position itself as mere beneficiary of the security arrangements in Europe. Commensurate with our resources, military capability and comparative advantages in terms of strategic position and infrastructure facilities at Romania's disposal, we are also able and willing to play the role of *security generator*'.[54]

Meleşcanu had an important role in configuring this self-image and appeared to be the most emphatic about it in 1993-1996. His professional background as long-time diplomat brought another type of elite perspective on Romanian national identity and external relations. Unlike President Iliescu, who was generally perceived to have a strong affinity towards Russia due to his education in Moscow and communist party background, Meleşcanu had been socialised in a different and more 'Western'-oriented setting. He had attended postgraduate courses in International Relations and earned a doctorate in International Law at the University of Geneva during

[54] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania – Factor of Stability in the New Europe' in *Renaşterea diplomației româneşti,* p. 43 - emphasis in original.

1966-1973[55], being exposed to several ideas that affected the future Minister's interpretation of the Romanian and international imaginaries. Meleşcanu's studies influenced him as a foreign policy practitioner who distinctly reinforced Romania's chosen European and Euro-Atlantic direction.

Being a firm advocate of it, the Foreign Affairs Minister elaborated on the 'security provider' self-image (as opposed to consumer) in the context of NATO accession:

> 'Romania does not intend to simply be positioned at the receiving end of European security arrangements, instead wishing to play a role of security provider. The fact that Romania is considered a factor of stability in its geographical area speaks for itself in this respect. The political stability of Romania, its balanced, responsible and predictable international behaviour recommend it as an asset for NATO'.[56]

These speeches were delivered in London and Washington, where the intended audiences were highly influential Alliance members.

Romania, just like the other post-communist candidate states, needed to highlight and convince NATO decision-makers that it could contribute to allied capabilities. A purely rational account would argue that Romanian officials created the representation of 'security provider' in order to alleviate NATO's concerns about Romania becoming a potential net consumer of security once given membership. Yet the evidence shows that there is more to the story of foreign policy than

---

[55] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Biografie'/ 'Biography' in *The Parliament of Romania – Senate*; available at http://www.senat.ro/FisaSenator.aspx?ParlamentarID=9c148cba-956a-4a60-805a-c53d508a133e (April 2014).

[56] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania as a Security Provider' (Washington, 15-17 July 1996) in *Renaşterea diplomației românești*, pp. 134-135.

mere cost-benefit calculations. This is particularly relevant in the Romanian case, where deeply ingrained meanings about national identity shaped the state's main self-images and international behaviour.

Thus, the construct of 'security provider' did not simply emerge as a response to NATO requirements. Its ideational roots were linked to a long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of Europe and the West, which features prominently in the Romanian imaginary. As outlined in chapter II, collective memory-myths are a domestic factor of national identity formation, a source from which elites draw understandings about the state's self-images. They also constitute subjective interpretations or narratives regarding the nation's remembered past.

When talking about the construction of Romanian 'uniqueness' or exceptionalism in historiography, Anca Baicoianu distinguishes three major coordinates – geographic, historical and cultural. Geographically, Romania occupied the strategic position of a 'turning point' between the East and the West, as well as a necessary 'defence line against all invasions'.[57] Second, the historical coordinate obsessively portrayed the 'heroic and civilizing' double descent (Dacian and Roman), which was invoked to 'claim superiority over the closest neighbours and to legitimate Romania's place as a rightful member of the European choir of nations'.[58] Third, culturally speaking, 'the ever increasing feeling of isolation' turned 'the idea of uniqueness into a true framework of Romanian identity'; unable to find a suitable pace

[57] Anca Baicoianu, 'The Trap of Memory: Auto-Orientalism as Victimization', *Internet Journal for Cultural Sciences*, number 16, 2006; www.inst.at/trans/16Nr/02_2/baicoianu16.htm (March 2014).

[58] Anca Baicoianu, 'Markers and Shifters of Romanian Identity', *Analele Universității 'Ovidius' – Literary and Cultural Encounters*, volume XIX, 2008, p. 10.

and constantly fearing exclusion from an ideally imagined Western Europe, Romanian culture 'struggles to achieve a however fragile balance between its specificity and a longing for integration'.[59]

The collective memory-myth of Romanian exceptionalism, its articulation as defender of the West and stronghold protecting European civilisation against invading foreigners, was sometimes openly expressed in the foreign policy texts: '[s]ituated in Central Europe, Romania has certainly been central to Europe. For centuries, the Romanian countries were the bastions of European civilisation, independence and freedom'.[60] The above quote is a good example of how the Romanian past has been dramatised under the 'remarkable functionality' of the myth of the struggle for independence.[61] In this respect, Lucian Boia explains how the 'pressure of foreigners from outside and from within, real up to a point but hyperbolized in the national imaginary, generated the besieged fortress complex which is so typical of the Romanian mentality of the last two centuries'.[62] Such collective memory-myths hold a triple purpose: 'highlighting the virtue and heroism of the Romanians, justifying their historical late-coming in terms of the sacrifices imposed by ceaseless aggression, and, finally, attracting the attention of the West to its debt of gratitude towards the Romanians who defended it from the Ottoman onslaught'.[63]

So the 'security provider' self-image had a solid and older ideational foundation to be built upon, resonating with Romanian

[59] Anca Baicoianu, 'The Trap of Memory: Auto-Orientalism as Victimization'.
[60] Teodor Meleşcanu, 'Romania as a Security Provider' (Washington, 15-17 July 1996) in *Renaşterea diplomației româneşti*, p. 135.
[61] Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), p. 155.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

understandings of the nation's past. It drew on a historical reference point to mould and guide one of the main facets of Romania's post-communist national identity and foreign policy role. As Boia argues,

> '[t]he image of a West protected thanks to Romania's sacrifice and a Romanian society strained and held back by fulfilling the function of defender of the European civilization has become deeply ingrained in the political vision of the Romanians, in their behavior and their reactions'.[64]

Concluding Remarks

The period 1990-1996 crystallised the 'formative moment' of the three main self-images articulated within Romania's national identity: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. The 'European' self-image was more prominent in this time frame, but together they formed the foreign policy imaginary which would influence Romanian international behaviour between 1990 and 2007. Romania's 'European' identity was consistently constructed in political discourses and meant to underline the state's Western origins. Romanian elites attempted to discursively detach the post-totalitarian state from the negative connotations of 'Eastern Europe', instead representing it as 'Central European'.

Romania's relationship with the Balkans has been characterised by a combination of rejection and acceptance. State officials explained at length that Romania was not a Balkan country, especially to external audiences. However, the 'Balkan other' was not represented

[64] Ibid, p. 156.

as a threat. On the contrary, the region was often described as 'our friends to the South', with Yugoslavia depicted as 'traditional partner' and 'best neighbour'. These meanings configured a 'non-Balkan' Romania that retained an affinity with the Balkans.

The 'security provider' self-image of Romanian identity had a range of understandings, including 'reliable partner' and 'source of stability'. To some extent, this self-image was related to NATO accession since Romania needed to convince Alliance members that it could contribute to military capabilities. Nevertheless, the construct of 'security provider' was not merely a response to NATO rhetoric and membership criteria. Its ideational origins were closely linked to a long-standing collective memory-myth of Romania as defender of Europe and the West. All the self-images become particularly relevant in subsequent chapters, when examining Romania's reactions to critical events and foreign policy situations like the Kosovo military intervention and the Iraq war.

Chapter IV: The Inherent Dilemmas of Acting as a 'European' Liberal Democracy and Security Provider (1996-1999)

Among the formative periods of Romanian national identity and foreign policy, the years 1996-1999 were marked by a series of important re-definitions which predominantly occurred during the Kosovo crisis. This chapter aims to show how the Romanian self-images translated into the post-1996 discourse and the events surrounding the NATO summit in July 1997. Although they represented the same Romanian self-image, the 'liberal democratic' facet of national identity circulated more frequently than the 'European' one in the post-1996 internal discourses. The 'security provider' self-image was reinforced by domestic elites and was usually connected to the area where it could be externally validated – the Balkans. Romania's national identity also retained a Balkan affinity, which continued to manifest itself after 1996 through traditional amicable relations with rump Yugoslavia (essentially Serbia).

Considering NATO's refusal to include Romania in the first wave of enlargement, a large part of the chapter has been devoted to the 'formative moment' of the Kosovo conflict and Romanian responses to it. NATO allies had initially tried to solve the Kosovo crisis by using peaceful methods, such as multilateral negotiations and imposing economic sanctions on the Yugoslav government. Yet the escalating violence in Kosovo and the failure of diplomatic dialogue forced both

the Alliance and the international community to adopt a firmer stance, which eventually led to NATO initiating Operation Allied Force on 23 March 1999.

Romania exhibited an evolving foreign policy position regarding Kosovo, which started with partial support for NATO (October 1998) and later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance's military intervention (March-April 1999). The initial reaction was a nuanced and relatively comfortable middle ground, which had a dual purpose. First, partial support - airspace access in case of emergency - did not oppose NATO or undermine Romania's Euro-Atlantic identity. Second, partial assistance for the Alliance campaign accommodated the dilemmas inherent in the state's national identity – whether to act as a 'European' liberal democracy and 'security provider' or choose the traditional Balkan ties.

This foreign policy response was re-defined under the combined influence of three elements: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Romanian leaders anticipated that NATO air strikes on Yugoslav territory would bring substantial economic costs and a drastic decline in their popularity, since the state's public opinion was overwhelmingly against a military intervention in Kosovo. From a rational perspective, they were necessary sacrifices to obtain the ultimate goal of NATO membership. The rational factor of Romania's journey towards Euro-Atlantic integration contributed to its decisions on Kosovo. Yet rational interests cannot explain why the state did not opt to fully support the Alliance from the beginning. This is where national identity supplements the analysis by identifying the tensions between the two

self-images - 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' – and Balkan sentiments, which shaped Romanian foreign policy.

Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitate the re-articulation of international discourses. In March 1999, the rational component of Romania's NATO accession was still present but, more importantly, the international ideational context had changed. Many authoritative Euro-Atlantic voices endorsed a discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The normative pressure had increased so much that any established liberal democracies or those in the course of gaining recognition had to act decisively without delay. This ideational background influenced a hierarchical process within Romanian identity, with the 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image and the 'security provider' one becoming more relevant than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Once the tensions within national identity were resolved, any past dilemma was replaced with the appropriate international choice of fully and unconditionally supporting NATO. With regards to the structure of this chapter, the discussion begins with the re-definitions of Romania's foreign policy imaginary during the period 1996-1999, followed by the volatile context of the Kosovo conflict and the evolving Romanian foreign policy on the military intervention in Kosovo.

The Re-definitions of Romania's Foreign Policy Imaginary

Romania's political administration changed after the parliamentary and presidential elections of November 1996, the third general round of free elections following the 1989 revolution. The centre-left government (Social Democratic Party of Romania – PDSR) under the leadership of President Iliescu was replaced by a mostly

centre-right governing coalition which had the majority of votes in both houses of Parliament. The new governing coalition included three parties: the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) with 37.06% of seats, the Social Democratic Union (USD) with 16.08% and the ethnic Hungarian political party (UDMR) with 7.69%.[1] CDR was in turn made up of two historical pre-1947 parties - the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNȚCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). The 1996-2000 coalition was heterogeneous and contained parties with different ideological affiliations, which caused governmental incoherence and lack of consensus about domestic reforms. CDR and UDMR were centre-right political entities, while USD was centre-left. PDSR gained 28.67% in the parliamentary elections and formed the opposition, together with two right-wing parties - the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR – 4.9%) and the Great Romania Party (PRM – 5.59%).[2]

In the second ballot of presidential elections, Emil Constantinescu defeated Iliescu by obtaining 54.4% of the votes and thus became the new President of Romania.[3] Internationally, these shifts in governmental and presidential power were seen as positive outcomes, which indicated that the Romanian democratic system was more consolidated and would not be reverting to authoritarianism. As the NATO Secretary General put it in February 1997,

---

[1] Central Electoral Bureau, *The Parliamentary Elections Results* (3 November 1996); http://www.agerpres.ro/documentareparlamentare2012/2012/10/30/alegerile-parlamentare-din-3-noiembrie-1996-17-15-50 (May 2014).

[2] Ibid.

[3] University of Essex, 'Romania: 1996 Parliamentary Elections', *Election Results*; http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc (May 2014).

> '[t]he way this important election has been conducted is a sign of your country's commitment to democratic and pluralistic values. Within a short time, Romania has gone very far indeed'.[4]

Some analysts even argued that the 1996 electoral events 'culminated in the first democratic and peaceful change in Government since 1937', demonstrating that the post-communist state 'had overcome many of [the] earlier problems and its slow political development'.[5]

As the most popular post-1996 political party and de facto leader of the governing coalition, CDR had said before the elections that the main goal of the state's foreign policy should be 'convincing the international community of the Romanian people's attachment to the principles of democracy', while also identifying the state's past and present 'European role' and stressing the need to 'cultivate its vocation as partner and mediator, open to dialogue and cooperation'; in other words, the party's aim would be 'to give the world the true image of a resurrected Romania'.[6] So the new government's self-imposed mission was to consolidate the internal democratisation process and gain its external recognition, thus contributing towards restoring Romania's 'natural place' in Europe. The discursive themes crystallised in the period 1990-1996 were also expressed by the new administration, although with some re-definitions.

---

[4] Javier Solana – NATO Secretary General (5 December 1995 – 6 October 1999), *Welcoming Remarks for Romania's President* (Brussels, 4 February 1997); available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25719.htm?selected Locale=en (May 2014).

[5] Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk, 'Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July 1997 Summit', *Strategic Forum - Institute for National Strategic Studies*, number 101, February 1997, p. 3; http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD= ADA394379 (May 2014).

[6] The Democratic Convention of Romania, 'The Platform-Programme of the Democratic Convention of Romania' in Dan Pavel and Iulia Huiu, "*Nu putem reuşi decât împreună": O istorie analitică a Convenției Democratice 1989-2000/ "Only Together Can We Succeed": An Analytical History of the Democratic Convention 1989-2000* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003), Annexe 8, p. 554.

According to Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, '[h]istorically and culturally Romania belongs in the West' even if it was previously alienated due to the fifty years of communist dictatorship.[7] On 4 February 1997, President Constantinescu highlighted the main principles of Romanian foreign policy in front of the North Atlantic Council: '[t]he essential message that I wish to convey is the firm option of the Romanian people to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures, as soon as the gates of the Organization open to receive new Member States'.[8] Apart from reaffirming the Euro-Atlantic course, Constantinescu advanced some interesting articulations which suggested an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in Romanian present and future:

> '[m]ore than fifty years ago, Romania suffered from essential evil. She was detoured from her normal path, that of a democracy (...) The only substantial remedy for Romania is reintegration into the democratic world. The willingness of the Alliance Member States to be the guarantors of democracy and freedom is the main reason for which Romania wishes to join You'.[9]

At first glance, the latter meanings seem somewhat different from the prevalent national discourses of 1990-1996, when Romania's 'European' self-image held a central role. They are actually variations on the same European identity theme, whose broad definition entails being known and internationally accepted as a Western European

---

[7] Victor Ciorbea – Prime Minister of Romania (12 December 1996 – 30 March 1998) cited in Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 163.

[8] Emil Constantinescu – President of Romania (29 November 1996 – 20 December 2000), 'Speech to the North Atlantic Council' (Brussels, 4 February 1997), *Romanian Journal of International Affairs*, volume 3(2), Spring 1997, p. 3.

[9] Ibid, p. 4.

inspired liberal democracy which upholds two key principles – the organisation of regular democratic elections and the protection of human rights and freedoms. If the period 1990-1996 shows the configuration of the main themes for Romania's self-images and foreign policy, the years 1996-1999 bring forward the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity. What is the appropriate 'European' course of action when faced with a humanitarian crisis in the Balkan area? How should a legitimate liberal democracy react when its loyalties are divided, considering Romania's friendly relations and affinity with the Balkans?

Post-1996 elite discourses referred to the liberal democratic facet of national identity more often than the 'European' one. For instance, President Constantinescu had strong beliefs about the 'essential good' of democratic regimes -

> 'We do not believe Romania is threatened by another nation. On the contrary, we think that when democracy triumphs all over the world, wars of aggression should be excluded from our vocabulary. For precisely this reason we would not want our quest for NATO membership to be understood as a cry for help for someone else to take charge of our defence'.[10]

The 'essential good' of democracy was a recurring notion, which indirectly configured NATO as not just a military alliance, but an embodiment for the peaceful association of liberal democratic states.

In this sense, Romania was reiterating NATO's self-image as it had been constructed by the Alliance discourse after 1991 - '[b]ased on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law,

[10] Ibid, p. 6.

the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe'.[11] The state's aim was both to ingratiate itself and show ideational compatibility with NATO. In June 1997, the Romanian President expressed these ideas explicitly:

> '[f]ar from being a mere coalition around increasingly sophisticated weapons, NATO has been conceived and developed as an alliance based on values: representative democracy, political pluralism, freedom of economic initiative, defence of human rights, tolerance and the right to be different'.[12]

Constantinescu attributed the aforementioned values to 'Western civilisation' and argued for their extension to Europe as a whole, emphasizing that Euro-Atlantic integration would be the deserved validation for Romania's national identity:

> 'Romanian society does not regard accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a form of protection against a threat, rather as a way to regain an identity that was unjustly denied to it for five decades. For us, NATO is not a shelter but a community based on shared values, now recovered'.[13]

The 'European' ('liberal democratic') self-image of Romania was not the only one re-defined after 1996. To give external credibility and substantiate the state's self-image of 'security provider', the two key foreign policy decision-makers - President Constantinescu and Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Severin - initiated a network of trilateral

---

[11] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'The Purpose of the Alliance', *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* (1991); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (May 2014).

[12] Emil Constantinescu, 'The Security Issues of Central Europe' (Prague, 23 June 1997) in *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*; volume III – *Lumea în care trăim/ The World We Live in* (Bucharest: Universalia, 2002), pp. 452-453.

[13] Ibid, p. 456.

cooperation arrangements surrounding Romania, which placed it as mediator of potential conflicts in neighbouring regions: Romania-Bulgaria-Greece; Romania-Ukraine-Poland; Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey; Romania-Republic of Moldova-Ukraine; Romania-Hungary-Austria. As Severin explained, his perspective on foreign policy included the fact that Romania 'needed to adopt a sub-regional role which would demonstrate its Euro-Atlantic vocation', combined with more open pathways towards Poland, Hungary and settling unresolved issues with Ukraine, Russia and Moldova.[14]

The Romanian self-image of 'security provider' was also more explicitly reiterated in the post-1996 foreign policy discourse. According to Severin, '[r]egional cooperation has emerged as a significant dimension of the stability and security in Europe and Romania has committed itself to be an active promoter of such cooperation'.[15] In a June 1998 speech, Constantinescu made a reference to Nicolae Iorga (prominent Romanian historian and politician), who had created the modern concept of 'South-Eastern Europe' – 'close to the Balkans yet different from them because it encapsulates, north of the Danube, Romania's connection to the centre of the continent'.[16]

---

[14] Adrian Severin – Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (December 1996 – December 1997) in dialogue with Gabriel Andreescu, *Locurile unde se construieşte Europa/ Where Europe is Being Built* (Bucharest: Polirom, 2000), p. 45.

[15] Adrian Severin, *Address at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (Brussels, 17 December 1997); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25498.htm?selectedLocale=en (May 2014).

[16] Emil Constantinescu, 'Romania in the New Millennium' (New York, 10 June 1998) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_ RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=6372&_PRID=arh (May 2014).

It was a diplomatic way of reinforcing the state's national identity as 'Central European' and introducing the area where Romania could externally validate its self-image of 'security provider': 'Romania truly has a South-Eastern European vocation, increasingly manifested today though its role as equilibrium factor and place of dialogue between Europe and the Balkans still torn apart by conflicts'.[17] The quote prefigured how Romania's international stance on the Kosovo situation would be shaped by the tensions within its national identity – 'European' ('liberal democratic') and 'security provider' self-images versus Balkan ties. The foreign policy decision on Kosovo had to accommodate the identity requirements of being a liberal democracy with a regional security role, as well as the traditional friendly relations with Yugoslavia.

To be consistent with its self-image of 'security provider', Romania was always eager to show its strategic and military potential. In late 1993, the state's accession into NATO had been unequivocally declared by political leaders as a top foreign policy objective. President Iliescu addressed a letter to the Secretary General in September 1993 where he reinforced 'Romania's decision to effectively participate alongside the NATO member states in their efforts to strengthen European and regional security and stability'.[18] The international context brought a promising opportunity in January 1994, when NATO heads of state and government decided to 'reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries'.[19] They also announced the formation of the Partnership for

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ion Iliescu, *Revoluție şi reformă*, p. 126.

[19] The North Atlantic Council, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government* (Brussels, 10-11 January 1994); available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm (May 2014).

Peace (PfP), which aimed to forge political and military ties with candidates from Central-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The goal of PfP was to foster a closer cooperative relationship with the Alliance at 'a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states'; to work 'in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed'.[20] In strategic terms, constituting the PfP was beneficial to NATO for three key reasons. First, it put in place a process that indicated membership to be the eventual target for some partners. Second, the PfP allowed for self-differentiation among partner states without giving them the full benefits of Alliance integration. Third, it served NATO's mission of exporting stability as configured in the 1991 Strategic Concept.[21] Candidates benefited from a more extensive access to NATO's political and military bodies, as well as a 'flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far beyond the soft dialogue and cooperation framework' set up by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).[22]

---

[20] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Partnership for Peace: Invitation* (Brussels, 10-11 January 1994); http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110a.htm (May 2014).

[21] Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 48.

[22] Corneliu Bjola, 'NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe', *EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Final Report 1999-2001*, p. 17; available at www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/bjola.pdf (May 2014).

On 26 January 1994, Romania was the first post-communist state to sign the official documents and join the PfP. In April 1994, a formal application for NATO accession was submitted and concrete discussions with Alliance representatives started. Under the coordination of President Iliescu, Romanian authorities debated and elaborated 'The Strategy for Romania's Integration into NATO' in June 1994.[23] The text was then sent to Parliament for approval and further improvement, its broad ideas being presented by Foreign Affairs Minister Meleşcanu at a NACC meeting soon after. During the first year as a PfP member, Romania took part in 58 related activities and four exercises or joint training sessions with the Alliance, allotting $0.8 million for these efforts; by 1997, the sum of almost $8 million had been set aside to cover PfP expenses.[24]

As much as its resources allowed, the Romanian state contributed to a variety of peace-keeping missions like Desert Storm (Saudi Arabia), UNOSOM II (Somalia), UNAVEM III (Angola), IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia) to name but a few; the involvement mostly consisted of sending field hospitals, military observers and engineers.[25] The PfP put forward 'a set of criteria that the emerging democracies would have to satisfy to ensure their political, economic and military compatibility' with NATO.[26] The state's participation in

---

[23] Mariana Cernicova-Buca, 'Romania: The Quest for Membership' in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.), *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 204.

[24] Donald Falls, 'NATO Enlargement: Is Romanian Ready to Join the Alliance?', *Research Paper for the Air Force University* (2000), p. 7; available at web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/ working_papers/wp_00-3.pdf (May 2014).

[25] Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 148.

[26] Hugh De Santis, 'NATO's Manifest Destiny: The Risks of Expansion' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington: Cato Institute, 1998), p. 160.

the PfP was the main instrument for achieving the interoperability between Romanian and NATO armed forces, but also an important step in the bilateral military cooperation with the US. The PfP was a necessary evaluation stage that helped prepare Romania and the other post-communist candidates for eventual NATO membership.[27]

The post-1996 Romanian administration was very preoccupied with NATO entry and the upcoming Madrid summit in July 1997. In June 1996, Romania's Parliament adopted a decision and formulated an appeal which was sent to all of the Alliance member state Parliaments. Article 1 of that decision contained the following:

> '[t]he Parliament of Romania considers vital, in order to consolidate the Romanian modern democratic society, Romania's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as a free, independent, sovereign and democratic country, and requests the Government, as well as the other institutions and state bodies involved in this process, to intensify their actions towards accelerating Romania's accession as a member with full rights to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization'.[28]

A highlight of early 1997 was the French President Jacques Chirac's official visit to Romania, which launched the special partnership between the two states and cemented France's strong support for Romanian Euro-Atlantic membership. Chirac's declaration encapsulated that attitude -

> 'France wishes to build with Romania, in all fields, an exceptional relationship (...) There is more than friendship between Romania and

[27] Stanley R. Sloan, *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 103.

[28] The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision Number 4 on 5 June 1996 regarding the Appeal Addressed to the Parliaments of NATO Member States', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 119, 7 June 1996.

> France. We have the same origins, struggles and hopes (…) France supports with enthusiasm your European commitment. She will do everything possible to ensure your accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. She will advocate Romania's candidacy to the European Union (…) My country will spare no effort to help Romania recover its family: Europe'.[29]

Constantinescu's response expressed the Romanian appreciation for French diplomatic efforts and concluded that:

> 'I believe in a future when our countries will share the same European destiny within an inevitable new global architecture. I believe in France's greatness, generosity and vision, in its firm and consistent actions towards a united Europe'.[30]

In the months leading up to the 1997 Madrid summit, NATO decision-makers engaged in detailed evaluations of the reform process in candidate states. The prevailing view on Romania was that, after seven years of delays under the socialist government of President Iliescu, the state had finally taken serious steps towards liberalisation and democratisation. The socialists' electoral defeat in 1996 and the establishment of a different government opened a new chapter in the process of redefining Romania's post-communist identity and made possible a new type of engagement with Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO.

---

[29] Jacques Chirac, 'Speech after the Meeting with President Constantinescu' (Bucharest, February 1997) in Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*; volume IV – *Cărțile schimbării/ The Books of Change* (Bucharest: Universalia, 2002), p. 245.

[30] Emil Constantinescu, 'Speech on the Occasion of French President Chirac's Official Visit' in *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii* , volume III, p. 389.

Nevertheless, substantial reforms had yet to take place before Romania could be a serious candidate for admission to NATO. In the words of Ronald Asmus who was an active contributor to NATO's Eastern enlargement,

> 'Romania's prospect for NATO membership had been considerably strengthened by the election of a new pro-reform government led by President Emil Constantinescu (…) Domestically, he was committed to making a clear break with the country's nationalist and xenophobic past (…). In foreign policy terms, he was pro-Western and determined to anchor his country to the West as well. Constantinescu was an impressive figure and these were admirable goals, but Bucharest's economic backwardness left it with little chance of being included in the first round of EU enlargement'.[31]

Except for a brief time in the late 1960s, Romania lacked economic and political openness before 1989. The first post-communist administration (1990-1996) 'preferred governmental stability to reform' and 'refused to take unpopular and radical measures, adopting chaotic changes and avoiding systematic reforms'.[32]

Apart from the slow pace of internal reforms, another significant impediment to Romania's NATO accession was related to memory-myths and their influence on national identity. After 1990, a considerable number of Romanian political and intellectual elites refused to acknowledge the state's complicity in the Holocaust and tried to rehabilitate Marshal Ion Antonescu. He had installed a fascist military dictatorship in Romania (September 1940) and been

---

[31] Ronald Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 214.

[32] Liliana Popescu, 'A Change of Power in Romania: The Results and Significance of the November 1996 Elections', *Government and Opposition*, volume 32(2), April 1997, p. 174.

instrumental in the extermination of thousands of Romanian Jews and Roma mostly between 1941 and 1943.[33] But institutionalised anti-Semitism was not just a characteristic of the Antonescu regime. As Alexandru Florian explained,

> '[s]imilar to the Nazi policy in Germany, the Holocaust in Romania had as its base the legal identification of the "enemy". All the Romanian governments from December 1937 to August 23, 1944 promulgated anti-Semitic legislation. The foundations were laid well before Antonescu'.[34]

The International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania directed by Nobel Peace prize laureate Elie Wiesel published a final report in 2004, which noted the contradictory aspects of the Antonescu dictatorship and the Holocaust in Romania:

> '[t]he Antonescu regime, which was rife with ideological contradictions and was considerably different from other fascist regimes in Europe, remains difficult to classify. It was a fascist regime that dissolved Parliament, joined the Axis Powers, enacted antisemitic and racial legislation, and adopted the "Final Solution" [extermination] in parts of its territory (...) At the same time, however (...) the regime did succeed in sparing half of the Jews under its rule during the Holocaust'.[35]

---

[33] Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 304-307.

[34] Alexandru Florian, 'The Perception of the Holocaust in Historiography and the Romanian Media' in Valentina Glajar and Jeanine Teodorescu (eds.), *Local History, Transnational Memory in the Romanian Holocaust* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 22.

[35] International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report* (2004), p. 86; http://miris.eurac.edu/mugs2/do/blob.pdf?type=pdf&serial=1117716572750 (May 2014).

Antonescu became a controversial figure in Romanian historiography post-1948, who was alternatively condemned or applauded by the communist propaganda. The historical narrative was initially rewritten to legitimise the communist dictatorship and depicted Romania as a 'heroic victim' of fascism; 'the issue of anti-Semitism was avoided and the word Holocaust never used'.[36] After Nicolae Ceauşescu came to power in 1965, communism underwent a nationalist shift and Antonescu's anti-Soviet attitude was useful for the 'new national saga'; the Marshal was officially rehabilitated, 'with the fascist dimensions of his regime downplayed and his anti-Semitism presented as moderate, non-Romanian, and thus anti-popular, an error that was due only to Nazi Germany's overwhelming pressure'.[37] The decades of communist indoctrination have impacted on the memory-myths about the Holocaust in Romania. During the 1990s, the newly democratic Romanian discourses were infused with various meanings which negated the state's involvement in the Holocaust. In this sense, Michael Shafir has introduced four main categories to describe the Romanian post-communist discursive practices: the 'outright' denial, 'deflective' negation, 'selective' negation and 'comparative trivialisation' of the Holocaust.[38]

First, outright denial was a rare occurrence illustrated in Romania by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the Great Romania Party

---

[36] Felicia Waldman and Mihai Chioveanu, 'Public Perceptions of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Romania' in John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic (eds.), *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe* (University of Nebraska Press, 2013), p. 453.

[37] Ibid, p. 454.

[38] Michael Shafir, 'Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization": Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe' in Randolph Braham (ed.), *The Treatment of the Holocaust in Hungary and Romania during the Post-Communist Era* (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 2004).

(PRM). In March 1994, Tudor claimed to have 'learned that English and American scientists are contesting the Holocaust itself, providing documentation and logical arguments proving that the Germans could not gas six million Jews, this being technically and physically an impossibility'.[39] PRM had been a parliamentary party between 1990 and 2004, which suggests that a part of the Romanian public opinion agreed with Tudor's views. Second, deflective negation of the Holocaust portrayed Romania as 'a victim, rather than a state sharing the Nazis' antisemitic ideological credo and participating in the perpetration of crimes'.[40] Romanian guilt was transferred or externalised to other parties like the Germans or the Jews themselves. For example, Petre Țurlea – a member of the National Salvation Front (FSN) – declared in June 1991 that responsibility for the Holocaust of Romanian Jews belonged to 'special repression troops of the German army'; at the same time, he proposed 'a moment of silence' in Parliament to commemorate Marshal Antonescu.[41]

Third, selective negation admitted that the Holocaust happened elsewhere in Europe, yet denied that Romania had contributed to the tragedy. This discursive method also rehabilitated Antonescu and regarded him as innocent of any wrongdoing.[42] Fourth, Shafir defined the practice of 'comparative trivialisation' with respect to the Holocaust as follows:

---

[39] Corneliu Vadim Tudor cited in Michael Shafir, 'Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization"', p. 49.

[40] Ibid, p. 58.

[41] Petre Țurlea cited in Andrei Muraru, 'Revizionism, uitare şi distorsionare'/ 'Revisionism, Forgetting and Distortion', *Observator Cultural/ Cultural Observer*, number 581, July 2011; available at http://www.observatorcultural.ro/Fals-in-declaratii-cu-presedintele-Romaniei*articleID_25551-articles_details.html (May 2014).

[42] Michael Shafir, 'Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization"', pp. 67-68.

> 'the wilful distortion of the record and of the significance of the Holocaust, either through the "humanization" of its local record in comparison with atrocities committed by the Nazis, or through comparing the record of the Holocaust itself with experiences of massive suffering endured by local populations or by mankind at large at one point or another in recorded history'.[43]

The varied meanings on the Holocaust negation were not only a Romanian phenomenon. Such interpretations of history were present to different extents in all the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. Romania's circumstances were the most complicated because memory-myths denying participation in the Holocaust did not help its already precarious case for NATO and EU accession. The allegations of individuals like Tudor and Țerlea were particularly visible since they were members of Parliament. And the fact that they had been elected as parliamentary representatives indicated that a segment of the Romanian population resonated with their viewpoints.

According to Maria Bucur, the 'perverse image' of Marshal Antonescu was not 'the product of a propaganda campaign led by right-wing extremists, but a pervasive myth fed by historical debates and political contests', to which the Romanian public seemed 'indifferent' or 'unproblematically' accepting.[44] At the very least, attempts to rehabilitate Antonescu and to downplay or negate the state's role in the Holocaust of Romanian Jews and Roma reinforced doubts about Romania's commitment to a Western and European path. Combined with the slow progress of reforms, it was unlikely that

[43] Ibid, p. 71.

[44] Maria Bucur, 'Edifices of the Past: War Memorials and Heroes in Twentieth Century Romania' in Maria Todorova (ed.), *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory* (New York: New York University Press, 2004), p. 158.

Romania would join NATO in the first wave of enlargement. Yet post-1996 Romanian foreign policy decision-makers made a last-chance effort to obtain NATO entry at the Madrid summit in July 1997.

At the NATO Council ministerial meeting in Sintra (29-30 May 1997), Romania managed to gain support for its inclusion in the first enlargement wave from most European member states, including France and Germany. At the Madrid summit (8-9 July), President Chirac argued in favour of five not just three states to be invited, with clear emphasis on the Romanian candidacy – '[b]eing democratic, at peace with its neighbours, Romania will strengthen the southern flank and the geographical cohesion of our Alliance'.[45] But five invitations constituted 'a more ambitious expansion than the [William] Clinton administration felt it could defend when the time came for US Senate ratification'; the US was also 'mindful that adding Romania and Slovenia would reduce the likelihood of a follow-up round of enlargement in the near future to include the Baltic States'.[46]

The US was not prepared to admit more than three new members into the Alliance, partly due to the vocal domestic opposition to NATO expansion. Romanian candidacy had three strikes against it in 1997: the slow pace of reforms, the failure to acknowledge the state's complicity in the Holocaust and the unfavourable American internal context. Asmus aptly summarised this situation:

> '[w]e had great sympathy for the people in these [candidate] countries and, in particular, for the new Romanian government. But our primary responsibility was to think about what was best for the U.S.

[45] Jacques Chirac, *Address at the Meeting of the North-Atlantic Council* (Madrid, 8 July 1997); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25608.htm (May 2014).

[46] James P. DeHart, *The Burden of Strategy: Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO Enlargement* (Washington: Georgetown University, 2008), p. 8.

> and NATO (…) Romania was not yet ready for NATO—and we were not ready for it'.[47]

The US, along with the UK and Iceland, remained inflexible and Romania was denied accession at Madrid. The official press statement did give some form of acknowledgement and hope for the future -

> '[w]ith regards to the aspiring members, we recognize with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of Southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia (…) So it is not a question of whether they join but when'.[48]

On 11 July 1997, only days after the NATO summit, President Clinton made a conciliatory visit to Bucharest. The idea was proposed by Mircea Geoană (Romanian ambassador to Washington) to encourage the state's efforts, considering the rejection in Madrid.[49] Perhaps overwhelmed by the very warm reception of the Romanian public despite his opposition to Romania's entry, Clinton remarked that he 'can see no stronger candidate' when referring to the state's future chances at Alliance membership.[50] This was a more or less reliable consolation statement, which still prompted Foreign Affairs Minister Severin to think that 'Romania could be labelled a leading candidate and a motor of further NATO enlargement'.[51]

---

[47] Ronald Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door*, p. 217.

[48] Javier Solana, *Statement to the Press after the North Atlantic Council Meeting* (Madrid, 8 July 1997); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25605.htm (May 2014).

[49] Ronald Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door.* p. 239.

[50] William Clinton cited in Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, p. 146.

[51] Adrian Severin, 'Romania Endeavors to Join NATO' in Anton A. Bebler (ed.), *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p. 161.

President Constantinescu was firm about Romania's direction:

> '[o]ur irreversible option towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration translates into accelerating the transformation processes of Romania into a credible and useful partner of these two cooperative structures (...) We will continue our efforts to develop efficient forms of regional and inter-regional collaboration, with our neighbours and states from the area. We consider these actions as a basis for regional stability'.[52]

Being left out of the first wave of NATO enlargement was not the only key international episode faced by Romania between 1996 and 1999. The state also had to formulate foreign policy responses to the Kosovo inter-ethnic conflict. The significance of Romania's reactions to Kosovo derives from showing how foreign policy is re-defined in times of crisis, when certain self-images of national identity ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') become more relevant and eventually take precedence over other affiliations (Balkan ties).

Romania and the Military Intervention in Kosovo

As mentioned in the introduction, a substantial part of this chapter has been devoted to the escalating Kosovo crisis and Romania's evolving foreign policy stance on it. The case study is particularly meaningful because NATO's intervention in Kosovo represents another 'formative moment' of Romanian national identity. The state's foreign policy on Kosovo was re-defined under the

[52] Emil Constantinescu, 'Speech to the Diplomatic Corps' (Bucharest, 16 January 1998) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=6388&_PRID=arh (May 2014).

combined influence of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Rationalism is a component of Romania's wish to join NATO that also impacted on Kosovo decisions. Yet it cannot explain why the state did not fully support Alliance actions in the province from the beginning. In October 1998, Romanian elites settled on partial support for NATO operations - airspace access only in case of emergencies. This position accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity, which stemmed from the two self-images ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') versus Balkan sentiments.

But critical events like the Kosovo intervention facilitate the re-articulation of international discourses. Many authoritative Euro-Atlantic voices promoted a discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The normative pressure was so high that liberal democracies or those seeking recognition for their liberal democratic credentials had to act without delay. The changing international context of ideas enabled a hierarchical process to occur within Romanian identity, with the 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image and the 'security provider' one becoming more relevant than the traditional Balkan affinity. Once the tensions within national identity were resolved in March-April 1999, Romania's dilemmas of appropriate behaviour were replaced with unconditional assistance for NATO's intervention in Kosovo.

The Volatile Context of the Kosovo Conflict

The literature on the Yugoslav wars has tried to understand why the different ethnic Balkan groups resorted to violence for the pursuit

of their goals. One factor is that controversial figures like Slobodan Milošević manipulated national sentiments for personal gains. For instance, as Warren Zimmerman affirms, 'Yugoslavia's death and the violence that followed resulted from the conscious actions of nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic designs'.[53] Sabrina Ramet insists that the Balkan communities nurtured 'differing truths' about the same issues or events, which contributed to the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict.[54]

In the specific case of Kosovo, as Christopher Layne succinctly argues, the 'immediate cause of the struggle' was 'the clash of rival Serbian and ethnic Albanian nationalisms, which led to a situation in which the political demands of the two sides were irreconcilable'.[55] Kosovo seemed to be the location where regional ethnic tensions culminated to the most dangerous degree. The ethnic Albanians, who were the majority among the province's population, invoked the principle of national self-determination and were seeking independence in a place of great historical symbolism for Serbia. Since the Serbs regarded Kosovo as a crucial part of their national identity, they adamantly refused to lose the province.[56] Kosovo had been the core of the Serbian medieval empire, but constituted a key landmark

[53] Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers* (New York: Times Books, 1993), p. vii.

[54] Sabrina P. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 291.

[55] Christopher Layne, 'Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington: Cato Institute, 2000), p. 12.

[56] Tom Gallagher, *Balkans in the New Millennium* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 20.

for the history of both Serbs and Albanians and their respective nineteenth century evolution.[57]

Although 'the confrontation between the province's Albanian leadership and the Serbian regime had been simmering' for many years and was visible to international public opinion, the Kosovo conflict appeared to catch most Western leaders unprepared.[58] In the early 1990s, the ethnic Albanian movement, under the leadership of the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK), had used peaceful methods to achieve the goal of independence. Yet over time many Kosovar Albanians became dissatisfied with the lack of results from LDK's moderate policy.[59] By 1996 they organised the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), whose purpose was to wage an 'armed insurgency and other unsavoury activities' with terrorist roots against the Yugoslav government, in order to create a Greater Albania.[60]

Belgrade's brutal military responses 'triggered a spiral of rising violence', which prompted the reactions of international observers and eventually required NATO's involvement.[61] In March 1998, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright urged her colleagues from the UN Ministerial Contact Group to push for immediate actions, rather than rely on diplomatic relations and rhetoric:

---

[57] Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), p. 4.

[58] Florian Bieber, 'Introduction' in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), *Understanding the War in Kosovo* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005), p. 18.

[59] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 10.

[60] James G. Jatras, 'NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*, p. 25.

[61] Christopher Layne, 'Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War', p. 13.

> '[w]hen the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community did not react with sufficient vigor and force. Each small act of aggression that we did not oppose led to larger acts of aggression that we could not oppose without great risk to ourselves. Only when those responsible paid for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war end. It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to this moment of hope. It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo (…) This time, we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late'.[62]

Initially, a series of economic sanctions on the Yugoslav government were attempted, but their implementation took a long time. Five of the six Contact Group states agreed 'to consider additional measures, including instituting a complete arms embargo, denying visas to senior Serb government and security officials, placing a halt on export credit financing, and freezing Serb-held funds abroad'.[63] Only three months later did NATO allies start to analyse how military force could be used to pacify the situation in Kosovo. During a meeting in May 1998, the North Atlantic Council announced:

> 'in order to have options available for possible later decisions and to confirm our willingness to take further steps if necessary, we have commissioned military advice on support for UN and OSCE monitoring activity as well as on NATO preventive deployments in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (…) We are determined, through the ongoing activities of the Alliance through Partnership for Peace and the additional measures we have decided

[62] Madeleine K. Albright – US Secretary of State (1997-2001), *Statement at the Contact Group Ministerial on Kosovo* (London, 9 March 1998); available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980309.html (May 2014).

[63] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly,* p. 29.

> today, to contribute to the international efforts to solve the crisis in Kosovo and to promote regional security and stability'.[64]

In his remarks to the press after the meeting, Secretary General Solana emphasized – '[t]he North Atlantic Council will also keep the situation in and around Kosovo under very close review. It will consider further deterrent measures, if the violence continues. Let me stress, nothing is excluded'.[65] Since the violence in Kosovo was escalating, certain NATO members argued for more practical approaches like military actions to settle the inter-ethnic conflict. For example, the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe was firmly against continuing inconclusive sanctions and said that:

> '[w]e cannot afford any longer to focus on hollow solutions of rather symbolic character like border-securing missions in Albania or Macedonia, thus sealing off Kosovo from the outside (…) What we now have to focus on in order to support the ongoing political process is to elaborate credible military options aiming at the core of the problem: the extensive use of violence by Serbian security or military forces against the Albanian civil population in Kosovo'.[66]

There were three obstacles that prevented a NATO consensus. First, some allies 'feared that NATO intervention against Serb forces would favour the military and political fortunes of the KLA'.[67] Second,

---

[64] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Statement on Kosovo* (Luxembourg, 28 May 1998); available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm (May 2014).

[65] Javier Solana, *Remarks to the Press* (Luxembourg, 28 May 1998); available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980528a.htm (May 2014).

[66] Volker Rühe – German Federal Minister of Defence (1992-1998) cited in Craig R. Whitney, 'Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview', *The New York Times* (12 June 1998); http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/12/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-conduct-large-maneuvers-warn-off-serbs.html (May 2014).

[67] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly,* p. 34.

even those who felt that military action was necessary did not agree on the most effective and least risky strategy.[68] Third, the legal basis of an Alliance intervention was uncertain because Russia threatened to veto 'any UN resolution authorising NATO's use of force'.[69] Through the voice of Secretary of Defence William Cohen, the US declared that a UN mandate was optional in the end - 'as most members agree, I believe that we would like to have UN or OSCE endorsement. The United States does not feel that that is imperative – it's desirable, not imperative'.[70] Though the allies had been debating the possibility of a UN mandate for some time, by early October 1998 they were no closer to finding a solution than they had been at the beginning.

Some NATO states reasoned out that 'the humanitarian urgency, combined with the Security Council's inability to act, created a situation in which an exception to the agreed norm could be justified'.[71] This last point convinced France of the need to intervene, despite being concerned about using force without UN approval. As President Chirac said on 6 October 1998,

> 'France (...) considers that any military action must be requested and decided by the Security Council. In this particular case, we have the resolution which does open the way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it,

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] William Cohen – US Secretary of Defence (1997-2001), *Remarks at NATO* (Brussels, 11 June 1998); http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1444 (May 2014).

[71] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly,* p. 44.

then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in order to assist those that are in danger'.[72]

As the international community became increasingly preoccupied with the subject of Kosovo, Romania had to configure its responses to the escalating crisis, including to a potential military intervention. To understand why Romanian elites first decided to provide only limited support for NATO actions regarding Kosovo in October 1998, then shifted to a position of unconditional support in April 1999, one needs to look at the tensions between the three self-images of Romania's national identity. Early on in his presidency, Constantinescu's discourse suggested he believed communism and any form of dictatorship to be 'evil', although the case of Yugoslavia was complicated for the Romanian imaginary. During the 'formative moment' of 1990-1996, the foreign policy imaginary conveyed traditional ties and affinity with the Balkans. The main discursive themes were discussed in chapter III and the key point to bear in mind was that the 'Balkan other' had not been constructed as a threat.

On the contrary, the region was often referred to as 'our friends to the South', with Yugoslavia particularly described as 'traditional partner' and 'best neighbour'. In May 1996, these aspects were formalised though a bilateral treaty of friendly relations signed by the two states.[73] Therefore, when formulating a clear Romanian stance on the Kosovo conflict became urgent, it was interesting to look at how

---

[72] Jacques Chirac cited in NATO Parliamentary Assembly, *Committee Reports – 'Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a Reform of the Security Council?' International Law and Humanitarian Intervention*; available at http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/ 1999/as244cc-e.asp (May 2014).

[73] 'The Basic Treaty of Friendly Relations, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 250, 16 October 1996.

the inherent tensions within Romanian national identity played out, how the 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images vis-à-vis Balkan affinity competed for precedence in the collective mindset of state officials.

Romania and Its Evolving Foreign Policy Decisions on Kosovo

Romania's wider international stance on the Balkan area had been prefigured in December 1996:

> 'although a deterrence capability is still needed, the future of the Balkans cannot be built by military force (...) we believe that it is [European] integration rather than deterrence that must be a key instrument for long-term stability of the region (...) International assistance should not be construed by them as an everlasting means of existence, but as an instrument for the development of trade and economic cooperation'.[74]

Specifically asked about how his state would react to a military intervention in Kosovo, Defence Minister Victor Babiuc said the following on 18 June 1998:

> 'Romania is part of the Partnership for Peace and as such has a series of commitments towards its partners. If the allies intervene in Kosovo, Romania will honour those commitments. Still, I hope that the wisdom of Yugoslav and Albanian leaders will find a political solution to the crisis'.[75]

---

[74] Lazăr Comănescu - Secretary of State representing the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Statement at the North Atlantic Co-operation Council* (Brussels, 11 December 1996); http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A105296C-07401405/natolive/opinions_25086.htm (May 2014).

[75] Victor Babiuc - Minister of National Defence (December 1996 - March 2000) cited in Valentin Stan, *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest/ Romania and the Failure of the Campaign for the West* (Bucharest: Editura Universității din Bucureşti, 1999), p. 105.

The above quote exemplifies how the responses of foreign policy decision-makers were shaped by the Romanian self-image of 'security provider' and its related articulation of 'reliable partner', when thinking about future international conduct. From a strictly formal point of view, the PfP framework document required its signatories to comply with two provisions regarding military actions: 'c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed'.[76] A military intervention orchestrated by NATO is neither an exercise nor a mission under UN and CSCE flag. It constitutes a planned aggression, legitimate if given a UN mandate, to impose peace via force.

So Romania was under no obligation to wage war together with NATO members against Yugoslavia. But the PfP had been interpreted by most post-communist candidates as a training and evaluation stage towards eventual NATO integration. Considering Romania wanted to be recognised as a liberal democracy worthy of Alliance membership, it would have been difficult to explain why domestic elites did not agree with NATO's military intervention. After all, a conscientious democratic student is expected to follow the example of its much older and wiser Euro-Atlantic teachers, who had the

[76] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document* (Brussels, 11 January 1994); http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm (May 2014).

authority to decide if the former's performance was satisfying enough to pass the quite fluid criteria of NATO accession. Even though allied members had been divided on how to deal with the Kosovo crisis and needed a long time to reach the final resort of armed force, once air strikes were agreed upon, NATO candidates had little choice in supporting these actions. Otherwise, they could have been seen as not fitting in with the established liberal democratic club.

The story of Romania's reactions to the Kosovo conflict contains two episodes: first, the international response of October 1998 when NATO initially requested unrestricted airspace access for operations which were aborted by resumed peace talks; second, the position around March-April 1999 when the violence re-escalated, Operation Allied Force was launched and another request for NATO aircrafts' access was received. According to President Constantinescu, on 7 October 1998 he was informed that the situation in Kosovo had become 'explosive', which prompted the urgency to configure a foreign policy position and to prepare for any potential negative developments.

During informal consultations with Prime Minister Radu Vasile, Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Pleşu, Defence Minister Victor Babiuc, General Constantin Degeratu – Chief of the General Staff (the highest rank in the Romanian Armed Forces), presidential advisers Zoe Petre and Dorin Marian[77], the widespread idea was for Romania to support a military strike against Yugoslavia only if all other means of dialogue and peaceful solution to the conflict had been exhausted.[78]

[77] These state officials were also members of Romania's Supreme Council of National Defence, a forum and instrument of decision-making in the areas of foreign policy and national security.

[78] Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*, volume I, p. 168.

Constantinescu also asked for the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) to convene in a few days' time, so as to reach an official agreement and issue a public statement regarding the recent developments in Kosovo. But the premises of the scheduled CSAT meeting were drastically altered in the evening of 9 October, when the official note number 98/1023 came in and communicated NATO's request to be granted 'unlimited access' to Romanian territory for the air campaign directed against Yugoslavia.[79]

Establishing a semi-presidential system based on the French model, the 1991 Romanian Constitution gave considerable prerogatives to the President in terms of foreign policy and national security. During the 1996-2000 administration, the three Premiers (Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile, Mugur Isărescu) were content to only deal with the multitude of domestic problems and left President Constantinescu to be the primary foreign policy decision-maker. Thus, while he did consult with other prominent members of the executive and presidential advisers, the final say on NATO's request for unrestricted airspace access was solely Constantinescu's responsibility. His resolution would then be moved to Parliament for deliberation, where the normal expectation would be for the legislative majority of the governing coalition to approve it.

The President's letter addressed to Parliament on 14 October 1998 summarised four main ideas. First, it was an appeal to find a peaceful solution for the Kosovo crisis. Second, the letter requested the Parliament of Romania to grant NATO allied aircraft access to the

[79] Ibid, p. 169.

state's airspace 'in case of emergency and unexpected situations'.[80] Third, the President thought that Romania should choose not to be directly involved in the intervention from a military point of view. Fourth, the letter asked the legislature to debate the possibility of sending a mobile multi-functional contingent for humanitarian assistance on the ground.[81]

Before examining the parliamentary debates, the pending question would be why Romania decided to refuse NATO 'unlimited access', instead offering humanitarian relief efforts (medical section, refugee housing, reconstruction division) and help to air operations only in emergencies. Constantinescu's memoirs indicate that he was very torn about the appropriate course of action. On the one hand, despite the rejection at Madrid, he believed that Romania 'should act like a *de facto* NATO member' and fully support the Alliance's intervention in Kosovo. On the other hand, the target of NATO's campaign was Yugoslavia – a country towards which 'Romanians have truly fraternal feelings'.[82]

The CSAT convened on 11 October to discuss things further and elaborate an official response to NATO. The context was further complicated by the fact that Bulgaria, fellow candidate and close competitor towards Euro-Atlantic integration, had declared 'its readiness to grant NATO access to Bulgarian airspace' without limitations; Bulgaria would also contribute with 'a military

[80] The Parliament of Romania, 'Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies regarding Parliament's Approval to Romanian Airspace Access', *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* (Bucharest, 14 October 1998); available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=3381&idm=4&idl=1 (May 2014).

[81] Ibid.

[82] Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*, volume I, p. 169.

reconnaissance aircraft for participation in the NATO-led operation "Eagle Eye", the NATO Air Verification Mission in Kosovo'.[83] The pressure on Romania to fully support the Alliance had substantially increased, since Bulgaria displayed little apparent hesitation in doing so and was not hindered by Balkan ties.

A rational analysis of the costs and benefits regarding Romanian involvement in the Kosovo military intervention underlines several drawbacks. Governmental elites had a lot to lose (economically and in terms of public opinion) because of the war. As a frontline state during the crisis, Romania would be faced with serious financial costs derived directly and indirectly from the air campaign targeting Yugoslav infrastructure. The national economy, fragile and still adapting with popular sacrifice to the liberal markets, had to stretch already very thin resources. Being neighbouring states, a substantial number of ethnic Romanians lived on Yugoslav territory. There was obvious concern for their welfare due to the air strikes and to the perceived betrayal of Serbia by its long-time Romanian friend and partner.

Furthermore, on the domestic public opinion front, things looked equally difficult to manage. The dominant views portrayed the Serbian population as victims of Slobodan Milošević's totalitarian regime, innocents who should not be punished for the crimes of a dictator. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, Romanians remained 'critical of Western action' and their national leaders' response to it, with about

[83] Plamen Bonchev, 'Bulgaria's Way to NATO' in Institute for Regional and International Studies – IRIS (ed.), *Bulgaria: A Loyal Partner and Prospective Member of NATO - Papers of the Institute for Regional and International Studies*, p. 332; http://www.iris-bg.org/files/chapter5.pdf (May 2014).

78 percent being against the military operation.[84] NATO also remained vague about what would happen if candidate states engaged in the intervention were threatened with Serbian retaliation. Secretary General Solana declared the following on 13 October 1998:

> '[w]ell, we are very grateful, logically, for the solidarity and support of partners, which is another example of how the security of partners and that of the Alliance are difficult to separate, impossible to separate as a matter of fact. Any threat to the security of partners will be viewed with the utmost seriousness and will be met with an appropriate response'.[85]

The lack of any concrete reassurances or promises from NATO reinforced the idea that NATO would not make any formal commitment to defend or help partner states (including Romania) in case of Serbian aggression. Even so, if the pragmatic goal was to obtain NATO membership, then all these aspects could be necessary costs to achieve the ultimate benefit. Interestingly, Romania settled for a more nuanced answer in October 1998 which did not go against NATO and thus potentially jeopardise the main interest of integration, yet at the same time it appeased the tensions inherent in the state's national identity – whether to act as a 'European' liberal democracy or choose the traditional Balkan affinity. The dominant views during the CSAT meeting were that, while Romania must side with NATO and adhere to UN Security Council Resolution 1199[86], it 'could not take

---

[84] Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 191.

[85] Javier Solana, *Transcript of the Speech and Press Conference* (Brussels, 13 October 1998); http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013b.htm (May 2014).

[86] United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1199 (1998)*; it demanded at point 1 that 'all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo'; at point 12, it called upon UN member states 'to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region'; http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1199 (May 2014).

part in fighting operations on the Yugoslav territory'.[87] In order to maintain a 'consistent stance', neither could the Romanian state put its airports at NATO's disposal for use as bases of attack.

Both General Degeratu and Foreign Affairs Minister Pleşu had argued that giving access to airspace or land essentially amounted to the 'same thing – it's still called direct involvement'; Constantinescu agreed with that assessment.[88] The CSAT decided to write a memorandum, in the name of the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Ministries, which basically reiterated the main points of Resolution 1199: immediate ceasefire, resuming diplomatic dialogue between the Yugoslav authorities and Albanian leaders in Kosovo and humanitarian relief efforts. The memorandum also 'heavily underlined the necessity to preserve Serbia's territorial integrity, with a large autonomy for Kosovo'.[89]

Meanwhile, the parliamentary debates regarding the motion to grant NATO access to national airspace produced radically different opinions. In the 1996-2000 legislature, there were nine parliamentary parties and groups – the governing coalition (PNȚCD, USD, PNL, UDMR), the opposition (PDSR, PRM, PUNR), the groups of other national minorities different from the Hungarians and the independents or members without party affiliation. Sorin Lepşa, speaking on behalf of PNȚCD, emphasized that two questions needed to be answered in the context of the Kosovo crisis: '1) [d]o political forces in this Parliament wish for Romania to be considered a serious partner of

---

[87] Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*, volume I, pp. 170-173.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*, volume III, p. 435.

NATO?; 2) [d]o we want to prove that Romania has the expected reactions of a member state in the Alliance?' He also made reference to a position piece presented by state officials during the first round of individual dialogue on NATO enlargement (29 March 1996), in which Romania committed itself, depending on the Alliance's preferred option and the concrete developments in the European security area, 'to offer allied forces the infrastructure facilities necessary to conduct operations'.[90]

Representing the main opposition party (PDSR), Ion Iliescu argued for continued efforts towards finding a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issues which preserved Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity, also pointing out that Romania had always maintained neutrality and non-involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts.[91] Valeriu Tabără (PUNR) discussed NATO's hypocritical conduct towards Kosovo, when in so many other disastrous humanitarian cases it decided to not interfere; he warned against the problematic implications of such an unprecedented military intervention.[92] Here the first two members of Parliament conveyed the tensions inherent in Romania's national identity, which reflected contrasting foreign policy positions. On the one hand, the 'security provider' self-image and its 'reliable partner' articulation meant full support for NATO. On the other hand, Romanian traditional good relations and affinity with the Balkans suggested that a neutral stance on Kosovo was more suitable.

---

[90] Sorin V. Lepşa - PNȚCD Deputy, 'Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies regarding Parliament's Approval to Romanian Airspace Access', *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* (Bucharest, 14 October 1998); available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=3381&idm=4&idl=1 (May 2014).

[91] Ion Iliescu – PDSR Senator, ibid.

[92] Valeriu Tabără – PUNR Deputy, ibid.

Moreover, Bogdan Niculescu-Duvăz (USD) stressed the 'wisdom of having a clear attitude of political support', specifying that the object of debate was not even about helping logistically; rather it essentially constituted 'humanitarian assistance'.[93] This position indicates that an idea of humanitarian intervention for Kosovars was already present in the mindset of certain Romanian elites, which aligned with the 'European' or liberal democratic self-image. When asked to give further clarifications on how the state was supposed to contribute towards NATO operations, Defence Minister Babiuc said:

> '[t]here is a great difference between entering a country's air space without any restrictions and giving permission to enter it with the specification "in case of emergency or unexpected occurrences", and the respective notions are neither vague nor unknown'.[94]

Babiuc continued his argument by making reference to the Chicago Convention (1944), where aircraft emergency or distress situations had been defined in connection with airplane and pilot problems such as technical difficulties, urgent need for re-fuelling and injury. To explain the concrete meanings of 'unexpected occurrences', he invoked the standard operating procedures used during the joint activities of NATO with partner states, which highlighted two issues: changing the plane's direction due to objective reasons like insurmountable meteorological conditions and search and rescue operations.[95]

Speaking for PDSR, Adrian Năstase cautioned that: '[i]n international law the only body able to approve military operations like those discussed until now is the UN Security Council. Resolution 1199 (…) says a multitude of things yet does not mention or mandate such

[93] Bogdan Niculescu-Duvăz – USD Deputy, ibid.
[94] Victor Babiuc, ibid.
[95] Ibid.

a [NATO] operation (...) Romania should be wary of giving up the umbrella of international law'.[96] In the end, the members of Parliament voted 244 in favour, 160 against and 82 abstentions to grant the Alliance access to the state's airspace in 'case of emergency and unexpected situations'.[97] This was a nuanced foreign policy stance that accommodated the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity, where the 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images competed with Balkan ties for precedence.

The five months between the cancelled air strikes against Yugoslavia (October 1998) and NATO initiating Operation Allied Force (23 March 1999) showed signs that President Constantinescu was re-defining his position on the Kosovo crisis. In a speech dedicated to the Day of National Solidarity against Dictatorship, made official in November 1998, Constantinescu voiced such thoughts:

> 'the evil which we had removed from our lives along with the fall of dictatorship cannot be forgotten, cannot be minimised. Democracy is like health – you realise its significance only when it's gone. Memory is the most effective medicine to this kind of danger (...) Solidarity against dictatorship should not be symbolic. It has practical value as long as those old dictatorships have left deep scars in and among us'.[98]

Remembering the painful communist past and the wounds inflicted by Ceauşescu's autarchy appeared to be the key towards a brighter democratic future, also rendering Romanians much more sympathetic

---

[96] Adrian Năstase – PDSR Deputy, ibid.

[97] The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision Number 39 on 14 October 1998', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 393, 16 October 1998.

[98] Emil Constantinescu, 'Message for the Day of National Solidarity against Dictatorship' (Bucharest, 16 December 1998) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=6361&_PRID=arh (May 2014).

towards other peoples suffering from the same or comparable plight. Kosovo had some respite from violence between October 1998 and early January 1999.

Unfortunately, that brief relief ended on 15 January 1999, when Serbian armed forces devastated the village of Račak in southern Kosovo, leaving behind a large number of dead and mutilated victims. US Ambassador William Walker witnessed the aftermath and described it as 'an unspeakable atrocity' that represented 'a crime against humanity'; he said that he would not 'hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility'.[99] Račak became a turning point for NATO allies and the international community as a whole. On 28 January, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had a meeting with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, which he ended with a highly symbolic message:

> '[w]e must (...) further refine the combination of force and diplomacy that is the key to peace in the Balkans, as everywhere (...) The bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts - by reason or by force - particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign state. But nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia'.[100]

Some scholars have argued that Annan 'implicitly provided his blessing to threatening and even using force against a sovereign state', although 'such action was never explicitly authorized by the UN

[99] William Walker cited in Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly,* p. 64.

[100] Kofi Annan – Secretary General of the United Nations (1997-2006), *Statement* (Brussels, 28 January 1999); http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm (May 2014).

Security Council given the certainty of a Russian veto'.[101] Within hours of Annan's statement, Secretary General Solana affirmed NATO's readiness to act militarily -

> '[t]he appropriate authorities in Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovo Albanian leadership must agree to the proposals to be issued by the Contact Group for completing an interim political settlement (...) NATO stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides of the demands of the international community, and in particular observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions (...) the North Atlantic Council has decided to increase its military preparedness to ensure that the demands of the international community are met'.[102]

The most influential European allies started endorsing a similar rhetoric. Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, declared that: 'I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of last resort. So I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If people are being massacred, you cannot mutter about having no mandate. You must act'.[103] The following day, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement saying that they were 'willing to consider all forms of military action, including the dispatch of ground forces, necessary to accompany the implementation of a negotiated agreement. If an early political agreement proves impossible, the two leaders believe that all options will need to be considered'.[104]

---

[101] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly,* p. 75.

[102] Javier Solana, *Statement to the Press* (Brussels, 28 January 1999); available at http://www.nato.int/DOCU/pr/1999/p99-011e.htm (May 2014).

[103] Joschka Fischer cited in Tom Gallagher, *Balkans in the New Millennium,* p. 49.

[104] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly,* p. 75.

The US did not want to place troops on the ground, which left the option of air strikes. The North Atlantic Council reinforced this discourse on 30 January, stating that 'NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement'.[105] To ensure NATO's responsiveness to the evolving situation, '[t]he Council has (...) agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] territory'.[106]

At the end of this intricate series of statements, the preferred strategy for dealing with the Kosovo conflict was clear. One way or another, there would be a resolution of the conflict shortly. Even so, Chirac argued for 'one more attempt to negotiate a political solution' and declared that 'Europeans must take responsibility for Europe'.[107] Blair also agreed with a final attempt at negotiations: '[t]he consequence of these threats was so serious in terms of the military action, for goodness sake let's give it another try with the political process, let's stick all the people together, get all the pressure we can on both sides to come round the table and sort it out'.[108] Thus came

---

[105] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo* (30 January 1999); http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm (May 2014).

[106] Ibid.

[107] Jacques Chirac cited in James Gow, 'The War in Kosovo, 1998–1999' in Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2012), p. 312; available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/purduepress_ebooks/28/ (May 2014).

[108] Tony Blair cited in ibid.

forth the decision to bring the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians together at the fourteenth century château of Rambouillet, about 44 kilometres southwest of Paris, in order to reach a mutually agreeable settlement.

Before the opening of the Rambouillet talks, on 4 February 1999, US Secretary Albright warned all parties involved in the process that:

> 'three outcomes are possible. If President Milosevic refuses to accept the Contact Group proposals, or has allowed repression in Kosovo to continue, he can expect NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the ground, they cannot expect the NATO and the international community to bail them out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and we will find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides do reach agreement, we will need to concentrate our efforts on making sure that it is successfully implemented'.[109]

The negotiations at Rambouillet (6 – 23 February 1999) failed as the Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo could not find common ground.

Nevertheless, what happened at Rambouillet remains a controversial topic. Michael Mandelbaum summarised the peace conference as follows:

> '[NATO] summoned the Serbs and the KLA to the French chateau of Rambouillet, presented them with a detailed plan for political autonomy in Kosovo under NATO auspices, demanded that both agree to it, and threatened military reprisals if either refused. Both did refuse. The Americans thereupon negotiated with the KLA, acquired its assent to the Rambouillet plan, and, when the Serbs persisted in

[109] Madeleine K. Albright, *Remarks and Q&A Session at the U.S. Institute of Peace* (Washington, 4 February 1999); available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/ 990204.html (May 2014).

> their refusal, waited for the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors and then began to bomb'.[110]

Some claim that impossible demands were placed on the Serbian side and the talks were designed to fail; unsuccessful negotiations provided a good pretext for the Alliance to intervene in Kosovo.[111]

Two major obstacles prevented the Serbs from accepting the Rambouillet agreement. First, the document stipulated 'the transitional occupation of Kosovo by NATO-led forces', which 'included the free use of all of Yugoslav territory and resources'.[112] Second, the text 'intimated a future independence referendum as the resolution mechanism' for Kosovo.[113] The Serbs could not willingly renounce the province, since they had been fighting against Kosovo independence to begin with. Whether or not NATO had already decided on an air operation against rump Yugoslavia and was simply looking for a pretext, the Rambouillet conference is 'a textbook example of how not to practice diplomacy'.[114]

The allied states were generally more inclined towards a humanitarian intervention due to the shifting international discourses. As the Kosovo situation deteriorated, the international ideational context about humanitarian intervention changed as well. Discursive support for an intervention in Kosovo was orchestrated through rhetorical

---

[110] Michael Mandelbaum, 'A Perfect Failure', *Foreign Affairs*, volume 78(5), September-October 1999, p. 3.

[111] James G. Jatras, 'NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory*, p. 24.

[112] Elizabeth Allen Dauphinee, 'Rambouillet: A Critical (Re)Assessment' in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), *Understanding the War in Kosovo* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005), p. 103.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Christopher Layne, 'Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War', p. 15.

means such as the negative consequences of appeasing totalitarianism and analogies with the Holocaust. For example, in a Washington Post article on 25 March 1999, the US republican senator Jesse Helms criticised the Clinton administration for its foreign policy of appeasement towards Balkan dictators:

> 'Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic has for the past year waged a brutal campaign of genocide against the Albanian population of Kosovo (…) This must stop. And the only way it will stop – ever – is if we address the underlying cause of the problem in the Balkans: Slobodan Milosevic's continued rule'.[115]

The British Prime Minister also proved to be an emphatic anti-appeaser of dictatorship. Speaking to the House of Commons in March 1999, Blair noted that '[w]e know from bitter experience throughout this century, most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of Europe too'.[116] Kosovo 'represented Blair's "awakening"' to humanitarian interventionism, because he 'saw the former Yugoslavia, and the machinations of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, in moral terms'.[117]

Alexandra Gheciu explains that, as the inter-ethnic violence was escalating in Kosovo, Western states and NATO gradually developed a specific reading of the conflict:

---

[115] Jesse Helms, *Empire for Liberty: A Sovereign America and Her Moral Mission* (Washington: Regnery, 2001), pp. 133-134.

[116] Tony Blair cited in Stanley Henig, 'Britain: To War for a Just Cause' in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?* (London: Pearson, 2001), p. 40.

[117] R. Gerald Hughes, *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 160.

> '[a]ccording to [NATO's] interpretation, the crisis involved a conflict between the progressive, modern values of liberal democracy and the barbarity embodied in the Milosevic regime. As the institutional embodiment of the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO was acting in a civilized ("surgical") manner to protect Kosovar civilians against the authoritarian, undemocratic government of Slobodan Milosevic'.[118]

The changing international context and discourses about Kosovo were bound to impact on Romania's foreign policy. The state needed to re-consider its attitude of October 1998, when NATO's military intervention in Kosovo became again imminent in March 1999.

On 21 March 1999, President Constantinescu made a public statement to the domestic population and it constituted a clear Romanian foreign policy position:

> '[f]rom the beginning Romania has contributed to the OSCE, NATO and EU efforts of solving the Kosovo crisis through discussions. Our own political experience has proved that there is always a way towards dialogue if both parties show good faith and the will to avoid conflicts (...) Unfortunately, all these efforts still face major difficulties resulting in the tragic loss of lives, the brutal dislocation of refugees and escalation of tensions in the entire region (...) States do bear the responsibility to manage internal conflicts. Yet, when this management does not calm but rather amplifies a conflict endangering regional and even European security, the international community must put a stop to it (...) If peace negotiations fail, Romania considers a NATO intervention to be *necessary and legitimate* and reiterates its decision to support the re-establishment of peace and humanitarian operations'.[119]

---

[118] Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe'*, p. 189.

[119] Emil Constantinescu, *Statement on the Kosovo Crisis* (Bucharest, 21 March 1999), emphasis added; http://www.constantinescu.ro/discursuri/281.htm (October 2012).

Constantinescu was 'acutely aware that the two words remembered from the whole speech' would be 'those justifying NATO's actions – legitimate and necessary'; yet he thought 'the time for half measures' had passed and Romania needed to 'unequivocally side with the democratic countries', hoping 'friends in Yugoslavia' would understand that Romanians were joining 'the fight against Milosevic and not Serbia'.[120]

The initial stance of October 1998 was re-defined under the combined influence of three factors: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. There had been an undeniable rational component to Romania's quest for Euro-Atlantic integration, but that was only part of its evolving foreign policy on Kosovo. The state could have maintained the comfortable middle ground of supporting NATO missions only in case of emergency and unexpected occurrences. However, the five months from October 1998 to March 1999 had drastically altered the international context. The escalating violence (particularly the Račak massacre) in Kosovo had great emotional impact and constrained both NATO and the international community to be firmer and more decisive in using the last resort of force. The UN Secretary General, the US, France, Germany and the other Alliance members reinforced the discourse of urgent humanitarian intervention.

The normative expectations of saving Kosovo were so high that any self-respecting liberal democracy had to adopt the same views to receive external validation. Under this changing ideational background, Romania's national identity underwent a process of

[120] Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*, volume I, pp. 183-184.

hierarchy, where the 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image and the 'security provider' one became more relevant than traditional ties and affinity with the Balkans. Once the tensions within Romanian identity were settled, the appropriate international choice was to fully support Operation Allied Force. President Constantinescu communicated the state's new position two days prior to the announcement that NATO would begin air strikes against Yugoslavia:

> 'NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia (...) We must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo (...) We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century. We have a moral duty to do so'.[121]

On 24 March 1999, in his statement concerning Operation Allied Force, Constantinescu advanced further clarifications -

> '[a]s previously declared, our position is firm: we unconditionally support the efforts for the settlement of the crisis through political dialogue, as well as NATO's efforts towards an immediate resolution of the conflict (...) I express as clearly as possible that Romania will not take part in fighting actions on the territory of the Yugoslav Republic. Romania did not offer combatant forces'.[122]

At that time the 'unconditional support' for the allied intervention was purely rhetorical, since the state continued to refuse any military contribution.

---

[121] Javier Solana, *Press Statement* (Brussels, 23 March 1999); available at http://www. nato.int/ docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm (May 2014).

[122] Emil Constantinescu, 'Statement on the Kosovo Crisis' (Bucharest, 24 March 1999) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presi dency.ro/index. php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=6352&_PRID=arh (May 2014).

In late April 1999, the Romanian government received NATO's second request to be granted unrestricted access to the state's airspace, for the purpose of carrying out bombings on targets in Yugoslavia; on this occasion, Constantinescu asked the Parliament to approve it ad litteram.[123] Compared to October 1998, accepting such a request implied Romania's unequivocal aggression towards a long-time partner, which caused great controversy among political elites and public opinion. Even if the President was in favour of unrestricted airspace access, it was possible that the majority of Parliament could disagree with his request. There was also a bilateral treaty signed with rump Yugoslavia (basically Serbia) in 1996, which had a very clear article 7 – '[n]one of the contracting parties will permit its territory to be used by a third state to conduct an act of aggression towards the other (…) and will not give any help to such a third state'.[124] This was another reason why Romania could have chosen not to side with NATO and re-state the response of October 1998.

Looking at the parliamentary discourses, a joint meeting of the two Chambers was quickly arranged on 22 April 1999 and the heated government-opposition debate began. Ioan M. Paşcu, representing the main opposition party (PDSR), presented a cautious point of view:

> '[b]eing against the use of force in any adverse matter, PDSR felt responsible to warn NATO that military means would negatively

[123] The Parliament of Romania, 'Joint Report on the President's Request to Grant the North Atlantic Alliance Unrestricted Access to Romanian Airspace' in *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* (Bucharest, 22 April 1999); http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5023&idm=4&idl=1 (May 2014).

[124] The Parliament of Romania, 'Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 250, 16 October 1996.

> impact on the crisis and its effects (...) As a direct consequence of the Alliance's military intervention, the [Kosovo] situation today is far worse and shows no sign of improvement (...) Basically, we are asked to adopt the obligations of a NATO member state, without benefiting from any rights and security guarantees'.[125]

He concluded that the best solution would be to maintain the decision of October 1998, only allowing access in case of emergencies or humanitarian reasons. Teodor Meleşcanu, speaking for a large number of independents, stressed that either approving or rejecting the allied request would have long-term implications for Romania.[126]

What an examination of the transcript highlighted were the competing ideas associated with the national interest. One member of the government coalition argued that the national interest demanded Romania to 'unconditionally support' NATO's stance on Kosovo, in order to be recognised as a reliable ally.[127] The main opposition party reinforced the state's Euro-Atlantic commitments, yet at the same time reminded that it was in Romania's national interest to consider all the consequences for its foreign policy. The right-wing party (PRM) pointed out that Romania should be wary of supporting the Kosovo intervention, which could set a dangerous precedent for secessionist movements within Transilvania. Consequently, the ultimate national interest should be safeguarding the state's territorial integrity.[128]

---

[125] Ioan M. Paşcu – PSDR Deputy, 'Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies' in *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* (Bucharest, 22 April 1999); http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5023&idm=5&idl=1 (May 2014).

[126] Teodor Meleşcanu – Independent Senator, ibid.

[127] Ioan Vilău – USD Deputy, 'Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies' (22 April 1999).

[128] Corneliu Vadim Tudor – PRM Senator, ibid.

The different kinds of international interests reflect which self-image of Romanian identity different members of Parliament focused on – 'security provider' (whether in the external or domestic realm) or more reserved Balkan endorsement which did not see military force to be a long-standing solution for Kosovo. The speeches that generated widespread agreement and eventually shifted the balance belonged to representatives of the government coalition. Both explained how Romania should respond to Kosovo in terms of national identity and democratic values.

Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (PNL) said the following:

> '[t]oday Romania must adopt its responsibilities as a European and civilised country (...) We have the moral obligation to participate in the international community's refusal to accept such totalitarian practices (...) Romania should not support NATO actions because of political opportunism, but to reaffirm our own democratic choices'.[129]

Similarly, Petre Roman (USD) emphasized that the final vote would demonstrate the consistency of the national commitment to democracy and to being part of the 'civilised and democratic world'.[130] Even those who questioned the approval of NATO's unrestricted access felt the need to reassert their attachment to liberal democratic ideas and values. To quote another member of Parliament: 'the decision we make today is essentially our choice for a type of civilisation'.[131]

So the parliamentary debates clustered around the same tensions within Romanian identity, although the two camps were more

[129] Călin Popescu Tăriceanu – PNL Deputy, ibid.
[130] Petre Roman – USD Senator, ibid.
[131] Sergiu Cunescu – Independent Deputy, ibid.

vocal now. Compared to the session in October 1998, the Friendship Treaty with rump Yugoslavia was alluded to yet no one actually framed it as a reasonable argument against support for NATO. This suggests that even members of the opposition had interpreted like President Constantinescu the hierarchy of self-images within national identity. The reason why the notion of liberal values and acting like a recognised democracy was so widely appealing refers back to the changing international context, which endorsed humanitarian relief at the cost of using force.

In April 1999, Blair summarised this aspect in a memorable speech, where he qualified the military intervention in Kosovo as a 'just war' due to its humanitarian concerns -

> '[n]o one in the West who has seen what is happening in Kosovo can doubt that NATO's military action is justified. Bismarck famously said the Balkans were not worth the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier. Anyone who has seen the tear stained faces of the hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming across the border, heard their heart-rending tales of cruelty or contemplated the unknown fates of those left behind, knows that Bismarck was wrong (…) This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later'.[132]

[132] Tony Blair, *Doctrine of the International Community* (Chicago, 24 April 1999); available at http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=279 (May 2014).

The Romanian Parliament's final resolution contained three articles, each with a mixed proportion of votes. Article 1 granted NATO 'unrestricted access to Romania's airspace during the air operations' in Yugoslavia; it had 214 votes in favour, 37 against and 97 abstentions (PDSR delegates mostly).[133] At article 2, Parliament asked the Romanian government to continue its efforts with regards to: a) ensuring 'some security guarantees and the state's territorial integrity erga omnes' (towards all); b) providing 'the technical infrastructure' for NATO aircrafts; c) 'obtaining assistance in eliminating the negative effects of the regional crisis'.[134] It enjoyed a large majority of votes in favour, 20 against and 12 abstentions. Article 3 included the ongoing wish for 'a political solution to the conflict' and re-affirming the willingness to contribute to such a goal; it only had 4 votes against and 5 abstentions.[135] These amendments were added to the presidential request which featured just the first article, indicating Parliament's more active role in shaping this foreign policy resolution.

After the difficult stage of the Kosovo war had ended, on 11 June 1999, President Constantinescu concluded that:

> 'Romania has to remain a pillar of stability and equilibrium in the region and must participate as such in the process of reconstruction (...) In this critical period, we successfully passed a test. A test of being firm and consistent about the alliances we choose and the principles we wish to defend. We proved that we were capable of both words and actions'.[136]

---

133 The Parliament of Romania, 'Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies' (22 April 1999).

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

136 Emil Constantinescu, *Message to the Romanian People on the Kosovo Conflict* (Bucharest, 11 June 1999); http://www.constantinescu.ro/discursuri/311.htm (October 2012).

Romania demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its national identity and international conduct surpassed any other traditional friendly ties, including those with the Balkans.

Concluding Remarks

The years 1996-1999 brought forward a few significant re-definitions of Romania's national identity and foreign policy. The discursive themes crystallised between 1990 and 1996 were consolidated by the new centre-right political administration, although with some re-articulations. President Constantinescu and the CDR-led Government reconfirmed Romania's Euro-Atlantic orientation, while also configuring an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in the state's past and future. The Romanian foreign policy discourses showed a preoccupation with the 'essential good' of liberal democracy.

These understandings were closely related to Romania's 'European' self-image, which had been prevalent in 1990-1996. They were actually variations on the same European identity theme, whose broad meaning referred to being internationally recognised as a Western European liberal democracy that upheld two key principles – regular democratic elections and the protection of human rights and freedoms. Post-1996 elites mentioned the 'liberal democratic' self-image of Romanian identity more frequently than the 'European' one, yet they were facets of the same articulation. Another re-defined self-image was that of 'security provider', being more explicitly reiterated in the post-1996 foreign policy imaginary. This was often associated with the Balkans, the area where Romania could validate its representations of 'security provider' and 'source of stability'.

After the configuration of its foreign policy imaginary between 1990 and 1996, the period 1996-1999 focussed on the dilemmas inherent in Romanian national identity. State officials had to decide what would be the right 'European' course of action, when confronted with a humanitarian crisis in the Balkan region. Romania's loyalties were divided since it was an aspiring liberal democracy with a security provider role, which had a friendly rapport and affinity with the Balkans as well. The state's reactions to Kosovo came soon after Romania was left out of the first NATO enlargement wave at Madrid in 1997. Romanian candidacy had obtained the firm support of France and Germany, but the US remained opposed to it.

There had been slim chances for Romania to be included in the 1997 round of Alliance expansion, due to a combination of factors: the slow pace of national reforms, the failure to acknowledge the state's complicity in the Holocaust and the fact that US domestic politics did not favour issuing more than three NATO invitations (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary). NATO rejection was nonetheless a quite bitter pill to swallow and could have rendered Romania even more reluctant to endorse the Alliance's military intervention in Kosovo.

The Kosovo case study is particularly relevant because it constitutes a key 'formative moment' of Romanian national identity and international responses. Romania exhibited an evolving foreign policy stance on Kosovo, which began with partial support for NATO (October 1998) and later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance's military campaign in March-April 1999. The initial position of October 1998 was a nuanced and relatively comfortable middle ground with a dual purpose. First, partial support - airspace access in emergencies – did not specifically oppose NATO or undermine

Romania's self-declared Euro-Atlantic national identity. Second, partial assistance for the Alliance operations accommodated the inherent dilemmas of Romanian identity – whether to act as a 'European' liberal democracy and 'security provider' or opt for the traditional Balkan ties.

This foreign policy decision was re-defined under the impact of three elements: national identity, rational interest and shifting international context. Romanian elites anticipated that NATO air strikes on Yugoslav territory would lead to very high economic costs. Figures from the Danube Commission - an organisation monitoring the maintenance and improvement of navigation conditions along the Danube – estimated that 'replacing all eight bombed bridges over the vital river' would amount to 'at least £80 million, up to ten times more than the cost of destroying them'.[137] The oil embargo caused its share of 'severe losses' too, resulting in 'increased prices for Romanian goods domestically and abroad'.[138]

Romanian political leaders were also aware of the potential drastic decline in their popularity, as internal public opinion was overwhelmingly against intervening militarily in Kosovo. According to rationalism, these were necessary sacrifices for the ultimate objective of NATO membership. Rational interests were part of Romania's Euro-Atlantic choice and contributed to its stance on Kosovo, yet they cannot explain why the state did not fully support Alliance actions from the beginning.

---

[137] BBC News, *Kosovo War Cost £30bn*; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/476134.stm (May 2014).

[138] Catherine Lovatt, 'Waiting for the Pay-back', *Central Europe Review*, volume 1(13), 20 September 1999; available at http://www.ce-review.org/99/13/lovatt13.html (May 2014).

Here national identity comes in to supplement the analysis and identify the tensions between the two self-images - 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' – and Balkan affinity, which influenced Romanian foreign policy. Critical events like the Kosovo crisis enable the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the Euro-Atlantic ideational context was shifting towards endorsing an urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The Serbian attack on the village of Račak in southern Kosovo seemed to be the turning point for NATO states and the international community as a whole.

Allied members were prepared to use force without a UN mandate. Prominent Euro-Atlantic voices rhetorically promoted the negative consequences of appeasing dictators and a certain reading of Kosovo as a conflict between the progressive values of liberal democracy and the barbaric regime of Milošević. The normative pressure increased so much that established democracies or those seeking external recognition had to act without delay.

This changed ideational context facilitated the emergence of a hierarchy within Romanian identity. The 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images became more meaningful than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Once the dilemmas of national identity were settled in March-April 1999, Romania unconditionally supported NATO's air campaign in Kosovo by granting unrestricted airspace access without combatant forces.

The Romanian presidential and parliamentary discourses resonated with the notion of their state behaving like a veritable liberal democracy. President Constantinescu had been aware that expressing full backing for Operation Allied Force in March 1999 would come at a

high cost. Popular trust in him plummeted by about 20% and never recovered. In Constantinescu's words, Romanians 'could not forgive their president for using the adjectives "*necessary and legitimate*"' to describe the military intervention in Kosovo.[139] After deciding to act like a credible 'European' liberal democracy and security provider, Romania's trajectory of national identity and foreign policy moves on to another key question – whether or not to be an 'Atlantic' liberal democracy and align with the US on the Iraq war.

[139] Emil Constantinescu, *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii/ The Time of Demolition, the Time of Building*, volume I, p. 190, emphasis in original.

Chapter V: To Be or Not to Be an 'Atlantic' Liberal Democracy? (2000-2004)

The initial post-communist decade of Romania's national identity journey focused on having its 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image recognised, as well as on what this self-image meant in terms of appropriate foreign policy actions. The period 2000-2004 was no exception since Romania had to decide whether it should be a 'European' or 'Atlantic' liberal democracy. This chapter explores how a series of 'formative moments' for Romanian identity and foreign policy culminated in the fundamental re-definition of national identity during the 2003 Iraq war. Romania's identity was re-articulated in the escalating Kosovo conflict, when international discourses advocated the democratic duty of humanitarian intervention. This changing ideational context shaped Romania's 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image, which was re-defined as pro-active liberal democracy that tried to save the people suffering in totalitarian regimes.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was another critical event that facilitated important re-definitions of Romanian identity and foreign policy attitudes. French-German and American opinions on how to disarm Iraq persistently differed, which placed Central-Eastern European states in an uncomfortable situation because they did not want to choose between 'Europe' and the US. Romanian identity underwent a crisis within its 'liberal democratic' self-image and the

state had to opt whether to act as a 'European' or 'Atlantic' liberal democracy. The tensions in national identity were settled by invoking certain collective memory-myths and Romania chose to become an 'Atlantic' liberal democracy. Romanian elites and public opinion felt an emotional solidarity with the US, even at the expense of France who had been Romania's traditional ally. These sentiments were rooted in Cold War experiences and memory-myths that had impacted on national identity.

Structurally, this chapter starts with an overview of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary under a new political administration. Then the discussion looks at the Bilateral Immunity Agreement which Romania signed with the US in August 2002. It constitutes a controversial episode that prefigured Romania's reflexive Atlantic rather than European international orientation. A lot of attention has been given to Romania's evolving position on the Iraq war, a time of key re-articulations. At first, Romania attempted to maintain a neutral stance on Iraq, but in the end state elites across the political spectrum configured a vocal Atlantic response and full military involvement in the US-led coalition against Iraq.

The Romanian Context and Foreign Policy Imaginary

By late 2000, under the mandate of President Constantinescu, the heterogeneous governing coalition had proved its inconsistent nature and inability to handle serious national macroeconomic issues. The coalition was made up of political parties with different ideological affiliations: the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR – centre-

right), the Social Democratic Union (USD – centre-left) and the ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR – centre-right). CDR in turn included two prominent parties - the National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNȚCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). All these parties could not decide on a coherent approach to Romania's socio-economic reforms, which caused substantial losses of popular support and limited progress including in the areas of EU and NATO accession criteria.[1] Constantinescu had been supported by CDR in the previous presidential elections. However, CDR's unsuccessful management of the governmental coalition prompted Constantinescu not to run for a second term. Opinion polls also indicated that the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) and the Great Romania Party (PRM) surpassed CDR in terms of popularity. CDR was disbanded and its two parties – PNȚCD and PNL – competed separately in the general elections.

In November 2000, Romania's parliamentary elections removed the mostly centre-right administration, replacing it with a centre-left government led by PDSR which gained almost an absolute majority of seats (44.93%).[2] PRM ranked second with 24.35% of seats, followed by the Democrat Party (PD) with 8.99%, PNL with 8.7%, UDMR with 7.83% and the other ethnic minorities were allocated 5.22%.[3] PNȚCD had been perceived by the Romanian population as the unofficial leader of CDR and the 1996 governing coalition. But in November 2000 PNȚCD did not have enough votes to pass the electoral

[1] Steven D. Roper, 'Parliamentary Development' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004), p. 174.

[2] Central Electoral Bureau, *The Parliamentary Elections on 26 November 2000*; http://www. agerpres.ro/documentareparlamentare2012/2012/10/30/alegerile-parlamentare-din-26-noiembrie-2000-18-08-53 (June 2014).

[3] Ibid.

threshold; hence it had no members in the Romanian Parliament. This massive collapse for PNȚCD was a result of the public opinion's dissatisfaction with the pace of domestic reforms, high corruption levels within the governmental coalition and the still unachieved goals of NATO and EU membership.[4]

On 26 November, Ion Iliescu (the former President of Romania and PDSR leader) won the first round of presidential elections with 36.35% of votes.[5] His next competitor had 28.34% and was Corneliu V. Tudor, PRM leader and controversial figure whose discourse had contained xenophobic and anti-Semitic elements. The 2000 elections suggested a polarisation of Romanian politics. The nationalist and populist PRM quadrupled its previous electoral results (from 5.59% to 24.35%), while the historic pre-communist PNȚCD was not admitted into Parliament. This increased popularity of PRM and Tudor was the product of unique circumstances, such as the accumulated disappointment of certain Romanians towards three consecutive political administrations (1990-1992; 1992-1996 and 1996-2000). It was a singular success for PRM and Tudor, as their popularity would significantly decrease after 2004. Even though Tudor ranked second in the initial round of presidential elections, his electoral performance would not be confirmed in December 2000.

It was an important episode for Romanian democracy. Society as a whole needed to demonstrate its alignment with Western or liberal democratic values. Neither of the two remaining presidential

[4] Elizabeth Pond, 'Romania: Better Late than Never', *The Washington Quarterly*, volume 24(2), 2001, p. 36.

[5] University of Essex, 'Romania: 2000 Parliamentary Elections', *Election Results*; http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexElections.asp?country=ROMANIA&election=ro2000presidential (June 2014).

candidates was a good option. Tudor's rhetoric of the early 1990s was prolific in xenophobic and anti-Semitic connotations. He was a central promoter of Marshal Ion Antonescu's rehabilitation and refused to acknowledge Romania's complicity in the Holocaust, even going so far as to deny the very existence of the Holocaust in Europe. As for Iliescu, he was not at all an inspiring candidate or former President. His political background had several problematic issues: Iliescu's communist past, how he and the National Salvation Front negatively marked Romania's transition to democratic rule, how they exhibited undemocratic attitudes towards opposition groups, Iliescu's role in bringing the Jiu Valley miners to Bucharest and their subsequent violent actions (June 1990).[6] So the new President of Romania would either have questionable democratic credentials or lack them entirely. Who fitted better a state aspiring to be accepted as a Euro-Atlantic democracy? Romanians overwhelmingly chose the lesser of two evils, when two thirds of the electorate voted against Tudor becoming the next President in the second round of elections – Iliescu 66.83% and Tudor 33.17%.[7] Liberal democratic values, or at least the hope for a Euro-Atlantic future, influenced the outcome of December 2000.

Considering the poor record of Iliescu and PDSR on necessary domestic reforms in 1990-1996, some observers feared that Romania would not adequately meet its obligations for NATO and EU integration, which would make the state lag even further behind most of the other post-communist candidates.[8] PDSR appointed Adrian

[6] For further details see Loretta C. Salajan, *Discoursing on European Identity: A Study of Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy* (Cluj: Presa Universitara Clujeana, 2017).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, *Romania and the European Union: From Marginalisation to Membership* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 48.

Năstase as the new Prime Minister and formed a legislative majority with the help of UDMR. President Iliescu's electoral programme defined Euro-Atlantic accession as a 'major priority' and indicated that Romanian foreign policy would play 'an essential role in promoting the new European destiny of our country, in affirming our identity in the context of accelerated European integration, in consolidating relations with neighbours, as well as other states'.[9]

On 31 March 2001, Prime Minister Năstase reinforced that Romania's Euro-Atlantic orientation was 'firm and irreversible'.[10] At the end of May 2001, he also stated quite confidently that:

> '[f]rom our point of view, Romania will fulfil all accession criteria in 2002. Romania's importance in the region, the relations built with NATO countries over the years represent a guarantee that Romania will continue to be an island of stability in this agitated area of Europe'.[11]

After the shocking terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Romania gradually shifted its arguments for NATO membership to stress the ability of contributing to the 'War on Terror', which also incorporated the state's self–images and related articulations of national identity ('European', 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider').

---

[9] Ion Iliescu – President of Romania (December 2000 – December 2004), 'Close to People, Together with Them' – Electoral Campaign Programme (December 2000) in *Renaşterea speranței/ The Re-birth of Hope* (Bucharest: Mondo Media, 2001), p. 17 and p. 24.

[10] Adrian Năstase – Prime Minister of Romania (December 2000 – December 2004), 'Speech at the NATO Forum' (Snagov, 31 March 2001) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; available at http://www.gov.ro/interventie__l1a5374.html (February 2013).

[11] Adrian Năstase, 'Speech at the Meeting with Foreign Press Representatives' (Bucharest, 29 May 2001) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; available at http://www.gov.ro/discurs__l1a5755.html (February 2013).

During its first post-communist decade, the fluid nature of Romanian identity displayed a series of key re-definitions. The years 1990-1996 configured a foreign policy imaginary that contained three main self-images: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. As discussed in chapter II, these self-images can be seen as identities in their own right, yet they also subsume hierarchically to a larger identity. All three self-images feed into Romania's overarching 'Euro-Atlantic' national identity. Romania's 'European' identity basically meant becoming a consolidated liberal democracy and being recognised as such in the international realm, including in the context of NATO and EU requirements. That is why the 'European' and 'liberal democratic' self-image referred to the same representation.

If the period 1990-1996 was about articulating the main themes featured in the Romanian foreign policy imaginary, post-1996 the liberal democratic facet began to appear more frequently than the 'European' one in domestic discourses. Romania's evolving reactions to the Kosovo crisis encapsulated the inherent dilemmas of acting as a 'European' liberal democracy. The two self-images ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') and Balkan affinity competed for precedence in the collective mindset of state officials. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitated the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the international ideational context changed towards the endorsement of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Normative Euro-Atlantic expectations demanded that any self-respecting liberal democracy would act to save Kosovo from a totalitarian regime. Such an ideational shift enabled a hierarchy inside Romanian national identity, where the 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images prevailed over Balkan ties.

This point was very significant in the trajectory of Romanian identity and foreign policy, influencing the state's stance on the Iraq war in particular and its external conduct in general after 2000. Here national identity underwent two fundamental re-definitions. First, as the international discourses advocated the notion of humanitarian and democratic intervention in 1999, Romania's 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image moved towards representing the state as a pro-active liberal democracy that should help those suffering under dictatorships. Romania's painful communist past made it understand too well the difficulties of people going through similar totalitarian plights. Until now, the 'European' and 'liberal democratic' facets constituted the same self-image. From this point onwards, the Romanian 'liberal democratic' self-image was discursively separated from 'European' identity.

Second, after the national identity tensions were settled regarding the Kosovo case, the 'non-Balkan' self-image gradually disappeared from the foreign policy imaginary. The 'European', 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images became the dominant ones. Consequently, two fundamental re-definitions of Romanian national identity occurred between 1990 and 2000: the 'non-Balkan' self-image faded away and Romania was articulated as a pro-active liberal democracy that could have a primary 'European' or 'Atlantic' vocation. These elements become particularly relevant when analysing Romania's position on the Iraq war.

The post-2000 internal discourse highlighted variations on the 'security provider' and liberal democratic themes, the kinds of meanings which would appeal to Euro-Atlantic audiences. This was

visible in the Romanian Parliament's decision adopted on 19 September 2001, with only one abstention -

> 'Romania, as strategic partner of the United States of America and member of the Partnership for Peace, will take part as a de facto NATO ally (…) in the fight against international terrorism through all means, including military'.[12]

The resolution offered the use of 'facilities on Romanian air, land and maritime territory' to support 'potential counter-terrorist operations' at NATO's request.[13] Continuing the anti-terrorist vein, in December 2001, the political administration published the new National Security Strategy, a document which reflected the state's perspective on the changing international realm in the aftermath of 9/11.

Although unconventional threats or risks featured quite prominently in almost all sections of the text, it was interesting to note that they were not discursively associated with the state's interests. Romanian national interests were defined around building a democratic and stable state and were listed as follows:

> 'the maintenance of the integrity, unity, sovereignty and independence of the Romanian state; the guarantee of fundamental democratic freedoms, and ensuring the welfare, security and safety of Romania's citizens; the economic and social development of the country, in accordance with the world's contemporary development (…); meeting the conditions for Romania's integration as a NATO and EU member (…); asserting the national identity and pursuing it as a democratic value, making best use of and developing the national cultural

[12] The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision number 21 on 19 September 2001 concerning Romania's Participation, together with NATO Member States, to Actions against International Terrorism', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 589, 20 September 2001.

[13] Ibid.

heritage and the creative abilities of the Romanian people; protection of the environment, natural resources, the quality of the environmental factors at international standards'.[14]

While it has been argued that the document was primarily based on an underlying neo-realist logic[15], both the national interests and security objectives were mostly inward-looking and focused on 'the modernisation of Romanian society'.[16] At different points in the text, Romania was articulated as a state embracing liberal democratic values, 'pillar of stability in the area', 'defender of democracy', 'important provider of regional and international security'.[17] Despite adapting the 2001 National Security Strategy to the post-9/11 context, the Romanian narrative did not modify the two main self-images of national identity – 'liberal democracy' and 'security provider'.

What did change was the higher profile of Romanian participation in multinational peace-keeping and stabilisation efforts (Bosnia and Kosovo), as well as the involvement in Afghanistan operations (October 2001). As part of the missions conducted within Enduring Freedom (joint American-British-Afghan) and International Security Assistance Force (NATO), Romania aimed to prove that it possessed the military capability – personnel, transport and logistic

[14] The Parliament of Romania, 'Romania's National Security Strategy. Guaranteeing Democracy and Fundamental Liberties, Sustained and Lasting Economic and Social Development, the Accession to NATO and European Union Integration', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 822, 20 December 2001.

[15] Andrei Miroiu, 'National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The Romanian Case', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, volume 2(2), 2002, p. 106.

[16] The Parliament of Romania, 'Romania's National Security Strategy' (2001).

[17] Ibid.

support - to act as a NATO allied state.[18] The Defence Minister, Ioan Paşcu, framed these foreign policy initiatives as a way of 'substantiating the security provider role' and counteracting some accusations that Romania was contributing too little in this sense.[19] The last part of the Romanian road to NATO membership was paved with an impulsive decision in August 2002, which to some extent prefigured the state's reflexive pro-American or Atlantic vocation of foreign policy during the Iraq war.

Romania and the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement

Romania's most controversial foreign policy action in 2002 was signing a Bilateral Immunity (or 'Article 98') Agreement with the US, which related to the recently founded International Criminal Court (ICC). In 1998 an international criminal justice system was established through the Rome conference and Statute. The ICC was the first permanent international legal body created to bring individuals to trial for accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. American hostility towards the Rome Statute and ICC focused on the fear of Court politicisation; hence it noted that 'in addition to exposing members of the Armed Forces of the United States to the risk of international criminal prosecution, the Rome Statute creates a risk that the President and other senior

[18] Ronald H. Linden, 'Introduction: Romania, NATO and the New Security Environment', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics,* volume 2(2), 2002, p. 3.

[19] Ioan M. Paşcu – Minister of National Defence (December 2000 – December 2004), *NATO Enlargement: The Case of Romania. Personal Report* (2007), p. 117; available at ioanmirceapascu.ro/media/pdf/extinderea-nato-ioan-mircea-pascu.pdf (June 2014).

elected and appointed officials of the United States Government may be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court'.[20]

Despite American concerns about the ICC, President Clinton suggested that the US intended to become a state party to the Rome Statute by signing it in 2000.[21] Nevertheless, on 1 July 2002, his successor - George W. Bush - notified the UN of his administration's intention to basically 'unsign' the treaty. In doing so, the US announced the removal from any further obligations stipulated in the Rome Statute and that there was no intention of ratifying it. The invoked reason was that the ICC 'undermined the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, it created a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power, it purports to assert jurisdiction over nationals of states that have not ratified the treaty, and it is therefore built on a "flawed foundation"'.[22]

Consequently, the Americans launched a campaign to withdraw their citizens from ICC jurisdiction via bilateral treaties with other states, which were based on article 98.1 of the Rome Statute:

> '[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless

[20] United States Department of State, *Title II: American Service-Members' Protection Act* (August 2002); http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm (June 2014).

[21] William Clinton, *Statement on the Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty* (31 December 2000); http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1095580.stm (June 2014).

[22] 'US Notification of Intent not to Become a Party to the Rome Statute' in *American Journal of International Law*, volume 96(3), 2002, p. 724.

> the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity'.[23]

On 1 August 2002, Romania was the first to sign this type of treaty with the US and among the very few European states to do so. To mark the occasion, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Secretary of State Cristian Diaconescu said the following -

> '[w]e express our hope that, after considering the conclusions of this Agreement, the opening of a new perspective will be encouraged regarding a larger cooperation with the International Criminal Court, which would contribute to its increased efficiency and prestige and consolidate its representative nature (...) Romania has adhered to its obligations towards the International Criminal Court and promoted a conduct in accordance with the European Union's common foreign and security policy'.[24]

The above message was soon contradicted since the Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) was interpreted as both obstructing the ICC and opposing the EU stance. Firstly, the document was problematic because it prevented Romania from transferring or extraditing American 'persons' to the ICC without US consent; these 'persons' were defined as 'current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or other

---

[23] Article 98 – 'Cooperation with Respect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to Surrender' in *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (1 July 2002), p. 69; http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (June 2014).

[24] Cristian Diaconescu – Secretary of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, 'Speech after signing the Agreement with the United States concerning the International Criminal Court' (Bucharest, 1 August 2002) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/declaratie__l1a11943.html (February 2013).

nationals of the United States of America'.[25] BIAs caused much controversy within the international community, since they were blocking the ICC jurisdiction over any American national and undermining the Court and architecture of ideals behind it.

Secondly, the EU did not have a clear attitude towards BIAs in August 2002, but EU officials were generally disappointed by Romanian actions. As the European Commission's spokesperson put it, 'we regret this decision of Romania (...) and we deplore that a candidate country has not waited until the European Union established its position'.[26] In September 2002, Prime Minister Năstase tried to downplay the situation and somewhat excuse Romania's overzealous foreign policy move:

> 'It is clear that we need to have better consultations and a more efficient system of communication so as to avoid such tensions. Yet there is obviously the pending matter which will be discussed between the European Union and the United States, and in my opinion, the document signed by Romania will be incorporated within their agreed solution'.[27]

Interestingly, Năstase still did not find the BIA implications controversial and did not seem to regret signing it. He only blamed the faulty Romanian communication with the EU.

---

[25] *Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Romania regarding the Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court* (2002); available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Romania_98_2.pdf (June 2014).

[26] Mircea Micu, 'The Europeanization of Romanian Foreign Policy: Mitigating European and National "Misfits" in the International Criminal Court and Kosovo Cases', *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, volume 11(4), 2011, p. 55.

[27] Adrian Năstase, 'Joint Press Statements with EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen' (Salzburg, 16 September 2002) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa__l1a12881.html (February 2013).

On 30 September 2002, the European Council reached its conclusions on the ICC and BIAs signed with the US:

> '[t]he Rome Statute provides all necessary safeguards against the use of the Court for politically motivated purposes. It should be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole'.[28]

The Council also gave guidelines to member and candidate states about only entering BIAs that relate to immunity for diplomats, military personnel and extradited persons, excluding other categories of American nationals.[29] In that respect, the Commission's subsequent report specified as follows –

> 'Romania has ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. In August 2002 Romania signed a bilateral agreement with the USA on the non-surrender of each others' nationals to the International Criminal Court. Regrettably, this decision was taken without adequate prior consultation with the EU. It does not comply with the guiding principles laid down by the Council'.[30]

In the end, the American BIA was not submitted to the Romanian Parliament's agenda and thus not ratified, due to its incompatibility with the EU viewpoints.

This episode of Romanian foreign policy shows that various elements were impacting on the state's international responses.

---

[28] The European Council, *Conclusions on General Affairs and External Relations* (Brussels, 30 September 2002), p. 9; available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/12134_02en.pdf (June 2014).

[29] Ibid, p. 10.

[30] The European Commission, *Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession* (Brussels, 9 October 2002), p. 120; available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/ro_en.pdf (June 2014).

Rationalism would say that Romania was trying to please the US - the most powerful Alliance member, in order to obtain support for NATO accession. But Romanian elites did not make the BIA official and legally binding in Parliament because of the opposing 'European'/EU position regarding the ICC. So the possible rational motive of currying favour with the US was not finalised. The American BIA indicated Romania's uncomfortable position between 'Europe' and the US, which would be intensified in the case of Iraq. Here Romania backtracked on its pro-American attitude and eventually aligned with 'Europe' in October 2002. Even so, the BIA was a sign that Romania could prefer an 'Atlantic' rather than 'European' orientation on Iraq, depending on what ideational factors shaped its foreign policy. The American BIA also proved not to play a great role in issuing Romania's invitation to become a NATO member. Unlike the Madrid summit in 1997, the US as a key decision-maker of NATO agreed with the other European allies that Romania should be admitted into the Alliance.

Romania was invited to join NATO at the Prague summit on 21 November 2002. President Iliescu described it as 'a historical moment which symbolises the total and radical separation from the past, as well as Romania's permanent inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic area'.[31] After the Alliance summit, President Bush visited Bucharest where he addressed a large and enthusiastic crowd on 23 November:

> '[y]our effort has been recognized by an offer to NATO membership. We welcome Romania into NATO (...) The promises of our alliance are sacred and we will keep our pledges to all the nations that join us. Should any danger threaten Romania, should any nation threaten

[31] Ion Iliescu, 'Message about Romania's Invitation to Join the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization' (Prague, 21 November 2002) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=4540&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

> Romania, the United States of America and NATO will be by your side. As a NATO ally, you can have this confidence - no one will be able to take away the freedom of your country (...) For centuries Romania's geography was a source of dangers. Now you can help our alliance to extend the hand of cooperation across the Black Sea'.[32]

The American President's speech suggested the representation of Romania as already being a NATO member or allied state. This articulation was also adopted by Iliescu, who remembered that day as a 'celebration of Romania's accession into NATO'.[33] Bush's words were interpreted by Defence Minister Pașcu to be an 'unambiguous security guarantee', which fulfilled 'the dream of generation after generation of Romanians to live securely in peace and prosperity'.[34]

The idea was reinforced by Foreign Affairs Minister Mircea Geoană – 'a security guarantee unique in the history of Romania'.[35] Throughout the rest of 2002, President Iliescu continued to depict his state as an Alliance member - '[o]ur accession into NATO is the most concrete evidence for the radical changes we started during the Revolution of December 1989'.[36] He further stressed that:

> '[a]s a central-southern European country, as NATO member and future member of the European Union, Romania must undertake

---

[32] George W. Bush, 'Remarks to the People of Romania' (Bucharest, 23 November 2003) in *The American Presidency Project*; transcribed from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/youtubeclip.php?clipid=73347&admin=43 (June 2014).

[33] Ion Iliescu, *Fragmente de viață şi de istorie trăită/ Excerpts of Life and Lived History* (Bucharest: Litera Internațional, 2011), p. 401.

[34] Ioan M. Paşcu, 'Perspectives of a Prospective NATO Member', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, volume 15(1), 2004, p. 15.

[35] Mircea Geoană – Minister of Foreign Affairs (December 2000 – December 2004), 'Transcript of TV Interview on Romania's Invitation to Join NATO' in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/transcriere__l1a14848.html (February 2013).

[36] Ion Iliescu, 'Speech in the Romanian Parliament' (Bucharest, 25 November 2002) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_ RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=4537&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

> more commitments in its geographical area, to honour its role as stabilising factor and security provider'.[37]

The natural enthusiasm of the occasion could have led national foreign policy decision-makers to temporarily forget a key aspect. Romania's NATO membership was not fully guaranteed. The individual Alliance members were still supposed to ratify the Romanian accession protocol. Only then would the state finalise one of the major goals of its post-communist foreign policy. This point will be significant when examining the complex context surrounding Romania's decision to take part and specific involvement in the coalition against Iraq.

Romania and the Iraq War

A crucial 'formative moment' that encapsulated the fundamental re-definitions of Romanian identity and foreign policy was the 2003 invasion of Iraq. There were two contrasting approaches to disarming Iraq – France and Germany preferred peaceful methods, whereas the US wanted to use armed force. Romania initially refused to choose between the two sides, yet in the end national elites across the political spectrum settled on a vocal Atlantic position and full military involvement in the coalition against Iraq. The international context was complicated and Romania could have had external costs either by aligning with 'Europe' (France and Germany) or with the US. Rationalism would affirm that Romania sided with the Americans to gain their help in finalising the NATO integration process. But France

[37] Ion Iliescu, 'Address to the Joint Chambers of Romania's Parliament' (Bucharest, 19 December 2002) in *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates*; available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5447&idm=1&idl=1 (June 2014).

was very displeased with Romania's pro-American attitude and indirectly threatened the state's EU candidacy.

Romanian accession into the EU was much more problematic than NATO membership, since the state had already been invited to join NATO in November 2002. France and Germany were key EU members and would each have a decisive say on Romania eventually entering the EU. Military participation in the Iraq war was not an advantageous option for Romania in the wider rational equation. That is why national identity comes in to shed light on the Romanian international orientation. The state became fully involved in the coalition against Iraq because this decision was consistent with both the fundamentally re-defined national identity ('pro-active liberal democracy') and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy. After intervening in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, Romania as a liberal democracy seeking external acceptance could not have double standards and decline to support the US in the Iraq war.

The International Context and Romania's Neutral Views on Iraq

The year 2003 brought the culmination of growing tensions between prominent NATO members over the issue of whether to invade Iraq. The US argued for an Alliance mission in Iraq, while France and Germany were against it.[38] On 29 January 2002, President

[38] For detailed analyses of the 2003 Iraq war, see Daniel Levy et al (eds.), *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War* (London: Verso, 2005); Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2007); Terri H. Anderson, *Bush's Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Frank P. Harvey, *Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Bush used his State of the Union address to announce a fundamental shift in American foreign policy:

> 'Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade (…) States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world (…) I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons'.[39]

Apart from demonising the Iraqi dictatorship and constructing it as the most dangerous 'other', this speech prefigured the American willingness to take unilateral action against those it perceived as a threat. The Bush doctrine of pre-emption was formalised in the new National Security Strategy, which mentioned the following in September 2002 –

> '[w]hile the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country'.[40]

The American foreign policy stance indicated that Iraq would be the first theatre where such a pre-emptive strike would be operationalised. This led to persistent international disagreements – on the one hand,

---

[39] George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address* (Washington, 29 January 2002); http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (June 2014).

[40] The US Presidency, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, September 2002), p. 6; available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/63562.pdf (June 2014).

between the US and France and Germany and on the other hand, within Europe itself.

On 22 January 2003, the French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder issued a common anti-war declaration after the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, which celebrated their states' historical reconciliation:

> '[o]bviously thinking about Iraq, Germany and France have an identical judgement about the crisis. Only the United Nations Security Council can make a legitimate decision (...) for us, war is always an acknowledgment of defeat and the worst solution, and therefore, everything must be done to prevent it'.[41]

Compared to the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the French-German position regarded war or the use of military force as the worst and final option. While the US considered a UN mandate to be desirable but ultimately optional for Iraq, France and Germany insisted on obtaining the approval of the UN Security Council.

The American reply came swiftly on the same day during the press conference held by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who introduced and defined the dichotomy of 'old' versus 'new' Europe -

> 'You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east (...) Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem (...) But you look at vast

[41] Jacques Chirac, *Speech to German and French Members of Parliament* (Versailles, 22 January 2003), p. 6; French version available at http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/fr/ wp-content/uploads/2010/04/couple-franco-allemand-22-janvier-2003.pdf (June 2014).

> numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany (...) they're with the United States'.[42]

Rumsfeld's comments underlined the fact that the European allies of NATO were divided on how to deal with the Iraq situation.

On 27 January 2003, the EU gave a neutral statement which reinforced the UN prerogative of authorising military actions:

> '[t]he Council underlines the fundamental importance of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the relevant international instruments. The Security Council has a key role to play in these endeavours (...) The responsibility of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security must be respected'.[43]

However, only three days later, eight European NATO members (the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) nuanced their stance and signed an open letter of support towards the efforts of disarming Iraq -

> '[t]he real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law (...) Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom. We in Europe have a relationship with the United States which has stood the test of time (...) The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security. In today's world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion

---

[42] Donald Rumsfeld – US Secretary of Defense, 'Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center', *News Transcript* (22 January 2003); available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330 (June 2014).

[43] The European Council, 'European Council Declaration on Iraq', *Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels, 27 January 2003), p. 16; available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf (June 2014).

> (…) The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security (…) Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein's last chance to disarm using peaceful means. The opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him'.[44]

Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council had been adopted on 8 November 2002. This resolution stated that 'Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations' and granted the state 'a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations'.[45] The letter of the eight European NATO allies came at a sensitive time in the French-German and American dispute on Iraq. It highlighted UN authority, while adding that 'Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein's last chance to disarm using peaceful means'. As the permanent members of the Security Council were divided over Iraq, Resolution 1441 did not explicitly mention that it was the final opportunity for Iraq to disarm peacefully. The letter of the eight was also an opportunity to make a stand for a certain kind of Europe. The signatory states used the text to express their own Atlantic vision of Europe vis-à-vis the one put forward by Paris and Berlin on 22 January 2003.[46] The eight European members of NATO indirectly conveyed that they would be willing to back the US, if Iraq did not comply with Resolution 1441.

Throughout January 2003, Romania maintained a neutral view on the possibility of an Iraq intervention, refusing to choose between

---

[44] 'Leaders' Statement on Iraq: Full Text', *BBC News* (30 January 2003); available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2708877.stm (June 2014).

[45] The United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1441 (2002)*, p. 3; available at http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf (June 2014).

[46] Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq* (London: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 130.

the 'European' and 'Atlantic' dimensions of its national identity. Romanian foreign policy elites denied the notion of a Euro-Atlantic rift, which translated into the need to opt for either the Europeans or the Americans. Instead, Romania insisted on the common values which had bound the allied states together for such a long time. These shared ideas and principles made it impossible or, at least, very difficult for Romania to select one side over the other. President Iliescu summarised this dilemma of national identity –

> '[h]ow could we make such distinctions between being European and non-European, pro-American and anti-American? (…) We have always underlined our preoccupation to act in the spirit of both European and Euro-Atlantic unity'.[47]

When answering a question about Rumsfeld and the US reliance on 'new' Europe, Prime Minister Năstase declared in January 2003:

> '[i]t is difficult for me to judge US relations with other countries in Europe (…) For us, for Romania, it is important to maintain complementary relationships with both NATO and the European Union. Naturally, it is important for us to have close ties with all European states as well as the US. We are unable to separate the two and do not wish to do so'.[48]

On 28 January 2003 in Paris, Năstase cautioned against letting the 'heated debates on the best course of action in Iraq' lead to 'a rift

[47] Ion Iliescu, 'Interview for BBC' (Brussels, 18 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3593&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

[48] Adrian Năstase, 'Press Statements after the Annual Awards of Romanian Diplomacy' (Bucharest, 24 January 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa__l1a16110.html (February 2013).

between EU and NATO allies'; otherwise, this would play into 'Saddam Hussein's real agenda – the division of the West'.[49]

In a Washington speech on 4 February 2003, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană emphasized that the Euro-Atlantic link needed to be stronger than the controversial topics that strained it:

> '[t]he Trans-Atlantic relationship cannot be reduced to the differences that exist even within the happiest of families. Whether we are talking about Kyoto, or the International Criminal Court, international trade or policy toward Iraq, *these differences are much more about approach and tactics than about substance and strategic vision* (...) We all agree on the essentials. What we need to work harder is on managing, not magnifying, bridging, not broadening our differences. From Seattle to Brest to Constanța on the Black Sea shore of Romania, *we belong to the same community of shared values and ideas*'.[50]

Since the three significant actors (the US, France and Germany) had already made clear their contrasting opinions on an Iraq invasion, Romania's reluctance to acknowledge the emerging state of affairs and insistence on the Euro-Atlantic bond or 'united front' could appear out of sync with reality. Yet this attitude in the face of Euro-Atlantic divergences should be seen as trying to avoid an identity crisis within Romania's liberal democratic self-image. According to Stephen Larrabee, Central-Eastern European states did 'not want to be forced

---

[49] Adrian Năstase, 'Speech at the University of Sorbonne' (Paris, 28 January 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/discurs__l1a 16229.html (February 2013).

[50] Mircea Geoană, 'Address at the School of Advanced International Studies – Johns Hopkins University' (Washington, 4 February 2003) in *Politica externă a României la începutul secolului XXI/ Romania's Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the XXI*st *Century* (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 2005), pp. 225-226, emphasis in original.

to choose between the United States and western Europe'; they were 'uncomfortable' with the Bush administration's attempt 'to differentiate between "old" and "new" Europe'.[51]

Throughout a range of interviews given to the French press in January 2003, Prime Minister Năstase was required to elaborate almost exclusively upon Romania's international responses to the opposing American and French-German stances on Iraq. From the beginning, he rejected Rumsfeld's distinction by saying that Romania was 'without a doubt part of "old" Europe' due to its long history and Latin ancestry.[52] Năstase voiced his disbelief in such a 'Manichean device' of 'good versus bad' because ultimately Europe and the US held the same values.[53] The Foreign Affairs Minister echoed similar meanings in Washington:

> '[s]peaking for Romanians, we have always considered ourselves part of the traditions, culture and history of "old Europe". After overcoming half a century of forced exile under communism, we are now a proud part of "new Europe". *A strong Europe, a vibrant NATO, a credible West. This is our vision, this is our drive*'.[54]

When asked frankly if Romania was attempting 'to seduce' the US to 'get closer' to NATO membership, while distancing itself from Europe, the Romanian Prime Minister framed his answer as follows -

---

[51] F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe', *Foreign Affairs*, volume 85(6), November-December 2006, p. 124.

[52] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview for the French Television Channel "LCI"' (Paris, 28 January 2003) in *Interviuri 2001-2004/ Interviews 2001-2004* (Bucharest: Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2009), p. 108.

[53] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview to French Newspapers "Le Figaro", "La tribune", "Liberation"' (Paris, 28 January 2003) in *Interviuri 2001-2004*, p. 114.

[54] Mircea Geoană, 'Address at the School of Advanced International Studies – Johns Hopkins University' (Washington, 4 February 2003) in *Politica externă a României la începutul secolului XXI/ Romania's Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the XXIst Century*, p. 228, emphasis in original.

> '[i]t is a false perception (…) We are a country that owes a great deal to its French and European friends in general, but also to the Americans, particularly concerning the formation of the unified Romanian state after the First World War. So we are deeply indebted to our friends and, consequently, cannot encourage a rift between them'.[55]

It was a diplomatic reply that did not give any indication about how Romania would react when forced to handle its identity dilemma, whether the state would eventually adopt a 'European' or 'Atlantic' foreign policy.

Romania as a Pro-active Liberal Democracy with an Atlantic Vocation

On 5 February 2003, Romania shifted its balanced Euro-Atlantic position towards a clearer solidarity with the US view, by signing the statement of the Vilnius 10. The latter was a group formed of already invited NATO entrants and some aspirants. Their statement tried to use a neutral language, which stressed the importance of a collective approach to counter-act threats against democratic principles:

> '[o]ur countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction'. [56]

---

[55] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview for the French Television Channel "LCI"' in *Interviuri 2001-2004/ Interviews 2001-2004*, p. 110.

[56] The Vilnius Group Countries, *Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia* (5 February 2003); available at http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/press-releases/2003/feb/ 2868/ (June 2014).

Two elements in the text clearly suggested alignment with the American stance. First, the Vilnius 10 group agreed that the US 'presented compelling evidence' to the UN Security Council 'detailing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, its active efforts to deceive UN inspectors, and its links to international terrorism'.[57]

Second, they drew the same main conclusion as the Americans and declared that 'it has now become clear that Iraq is in material breach of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, including U.N. Resolution 1441'.[58] The Vilnius 10 were therefore 'prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq'.[59] The statement ended on a more conciliatory tone and insisted on the necessity of a democratic united front under UN authority:

> '[t]he clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein's regime requires a united response from the community of democracies. We call upon the U.N. Security Council to take the necessary and appropriate action in response to Iraq's continuing threat to international peace and security'.[60]

The Vilnius 10 letter still referred to a UN approved Iraqi operation.

In the Romanian case, the Vilnius 10 document became irrelevant only a week later, when domestic elites 'provided facilities for US troops in the Iraq crisis and committed forces to the post-conflict stabilization effort'.[61] On 12 February 2003, Romania adopted

---

[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] F. Stephen Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Pittsburgh: RAND, 2003), p. 48; available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_ reports/2005/MR1744.pdf (June 2014).

an unequivocal pro-American orientation when Parliament approved the state's non-combatant contribution to a coalition against Iraq, if military actions were initiated. At US request, the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) led by President Iliescu initially analysed the situation and then decided to actively take part in a possible Iraqi mission.[62]

Iliescu sent an official letter in which he asked Parliament to sanction Romania offering '4 major state officers in the coalition command central, an NBC [joint nuclear-biological-chemical] regiment for defence purposes formed of 70 soldiers, a military police platoon formed of 25 soldiers, a medical unit of 30 agents and 149 bomb disposal experts', along with 're-confirming access to airspace and necessary infrastructure'.[63] The President hoped for a favourable vote from the legislative body because it would 'constitute Romania's commitment to promoting and defending democratic values'.[64] Considering the state's previously balanced or neutral position on Iraq which refused to choose between the US and 'Europe' (most powerful EU members – France and Germany), why did Romanian national identity and foreign policy abruptly change towards overt Atlanticism?

From a wider analytical perspective, the shift was not that sudden as Romania signing the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement in 2002 prefigured the state's emerging Atlantic vocation. The most accessible explanation for Romanian behaviour is the usual rational calculation, whose aim was to irrevocably secure NATO

---

[62] Ion Iliescu, 'The President of Romania's Request to Parliament concerning Romanian Participation to the Coalition against Iraq, in the Eventuality of Military Operations in the Crisis Region' in *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* (Bucharest, 12 February 2003); available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5382&idm=4&idl=1 (June 2014).

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

membership. Realists have also invoked the 'bandwagoning' and 'balancing' phenomena which basically say that Central-Eastern Europe in general[65] and Romania in particular[66] sided with the most powerful entity - the US - to solve their various security dilemmas. However, there is much more to the story of Romanian foreign policy and it derives from the influence of national identity on how elites interpreted the Iraq episode.

A re-definition of national identity started during the Kosovo conflict, when international discourses intensely promoted the notion of humanitarian intervention. This impacted on Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image, which was gradually constituted as a more pro-active liberal democracy that should help defend those suffering under totalitarian regimes. Similarly to Kosovo, the Iraq war was a 'formative moment' which favoured significant re-articulations of both identity and foreign policy. The fact that French-German and US views were persistently divided on Iraq forced Central-Eastern European states to make a firm choice. Against such a background, Romania's national identity underwent a crisis within its liberal democratic self-image and had to decide whether to be 'European' or become an 'Atlantic' democracy.

The CSAT meeting on 10 February 2003 established the main guidelines of Romanian involvement in the coalition against Iraq.[67] The

---

[65] Alexandru Grigorescu, 'East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War: The Choice between "Soft Balancing" and "Soft Bandwagoning"', *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, volume 41(3), 2008, pp. 281-299.

[66] Ruxandra Ivan, *La politique étrangère roumaine (1990-2006)/ Romanian Foreign Policy (1990-2006)* (Brussels: Editions L'Université de Bruxelles, 2009), p. 167.

[67] The Presidency of Romania, 'Press Release for the Meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defence' (Bucharest, 10 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3559&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

related motion was sent to Parliament, where the normal expectation was for it to be passed by the legislative majority. Unlike the Kosovo conflict, the topic of Iraq was met with widespread agreement across the political spectrum. Only the Great Romania Party (PRM) voiced dissent towards the project. Its representative, Senator Ilie Ilaşcu, reminded his audience about Romania's close ties to Western Europe and advanced the following arguments:

> '[t]he duplicitous attitude of Romanian authorities in the Iraqi crisis will have great negative impact on the population (...) the political sphere will be affected by Western European countries with whom we have close relations (...) I ask myself: why has the situation come to such a point that the government is ready to unforgivably defy the rules of global democracy, UN authorities, in exchange for an unclear military coalition with the United States of America, a country that has openly and firmly declared that it will attack Iraq with or without the consent of the UN Security Council?'[68]

He concluded by saying that PRM would abstain from the vote and remain opposed to any military action against Iraq in general and Romanian participation in particular, unless legally approved by the UN Security Council.[69]

The above quote indirectly appeals to the state's liberal democratic self-image, which identified with 'Western Europe' and should have shaped a foreign policy aligned with that of close friends like France. Taking the argument further, a consolidated liberal democracy should not act outside the boundaries of international law

[68] Ilie Ilaşcu – PRM Senator, 'The Debate and Adoption of Parliament's Decision regarding Romania's Participation in the Coalition against Iraq' in *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates – Joint Session of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies* (Bucharest, 12 February 2003); available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5382&idm= 5&idl=1 (June 2014).

[69] Ibid.

(lack of UN mandate), or at least not engage in a unilateral American mission that has not been agreed upon within the authoritative Euro-Atlantic club (NATO). So how should a partially recognised liberal democracy such as Romania respond, when the previously united dimensions of its Euro-Atlantic national identity pull it in opposing directions? Should it act as a 'European' liberal democracy or become an 'Atlantic'-oriented one?

Another representative from the parliamentary opposition, Deputy Gheorghe Negoiță, spoke on behalf of the Democrat Party - PD and described Romania's contribution to a coalition against Iraq as the 'natural continuity of a coherent foreign policy conducted by our country since removing Ceauşescu's dictatorship'.[70] He stressed that such an endeavour was part of the state's duty and responsibility as a NATO member:

> 'Romania must respect its international commitments to the defence of democracy and the fundamental values of humanity. We wanted our country to be part of NATO. We wanted this integration as the only alternative capable of confirming our democratic future. That is why Romania now needs to undertake both the benefits and the obligations of its status as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance (...) The Democrat Party has insisted and insists for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. But when the political and diplomatic arguments have been exhausted, a dictatorial regime has to be disarmed through a military intervention (...) The Democrat Party has supported NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and other areas where democracy was endangered (...) Now in 2003 Saddam Hussein is just as democratic as Slobodan Milosevic was in 1999'.[71]

[70] Gheorghe Liviu Negoiță – PD Deputy, ibid.
[71] Ibid.

In the Kosovo case, two self-images of Romanian identity ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') eventually prevailed over the state's Balkan affinity. Iraq brought about national identity tensions concerning the kind of liberal democracy Romania aspired to be. Kosovo had already set a precedent for democratic intervention, which prompted the question – how should Romania distinguish between dictators and decide to stand or not against them? Is a 'European' liberal democracy only preoccupied with the near abroad (former Yugoslavia)? That is a very selective understanding on how an established liberal democracy would be expected to act. If the authoritative Euro-Atlantic community advocates respect for human rights, geographical proximity should not be a deciding factor in humanitarian and democratic intervention.

The third opposition speaker, Deputy Ovidiu Drăgănescu, expressed a slight variation on the same themes of championing democracy and not appeasing totalitarianism -

> '[t]he National Liberal Party agrees with Romania joining the countries who wish to support the United States in Iraq's disarmament. Our party cannot ignore the solid arguments in favour of such an action – here I refer especially to the 18 UN resolutions which Iraq did not comply with. Moreover, we take into account the strong support conveyed by the Romanian public opinion with regards to a potential military intervention in Iraq (...) Looking back with pride to the 1989 Revolution, we, Romanians, paid the highest price to conquer our freedom and democracy, we paid with the blood of our young people killed in the streets of Timişoara, Bucureşti, Cluj (...) So today, after seeing what dictatorship and totalitarianism mean, we, Romanians, can only stand with those who love, cherish and defend freedom and democracy'.[72]

[72] Ovidiu Virgil Drăgănescu – PNL Deputy, ibid.

The quote suggests more explicitly how Romanian national identity has drawn from the collective memory-myths of its totalitarian past, which partially accounts for why the state felt responsible to promote and protect democratic values. This argument is analysed later in the chapter, as part of the wider ideational underpinnings of Romanian national identity and foreign policy. The different parliamentary opinions show that 'democracy' and 'democratic values' have become profoundly contested terms. The two concepts can be used either to support US actions despite the lack of a UN mandate, or to insist on not participating in military interventions without UN approval.

Drăgănescu also inquired why the government had not properly explained Romania's position to its EU partners, 'particularly those who have reservations about the American policy'.[73] In this respect, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană gave reassurances that the Romanian diplomacy had consulted with French, German and EU officials. Geoană also remarked upon the state's 'balance in international action', wishing to see 'a European Union with a coherent voice, a North-Atlantic Alliance with the same cohesion and security guarantees which work for the newly joined like Romania, and equally a United Nations and Security Council that preserve their full relevance'.[74]

During the final parliamentary discussions, Defence Minister Paşcu gave an interesting reply to Teodor Meleşcanu's (PNL member and former Foreign Affairs Minister) public recommendation to support the coalition against Iraq without sending troops. Paşcu had a more pragmatic opinion on the possibility of a balanced foreign policy

[73] Ibid.
[74] Mircea Geoană, ibid.

– 'solidarity with the USA, while taking Europe into account; I agree, it's perfect, just let us know how to put it in practice this time'.[75] He was the only one who explicitly acknowledged that the time for a middle ground had passed. Romania could no longer simultaneously appease both dimensions of its Euro-Atlantic national identity and opted for an Atlantic vocation. In the end, the decision to grant infrastructure and airspace access and prepare forces for potential post-conflict stabilisation was adopted with 351 votes in favour, 2 against and 74 abstentions.[76]

Therefore, the parliamentary debates on whether or not Romania had to be involved in the US military operations against Iraq encapsulated an evocative snapshot for the re-definition of Romanian national identity – preferably Euro-Atlantic yet, when forced to choose between the two dimensions, almost unhesitatingly Atlantic. The discourse indicated that both PD (opposition party) and Minister Geoană already considered their state to have achieved NATO accession – e.g. use of past tense in terms of seeking membership ('wanted'), 'its status as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance', 'newly joined like Romania'. Government and opposition alike framed the contribution in Iraq as the responsibility of a state that had painfully experienced life under dictatorship and 'paid the highest price for freedom'.

As the Foreign Affairs Minister said elsewhere,

> '[w]e in Romania have first-hand experience of living under dictatorship, without freedom, without choice, waiting for the opportunity to

[75] Ioan Mircea Paşcu, ibid.

[76] The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision number 2 on 12 February 2003 regarding Romania's Participation in the Coalition against Iraq', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania,* number 90, 13 February 2003.

> rejoin the West. We know that life lived in these circumstances is not life. It is merely survival (...) The Iraqi people, like the Germans under Hitler, the Baltics under Stalin and the Romanians under Ceauşescu deserve the opportunity for freedom'.[77]

The Defence Minister highlighted that, 'having lived a similar experience, Romania was able and wanted to directly support the domestic stabilisation effort and institutional consolidation of post-Saddam Iraq'.[78]

On 20 March 2003, President Iliescu issued the following statement covering Romanian participation in the Iraq war:

> 'Romania hopes that the military intervention will not take long and civilian casualties will be as low as possible. The Iraqi people have suffered enough and have the right to live in a peaceful democracy from now on. Romania is acting in a responsible manner, respecting its commitments and obligations in the international scene. Its position benefits from a large popular support, since Romanian citizens have lived the horrors of a totalitarian regime and are aware of the price for freedom. Depending on the available means, our country will contribute to the post-conflict operations, to help the civilian population and the political, economic and social reconstruction of Iraq'.[79]

---

[77] Mircea Geoană, 'Address at the School of Advanced International Studies – Johns Hopkins University' (Washington, 4 February 2003) in *Politica externă a României la începutul secolului XXI/ Romania's Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the XXIst Century*, p. 227 and p. 230; emphasis in original.

[78] Ioan M. Paşcu, *NATO Enlargement: The Case of Romania. Personal Report*, pp. 133-134.

[79] Ion Iliescu, 'Press Release on Current Developments in the Iraq Crisis' in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency* (Bucharest, 20 March 2003); available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3626&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

During the parliamentary debate, PD mentioned the 'Western European partners', but just in terms of informing them about Romania's Atlantic orientation, not questioning if perhaps the state should further deliberate its stance. Ironically, the only contestation about international legality and acting against the French-German side came from PRM – a nationalistic party with extremist tendencies and regarded as undemocratic.[80] Although the Foreign Affairs Minister continued to rhetorically emphasize the balanced nature of Romanian foreign policy, officially approving in Parliament the use of airspace and other required infrastructure by the anti-Iraq coalition was undoubtedly a pro-Atlantic move.

This was very problematic as it placed Romania in opposition to France, who had been a historical long-standing ally and friend. After all, France through its President Chirac had been Romania's most firm advocate for NATO accession at the 1997 summit in Madrid, while the US had refused to include it in that enlargement wave.[81] So it is important to note that foreign policy is not determined by either material interests or memory; rather different collective memory-myths or interpretations of history can be selected by elites from the foreign policy imaginary to support various views.

The diplomatic tensions with France arose very soon after the Romanian Parliament adopted the motion to support a potential coalition against Iraq under the US leadership. On 17 February 2003, the European Council held a special meeting that aimed to produce a

---

[80] Daniel Barbu, *Republica absentă: Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă/ The Absent Republic: Politics and Society in Post-communist Romania* (Bucharest: Nemira, 2004), p. 40.

[81] Ronald Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 239-240.

common EU view on Iraq. Yet the result did not contain a substantially different message from previous ones -

> '[w]e are committed to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order. We recognise that the primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security Council (...) The Union's objective for Iraq remains full and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions (...) We want to achieve this peacefully. It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want. War is not inevitable. Force should be used only as a last resort. It is for the Iraqi regime to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council'.[82]

This statement did not address the underlying disagreement among the European and EU allied partners of NATO. France and Germany continued to oppose a military operation in Iraq, while eight other members (the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) were willing to help an American initiative to disarm Iraq, possibly without UN approval.

The more interesting development happened after the European Council's meeting, when President Chirac held a press conference where he admonished, criticised and arguably threatened the EU applicants who supported the US:

> '[c]oncerning the candidate states (...) to be honest, I believe they have acted a bit superficially. Because accession to the European Union essentially involves a minimum of consideration for the other [members], a minimum of policy consultation. If, upon the first difficult subject, one gives a point of view independently from any discussion with the

[82] Council of the European Union, *Conclusions* (Brussels, 17 February 2003), p. 1; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/74554.pdf (June 2014).

> group which one actually wants to join, then that is not responsible behaviour (...) Therefore, I think they missed a good opportunity to keep silent. Beyond the somewhat amusing or childish aspects of the matter, it is a dangerous course of action (...) All it takes is one country not to ratify by referendum for [EU] enlargement not to move forward. So, frankly, I would say that these countries have been both not very well brought up and rather careless about the dangers that too quick an alignment with the American position could have for them'.[83]

Chirac also purposefully singled out Romania from a reporter's general question, underlining that Romania and Bulgaria 'were particularly superficial' considering 'their already delicate position with regards to Europe'; if the two states 'wanted to diminish their chances for European membership, they could not find a better way to do so'.[84] The French President gave the impression of speaking for the Union as a whole, when in fact that was not the case.

The EU officials had mixed reactions to Chirac's remarks. Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission) was disappointed by the candidates' conduct, since they failed to understand that the EU was not just about an economic union but also about shared political values and consensus.[85] Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations, insisted the EU was not the Warsaw Pact and added that – '[a]ll of us have our different ways of expressing ourselves, but the European Union is a club for equals,

---

[83] Jacques Chirac, *Press Conference after the Extraordinary Informal Meeting of the European Council* (Brussels, 17 February 2003); French version at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/europe/conf-chirac (June 2014).

[84] Ibid.

[85] Romano Prodi cited in 'Chirac Lashes out at "New Europe"', *CNN World* (18 February 2003); http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/ (June 2014).

and everybody has got to be listened to'.[86] Pat Cox (President of the European Parliament) 'blamed France for creating divisions in Europe by issuing unilateral foreign policy declarations'.[87]

Moreover, Romanian foreign policy decision-makers (who were present in Brussels) had to immediately formulate a response. Prime Minister Năstase opted for a diplomatic approach, stressing the state's uncomfortable international stance:

> '[i]t is very odd for us (…) to feel that were pushed to choose between Europe and the United States, instead of having to choose between Saddam Hussein's regime and the Euro-Atlantic countries (…) In my opinion, some issues need to be settled within an EU-US dialogue (…) However, it is difficult for us to accept being placed in an area of supplementary conditionality and (…) to understand why [EU] candidates like Romania have more obligations than member states and fewer rights. It would be a paradoxical situation'.[88]

President Iliescu went for a more direct phrasing and declared that the French President should regret his choice of words, concluding with –

> 'I find inappropriate such a way of framing things, as if some are more equal than others, some have fewer rights than others and, therefore, should be more prudent about what they think and say. I believe we

[86] Chris Patten cited in 'Candidates Sign up to EU Position on Iraq, Hit Back at Chirac', *EurActiv* (19 February 2003); http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/candidates-sign-eu-position-iraq-hit-back-chirac/article-114605 (June 2014).

[87] Pat Cox in ibid.

[88] Adrian Năstase, 'Press Statement after the Informal Meeting of the European Council with EU Candidate States' (Brussels, 17 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa__l1a16762.html (February 2013).

> are entering a democratic community in which mutual respect must govern everyone'.[89]

When tempers calmed down, Năstase introduced a firmer note to his statement, suggesting resentment towards a paternalistic France:

> 'France was disappointed by certain developments of the Iraqi crisis. I do not wish to comment on the language used, we must understand the French position because of our past (...) Yet I continue to believe that Romania, just like any other European country, has the right to decide its foreign policy actions and we do not appreciate someone else telling us what to do'.[90]

Among the Romanian public opinion, France's negative attitude caused concern that it would render the state's course for EU integration much more difficult or even impossible to achieve. Günter Verheugen - the European Commissioner for Enlargement - offered reassurances that EU gates were still open for Romania and it would not be subject to supplementary criteria compared to other applicants:

> '[t]he political trajectory defined at Copenhagen, aiming towards Romania's integration in 2007 is the principle underlying our [the Commission's] activity. I would like to point out that this process of EU enlargement will not end until Romania has become a member and we will apply the same set of EU accession conditions to Romania as with all the other candidate states. That is why achieving the

---

[89] Ion Iliescu, 'Interview for BBC' (Brussels, 18 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=3593&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

[90] Adrian Năstase, 'Joint Press Statements with EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen' (Bucharest, 20 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa__l1a16867.html (February 2013).

membership objective in 2007 depends on Romania's ability to fulfil the accession criteria'.[91]

The crucial question of this story is why Romania had a pro-active foreign policy on Iraq when it could have got away with a limited or neutral viewpoint on the invasion. Much of the literature on Central-Eastern European participation in the Iraq war gravitates around the neo-realist assumptions about 'small state' conduct. Though most works concede that these states had many reasons to side with the US, they tend to underline causal factors like power and material interests. Yet the logic of rationalism does not fully explain why Romania became wholeheartedly involved in the 'coalition of the willing'. In this respect, the notion of rational decision-making must be examined further.

Romania's situation in the process of NATO integration was complicated. In November 2002, it had received the invitation to join the Alliance and was scheduled to be granted official membership in 2004. The still pending issue was the fact that NATO allies had to individually ratify the accession protocol. Neither the US nor France had ratified it by the time of the Iraqi intervention. The US approved the accession protocol on 8 May 2003, while France was the last member to ratify it at the end of January 2004.[92] So the rational interest of pleasing the Americans to finalise NATO integration can account for why Romanian leaders backed the Bush administration, although the context is not clear-cut. France is not the most powerful Alliance member, but it has a veto at its disposal and is a highly influential member in the EU, where Romania's accession was much more problematic.

---

[91] Günter Verheugen cited in ibid.

[92] The Government of Slovenia, *NATO Ratifications*; available at http://nato.gov.si/eng/topic/ratification/ratifications/ (June 2014).

In the European arena, the more or less threatening remarks from Paris, Brussels and Berlin conveyed the worrying message that the upcoming EU integration could be jeopardised. EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen was convinced that Central-Eastern Europe would learn their lessons from Iraq because they 'know only too well where their markets are and where their money's coming from'.[93] According to a purely rational calculation, a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq could potentially bring political and economic losses that would outweigh the ultimate benefit. Pragmatically speaking, Romania was already with one foot inside NATO and a limited form of support such as airspace access without military troops would have probably appeased the Americans, without antagonising the French and Germans. This foreign policy scenario would have brought Romania a maximum gain with the least amount of costs.

Whichever way one looks at the rational equation, the narrative of Romania's position on Iraq would be incomplete without the influence of national identity. The divergent European (French-German) and Atlantic conceptions on how to approach the disarming of Iraq facilitated an identity crisis within Romania's liberal democratic self-image. The tensions in national identity were settled by drawing from collective memory-myths and Romania opted to act like an 'Atlantic' liberal democracy. Specific collective memory-myths or interpretations of history were particularly relevant at this point, since a set of conditions had been met.

[93] Günter Verheugen cited in 'New Europe Gets a Shock Lesson in Realpolitik', *The Guardian* (28 April 2003); http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/28/eu.politics (June 2014).

Thus, after the Kosovo conflict, Romanian national identity went through two fundamental re-definitions. First, the 'non-Balkan' self-image faded away from the foreign policy imaginary. The second fundamental re-definition of national identity was essential to the emergence of Romanian solidarity with the US on Iraq. As the international ideational context of 1999 advocated the notion of humanitarian and democratic intervention, the 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image was re-articulated to depict Romania as a pro-active liberal democracy that assisted the victims of totalitarian regimes. Memories of their painful communist dictatorship rendered Romanians keenly aware of how invaluable democracy was.

From 1990 to mid-1999, the 'European' and 'liberal democratic' self-images referred to the same representation. The Kosovo 'formative moment' enabled Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image to be differentiated from 'European' identity. Romania was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that could have a primary 'European' or 'Atlantic' vocation. This shift helped to clarify Romania's choice between the 'European' and 'Atlantic' dimensions of its national identity. A pro-active liberal democracy that wants to gain external validation for its self-image cannot be selective about where to promote democratic values. How should Romania distinguish between totalitarian regimes and decide to stand or not against them? The state decided to participate in the coalition against Iraq because this foreign policy option was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity of 1999 – a pro-active liberal democracy. At the same time, Romanian identity resonated with the American interventionist vision of liberal democracy.

As all these factors combined, certain Cold War collective memory-myths became meaningful since they reinforced both Romania's re-articulation as a pro-active liberal democracy and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy. Romanian foreign policy decision-makers felt an emotional solidarity with the American initiative, because the US had been discursively constructed as 'the liberator', 'the rescuer', 'the guarantor of freedom and democracy' since the end of World War II and especially during the communist dictatorship. This theme was reflected in the elite discourse before and after the Iraq invasion. On 8 January 2003, when asked if the state would be part of a potential American intervention in Iraq, the Prime Minister avoided a yes or no answer but did provide an idea of how priorities ranked in his thinking: 'Romania must do its duty as ally of the United States of America, as member of the North-Atlantic Alliance'.[94]

In the event of a unilateral US action against Iraq, President Iliescu declared in early February 2003 – '[w]e have a special relationship and strategic partnership with the USA. So, from this point of view, we have the moral obligation to stand by them until the end'.[95] Talking in 2004 about Romania and the Iraqi crisis, the Defence Minister stated that:

> '[s]ome have openly questioned the reasons for our support of the United States. The answer is simple. If, today, we are free and democratic once again, it is due to the huge effort undertaken by the West under American leadership, which defeated dictatorship in this

[94] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview for the Press Agency "Mediafax"' (Bucharest, 8 January 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/interviu__l1a15702.html (February 2013).

[95] Ion Iliescu, 'Interview' (Bucharest, 6 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_ arhiva&id=3594&_PRID=arh (June 2014).

> part of the world and eliminated the rigid division between the spheres of influence of the Cold War'.[96]

This quote explained why Romanians felt an emotional solidarity with the US, even at the expense of Europe and France.

Romania and Central-Eastern Europe's Atlantic predispositions are culturally and historically motivated. Ronald Asmus and Alexandr Vondra think that such reactions 'spring from a very specific set of historical experiences these countries have had with the United States over the past century, the Central and East European encounter with both Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes, a recognition of the leading role the US played in toppling communism and in facilitating the integration of these countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions'.[97] They also argue that the US is the only great Western power that 'has never constituted a threat' in the region, a largely positive record that contrasts sharply to the 'disappointing historical experiences with other leading Western powers' like France, Germany and the United Kingdom.[98] In Marcin Zaborowski's opinion, the origins of this 'reflexive Atlanticism' date back to the traumatic 'legacy of the Second World War and the post-war division of Europe'; at the time Central and Eastern European countries were abandoned by France and the United Kingdom to their fate of Nazi and later Soviet invasions, engendering an acute sense of betrayal.[99]

---

[96] Ioan M. Paşcu, 'Perspectives of a Prospective NATO Member', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, volume 15(1), 2004, p. 15.

[97] Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, 'The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, volume 18(2), 2005, p. 204.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Marcin Zaborowski, '"New Europe" between the United States and "Old Europe"' in Geir Lundestad (ed.), *Just another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 123.

The historical collective memory-myths of these states shaped their perspective on European appeasement and pacifism, the policies for which they had been sacrificed by Western brothers in the past.[100] Interestingly, although the US had an equal role in leaving Central-Eastern Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence, it continued to be regarded as a mostly 'benign albeit at times inconsistent and somewhat naive' power.[101] Consenting to the post-1945 separation of Europe could not outweigh the fact that American idealism made possible the independence and even existence of many Central-Eastern states.[102] For example, the vision promoted by President Woodrow Wilson after the end of World War I contributed to the Great Unification of Romania (1918), when Transilvania, Basarabia and Bucovina individually declared their independence from various ruling empires and chose to join the Romanian Kingdom.

Furthermore, in communist dictatorships, the domestic populations saw the US as an idealised alternative to the autocratic USSR and as the only possible source of help for their plight.[103] As Andrei Markovits notes, Central-Eastern Europeans' 'overwhelmingly positive views of America stem largely from their having perceived the United States as their sole ally against the much-despised Soviet Union'.[104] Jacques Rupnik agrees that American moral support offered to communist states during the Cold War has impacted on their

---

[100] Jiri Sedivy and Marcin Zaborovski, 'Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations' in Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborovski (eds.), *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 22.

[101] Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, 'The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe', p. 205.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Irina David, 'Scholars' Views on Eastern European Perceptions of America', *Synergy*, volume 8(2), 2012, p. 113.

[104] Andrei S. Markovits, *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 10.

present solidarity with US causes. Western European states like France may interpret the American hyperpower as a potential threat or imbalance in global security. Yet Central-Eastern Europe predominantly embraces US unilateralism as a necessary factor for maintaining international security.

And the US is the only one capable of not allowing Russia to become as powerful as it used to be pre-1990:

> '[t]he two Europes are out of sync in their attitudes toward the implications of the end of the Cold War. In West European eyes, the Eastern Americanophilia is, at best, an anachronism. In East-Central Europe, Franco-German challenge to American leadership is seen as a reckless undermining of their security. They closely associate their security with NATO and the U.S. presence on the continent. The French may be concerned about a unipolar world; the East Europeans have no nostalgia for a bipolar one'.[105]

Stephen Brooks reinforces that post-communist Europe's Atlanticism is rooted in Cold War perceptions; at the same time, he adds that pro-American feelings in Central-Eastern Europe are 'fueled by skepticism and mistrust of the European Union, which most of [these] countries have joined in recent years, or at least by a certain idea of the EU that critics associate with domination by France and Germany'.[106]

In the Romanian collective imaginary, the US was articulated during the Cold War as 'the liberator', 'the rescuer', 'the guarantor of

---

[105] Jacques Rupnik, 'America's Best Friends in Europe: East-Central European Perceptions and Policies towards the United States' in Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne (eds.), *With Us or against Us. Studies in Global Anti-Americanism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 98; also cited in Irina David, 'Scholars' Views on Eastern European Perceptions of America', p. 115.

[106] Stephen Brooks, *As Others See Us: The Causes and Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America* (Peterborough: Broadview, 2006), p. 119.

freedom and democracy'. This process and symbolic presence was best encapsulated by a famous Romanian phrase – 'the Americans are coming!' – very influential in the 1940s-1950s and repeated until the present.[107] The historian Florin Constantinescu defined it as:

> '[a] strange phenomenon of collective psychology (...) the strong and enduring belief that the West and above all the USA would pull Romania from beneath the Soviet boot. "The Americans are coming!" was an expression that summarised a political attitude but also a state of mind. These resisted all proof of disinterest in Western capitals towards the countries left behind the "Iron Curtain"'.[108]

Mircea Cărtărescu depicts the Romanians' fervent waiting for their rescuer, in the face of communist brutality and violence –

> '[m]y grand-father used to tell me how in that atrocious period, when forced collectivisation was introduced, when all the peasants' horses were taken away and shot by the communist activists, each peasant used to look at the sky at least once a day. They were not looking for signs of rain or good weather, but rather madly and desperately hoping for a historical miracle: the appearance of American airplanes which would deliver us from the Russians and finally bring us freedom'.[109]

Even if the US had also agreed to the 'Yalta order and betrayal', or at least tacitly approved it, their symbolic presence in Romania and Central-Eastern Europe during the Cold War kept the hope for

---

[107] Bogdan Barbu, *Vin Americanii! Prezența simbolică a Statelor Unite în România Războiului Rece/ The Americans Are Coming! The Symbolic Presence of the United States in Post-Cold War Romania* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2006).

[108] Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român/ A Sincere History of the Romanian People* (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), p. 450.

[109] Mircea Cărtărescu, *Pururi tânăr, înfăşurat în pixeli/ Always Young, Wrapped in Pixels* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003), p. 247.

democratic freedom alive. Such an imaginary was primarily configured through a network of radio stations (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America), which broadcast in the different native languages of Europeans under communist regimes. They promoted the US agenda, widely spreading the conviction that Central-Eastern European countries had not been completely abandoned by the Americans.[110]

In February 2003, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement translated this feeling into contemporary terms:

> '[t]he new candidate states have an emotional connection to the USA (...) Because if you ask a middle-aged Romanian citizen who contributed to the USSR's dissolution, he will not answer the EU but rather Reagan (...) basically the Americans. Consequently, we see a feeling of gratitude and solidarity for the role which the Americans played in the past. We should not criticise it, on the contrary, we should understand it since [that feeling] could be a basis for the new Euro-Atlantic relations'.[111]

After the initial operations in Iraq had been declared accomplished, the Prime Minister was asked why Romania had so decisively supported the US, taking into account that no weapons of mass destruction had been found there. Năstase replied to German-speaking audiences that the endeavour was meant to 'affirm a set of values' which 'represented the expression of past frustrations' lived

[110] Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000).

[111] Günter Verheugen, 'Joint Press Statements with Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase' (Bucharest, 20 February 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa__l1a16867.html (February 2013).

under Ceauşescu's communism.[112] During a BBC interview in July 2003, he reinforced the same idea -

> 'Saddam Hussein's regime was, for Romanians, the most important factor when they formed a moral judgement about supporting an intervention there (...) Romanians, due to their own painful experience, the difficult road towards democracy, understood better than others that we should help improve the Iraqi people's situation'.[113]

Ultimately, Romania's full support and contribution to the 'coalition of the willing' was a way of seeking acceptance for the state's 'liberal democratic' self-image.

For the rest of 2003 and most of 2004, government officials from the foreign affairs and defence departments worked on contouring the 'strategic profile of Romania inside the Alliance'.[114] On 9 December 2003, in a lengthy speech on this very topic, the Prime Minister defined the state's foreign policy trajectory in the context of NATO membership. He discussed five interconnected themes: '1) promoting security and stability in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region, Caucasus and Central Asia; 2) contributing to NATO's new role and missions; 3) strengthening the transatlantic link; 4) building a stronger Europe; 5) consolidating the United Nations' role in maintaining international security'.[115]

---

[112] Adrian Năstase, 'Interview for "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung' (Berlin, 8 April 2003) in *Interviuri 2001-2004/ Interviews 2001-2004*, p. 121; same idea in 'Interview for "Die Presse"' (Bucharest, 8 June 2003), p. 141; and 'Interview for Austrian Newspaper' (Salzburg, 31 July 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; available at http://www.gov.ro/interviu__l1a20920.html (February 2013).

[113] Adrian Năstase, 'Transcript of the Talk Show "Breakfast with Frost" at BBC News' (London, 13 July 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/ interviu__l1a20536.html (February 2013).

[114] Ioan M. Paşcu, *NATO Enlargement: The Case of Romania. Personal Report*, p. 136.

[115] Adrian Năstase, 'Allocution' (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 9 December 2003) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/alocutiune__l1a24069.html (February 2013).

Moreover, on 26 February 2004, Năstase said the following in the Romanian Parliament -

> '[t]o fulfil its obligations as an Alliance member state and contribute to [NATO's] transformation in the new security environment, Romania will continue to consolidate its strategic profile (...) by broadening our relations with neighbours, Western Balkan states, the EU's Eastern vicinity and the Extended Middle East. We will remain active in the fight against terrorism, including thorough a substantial contribution to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan'.[116]

By February 2004, all NATO allies had ratified the accession protocol and in a month's time the state would officially gain NATO membership. The Prime Minister still offering 'a substantial contribution' to Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that there was indeed more than rational interest at stake in Romanian reactions throughout 2003. Under Năstase's governmental coordination, Romania signifycantly increased and diversified its involvement abroad. The state also apparently wanted to continue being active both in NATO and other international missions.

As the Head of the Romanian Mission to NATO officially noted in January 2004,

> 'Romania is prepared to contribute to Allied land, air and maritime forces. Some of these capabilities have already been used in multinational operations, together with troops belonging to NATO nations. We provide 116 troops for KFOR, 119 troops for SFOR, one infantry battalion as a SFOR/KFOR reserve, 49 military personnel and

[116] Adrian Năstase, 'Speech in the Parliament of Romania' (Bucharest, 26 February 2004) in *The Archives of Romania's Government*; http://www.gov.ro/alocutiune__l1a26243.html (February 2013).

> one transport aircraft C-130 B for ISAF, one infantry battalion (405 military personnel) for the operation Enduring Freedom, 804 military personnel to the Operational International Force in Iraq (one infantry battalion one engineer detachment one military police company one NBC company one special detachment). We will also continue to provide military observers and monitors for UN or OSCE missions'.[117]

On 29 March 2004, Romania and six other states formally became members of NATO. The Foreign Affairs Minister's speech on 2 April marked the occasion while expressing a statement of intent:

> '[a]s a NATO member, Romania has both the moral obligation and a strategic interest in the continuation of Europe's reunification process - in the Western Balkans and across the Black Sea, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as to the East, to the Republic of Moldova, to Ukraine and indeed Belarus (…) Romania is a European country with a Trans-Atlantic vocation. We believe in a solid and effective NATO, a strong EU with enhanced and complementary military and security roles, and in a dynamic and robust Trans-Atlantic partnership. We believe these goals are complementary not contradictory, and we pledge our support to all three. We look forward to our journey with NATO, to promote and protect our shared values of security, freedom and democracy to the frontiers of Europe -- and beyond'.[118]

The message conveyed was that Romania aimed for an active regional role, which included democratising the Black Sea area. Geoană also introduced a re-defined articulation of national identity

---

[117] Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru - Head of the Romanian Mission to NATO, *Interview* (Brussels, 9 January 2004); http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040109b.htm (June 2014).

[118] Mircea Geoană, *Address at the Ceremonial North Atlantic Council on the Occasion of Romania's Accession to NATO* (Brussels, 2 April 2004); available at http://www.nato. int/docu/speech/2004/s040402d.htm (June 2014).

('European country with a Trans-Atlantic vocation'). For the first time the two dimensions of Romania's Euro-Atlantic identity were rhetorically separated.

On 13 May 2004, the Secretary General of NATO validated these emerging understandings related to Romanian national identity and foreign policy:

> 'Romania has an important role to play. Before you entered NATO you were among our most active Partners. Now that you are in NATO, countries all around you continue to long for a greater sense of security – a closer connection to the Europe in which you are now making your way. Whether it is Moldova or Ukraine, the countries of the Western Balkans or those of the South Caucasus – Romania can be an example to them, an invaluable source of inspiration and practical assistance'.[119]

The state's NATO accession in 2004 accomplished one of the two major objectives of Romanian post-communist foreign policy. This event prefigured the beginning of another formative period of national identity and foreign policy, as Romania's Euro-Atlantic identity was internationally recognised by one of the authoritative selves – NATO.

Concluding Remarks

The years 2000-2004 represented the culmination of a series of 'formative moments' for Romanian identity and foreign policy. The first post-communist decade brought a rich palette of re-articulated

[119] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer – NATO Secretary General (2004 - 2009), *Supporting an Active Romania in an Active Alliance* (Bucharest, 13 May 2004); available at http://www.nato. int/docu/speech/2004/s040513b.htm (June 2014).

meanings. The overarching 'Euro-Atlantic' national identity of Romania included three main self-images: 'European'/'liberal democratic', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. These self-images and key themes of the foreign policy imaginary were configured in 1990-1996, forming an ideational foundation that impacted on Romanian international relations until 2007. Romania's 'European' identity meant that the state was an aspiring liberal democracy that needed to be recognised as such by external audiences, especially by the authoritative Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU states). Otherwise, the self-images internally constructed by Romania would not be accepted in the international realm. The post-1996 national discourses circulated the 'liberal democratic' self-image more often than the 'European' one. Regarding the Kosovo crisis, Romania's evolving responses exhibited the inherent dilemmas of acting as a 'European' liberal democracy with a 'security provider' role that also retains Balkan ties. The 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images competed with Balkan affinity for prevalence on Romanian foreign policy. But the critical nature of the Kosovo conflict enabled the re-articulation of international discourses. In early 1999, the international context shifted towards the idea of urgent humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. This ideational change facilitated a hierarchical process within Romanian identity, in which the two self-images ('European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider') preceded the traditional relationship with the Balkans.

At this crucial point in 1999, the fluid nature of national identity made it subject to two fundamental re-definitions. First, the 'non-Balkan' self-image began to gradually disappear from the foreign policy imaginary, leaving the other self-images to be dominant. Second, the 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image was

substantially re-articulated. Until 1999, the 'European' and 'liberal democratic' self-images constituted the same representation. The Kosovo 'formative moment' enabled Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image to be separated from its 'European' identity. As the international narratives of 1999 advocated the concepts of humanitarian and democratic intervention, Romania was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that helped to spread democratic values; being a liberal democracy was not necessarily associated with 'Europe'. This shift in national identity was central in clarifying Romania's foreign policy on Iraq, whether it should opt for a 'European' or 'Atlantic' orientation. To some extent, the emerging Atlantic vocation of national identity and international conduct was prefigured by Romania signing the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement in August 2002. Romania was uncomfortable between the opposing views of the US and EU on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The Romanian state eventually adopted the 'European' (EU) viewpoint and did not ratify the document signed with the US. Yet the American Bilateral Immunity Agreement signalled that Romania could prefer an Atlantic orientation on Iraq, depending on the ideas shaping its external reactions.

The year 2003 forced Romania to choose between two contrasting approaches to disarming Iraq. France and Germany wanted to continue using peaceful means, whereas the US was firmly in favour of invading Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein's regime through military force. At first, Romania attempted to maintain a neutral stance, but in the end decided to support the US and participate in the coalition against Iraq. The state was again placed in an uncomfortable situation and could have incurred losses either way. Rationalism would argue that Romania was simply trying to please the

powerful US, in order to finalise the NATO integration process. However, the context was much more complicated than that. France had very harshly reprimanded Romanian solidarity with the Americans and indirectly threatened that such a position could jeopardise the state's EU candidacy. Romania had already been invited to join NATO in November 2002, yet its possible EU accession was much more problematic.

According to a rational calculation, Romania was halfway in NATO and could lose much more by antagonising France and Germany, who were both key EU decision-makers. Romania could have formulated a type of limited backing for the US (e.g. airspace access), a middle ground that minimised potential costs and did not include sending armed forces. Instead, Romanian elites across the political spectrum agreed on a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq and full military involvement. Here national identity comes in to explain the state's foreign policy on Iraq. The opposing European (French-German) and Atlantic views on Iraq prompted an identity crisis within Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image. An aspiring pro-active liberal democracy that seeks to be recognised in the international arena cannot have double standards about the promotion of democratic values. The state's painful communist past made Romanians more aware of how invaluable democracy was. How was Romania supposed to differentiate between dictatorships? It intervened in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, and then could not decline to do so in Iraq due to material considerations.

Romania became fully involved in the coalition against Iraq because this action was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity ('pro-active liberal democracy') and the emerging

Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy. Romanian identity was more compatible with the US and UK interventionist vision of liberal democracy. As all these elements combined, specific Cold War collective memory-myths were particularly relevant for national elites since they reinforced Romania's re-articulation as a pro-active liberal democracy and its Atlantic-oriented foreign policy. Romania felt an emotional solidarity with American causes, because the US was constructed as 'the liberator' and 'the guarantor of freedom and democracy' during the communist dictatorship.

The pro-American attitudes of Romania and Central-Eastern European states originate in certain interpretations about the Cold War, which convey the essential contribution of the US in defeating communism. Although Western Europe and the US had an equal role in the post-1945 settlement and leaving Central-Eastern Europe to Soviet domination, post-communist states mostly blame Western Europe for the 'Yalta order and betrayal'. The symbolic presence of the US in the Cold War imaginary of Central-Eastern Europe kept the hope for democratic freedom alive, especially through a network of radio stations that broadcast in the native languages of Europeans under communist regimes. The US had not completely abandoned Central-Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1989, and many post-communist states including Romania felt a moral duty to support the American democratic ideal on Iraq in 2003, even through force and at the expense of Western European appeasement and pacifism. After having re-defined Romanian identity as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic vocation, the state's story of national identity and foreign policy moves on to the last formative period of 2004-2007 and its intensified Atlanticism.

Chapter VI: Acting as an 'Atlantic' Liberal Democracy and Security Provider (2004-2007)

As the final formative time frame of Romania's post-communist national identity and foreign policy, the years 2004-2007 brought the consolidation and intensification of the state's Atlantic vocation. This chapter aims to show how the post-2004 foreign policy imaginary was re-defined and internally contested, as well as how the re-articulated Romanian identity shaped the state's international actions towards the 'East'. After 2005, the new President of Romania systematically extended his de facto prerogatives in the foreign policy domain, hence reducing the Government and Parliament's decision-making input. The presidential administration also promoted an intensified Atlanticism of Romanian national identity and international behaviour.

Although Romania was already part of NATO and was expected to finalise the EU accession process, the self-images of 'security provider' and 'pro-active liberal democracy' continued to be particularly meaningful for its foreign policy. The state intended to have an active involvement abroad, in more distant theatres of operation (Iraq and Afghanistan) and in the neighbouring region of the Black Sea. The Presidency's international vision shifted the Romanian outlook from the 'West' to the 'East', where the state could play an important role in democratising and stabilising the Euro-Atlantic community's vicinity.

Still, these meanings were not accepted by all Romanian leaders, especially the Prime Minister who tried to re-balance the 'European' self-image and Atlantic vocation of national identity, which in turn would affect the state's international affairs. In June 2006, the debates around Romania's potential military withdrawal from Iraq were an interesting case of contestation among domestic elites, where the Premier and President had contrasting views and competed for legitimacy over foreign policy. The Premier attempted to infuse a more balanced 'European' dimension to Romanian international stances, but was unsuccessful in front of the Atlantic-minded President.

The intensified Atlanticism of national identity, along with the self-images of 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider', impacted on Romania's Eastern foreign policy. The Romanian projects for the Black Sea region illustrated how international goals were undermined from within. A functional cooperation arrangement around the Black Sea needs a good working dialogue with Russia, who remains a key actor in the area. The Romanian President's antagonistic rhetoric towards Russia was not rational, but rather consistent with the representations advocated by the re-defined foreign policy imaginary which depicted a confrontational relationship between the Euro-Atlantic community and its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The hostile Romanian discourses offended Russia who ignored or sabotaged Romania's Black Sea initiatives.

Another component of Romania's Eastern foreign policy was building good relations with the Republic of Moldova and bringing it closer to the EU. The Romanian-Moldovan rapport was marked by an initial tentative progress that eventually transformed into a diplomatic crisis. With regards to structure, this chapter begins with a section on

Romania's re-defined foreign policy imaginary, followed by the debates on maintaining Romanian military presence in Iraq and the state's post-2005 Eastern foreign policy.

Romania's Re-Defined Foreign Policy Imaginary

The legislative elections of late November 2004 did not produce a clear majority in Parliament, since the two main political forces obtained very similar shares of the vote: the centre-left coalition between the Social Democrats (PSD) and the Humanist Party (PUR) won 36.8%, the centre-right 'Justice and Truth' – DA alliance between the Democrat Party (PD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) had 31.49%, the right-wing Great Romania Party (PRM) 12.99% and the ethnic Hungarian party UDMR 6.2%.[1] The nature of the major two coalitions differed in that the DA alliance had the juridical status of 'political alliance', while the National Union PSD+PUR was only an 'electoral alliance'.[2] This semantic distinction turned into a significant argument when interpreting the parliamentary results. Among the political parties, PSD emerged as the uncontested winner with a total of 159 seats or mandates. But, in terms of registered political unions, the DA alliance (PD and PNL) had the upper hand with 161 mandates.[3]

---

[1] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 'Annex – Election Results' in *Romania Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 28 November and 12 December* (Warsaw, February 2005), p. 34; http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/romania/41455?download=true (July 2014).

[2] Sean Müller, 'The Conflict between Băsescu and Tăriceanu. A Governmental System Viewpoint', *Sfera Politicii*, issue 126-127, 2007; http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/126-127/art06-muller.html (July 2014).

[3] OSCE, 'Annex – Election Results', p. 34.

The situation became so volatile that, within a month, Romania went through three coalitions in Parliament which all competed for the right to form the Government.[4] During the second ballot of presidential elections held on 12 December 2004, voters favoured the PD-PNL candidate Traian Băsescu (51.23%) over the former Premier and PSD leader Adrian Năstase (48.77%).[5] Băsescu's 'top priority' as the new President was to establish a stable majority in Parliament, explicitly inviting UDMR and PUR to consider governing alongside the DA alliance.[6] Although PSD+PUR had obtained a higher number of parliamentary seats, one of Băsescu's first decisions was to appoint Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu[7] (PNL co-leader of the DA alliance) as Prime Minister.

On 15 December 2004, President Băsescu increased the pressure over the entire political spectrum by declaring that:

> 'I will appoint Călin Popescu Tăriceanu as Prime Minister. If I cannot fulfil the mandate I was given by the people, I will return to the people (…) If the Government of the [DA] Alliance does not pass, we will certainly go back to early elections. I think that the President, who is elected by direct vote, has a right to decide the party he wants to work with, so that his own programme promoted during the election campaign will become reality'.[8]

---

[4] Daniel Barbu, 'Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the 2004 Romanian Elections', *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, volume 5(1), 2005, p. 12.

[5] OSCE, 'Annex – Election Results', p. 35.

[6] Traian Băsescu cited in 'Aliații PSD, PUR şi UDMR, sunt gata să întoarcă armele'/ 'PSD's Allies, PUR and UDMR, Are Ready to Change Sides', *HotNews.ro* (14 December 2004); http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1247821-aliatii-psd-pur-udmr-sunt-gata-intoarca-armele.htm (July 2014).

[7] Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu – Prime Minister of Romania (December 2004 – December 2008).

[8] Traian Băsescu cited in Sean Müller, 'The Conflict between Băsescu and Tăriceanu. A Governmental System Viewpoint', p. 56.

To support this unprecedented action, he invoked article 103.1 in the Romanian Constitution which said that - '[t]he President of Romania designates a candidate for the prime minister position, after consultations with the party holding a clear majority in Parliament or, if such a majority does not exist, after [consulting] the parties represented in Parliament'.[9] The Prime Minister would then have ten days to decide on a cabinet, outline the governmental plan and gain the legislators' vote of confidence.

Until 2004, the normal expectation was for the President to appoint a Prime Minister proposed by the party or coalition that had the largest number of seats, whether or not the party or coalition in question had a parliamentary majority as well. That winning party or coalition had the informal right of being the first to form a cabinet and try to find a stable majority. This happened in 1992 with the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR now PSD), in 1996 with the governing coalition led by the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) and in 2000 again with PDSR. Both CDR in 1996 and PDSR in 2000 had the greatest number of parliamentary mandates. They proposed a Premier during consultations with the President, but still had to co-opt other parties to create a legislative majority for the new Prime Minister and cabinet. Following the 2004 elections, the National Union PSD+PUR would have normally proposed a Premier who would then be designated by President Băsescu.

These arrangements, and especially which party or coalition was given the first chance to configure the government, were an informal rule of the Romanian political system. Article 103.1 of the Constitution was vague and did not explicitly say that the President needed to

[9] The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania*; available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339 (July 2014).

appoint a Prime Minister from the party or coalition with the most seats in Parliament. Băsescu interpreted article 103.1 to mean that, without a self-evident parliamentary majority, the President had the constitutional prerogative to choose which of the interested coalitions would eventually form the Government.[10] He opted for Tăriceanu to be the new Premier from the DA alliance, instead of a candidate from PSD. This decision was unusual for Romania and signalled that Băsescu would be a President highly involved in domestic politics and international relations.

The above presidential statement also contained a warning or even an indirect threat that Parliament would be dissolved, if it rejected the cabinet designated by Băsescu. According to article 89 of the Constitution, '[t]he President of Romania can dissolve Parliament, if the latter has not given a vote of confidence to the Government within 60 days of the first request and only after [Parliament] has rejected the Government at least twice'.[11] In the end, a fragile governing coalition was formed with 51.4% and 241 seats - 'a patchwork' consisting of the DA alliance, PUR and UDMR; PUR had unexpectedly abandoned PSD to be part of the governmental coalition supporting Premier Tăriceanu and his cabinet.[12] As Cristian Preda noted, the Romanian multi-party system of late 2004 lacked a dominant political force and led to 'the fabrication' of a majority.[13]

---

[10] Lavinia Stan, 'The Opposition Takes Charge: The Romanian General Elections of 2004', *Problems of Post-Communism*, volume 52(3), May-June 2005, p. 12.

[11] The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania*.

[12] Peter Gross and Vladimir Tismăneanu, 'The End of Postcommunism in Romania', *Journal of Democracy*, volume 16(2), April 2005, p. 151.

[13] Cristian Preda, *Partide şi alegeri în România postcomunistă (1989-2004)/ Political Parties and Elections in Post-communist Romania (1898-2004)* (Bucharest: Nemira, 2005), p. 100.

From the beginning of his electoral campaign, Băsescu declared that he would be a new type of political leader, unlike any presidential predecessor. He aimed to be a 'president-player', heavily involved in Romanian politics and policies, rather than just a detached 'spectator' of internal and external affairs. His unique view of the Presidency as a state institution was announced in November 2004:

> '[t]he power granted by the Constitution to the President is to be an active and efficient player in the public life of Romania, not just a well meaning spectator. I have never been a person who remains uninvolved. I do not want to be a President-spectator, who occupies the best seat on the official stage; what I want is to be a President-player, who works shoulder to shoulder with the other responsible agencies and the whole society'.[14]

This was another personalised interpretation of article 80.2 in the Constitution, which described a more neutral role for the President -

> '[t]he President safeguards the respect for the Constitution and the good functioning of public authorities. To this end, the President exercises mediation between state powers, as well as between state and society'.[15]

The general context of Băsescu's rhetoric and actions during the presidential campaign and immediately after his election indicated an emerging personalisation of Romanian politics. The new President expertly manipulated a Parliament with no obvious majority and was apparently willing to go to extreme lengths (even dissolving the

[14] Traian Băsescu cited in The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Raport - Traian Băsescu, şase luni de mandat prezidențial: rezultate şi perspective/ Report - Traian Băsescu, Six Months of Presidential Mandate: Results and Prospects* (Bucharest, July 2005), p. 5; http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport-Basescu-6%20luni_Final.pdf (July 2014).

[15] The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania*.

legislative body), in order to ensure that his preferred DA alliance would form the next Government of Romania. True to his word, Băsescu was a determined and quite forceful 'president-player', very different from his predecessors. The situation was bound to turn at least somewhat problematic in the foreign policy arena, because the Romanian semi-presidential system featured dual authority and democratic legitimacy with two prominent leaders of the executive branch. Băsescu had been elected as President of Romania via direct vote, while the designated Prime Minister Tăriceanu and his cabinet succeeded in passing the Parliament's vote of investiture.

Although they were initially considered a good team, the working relationship between the two actors gradually deteriorated from tensions to public disputes and even conflict. By 2006, the Romanian Presidency and Premiership were facing an uneasy cohabitation.[16] The intra-executive divergences also appeared in the area of foreign policy decision-making, where the President as head of state and the Prime Minister as head of the Government had unclear and potentially overlapping prerogatives. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has underlined the inherent problems of the Romanian Constitution, where in practice there is no clear separation of powers between and within state institutions. She considers Romania's semi-presidentialism to be 'overloaded with checks and balances to the point of deadlock' and prone to institutional conflict in areas of joint responsibility.[17]

---

[16] Cosmin Dima, 'Conflictul intraexecutiv în regimul semiprezidențial românesc. Primul-Ministru Călin Popescu Tăriceanu versus Preşedintele Traian Băsescu'/ 'The Intra-executive Conflict in the Romanian Semi-presidential Regime. Prime Minister Tăriceanu versus President Traian Băsescu', *Sfera Politicii,* issue 139, 2009; http://www.sfera politicii.ro/sfera/139/art05-dimac.html (July 2014).

[17] Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Politica după comunism: structură, cultură şi psihologie politică /Politics after Communism: Structure, Culture and Political Psychology* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002), pp. 42-46.

In the case of foreign policy, the Romanian President's constitutional prerogatives were substantially limited and depended on the counter-signature and approval of either the Government or Parliament or both of them.[18] So the Constitution ensured that, at least formally, decisions had to be agreed by the President and Prime Minister and sometimes ratified by Parliament. Romanian semi-presidentialism lacks a clear delineation between the powers of the Presidency and Government, which makes it very difficult to identify who is the primary authority with respect to the state's international stances.

Early on in his mandate, Băsescu did everything possible within constitutional limits and sometimes beyond them to grasp full control over Romania's international affairs. He started to systematically extend the President's conventional role in the foreign policy domain, hence diminishing the influence of Parliament and that of the Government.[19] The ambiguous semi-presidential system, combined with a rather weak Prime Minister and cabinet, led to the Government being compelled to accept foreign affairs as Băsescu's sole de facto prerogative.[20] Premier Tăriceanu's cabinet had a fragile majority in Parliament (51.4%), which was also undermined from within the governing coalition by PD - the party loyal to its former leader, Băsescu. Taking these aspects into account, President Băsescu was the main foreign policy decision-maker and had the greatest impact on

[18] The Parliament of Romania, *The Constitution of Romania*; available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339 (July 2014); see Articles 91 and 102.1.

[19] The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Raport - Efectele 'Doctrinei Băsescu': izolarea internațională a României/ Report – The Effects of the 'Băsescu Doctrine': Romania's International Isolation* (Bucharest, 7 March 2008), p. 3; http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport%20pol%20externa%202008.pdf (July 2014).

[20] Ruxandra Ivan, *La Politique Étrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)*, p. 109.

the national imaginary between 2005 and 2008. Nevertheless, while other domestic agents were not as influential as the presidential administration, they did at times offer discursive contestation and competed for dominance in directing Romania's international affairs.

With regard to the reconfiguration of the foreign policy imaginary, the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) was an essential expression of the new administration's vision for Romanian international and security relations. Its initial drafted form had been revealed in February 2006. Compared to previous similar papers, this document was the most controversial among internal audiences because it prefigured an intensified Atlantic vocation for the state to the point of neglecting everything else. The 'liberal democratic' self-image of Romanian national identity had already been re-defined as pro-active and Atlantic-oriented during the Iraq invasion. The 'European' self-image had always been a key component of Romanian identity, but in the 2006 NSS it was marginalised or subordinated to the other two self-images: 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider'.

Public opinion was particularly interested since it was the first NSS draft published by Romania's Presidency prior to Parliament deliberations and final vote. The text confirmed the foreign policy meanings that were re-articulated in 2003, moving from Romania's traditional defensive position towards a more pro-active one; counteracting or responding to dangers shifted to preventing and even pre-empting threats. Throughout its proposed material, the 2006 NSS was permeated by the 'global war on terror', which went substantially beyond depicting terrorism as a major risk:

> '[t]he active commitment to achieving security by promoting democracy, fighting international terrorism and countering proliferation of

> weapons of mass destruction is a must for Romania's security policy. It is the fundamental condition for us to enjoy the benefits of globalization, seize the opportunities offered by the international environment and effectively counter major risks and threats'.[21]

National security strategies and other relevant papers were often shaped by the international discourse on terrorism, which emerged and gained influence post-9/11. The Romanian NSS had some distinctive traits because the war on terrorism was 'insinuated into the document's narrative', from the usual 'security environment and identification of threats' to the 'formulation of policy directions that obviously pre-date 9/11'.[22] For example, principles and policies that had been characteristic of 'Europe' were 'affected by the superimposition of the global dynamic and security logic' of the global war on terrorism.[23] Previous foreign policy concerns remained valid: deepening NATO and EU integration, developing closer relations with Western states, strengthening the strategic partnership with the US, continuing the reform and modernisation of the army in order to create interoperability with NATO forces.

Issues like Euro-Atlantic identity and integration were re-defined according to the logic of the war on terrorism, even though Romania had already obtained NATO membership in March 2004 and would officially accede into the EU in January 2007. Rationally speaking, the

---

[21] The President of Romania, 'The National Security Strategy of Romania. European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and more Prosperous Country' (Bucharest, 2006) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*, p. 12; http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf (July 2014).

[22] Felix Ciuta, 'Lily-Pad Geopolitics: Romania in the Global War on Terror', *Paper for the 7th ECPR-SGIR Conference* (Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010), p. 11.

[23] Ibid.

state was not required any more to prove its 'security provider' self-image or necessarily fulfil the perceived duties of a partially accepted liberal democracy. NATO was the first crucial Euro-Atlantic audience or authoritative self to irrevocably legitimate Romanian national identity and self-images, while the EU was expected to do the same soon. Yet identity has a fluid nature and the story of Romanian national identity continued even after its international recognition.

As suggested by its prominent place in the title of the NSS, Romania's 'European and Euro-Atlantic identity' became a key element for the Băsescu administration's foreign policy perspective. Romania was finally included in the 'Euro-Atlantic community', which had been depicted to be 'a security domain based on common values, interests and goals'.[24] Having already achieved one of its major post-1990 foreign policy goals (NATO membership) and being close to the second one (EU entrance), Romania was in search of a new international purpose.

The NSS represented this purpose as a new geostrategic profile:

> 'Romania's integration in NATO and EU triggers substantial changes in its status and strategic identity. From this viewpoint, the dynamics of the development of Romania's European and Euro-Atlantic identity, as well as that pertaining to the shaping of a profile matching its geostrategic potential, will be structurally re-designed and promoted at a high pace. Membership involves the gradual configuration of a specific and active role for Romania within the two organizations and providing the necessary resources to fulfil it'.[25]

[24] 'The National Security Strategy of Romania' (2006), p. 5.
[25] Ibid, p. 17.

Felix Ciuta pointed out that the 'strategic hybridity' of Romania's identity was present together with 'the tension between its being and becoming European', which had dominated the discourse of the return to Europe.[26] The Romanian 'specific and active role' focused on the familiar assumption that democracy was the most effective shield and weapon against terrorism. The Romanian state pledged to 'actively' participate via political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence and military means in spreading democratic values, security and prosperity to countries 'neighbouring Romania and other areas of strategic interest'.[27]

The insistent repetition of variations on the 'being pro-active' theme attempted to describe a more 'dynamic strategic profile', while also conveying the veiled critique that previous Romanian administrations had opted for a more passive approach to regional and international affairs.[28] Such pro-active endeavours would be carried out through institutionalised channels, as responsibilities deriving from NATO and EU commitments. They would also be part of collective efforts alongside allied, partner and friendly states, according to the decisions adopted by the international community.[29]

The 2006 NSS portrayed a very pessimistic and conflictual imaginary. It featured proliferating conflicts at global level ('clashing world'), in which 'the main battle' was 'waged between fundamentally

---

[26] Felix Ciuta, 'Lily-Pad Geopolitics: Romania in the Global War on Terror', p. 12.

[27] 'The National Security Strategy of Romania' (2006), p. 13.

[28] Şerban F. Cioculescu, *România postcomunistă în 'ecuația' strategică a vecinătăților: Balcanii, Marea Neagră şi Orientul Mijlociu Extins/ Postcommunist Romania in the Neighbouring Strategic 'Equation': The Balkans, Black Sea and Greater Middle East* (Bucharest: Editura Universității din Bucureşti, 2009), p. 285.

[29] 'The National Security Strategy of Romania' (2006), pp. 14-15.

different values' – 'democracy and totalitarianism'.[30] In the context of Romania's foreign policy, President Băsescu often indirectly dismissed a 'unifying logic' based on European integration and advocated 'a logic of exclusion and confrontation' – where the good Euro-Atlantic self fights to defeat the evil non-Euro-Atlantic other.[31] So it was not surprising that the 2006 NSS was built on similar identity premises.

Moreover, the document tried to coherently combine the European and Atlantic dimensions of Romania's national identity by differentiating between two sets of goals. On the one hand, the Atlantic dimension would endeavour to ensure security via democracy promotion, the war on international terrorism, eliminating illegal trafficking. On the other hand, the European dimension would deal with prosperity through solidarity and development, Eastern enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, stability via the encouragement of democratic values.[32]

This tidy compartmentalisation failed to be convincing since the NSS title and content articulated two distinct identities – 'European' and 'Euro-Atlantic'. They were also not constructed to exert equal impact over the state's foreign policy. Unlike previous strategies, the relationship was explicitly hierarchical with the Atlantic dimension dominating the European one in terms of ideological influence. President Băsescu declared early on in his mandate an overt Atlantic orientation, when arguing for a special relationship or privileged

[30] Ibid, p. 7.

[31] The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României/ The Analysis of Romania's National Security Strategy* (Bucharest, 9 March 2006), p. 8; available at http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Raport_SSNR.pdf (July 2014).

[32] 'The National Security Strategy of Romania' (2006), pp. 16-18.

partnership between the US, UK and Romania. More than ideological preference, the 2006 Strategy indicated both an alignment with the US position and a re-definition of Romania's identity. While the threat of terrorism could not be denied in an international security environment, Romania did not have a history of such dangers and had been fortunately overlooked as a target, even after its involvement in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Yet the Romanian NSS transferred from the American one the US 'missionary vocation', where the latter adopted this role globally and Romania was constructed as a civilising state in the Black Sea region.[33] This re-conceptualisation of national identity affected directly Romania's 'European' self-image, given that the 2006 Strategy configured American priorities to be more important than European ones.[34] Significant EU foreign policy topics were marginalised or secondary at best. For instance, Romania wanted to participate in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, but only 'to develop and consolidate trans-Atlantic cooperation'.[35] The European Neighbourhood Policy was mostly a means to 'boost' Romania's 'contribution to promoting democracy, peace and security' in the Black Sea region.[36]

Apart from the underlying discursive influence of the 'War on Terror', the text confirmed that Romania's 'non-Balkan' self-image had faded from the foreign policy imaginary. Romania had been

[33] The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României*, p. 16.

[34] Ion Stan, 'The Political Strategy of National Insecurity' in *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* (Bucharest, 23 October 2007); available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6383&idm=1,54&idl=1 (July 2014).

[35] 'The National Security Strategy of Romania' (2006), p. 16.

[36] Ibid, p. 17.

traditionally preoccupied with the democratic stability of the Balkans, but the matter was only briefly discussed in the 2006 NSS. Romania supported the democratisation efforts, economic development and European integration of the Balkan states. It would also continue to act as a 'security provider' in the Balkans.[37]

Another representation often circulated by the NSS was that of Romania having a special role and responsibility in 'non-Western' Europe, especially in the extended Black Sea region. The document contained a chapter specifically dedicated to the Black Sea, where Romania portrayed itself as a 'dynamic vector of democratic security and stability, as well as economic prosperity'.[38] As part of a more general interest, the text explicitly mentioned the Romanian objective of ensuring a European and Euro-Atlantic engagement in the area.

The Strategy described the extended Black Sea region as the place of intersection for two strategic flows: one connecting the 'energy producer' (Near East, Caucasus and Caspian Sea) with its 'energy consumer' (the West); the other symbolising a link between the 'security provider' (Euro-Atlantic community) and its 'security consumer' (Near East, Caucasus).[39] From such a perspective, Romania was associated with meanings like European frontier or periphery, a state bordering or bridging the gap between the 'the West and the Rest'.[40] As shown in chapter III, starting with the period 1990-1996, Romania's foreign policy discourse persistently shaped a 'Central European' subjectivity to differentiate the state from two negative

[37] Ibid, p. 18.
[38] Ibid, p. 19.
[39] Ibid, pp. 19-20.
[40] Phrase borrowed from Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72(3), 1993, p. 29.

representations: 'Eastern European' with its Cold War connotations and 'Balkan' with an image of instability. Post-2004 the articulation of national identity abandoned the 'Central European' subjectivity and insistently re-defined Romania as a 'border state'.

More so, dissociating the state from a 'Central European' image was counter-productive, if one paid attention to the regional context where Ukraine advocated in a quite credible manner its bonded role as both a Pontic (Black Sea) and Central European state.[41] Unlike Ukraine's approach, the Romanian foreign policy discourse - generated mostly by the presidential administration - operated with exclusive meanings when referring to the two areas, pushing to promote one at the expense of the other. Since Romania obtained NATO membership and was close to finalising EU accession, the presidential administration as a key foreign policy decision-maker saw the state like a bridge to the outside. Romania's post-2005 international purpose would be to act as a 'border state', connecting the Euro-Atlantic community with its non-Euro-Atlantic others.

The 'Central European' subjectivity had expressed Romania's inextricable link to Western Europe. Having gained international validation for the main themes of its post-communist national identity, Romania was looking from the West to the East. An internationally accepted pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role could exert a meaningful influence by democratising and stabilising the neighbouring non-Euro-Atlantic states, as well as by participating in more geographically distant military operations. Yet these Romanian foreign policy articulations were not endorsed by all

[41] The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României*, p. 9.

domestic elites. June 2006 brought an episode of internal contestation and debates regarding the withdrawal of Romanian soldiers from Iraq. It was part of a wider attempt to re-define Romanian identity and foreign policy, by re-balancing the state's 'European' self-image and Atlantic vocation.

Debating Romania's Military Presence in Iraq

From August 2003 until their final withdrawal in June 2009, more than 5,200 Romanian troops were deployed to support the US-led multi-national mission Operation 'Iraqi Freedom'. Their responsibilities included intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance, providing rapid response forces, conducting training and monitoring of local army units.[42] Being one of the newest NATO members, Romania's continued contribution to American efforts in Iraq brought a series of challenges. Unlike the case of Afghanistan, the Alliance did not eventually take over operations and Iraq remained a purely US-driven endeavour, opposed by several NATO and EU partners. Romania maintained its military presence in Iraq post-2004, which entailed costs like further risking soldiers' lives and spending large financial resources. It also continued to antagonise France and Germany by closely aligning with the American stance.[43]

---

[42] The United States Department of Defense, *News Article: Romanian Forces End Mission in Iraq* (9 June 2009); http://www.defense.gov/News/newsarticle.aspx?id=54700 (July 2014).

[43] Ronald H. Linden, 'The Burden of Belonging: Romanian and Bulgarian Foreign Policy in the New Era', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, volume 11(3), 2009, p. 276.

Throughout his electoral campaign and subsequent mandate, President Băsescu clearly favoured an Atlantic orientation for Romanian foreign policy. He envisioned an extended 'special relationship' between the US, UK and Romania, which was articulated through a somewhat uninspired phrase - 'the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis'. On 13 December 2004, shortly after his election, Băsescu declared that:

> '[b]eyond our NATO membership, the strategic relation with the US and Great Britain will remain of utmost importance for the state's foreign policy. The Washington-London-Bucharest Axis will be a strategic axis for the President of Romania'.[44]

This Atlantic construction appeared to be a one-sided initiative, considering that neither the Americans nor the British publicly recognised it.[45]

After Băsescu's official visit to the US in March 2005, President Bush was asked about a potential 'special partnership' between Washington, London and Bucharest. He avoided giving any concrete confirmation and depicted Romania as a 'special ally' among many other special liberal democratic partners:

> 'I view Romania as a special ally because Romania shares the same values that we share (...) we all long for peace, and we understand the world will be more peaceful as freedom spreads (...) And so this is a

[44] Traian Băsescu, 'Post-Election Speech' (Bucharest, 13 December 2004) cited in 'Cele două Românii'/ 'The Two Romanias', *Revista 22*, number 771, 16 December 2004; http://www.revista22.ro/cele-doua-romanii-1362.html (July 2014).

[45] Nicolae Toboşaru, 'Axa Washington-Londra-Bucureşti în politica externă şi de securitate a administraţiei prezidenţiale - Deziderat şi realitate'/ 'The Washington-London-Bucharest Axis in the Foreign and Security Policy of Romania's Presidential Administration – Wishes and Reality', *Pulsul geostrategic,* number 32, 5 July 2008, p. 3; http://www.ingepo.ro/download-materiale/126/SuplimentBuletin32Ro.pdf (July 2014).

> special relationship because of the shared values, and I am honored to call the President my friend, and I'm honored to call Romania a strong ally'.[46]

As in the case of Iraq's invasion, France was much more opinionated about Romania's continued Atlantic-oriented external agenda. The French Foreign Affairs Minister - Michel Barnier - visited Bucharest in February 2005. He candidly admitted to having 'some difficulty in understanding the significance of this rather unusual axis'[47], then went on to add:

> 'Romania's need for security is the same as that of France, Germany and Greece who isn't far away and is already in the European Union (...) So, I think that the right reflex when you want to join the European Union, the legitimate, necessary reflex is a European one. And that doesn't stop one being friends with America or others'.[48]

France had not changed its viewpoint from January 2003, when President Jacques Chirac admonished, criticised and even threatened the EU candidates (especially Romania) who sided with the US on invading Iraq. Despite the more diplomatic language of Minister Barnier in 2005, France persisted in politically pressuring Romania who, as an EU applicant state, was expected to instinctively embrace a 'European' (preferably French) foreign policy perspective.

---

[46] George W. Bush, 'Presidents Bush and Băsescu Discuss U.S.-Romanian Partnership', *White House Press Releases* (Washington, 9 March 2005); available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050309-3.html (July 2014).

[47] Michel Barnier – Foreign Minister of France cited by *BBC* (25 February 2005); http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2005/02/printable/050225_romania_franta.shtml (July 2014).

[48] Michel Barnier, 'Interview for the Romanian Public Television Channel "TVR"', *Embassy of France in London - News* (Bucharest, 25 February 2005); http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Visit-to-Romania-Interview-given (July 2014).

Regardless of the international audience, President Băsescu's message on Romania's Atlantic vocation and involvement in Iraq was consistent. During an interview for 'Le Monde' in March 2005, the question of whether Romania risked being caught once again between the US and EU arose. The President's reply was clear:

> 'I am not sure if the word "axis" is the most appropriate, but we will consolidate our partnership with the United States and Great Britain (...) Romania is willing to host American bases on its territory (...) We are an ally of the United States and Great Britain in Iraq and will remain a partner in this coalition (...) I will not admit any ambiguity on this topic'.[49]

Băsescu's vehement stance was surprising and quite insular, as domestic public opinion in the US and many European states exercised pressure towards gradual yet accelerated military withdrawal from Iraq. His attitude prompted 'Le Monde' to describe Romania as 'America's Trojan horse in Europe'[50], a representation that had been first associated with Poland.

By contrast, the DA alliance PNL-PD as leader of the Romanian governing coalition seemed to prefer a more neutral external position for the state. The electoral programme of the DA alliance contained a chapter on national security, which combined the views regarding foreign policy and national defence. A lot of attention was given to deepening internal reforms for Alliance interoperability and future EU

---

[49] Traian Băsescu, 'Interview for "Le Monde"' (4 March 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id= 6013&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[50] Le Monde (6 April 2005) cited in Nicolae Toboşaru, 'Axa Washington-Londra-Bucureşti', p. 10.

accession.[51] Under EU and NATO flags, Romania would help to ensure stability in the Balkan and Black Sea areas; a brief mention was devoted to how the state would take part in the European Security and Defence Policy and the battle against terrorism.[52] Interestingly, according to the DA alliance, one of the main Romanian foreign policy objectives was to 'actively participate in the institutional and cultural construction of Great Europe'.[53] The DA alliance transferred the principles of its electoral campaign to the Government Programme for 2005-2008, issued in late December 2004.[54]

Concerning the state's external relations, the electoral and Government programmes suggested that Prime Minister Tăriceanu and his cabinet would focus first on achieving EU integration, followed by other commitments deriving from NATO membership. Fighting international terrorism and contributing to the EU Foreign and Security Policy were portrayed as equally important to the Government of Romania.[55] The presidential administration's emphasis on building an intensified Atlantic vocation and being involved in the global war on terrorism, which had been underlined by the 2006 National Security Strategy, were notably absent. This is a significant point because it indicates that the Government had different priorities compared to the President, where the EU and Romania's 'European' self-image featured

---

[51] The DA Alliance PNL-PD, *Platfoma de guvernare/ The Governmental Programme* (October 2004), pp. 111-114; http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/document-2008-10-7-4684918-0-platforma-aliantei-2004.pdf (July 2014).

[52] Ibid, p. 115.

[53] Ibid, p. 116.

[54] The Parliament of Romania, 'The Government Programme 2005-2008', *Monitorul Oficial al României/ The Official Registry of Romania*, number 1265, 29 December 2004.

[55] Ibid.

more prominently or, at the very least, were not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of national identity.

The topic of Romanian withdrawal from Iraq triggered mixed reactions inside the government and parliamentary majority, being intrinsically linked to the state's intensified Atlanticism. In late April 2005, the first to request Iraq withdrawal was PUR (re-named as the Conservative Party – PC), a small parliamentary group which had tipped the governmental majority scale in favour of the Tăriceanu cabinet after the 2004 elections.[56] A month later, Deputy Eugen Nicolaescu (spokesperson for PNL) said that 'the removal of our Iraqi troops should be debated within the governing coalition'; as a personal point of view, he argued against continuing any military presence in Iraq since 'Romania could use those expenses to modernise the army and make it more compatible with NATO'.[57]

On 24 May 2005, Prime Minister Tăriceanu was reluctant to express a clear position, declaring that Iraq withdrawal 'could have serious implications for Romania's assumed commitments and credibility as a NATO state and future member of the European Union'.[58] Almost a year later (April 2006), he appeared to support

---

[56] The Conservative Party (PC), 'Partidul Conservator susține retragerea trupelor româneşti din Irak'/ 'The Conservative Party Supports the Withdrawal of Romanian Troops from Iraq', *PC Official Website* (Bucharest, 29 June 2006); http://www.partidulconservator.ro/ 2006/06/partidul-conservator-sustine-retragerea-trupelor-romanesti-din-irak/ (July 2014).

[57] Eugen Nicolaescu cited by *HotNews.ro* (Bucharest, 20 May 2005); available at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1227191-personal-nu-cred-bine-suntem-irak.htm (July 2014).

[58] Călin Popescu Tăriceanu cited by *Radio Free Europe* (Bucharest, 24 May 2005); http://www.europalibera.org/archive/news/20050524/445/445.html?id=1418584 (July 2014).

maintaining Romanian forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, both theatres being associated with the responsibilities of NATO membership:

> 'I do not think withdrawing our troops is a relevant issue right now. On the contrary, Romania has stated at an official level that it is determined to continue participating with military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as long as those countries require it. The recently begun process of democratising Iraq needs to be consolidated (…) this entails extremely costly efforts, in terms of human resources and the very painful loss of lives, as well as financially. Still, I do believe Romania should prove itself capable of being a reliable partner for NATO'.[59]

The end of June 2006 highlighted a sudden but intense contestation in the national discourses, which showed divergent perspectives on Romania's national identity and the consequences of long-term military involvement in Iraq. The question of whether to withdraw or not the forces deployed there escalated into an open conflict between the two heads of the executive - the Prime Minister wanted a timetable of withdrawal and the President was firmly against such a prospect. Tăriceanu's opinion of April 2006 changed under the impact of a shifting international context, rationalism and the 'European' self-image of national identity. These aspects are analysed in detail later on in this section, after discussing the debates that surrounded Romanian military withdrawal from Iraq.

The initial announcement was made by Premier Tăriceanu and his Defence Minister Teodor Atanasiu, who advanced the PNL idea of

[59] Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (Bucharest, 27 April 2006) cited in Cristian Oprea, Laura Cernahoschi, Dan Tapalaga, Alina Mihai, Alin Bogdan, 'Retragerea din Irak a început cu o baterie'/ 'Iraq Withdrawal Began with a Battery', *Cotidianul* and *HotNews.ro* (30 June 2006); available at http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1170632-retragerea-din-irak-inceput-baterie.htm (July 2014).

removing approximately 890 Romanian soldiers from Iraq starting with 1 January 2007. The proposal was meant to be next presented to the Supreme Council of National Defence, which needed to examine the state's military planning for the following year. The two cabinet members invoked a range of reasons to substantiate their party's view. Tăriceanu began with the human dimension (past casualties and high risk of losing more lives), moving on to the widespread behaviour manifested by EU member states –

> '[w]e have taken into account the [human] impact of incidents in Iraq (...) France and Germany never participated, Spain has resolved for quite some time to withdraw, the same with Bulgaria and Italy. This decision subscribes to a clear tendency at the EU level. Right now the only two countries with [military] involvement are Poland and Romania'.[60]

Arguably, what affected Romanian forces the most was the imminent complete withdrawal of Italy. They operated together with the Garibaldi brigade in Nassyria and the latter's absence would leave Romania's troops without logistical support by the end of 2006.[61] Stressing Italy's revised viewpoint on Iraq was not coincidental and it played an important role in the context surrounding Prime Minister Tăriceanu's proposal. In March 2005, the Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi had made public that the country intended a 'progressive reduction' of its Iraq soldiers, due to the growing opposition from

---

[60] Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in *ibid.*

[61] Teodor Atanasiu - Romanian Minister of National Defence (December 2004 - September 2006) cited in 'Ministrul Apărării propune retragerea soldaților români din Irak'/ 'Defence Minister Proposes Withdrawing Romanian Soldiers from Iraq', *HotNews.ro* (Bucharest, 29 June 2006); http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1170824-ministerul-apararii-propune-retragerea-soldatilor-romani-din-irak.htm (July 2014).

domestic public opinion.[62] Italy was an EU state that had long displayed a predominantly Atlantic external orientation, which translated into aligning with the US intervention in Iraq and offering a substantial military force.[63]

If a devoted Atlantic state had already implemented gradual withdrawal, Romania deciding on a similar course for a smaller contribution would hopefully not be regarded as a betrayal of its Atlantic affiliation. According to Defence Minister Atanasiu on 29 June 2006, '[t]here is no country present in Iraq that does not have a timetable of withdrawal, especially considering that the Iraqi army has become much better trained and capable of taking over the missions we have been developing in this theatre of operations'.[64] He further mentioned that annual expenses for Iraq had risen to 200 million US dollars, which amounted to 11.8% of the defence budget.[65] Tăriceanu concluded his proposal to withdraw from Iraq by saying that Romania would maintain the military obligations which stemmed from NATO, EU and UN membership.[66]

---

[62] Silvio Berlusconi cited in 'Italy plans Iraq troop pull-out', *BBC News* (15 March 2005); http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4352259.stm (July 2014).

[63] Leopoldo Nuti, 'The Richest and Farthest Master is Always Best: US-Italian Relations in Historical Perspective' in David M. Andrews (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations After Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 194.

[64] Teodor Atanasiu cited in 'Liberalii atacă propunând retragerea'/ 'Liberals Attack by Proposing Withdrawal', *Gândul.info* (30 June 2006); http://www.gandul.info/stiri/liberalii-ataca-propunand-retragerea-260939 (July 2014).

[65] Teodor Atanasiu (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in 'Ministrul Apărării propune retragerea soldaților români din Irak'.

[66] Călin Popescu Tăriceanu cited in 'PNL cere retragerea trupelor din Irak'/ 'PNL Requests Troop Withdrawal from Iraq', *Deutsche Welle* (Bucharest, 29 June 2006); http://www.dw.de/pnl-cere-retragerea-trupelor-din-irak/a-2633090 (July 2014).

Following this unexpected announcement, the governing coalition was torn between mild support and strong opposition. The UDMR representatives favoured the 'European' way of doing things:

> '[i]t is a PNL decision and we support it. This does not mean that tomorrow the soldiers deployed there start packing and are coming home. Time is necessary to prepare a calendar, as all the European countries have done. I assume the Prime Minister has consulted with our international partners before making the announcement'.[67]

PC was glad to see PNL agreeing with an opinion it had already advanced in mid-2005.[68] The PD leader Emil Boc described the PNL statements to be a 'serious political mistake' that lacked responsibility and 'could affect Romania's international credibility'.[69]

The most critical response came from the presidential administration, which characterised as 'unacceptable' the unilateral position expressed by the Premier and Defence Minister on Iraq withdrawal, bypassing prior consultations with other internal institutions and external partners.[70] On 29 June 2006, President Băsescu made his stance clear:

> 'I am not a partisan of sending troops abroad; nevertheless, I do support respecting our commitments. Romania has a partnership with

[67] Kelemen Hunor (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in Cristian Oprea et al., 'Retragerea din Irak a început cu o baterie'.

[68] The Conservative Party, 'Partidul Conservator susține retragerea trupelor românești din Irak'.

[69] Emil Boc (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in Cristian Oprea et al.

[70] Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (29 June 2006) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=7712&_PRID=search (July 2014).

> the United States and Great Britain (...) It must have a credible and predictable foreign policy behaviour'.[71]

If Romanian elites were divided on continuing the military presence in Iraq, those mixed signals confused both the American and British sides. After being informed of Prime Minister Tăriceanu's initiative, the US ambassador Nicholas Taubman opted for a cautious reaction at first – '[m]y impression is that not all relevant parties inside Romania or outside of it have been consulted before making this announcement'.[72] Then he put some diplomatic pressure on Romanian authorities:

> 'Romania is one of the United States' most highly appreciated and trustworthy allies. We believe that Romania will continue to work together with us on common issues, including Iraq and the global war on terrorism'.[73]

The UK embassy conveyed its gratitude for Romania's help in southern Iraq, but ambassador Robin Barnett ended his statement on a sharper note - '[w]e have not been notified about the proposal advanced today by the Defence Minister and await urgent clarifications about future plans'.[74]

Looking at the story thus far, it could be argued that the divergences between Premier Tăriceanu and President Băsescu were

---

[71] Traian Băsescu, 'Interview for the Romanian Public Television' (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=7714&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[72] Nicholas Taubman cited in 'Preşedintele dezaprobă iniţiativa PNL'/'President Disapproves of PNL Initiative', *BBC* (29 June 2006); available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/ news/story/2006/06/060629_soldati_romani_irak.shtml (July 2014).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Robin Barnett cited in 'Preşedintele dezaprobă iniţiativa PNL'.

about whether to prioritise human and material costs or to persevere with Romania's role as a credible international partner despite the burdens. In this respect, two sets of contrasting values could have been competing for dominance: efficiency versus loyalty, adjustment versus predictability, benefits versus solidarity.[75] However, the potential withdrawal from Iraq is part of a larger attempt to re-define national identity, by re-introducing the 'European' self-image as an equally important element to the Atlantic vocation of Romanian foreign policy.

The President's foreign policy attitude was consistent with two self-images of Romanian national identity - 'pro-active liberal democracy' and 'security provider'. The 'European' self-image was a key theme of the Romanian foreign policy imaginary until 2004 and had influenced the state's evolving international responses to the Kosovo crisis. During the Iraq invasion of 2003, Romania was fundamentally re-articulated as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic vocation and chose to be part of the US-led coalition against Iraq. Post-2004 the 'liberal democratic' self-image was re-defined, since the Băsescu administration continued to intensify the Atlantic vocation of national identity and foreign policy. This intensified Atlanticism and marginalisation of the 'European' dimension were perplexing from a rational point of view. Romania became an official NATO member in 2004, but maintained its military forces in Iraq and other theatres of operations.

In contrast to these aspects, the context of EU integration was more problematic. In February 2005, the French Foreign Affairs

[75] Şerban F. Cioculescu, *România postcomunistă în „ecuația" strategică a vecinătăților: Balcanii, Marea Neagră şi Orientul Mijlociu Extins*, p. 268.

Minister pointed out that the Romanian state should be wearier of promoting a 'Washington-London-Bucharest Axis' instead of supporting the 'European' (EU) stance. The still pending situation of Romania's EU accession was implied here. Romania signed the EU accession protocol on 25 April 2005, yet membership would not be guaranteed until all EU member states ratified the protocol via referendum.[76] As President Chirac told Romania in 2003, '[a]ll it takes is one country not to ratify by referendum for [EU] enlargement not to move forward'.[77] Against such an international background, Romania led by President Băsescu did not exhibit a rational conduct. The state not only consolidated the Atlantic vocation of its national identity and foreign policy, but also intensified it and further displeased France.

The timeline indicated that the Prime Minister modified his perspective around May-June 2006. His declaration in April the same year literally subordinated human and other costs to Romania being perceived as a reliable ally internationally; hence a standpoint similarly shaped by the 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images, which prevailed over the 'European' one. While being a topic worthy of public debate, the idea of Iraq withdrawal was simply launched by Tăriceanu without notifying any other implicated parties. There were slim to no chances for the steadfastly Atlantic-minded Băsescu to agree, yet the American and British sides - who commanded Romanian soldiers in Iraq - should have been warned.

---

[76] The European Union, *Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania* (25 April 2005); http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgaria_romania/treaty_2005_en.htm (July 2014).

[77] Jacques Chirac, *Press Conference after the Extraordinary Informal Meeting of the European Council* (Brussels, 17 February 2003); French version at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/europe/conf-chirac (June 2014).

Tăriceanu's impulsive gesture undermined what was otherwise a legitimate national concern. Due to his change of opinion, the Premier was accused of carelessly antagonising the President and moving their domestic institutional struggle to the sensitive arena of external affairs. Using the words of the PSD (largest opposition party) leader and former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană,

> '[a] foreign policy issue like the presence of Romanian troops in Iraq cannot become the object of political games (…) it is something which needs to be negotiated beforehand. We are not dealing with individual ambitions, what lies at stake is Romania's credibility'.[78]

However, Tăriceanu's agenda went beyond material interests or winning the upper hand over Băsescu. A combination of factors explains his shift in views on Romanian military presence in Iraq – a changing international context, rationalism and the 'European' self-image of national identity. First, the international context was substantially different in June 2006 than mid-2005. Other European states were withdrawing from Iraq or had already done so, including Italy who had displayed a long-term Atlantic affiliation in terms of foreign relations. In such circumstances, it was hoped that Romania would not be perceived as betraying its Atlantic vocation.

More significantly, Romania signed the EU accession protocol in April 2005. But the ratification process of Romania's future EU membership was going slowly in the individual member states. At the end of March 2006, Foreign Affairs Minister Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu expressed his disappointment that certain EU states had not adopted

[78] Mircea Geoană (Bucharest, 29 June 2006) cited in Cristian Oprea et al, 'Retragerea din Irak a început cu o baterie'.

a 'speedier pace' for ratifying the Romanian accession treaty and gave the example of France.[79]

Premier Tăriceanu's reply of April 2006 was a reflexive reference to Romania's self-image of 'security provider' and reliable NATO partner. His answer also began with the idea that Iraq withdrawal was not a relevant topic 'right now' (April 2006). Tăriceanu needed more time to internalise the shifting international context and the potential implications of key EU members like France delaying the ratification of Romania's EU accession. His change of stance from April to June 2006 suggests that the Prime Minister aimed to quickly rebalance the 'European' and 'Atlantic' dimensions of national identity and foreign policy. This rebalancing shift had been prefigured by the Government Programme for 2005-2008 issued in December 2004, where the EU and Romania's 'European' self-image featured prominently and were not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of national identity. So June 2006 was a favourable time for domestic elites to reconsider the Iraq situation and even attempt to modify the state's wider approach to international relations.

Second, rational interests also played a role here because Tăriceanu did not change his mind at random in two months. He saw the opportunity to stand out compared to a highly visible Băsescu (the 'president-player') and pursued a series of possible advantages. The Premier's motivations included an increase in the Government's national popularity, allocating Iraq resources elsewhere and, most of

[79] Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu - Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (December 2004 – March 2007) cited in 'Romania Disappointed by French Delay on Accession Ratification', *EUObserver* (Brussels, 21 March 2006); http://euobserver.com/enlargement/21181 (July 2014).

all, showing that he had the ability to offer a 'European' alternative to the Presidency's long-standing views. This is where the impact of national identity comes in as a third element.

Tăriceanu and some cabinet members wanted a more nuanced Romanian foreign policy that would be equally influenced by the 'European' and 'Atlantic' dimensions of national identity. The prevalent 'European' (understood as EU) model of conduct regarding Iraq was the main ideational basis of Tăriceanu's rhetoric. He contested Băsescu's de facto exclusive prerogative to decide Romania's actions on Iraq, by invoking democratic arguments. Opinion polls at the time suggested that Romanians' attitudes towards their state's military presence in Iraq had shifted from the 2003 intervention: 50-52% did not support it and only 40-42% were in favour of it.[80] The Prime Minister and President were ultimately competing for legitimacy over foreign policy decision-making, which would feed into the hierarchy of self-images inside national identity.

In the end, the Prime Minister's initiative was submitted to deliberations within the Supreme Council of National Defence on 30 June 2006. It resulted in a majority of votes against withdrawing Romanian forces deployed in Iraq (10 versus 2).[81] Surprisingly, only the Premier and Defence Minister voted in favour. The other two PNL representatives – Foreign Affairs Minister Ungureanu and Finance

[80] Sever Voinescu and Gabriela Dobre, *The Perception of Romanian Public Opinion regarding Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Bucharest: The Institute for Public Policies, 2005), p. 59.

[81] Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (30 June 2006) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=7715&_PRID=search(July 2014).

Minister Sebastian Vlădescu[82] - chose to align with the presidential position.[83] The remaining members of CSAT had been expected to support the Presidency, because they were either cabinet members from PD (Băsescu's former political party), officials previously appointed by the President or his institutional advisers. It is clear evidence that the Government itself was torn between the two heads of the executive branch. Party allegiance, which tends to be very strong in Romanian politics, did not affect the Foreign Affairs and Finance Ministers' option to a decisive degree. Both went against their cabinet and PNL leader, which jeopardised their respective situations in the Government and political party.

Two votes would have obviously not changed the final resolution. Even so, the fact that the two cabinet members agreed with Romania maintaining the same contribution to Iraq, and thus sided with Băsescu's Atlantic priorities, indicates that the 'security provider' and 'pro-active liberal democracy' self-images of national identity were influential among the main foreign policy decision-makers.

The Presidency issued a press release, in which Băsescu heavily criticised and dismissed re-thinking a timetable of withdrawal for Iraq:

> '[s]ince a mandate for negotiating the reconfiguration of forces had already been in place, since the parties involved – Romanian, British, Italian and Australian – jointly agreed on the future dimensions of our Iraqi forces [March-June 2006], the proposal of withdrawal made by

[82] Sebastian Vlădescu – Romanian Minister of Public Finances (December 2004 – April 2007).

[83] Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (Bucharest, 30 June 2006).

> the Prime Minister and Defence Minister is difficult to justify and only creates the impression of an incoherent military and foreign policy'.[84]

Premier Tăriceanu's unsuccessful attempt at contestation was described as a confusing episode. Foreign Affairs Minister Ungureanu said that an 'unfortunate confusion' occurred between what was essentially a political proposal and not a final governmental decision.[85] A better thought-out and organised action by Prime Minister Tăriceanu could have become a more significant challenge to President Băsescu's Atlantic vision for Romanian international relations. With regards to the intensified Atlanticism of the presidential administration, the Romanian self-images of 'pro-active liberal democracy' and 'security provider' were embodied in the state's post-2005 international focus – Romania's Eastern foreign policy.

Romania's Eastern Foreign Policy

Post-2005 emerged as another formative period suitable for re-defining national identity and revising international priorities. As the end of chapter V suggested, the re-articulation process was prompted by the formal NATO accession in March 2004. At that time, Foreign Affairs Minister Geoană outlined at the North Atlantic Council the idea of Romania having an active regional role, whose primary objective was to democratise the Black Sea area. The state's upcoming entrance into the EU did not prefigure a different set of discursive meanings.

---

[84] Ibid.

[85] Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu and Armand Goşu, 'Interview', *Revista* 22, issue 852, 7 July 2006; available at http://www.revista22.ro/a-href-retragerea-din-irak-nu-figureaza-in-programul-de-guvernare-2873-2873.html (July 2014).

In December 2004, the newly elected President Băsescu enumerated the principles which would govern Romania's relations with the EU - an irreproachable conduct to guarantee successful integration and fulfilling the conditions required to gain membership (i.e. reform of the judicial system, reducing levels of corruption, increasing administrative performance and adjusting the features of internal economic competition to fit with EU norms).[86] These principles were related strictly to domestic affairs and indicated a limited concern about how the Romanian external agenda would fit within the EU.

At the end of 2004, the status of Romania's EU candidacy was promising, but it was unclear whether or not it would join the organisation in 2007. Thus, Băsescu's hesitancy in configuring an international vocation for his state as a future EU member was understandable to an extent. The negotiations eventually led to Romania being invited to sign its EU Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005, which scheduled official membership for January 2007. The state's journey towards EU entrance had reached a final stage yet the outcome was not guaranteed, because the European Council could decide to postpone the accession date for another year (1 January 2008), depending on how Romania continued to achieve the required progress.[87] Romania's EU membership also needed to be approved and ratified by each of the member states through referendum.

---

[86] Traian Băsescu, 'Speech in the Parliament of Romania' (Bucharest, 21 December 2004) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php ?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5866&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[87] The European Union, *Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria* (25 April 2005); http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulgaria_romania/treaty_2005_en.htm (July 2014).

After the Accession Treaty signing, the President expressed how Romania envisaged its 'European' self-image and foreign policy:

> '[o]ur objective is not to simply be a new member of the European Union (…) We take our role in securing a large part of the Union's eastern border very seriously (…) As a priority, we have set to actively contribute towards an Eastern neighbourhood characterised by stability and security'.[88]

In a post-ceremony interview, Băsescu clarified his interpretation of Romania's 'European' identity and associated it with the other main self-images of 'security provider' and 'liberal democratic':

> 'Romania must contribute not only by enlarging the internal market, by providing a skilled work force, by offering its unique culture. Romania needs to make an essential contribution towards the security of the European Union and NATO (…) We are probably the country that has the most extensive border with an area outside the EU. There is Ukraine in the North, Moldova with a frozen conflict in Transnistria to the East, the countries of former Yugoslavia to the South. In all of these regions Romania can contribute to the consolidation of democracies and the creation of a secure area.[89]

The discourse articulated the state's national identity along the lines of an actor who could primarily distinguish itself in the EU context as 'gate keeper' or 'bridge' to the outside. Such a member could not add value just by constituting a functional element of the EU whole. By adopting the representation of 'border state' in an

---

[88] Traian Băsescu, 'Speech on the Accession Treaty to the EU' (Luxembourg, 25 April 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=6185&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[89] Traian Băsescu, 'Interview for the "Pravd" Publication' (Luxembourg, 25 April 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index. php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=6183&_PRID=search (July 2014).

exclusive manner, Romania preferred to be less involved in the debates concerning the EU's internal structure and future course. This rather passive attitude could be justified by the fact that EU accession would be confirmed and rendered official only on 1 January 2007. Yet things did not change after that date, even though Romanian elites had a series of important instruments at their disposal. As a new member state, Romania benefited from both a medium-sized territory and a population that ranked in third place among EU members' voting power. Consequently, its number of votes in the EU Council of Ministers was surpassed only by the 'big four' (Germany, France, Italy and the UK), Spain and Poland.[90]

An analysis of material interests would have expected Romania to make use of its voting power and seek to maximise the advantages; or at least to render its presence quite visible within the EU via multilateral and bilateral cooperation with fellow members. The year 2007 had plenty of opportunities for exerting influence, with four issues of great significance placed on the EU's agenda: institutional reform, energy policy, security and defence policy. The topics were discussed in the European Parliament's sessions and at the Council of Ministers' level. Still, the Romanian state and its foreign affairs representatives continued showing a rather passive attitude to inside deliberations, looking instead towards the outside.[91] Romania was mostly preoccupied with the EU mechanisms that were meaningful for the other two self-images of national identity - 'pro-active liberal

[90] The European Union, *How Does the EU Work?*; available at http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_4/ (June 2013).

[91] The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Raport - Efectele 'Doctrinei Băsescu': izolarea internațională a României,* p. 6.

democracy' and 'security provider'. And those policies referred to the EU's Eastern neighbourhood and potential future enlargement.

Furthermore, according to Foreign Affairs Minister Ungureanu in August 2006, Romania would use its 'European' self-image to connect the 'West' (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity:

> '[o]n the international front, post-2007 Romania will be a European state with the potential to specialise in specific issues and geographical regions of foreign policy, and it can play the part of a link between the West and certain regions located in strategic proximity to the Euro-Atlantic area. A European Romania with a selective global vocation is the country we have all been dreaming of and one we have the historical duty to make a reality'.[92]

Taking into account President Băsescu's background as Navy commander, Romania was seen as 'an ideal transatlantic port to the Black Sea'.[93] In November 2006 foreign policy elites decided to 'actively lobby the relevant institutions in Brussels' to place the two neighbours – the Black Sea region and Moldova – on the EU's agenda, since the EU lacked a specific policy for the Black Sea region.[94]

Romania's potential influence in the Black Sea region resulted from controlling the Danube Delta and its channels (4,200 km), as well as 'approximately 245 km of the sea shore and the corresponding

---

[92] Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, 'Romania after 1 January 2007: New Realities, New Responsibilities, New Perspectives' (Bucharest, 30 August 2006) in *Întotdeauna loial: note diplomatice pentru o Românie modernă 2005-2007/ Always Loyal: Diplomatic Notes for a Modern Romania 2005-2007* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2008), p. 118.

[93] Iulia Motoc and Şerban F. Cioculescu, *Manual de Analiză a Politicii Externe/ Manual of Foreign Policy Analysis* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010), p. 57.

[94] Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, 'Speech at the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation' (Moscow, 1 November 2006) in *Întotdeauna loial: note diplomatice pentru o Românie modernă 2005-2007,* p. 72.

territorial waters'.[95] Post-2004 Romania had been trying to promote its own idea of a Black Sea initiative, in connection with the goals of NATO and the EU.[96] Cooperation in the Black Sea area had substantially increased for the past decades, ranging from the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Process of Stability and Good Neighbourly Relations in South-Eastern Europe, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, to military endeavours like BLACK-SEAFOR.[97] Yet the main bodies of regional dialogue in the Black Sea area had all been led by major actors like Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In 2007 Romania - together with Bulgaria and Greece - advocated that the EU needed to create a separate special initiative for the region. This was called the Black Sea Synergy and officially launched in February 2008, being integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy.[98]

The main objective of the Black Sea Synergy was 'the strengthening of cooperation between the riparian states, through implementing sectoral partnerships'; the most visible activities of the Synergy were 'environment and civil society development through the Romanian initiative of the Black Sea NGO Forum'.[99] The notion of a 'Black Sea Forum' had first been mentioned by President Băsescu in his February

---

[95] Irina Angelescu, 'New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania's Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region', *Perspectives*, volume 19(2), 2011, p. 135.

[96] Mihail E. Ionescu, *Marea Neagră de la 'lac bizantin' la provocările secolului XXI: Culegere de studii/ The Black Sea from 'Byzantine Lake' to XXIst Century Challenges: A Collection of Studies* (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2006), p. 373.

[97] George C. Maior, *The Danube, European Security and Cooperation at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Bucharest: Encyclopedica, 2002), p. 116.

[98] Ruxandra Ivan, 'Black Sea Regional Leadership in Romanian Foreign Policy Discourse' in Ruxandra Ivan (ed.), *New Regionalism or No Regionalism? Emerging Regionalism in the Black Sea Area* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p. 164.

[99] Ibid.

2005 visit to Moscow. He conceived it to be a 'political forum', which had the mission of 'developing a political vision that would solve [Black Sea] problems'.[100] The Black Sea Forum was 'meant to complement existing initiatives and forms of organization in the region by providing an informal platform for communication'.[101] The one and only meeting of the Black Sea Forum was held in Bucharest in June 2006 and was not attended by Russia.

Regardless of what projects were undertaken in the extended Black Sea area, the Russian Federation remained a key player. The success of President Băsescu's Eastern foreign policy inevitably depended upon establishing some sort of communication and working partnership with Russia. There were a few persuasive reasons to be considered in this respect. First, Russia was one of the states bordering on the Black Sea. Second, Russia's role could impact positively or negatively on the frozen conflicts in the area. Third, the Russian state in all its historical incarnations had always held strong views regarding the evolution of its immediate and close vicinity, an aspect which had to be seriously taken into account.[102] Romania's diplomatic relations with Russia had been strained or difficult at best throughout the post-communist period, but they had never deteriorated to such an extent as after 2005. The main cause was the

---

[100] Traian Băsescu (May 2006) cited in Ileana Racheru and Octavian Manea, 'Prioritățile de politică externă ale lui Traian Băsescu'/ 'The Priorities of Traian Băsescu's Foreign Policy', *Revista 22*, issue 992, 10 March 2009; available at http://www.revista22.ro/ prioritatile-de-politica-externa-ale-lui-traian-basescu-5737.html (July 2014).

[101] Irina Angelescu, 'New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania's Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region', p. 136.

[102] Simona Soare, 'Still Talking Past Each Other: Romanian-Russian Relations', *Russian Analytical Digest*, number 125, 25 March 2013, p. 15; available at http://www.css.ethz. ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-125-14-18.pdf (July 2014).

Romanian President's somewhat aggressive foreign policy discourse, which started manifesting itself in the second half of 2005.

During his first official visit to Russia in February 2005, things appeared stable and Băsescu asked for President Vladimir Putin's involvement in a future multi-lateral arrangement of cooperation around the Black Sea – later known as the Black Sea Forum.[103] This neutral language was short-lived and the Romanian presidential discourse soon began to consistently antagonise Russia. Although there was a grain of truth in most of Băsescu's choice of words, the language of international diplomacy had rules that could not be ignored without consequences. In a speech delivered at Stanford University, President Băsescu declared that the Russian Federation treated 'the Black Sea as a Russian lake' because it did not want problems in the region to be 'internationalised'.[104]

Consistent with the intensified Atlantic dimension of Romania's national identity, in December 2005 an agreement was ratified, which granted permission to build US military bases on Romanian territory. It ensured American presence near Romania's South-Eastern border and led to further Russian displeasure. On 25 January 2006, an opportunity to briefly discuss this issue arose during an address by President Băsescu in front of the Council of Europe. When replying to the Russian representative's question about the American bases in Romania, he ended the answer with a cutting remark on the past

[103] Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (15 February 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5958&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[104] Traian Băsescu cited in Simona Soare, 'The Romanian-Russian Bilateral Relationship in the Aftermath of Romania's Euro-Atlantic Integration', *Monitor Strategic*, number 1-2, 2010, p. 102.

Soviet military presence - '[y]ou stayed for thirty years in Romania, and we never asked you why you did so'.[105]

As a form of retaliation, in June 2006 Russia ostentatiously ignored the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership organised in Bucharest. Late October 2006 brought another hostile reference in the context of European dependence on Russian gas supplies: 'the promotion of reforms throughout the Black Sea region is burdened by Russia's energy monopoly'.[106] The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs - Serghei Lavrov - handed a letter to his Romanian counterpart after an OSCE meeting, where he expressed Russian concern for President Băsescu's 'unfriendly statements'; according to the language of diplomacy, the word 'unfriendly' symbolised a very serious deterioration of the states' bilateral relations.[107]

Băsescu's rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia was persistently antagonistic, often with an undiplomatic and hostile tone. Rationally speaking, there is no plausible reason for it because his attitude clearly undermined any initiative the Romanian Presidency wanted to promote in the Black Sea region. Russia remains too powerful an actor to ignore or, worse, openly insult and expect it not to sabotage Romanian projects. Băsescu's extremely blunt words, to the point of being offensive, can be explained by the kinds of understandings which circulated in the foreign policy imaginary post-2004.

---

[105] Traian Băsescu (25 January 2006) cited in The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, *2006 Ordinary Session (First Part)*; available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/Records/2006/E/0601251000E.htm (June 2013).

[106] Traian Băsescu, 'Speech' (31 October 2006) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8116&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[107] Ruxandra Ivan, *La Politique Étrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)*, p. 143.

As reflected by the 2006 National Security Strategy, the presidential discourse operated with negative representations of the 'non-Euro-Atlantic' others. The 'main battle' was 'waged between fundamentally different values' – 'democracy and totalitarianism'.[108] In such a global context, the 'logic of exclusion and confrontation'[109] was applied and it became particularly relevant in Russia's case. Romania had a traditionally uneasy relationship with Russia and many historical narratives of past wrongs, especially the National Treasure (given to Tsarist custody during World War I and never fully returned) or the Soviet Union being blamed for imposing communism in Central-Eastern Europe. Compared to the Balkans, Romania's foreign policy imaginary had not articulated Russia as a 'friendly other'.

President Băsescu considered Russia to be the root of all problems in the Black Sea area, which enabled the 'logic of exclusion' to move on to that of 'confrontation'. His intensified Atlantic vocation for the Romanian self-images of 'security provider' and 'pro-active liberal democracy' shaped an antagonistic behaviour towards the 'undemocratic' Russian other. The latter was held responsible for not allowing Romania and the Euro-Atlantic community to stabilise and democratise the Black Sea states, for undermining Băsescu's Eastern policies and the regional role he envisioned. As another component of Romania's Eastern foreign policy, the presidential administration tried to bring the Republic of Moldova (historically known as Basarabia) closer to 'Europe' and EU integration. It was a promising endeavour that produced mixed results.

---

[108] 'The National Security Strategy of Romania' (2006), p. 7.

[109] The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României*, p. 8.

Relations with the Republic of Moldova

Among Romania's neighbours, Moldova is the one state with whom it shares the greatest affinity and, to a certain degree, the most complex relationship. Immediately after the Cold War, the dialogue between Romania and Moldova was marked by the possible reunification of two states with similar historical origins, languages and cultures. Since 1989, the evolution of their relations has been characterised by rapprochement interspersed with tensions or even periods of conflict.

Irina Angelescu has summarised the long-standing and complicated background of the Moldovan-Romanian historical rapport:

> '[t]he territory of the contemporary independent state of Moldova had been an integral part of the Romanian Moldovan Principality, roughly from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century. It was conquered by the Russian Empire for five decades in the nineteenth century, and then it was an integral part of the Romanian independent state (...) until 1944, when it became part of the Soviet Union'.[110]

These historical changes contributed to Moldova having a 'regional' rather than a 'national' identity; Moldovan politics was dominated by multiple discourses about identity.[111] Dan Dungaciu has identified three types of domestic discourses that tell different

[110] Irina Angelescu, 'New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania's Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region', pp. 130-131.

[111] Oleg Serebrian, 'Basarabia: identitate, politică şi geopolitică'/ 'Basarabia: Identity, Politics and Geopolitics' in Vasile Boari, Sergiu Gherghina and Radu Murea (eds.), *Regăsirea identității naționale/ Recovering National Identity* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010), pp. 218-219.

stories about Moldova's identity – the Romanian discourse, the discourse of Soviet Moldovanism and the multi-ethnic and multicultural discourse.[112] The question of identity remains very sensitive in Moldova, where people basically disagree on whether they are actually Romanians or have a distinct 'Moldovan' national identity.

This divisive debate partly accounts for the ups and downs of Romania's engagement with Moldova since 1991, when Moldova declared itself an independent state from the USSR. Although the reunification of Moldova and Romania did not occur, the possibility of that outcome 'made Moldova's national minorities very uncomfortable and led to the "hot" war of Transnistria at the beginning of the 1990s'.[113] The resulting 'frozen conflict' has slim chances of being resolved while local ethnic and nationalist sentiments continue to be manipulated. As V.G. Baleanu has noted, 'the Transnistrian leaders expertly play the card of their opposition to Moldova's possible unification with Romania'.[114]

While presenting his foreign policy coordinates to the ambassadors accredited in Bucharest, President Băsescu said in January 2005:

> '[t]he relationship with the Republic of Moldova will be a priority for my mandate as president of Romania. The Republic of Moldova's European future must be a moral obligation of the entire Romanian

[112] Dan Dungaciu, 'The Part that Wants to Become Whole. Identity Discourses in the Republic of Moldova', *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*, volume 11(1), 2014, pp. 3-14.

[113] Irina Angelescu, 'New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania's Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region', p. 131.

[114] V.G. Baleanu, *In the Shadow of Russia: Romania's Relations with Moldova and Ukraine* (Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000), p. 14.

> society. Our identical language, culture and traditions are historical gifts. Protecting this identity is our duty'.[115]

The statement was followed by an official visit to Moldova during the same month, whose administration was probably surprised by the sudden change of its neighbour's rhetoric. After all, six years had passed since the last visit of a Romanian President to Chisinau.

Moldova's response was initially welcoming and showed its willingness to use the Romanian experience concerning EU accession. The exchanges during the visit were friendly and Băsescu offered his guarantee that Romania would be the Republic of Moldova's 'advocate of progress towards the West and the European Union'.[116] He also stressed the Romanian commitment to treat Moldova as an independent and sovereign state, at the same time mentioning the 'shared history' and the 'binding common future within the EU'.[117] An interesting detail appeared in the joint declaration with President Vladimir Voronin at the end of their consultations, where a substantial amount of attention was dedicated to regional cooperation in South-East Europe. The text explained how Romania would support Moldova's wish to join various economic and political organisations in that area, as part of the broader EU accession efforts.[118]

---

115 Traian Băsescu, 'Speech' (18 January 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5914&_PRID=search (July 2014).

116 Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (21 January 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5923&_PRID= search (July 2014).

117 Ibid.

118 Traian Băsescu, 'Joint Statements of Presidents Băsescu and Voronin' (Chisinau, 21 January 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; available at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5922&_PRID=search (July 2014).

Regarding the matter of Transnistria, on the occasion of his official visit to Russia in February 2005, Băsescu had already informed President Putin that Romania wanted to become involved in addressing the Transnistrian conflict. He proposed 'to enlarge the format of negotiation' (Republic of Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Transnistria and the OSCE) by including the Romanian side.[119] Băsescu had often called for the withdrawal of Russia's military presence from Transnistria. For instance, he thought the 'first step to a solution requires both withdrawing foreign troops and dissolving the military and paramilitary forces of the separatist regime, according to a clear timetable and with multilateral guarantees'.[120]

This international stance differed to an important extent from the EU's approach to the conflict, although the supranational institution had assigned a special representative for the Transnistrian issue. Ultimately, the EU did not insist on the withdrawal of foreign military forces and gave the impression of accepting as legitimate Russia's viewpoint - that its troops had a purely peace-keeping purpose.[121] Despite saying that it had a concrete plan to solve the 'frozen conflict', Romania's proposal to be included in the negotiations on Transnistria was met with refusal by most participant states – the Republic of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.[122]

---

[119] Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (15 February 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=5956&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[120] Traian Băsescu, 'Press Release' (2 December 2005) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*;http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=6848&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[121] Nicu Popescu, *EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Stealth Intervention* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 60.

[122] Armand Goşu, 'Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005'/ 'Romania's Eastern Policy: 1990-2005', *Contrafort*, number 1(135), January 2006; available at http://www.contrafort.md/old/2006/135/958.html (July 2014).

After July 2006, Romania's upcoming EU membership brought to the surface another sensitive issue in the relations with Moldova – dual citizenship. Romanian elites had a foreign policy initiative that was intended to bring Moldovans closer to 'Europe':

> 'Romania's accession to the EU meant that it had to introduce visas for Moldovan citizens – who until then did not even need a passport to travel to the country. To make the situation easier for Moldovans, the dual citizenship law made it possible for qualified Moldovans to obtain Romanian citizenship, but it also meant that Moldovans could now travel visa-free in the Schengen [and EU] space'.[123]

Yet the implementation of this foreign policy idea triggered several negative interpretations. Some EU members were not pleased by the influx of new and indirectly acquired EU citizens that originated from Moldova. The Russian speaking media in Chisinau depicted it as 'the tacit assimilation of Moldova by Romania'.[124] Throughout the autumn of 2006, President Voronin frequently criticised Romania and eventually accused it of trying to 'push' his state inside the EU.[125]

Romania's foreign policy imaginary operated on the belief of a shared European identity with the Republic of Moldova. That would be the reason it assumed 'European' (EU) integration to constitute the natural Moldovan future course. The Romanian administration was mindful not to insist on NATO membership, which remained problematic due to Moldova's ties with Russia. Instead, President

---

[123] Irina Angelescu, 'New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania's Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region', p. 132.

[124] V.G. Baleanu, *In the Shadow of Russia: Romania's Relations with Moldova and Ukraine*, p. 18.

[125] Vladimir Voronin (27 November 2006) cited in 'A Chronology of Relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova after 2004', *Ziare.com*; available at http://www.ziare.com/basescu/stiri-traian-basescu/relatiile-dintre-romania-si-republica-moldova-dupa-2004-cronologie-194365 (June 2013).

Băsescu wanted to bring the neighbouring state closer to the EU's influence and facilitate its accession. Nevertheless, it would seem that Bucharest and Chisinau did not have a sufficiently similar identity; or at least Moldova had not internalised a 'European' self-image.

Although the Moldovan administration welcomed at first its neighbour's foreign policy efforts, Romania's eager persistence was negatively interpreted by President Voronin as paternalistic and aiming to destabilise the state's regime. The situation degenerated into a full-blown political and diplomatic crisis throughout 2006 and 2007, whose severity was atypical for democracies.[126] Therefore, the relationship with Moldova as an essential component of Romania's Eastern foreign policy proved to be a partial success at best.

The exclusively Romanian initiative of the Black Sea Forum was also a failure. The overall achievements of the Băsescu administration's Eastern focus were disappointing. In the words of Armand Goşu, 'neither at a theoretical level has a coherent vision for Romania's Eastern policy been formulated, nor at a practical level can one notice a consistent endeavour in this respect'.[127] Even if the foreign policy embodiment of Romania's two externally accepted self-images – 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' – was unsuccessful in 2005-2006, a great accomplishment awaited state elites and public opinion on 1 January 2007.

Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration had been a long-standing foreign policy goal and national aspiration during the post-communist years. Its symbolic importance for the state was constitutionally enshrined and included among the revisions to the Romanian

[126] Ruxandra Ivan, *La Politique Étrangère Roumaine (1990-2006)*, p. 141.
[127] Armand Goşu, 'Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005'.

Constitution in 2003.[128] Minutes before the official EU accession (1 January 2007), in his New Year's Eve address to the domestic population, President Băsescu emphasised the collective will and sacrifice of all Romanians that led to the much desired achievement of NATO and EU memberships.[129]

> The message invoked the state's long awaited 'return to Europe':
>
> '[w]e have not entered but returned [to Europe] after 60 years, during which no one asked us if we wanted to be absent. We have come back home, to our Europe!'[130]

Romania finally obtained full and incontestable international recognition for its Euro-Atlantic national identity and all three related self-images: 'liberal democratic', 'security provider' and 'European'. This was the eagerly anticipated last stop in Romania's journey of national identity re-definitions that had shaped its foreign policy between 1990 and 2007.

Concluding Remarks

The period 2004-2007 consolidated and intensified the Atlantic dimension of Romania's national identity and foreign policy. Domestic politics was dominated by the new 'president-player' Băsescu, who became the main de facto decision-maker concerning the state's

---

[128] The Parliament of Romania, 'Title VI - Euroatlantic Integration' in *The Constitution of Romania*; http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_1&par1=6 (July 2014).

[129] Traian Băsescu, 'Address' (1 January 2007) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8358&_PRID=search (July 2014).

[130] Traian Băsescu, 'Message' (Sibiu, 1 January 2007) in *The Archives of Romania's Presidency*; http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8360&_PRID=search (July 2014).

international affairs. This was problematic in the Romanian semi-presidential system, which featured two heads of the executive branch – the President and Prime Minister. President Băsescu and Premier Tăriceanu entered an uneasy political cohabitation, although they had initially been co-leaders of the same coalition. The presidential administration shaped to a great extent the post-2005 foreign policy imaginary. The Presidency's discourses, reflected in the 2006 National Security Strategy, re-articulated Romania as a 'pro-active liberal democracy' and 'security provider' with an intensified Atlantic vocation. This intensified Atlanticism subordinated or rendered secondary the other key facet of national identity – the 'European' self-image.

Since Romania had gained NATO membership in 2004, the Presidency as a key foreign policy agent viewed the state like a bridge to the outside or to the 'East'. After 2005, the Romanian international purpose was to act as a 'border state' and 'gate keeper' that connected the Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. The 'European' self-image of Romanian identity represented its inextricable link to Western Europe. Having obtained international recognition for two main themes of national identity – 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' – via NATO integration, Romania started to look from the West to the East. An externally validated pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role needed to spread democratic values and stabilise the neighbouring non-Euro-Atlantic states. It also had to keep participating in nearer or more distant military missions as a component of the global war on terrorism. Yet such foreign policy understandings were not accepted by all Romanian elites, especially the Prime Minister as chief of the Government.

June 2006 configured an episode of domestic contestation regarding the withdrawal of Romanian armed forces from Iraq. These debates were part of a wider attempt to re-balance the state's Atlantic vocation and 'European' self-image, which would in turn impact on Romanian identity and international stances. The governmental programme adopted in December 2004 outlined that the foreign policy priority of the Tăriceanu cabinet would be achieving EU accession, followed by other obligations stemming from NATO membership. The Government saw the fight against international terrorism and the involvement in the EU Foreign and Security Policy as equally important. The Presidency's intensified Atlanticism for Romanian identity and foreign policy was absent. For Premier Tăriceanu's cabinet, the EU and 'European' self-image were not secondary to the Atlantic vocation of Romanian national identity. In June 2006, the Prime Minister tried to contest the President's sole de facto right to decide the maintaining of soldiers in Iraq, alongside attempting to rebalance the 'European' and 'Atlantic' dimension of Romanian identity and foreign policy. Tăriceanu's challenge to Băsescu's Atlanticist vision failed because it was not well planned and the 'pro-active liberal democracy' and 'security provider' self-images were more influential on national elites.

Post-2005 the Presidency's intensified Atlanticism also shaped Romania's Eastern foreign policy. The state was less involved in the internal 'European' deliberations and much more preoccupied with the EU mechanisms that were relevant to the dominant Romanian self-images ('liberal democratic' and 'security provider'). Those EU policies pertained to the Eastern neighbourhood and the organisation's possible future expansion. As a 'border state', Romania was looking to the East and wanted to connect the Euro-Atlantic community with its non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity. The state's Eastern projects were meant to democratise and stabilise the Black Sea region, but yielded mixed results.

Romania promoted its own idea of a Black Sea initiative among multilateral cooperation arrangements directed by major actors like Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Romania's 'Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership' was ignored by Russia and organised only one meeting in June 2006. The potential success of the 'Black Sea Forum' in particular and Romania's Eastern foreign policy in general depended on a good working relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, President Băsescu consistently antagonised Russia via a somewhat aggressive and hostile rhetoric throughout late 2005 and 2006. It was not a rational attitude, rather one influenced by the negative representations of the 'non-Euro-Atlantic' others circulated by the presidential discourses. As the logic of exclusion moved on to confrontation, the intensified Atlantic vocation of Romanian national identity shaped an antagonistic conduct towards the 'undemocratic' Russian other.

Another component of Romania's Eastern foreign policy referred to relations with the Republic of Moldova and the latter's EU prospects. Romanian-Moldovan dialogue had a promising beginning that eventually ended in a diplomatic crisis. Moldova had not internalised a 'European' international course and did not want to be 'pushed' by Romania in the EU. The Romanian state had also aimed to be included in the format of negotiations to solve the 'frozen conflict' of Transnistria, yet was refused by most participant states – the Republic of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Overall, Romania's Eastern foreign policy in 2005-2006 was marked by tentative progress which in the end proved to be a failure. This disappointment was assuaged by the state becoming an official EU member on 1 January 2007, which internationally validated all the three main themes of Romania's post-communist national identity and foreign policy: 'European', 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider'.

Conclusions regarding Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy (1990-2007)

This book has explored the significance of national identity in shaping the trajectory of Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. To accomplish its aims, the project has employed a conceptual perspective on national identity, which draws from four literatures related to constructivism, nationalism scholarship, collective memory and self-esteem and international recognition. The framework has applied the following general constructivist ideas: the changing nature and ideational foundation of national identity; how it influences state action without imposing causality; the external and domestic dimensions at work in identity formation; the way identity is constituted via difference and entails a variety of possible representations on the self-other nexus.

The thesis has then used nationalism and memory studies to identify the internal sources of national identity. A fairly obvious first domestic factor is the nation. The debates in the field of nationalism shed light on the imagined essence of the nation, which does not imply that nations are fictitious. They have a stable ethno-cultural core based on ethnic ancestry, language, territory and collective memories like internalised historical narratives and symbols. The second internal source of national identity refers to collective memory-myths, which are subjective interpretations of the nation's remembered past that give meaning to the self-images feeding into national identity and convey future aspirations.

Apart from the two domestic factors of national identity, there is the external dimension of international recognition. Self-images and national identity require validation by others from the international realm. Identity verification is intertwined with self-esteem, which illustrates an important motivator in a state's social survival and foreign policy. Self-images and national identity are negotiated between the self (the state) and its salient others. If self-images are not internationally recognised, the state appeals to different strategies such as identity re-definitions to convince external audiences of their validity. The multi-dimensional view of national identity has provided some very interesting and unique insights in the case of Romanian post-communist foreign policy.

Thus, the years 1990-1996 featured a rich palette of re-emerging meanings and a 'formative moment' that brought forward the main self-images of Romanian national identity: 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. The 'European' self-image was more intensely circulated at this time, yet the others were articulated as well. All three self-images formed an ideational foundation that shaped Romania's foreign policy between 1990 and 2007. The state's relationship with the Balkans has been marked by rejection and acceptance. Romanian officials persistently tried to convince external audiences that their state was 'non-Balkan'.

Even so, the 'Balkan other' was not constructed as a threat. The area was often represented as 'our friends to the South', with Yugoslavia described as 'traditional partner' and 'best neighbour'. These articulations configured a 'non-Balkan' Romania that retained an affinity and friendly rapport with the Balkans. The 'security provider' self-image of Romanian identity presented a range of

meanings like 'reliable partner' and 'source of stability'. It had a discursive connection with NATO membership because Romania had to prove that it could contribute to allied military capabilities. But the self-image of 'security provider' was not simply a response to NATO discourses and accession criteria, since it was rooted in a long-standing collective memory-myth about Romania being a defender of Europe and the West. The 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider' self-images were particularly relevant in influencing Romanian positions on the Kosovo military intervention and Iraq war.

After settling on the main themes of the post-communist foreign policy imaginary, Romania's journey of national identity and foreign policy in 1996-1999 emphasised the inherent dilemmas of a European liberal democracy and security provider that has Balkan ties. Confronted with an escalating inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo, Romanian leaders needed to decide what would be the suitable stance for an aspiring liberal democracy with a security provider role, which had a traditional friendship and affinity with the Balkans too. The post-1996 discourses had consolidated the key themes of Romania's foreign policy imaginary - 'European', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider', while articulating an ideational shift towards the role of democracy in the state's evolution. Elites mentioned the 'liberal democratic' self-image of Romanian identity more often than the 'European' one, yet they were facets of the same representation.

The Kosovo crisis was a 'formative moment' for national identity and international reactions. Romania had an evolving position on Kosovo which started with partial support for NATO in October 1998 and later changed to unconditional assistance for the Alliance's air campaign in March-April 1999. The initial response of October 1998

was a middle ground with a dual objective. Partial support for NATO actions (airspace access in emergencies) did not explicitly oppose the Alliance or contradict Romania's self-proclaimed Euro-Atlantic identity. It also accommodated the dilemmas within national identity - whether to act as a 'European' liberal democracy and 'security provider' or choose the traditional Balkan ties.

This foreign policy decision was re-defined under the impact of three factors: national identity, rationalism and shifting international context. Rational interests were a component of Romania's Euro-Atlantic goal and contributed to its Kosovo stance, but they cannot explain why the state did not fully endorse and assist NATO operations from the beginning. Here national identity shows the tensions between the two Romanian self-images - 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' – and Balkan affinity, which shaped Romanian foreign policy. Critical events like the Kosovo conflict facilitate the re-articulation of international ideational contexts.

In early 1999, the international discourses conveyed the urgency of a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and NATO states were ready to use force without a mandate from the UN Security Council. Prominent Euro-Atlantic voices talked about the negative implications of appeasing dictators and advocated a certain interpretation of Kosovo as a fight between the civilised values of liberal democracy and barbaric authoritarianism.

This shifting ideational context enabled a hierarchy within Romanian identity, as the 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' self-images became more relevant than traditional relations and affinity with the Balkans. Romania's presidential and parliamen-

tary discourses resonated with the idea of the state acting like an established liberal democracy. Once the tensions and dilemmas of national identity were solved in March-April 1999, Romania supported NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo by granting unrestricted airspace access without military troops.

Having decided to behave like a credible 'European' liberal democratic state and security provider, the journey of Romania's national identity and foreign policy in 2000-2004 moved on to another existential question – to be or not to be an 'Atlantic' liberal democracy? The years 2000-2004 featured the culmination of several 'formative moments' for Romanian identity and international politics. During the first post-communist decade, the state's Euro-Atlantic national identity included three main self-images: 'European'/'liberal democratic', 'non-Balkan' and 'security provider'. The 'European' self-image meant Romania was an aspiring liberal democracy that required international recognition from the authoritative Euro-Atlantic community - NATO and EU states.

At the crucial point of the 1999 Kosovo intervention, national identity underwent two fundamental re-definitions. Firstly, the 'non-Balkan' self-image started to gradually disappear from the foreign policy imaginary, which made the 'European'/'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' ones to be dominant. Secondly, the 'European'/'liberal democratic' self-image was re-articulated to a substantial extent. From 1990 to 1999, the 'European' and 'liberal democratic' self-images constituted the same representation. The Kosovo 'formative moment' encouraged Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image to be separated from its 'European' identity. As the international narratives of 1999 promoted the notions of humanitarian

and democratic intervention, Romanian identity was re-defined as a pro-active liberal democracy that helped to spread democratic principles; being a liberal democracy was not necessarily associated with 'Europe' anymore. This re-articulation of national identity was central in clarifying Romania's foreign policy on Iraq, whether it should opt for a 'European' or 'Atlantic' orientation.

During 2002-2003, France and Germany persisted in disarming Iraq via peaceful methods, while the US wanted to invade the country and remove its totalitarian regime through military force. NATO states were also divided on how to approach the Iraq situation. Romania initially attempted to remain neutral but decided to support the US and take part in the coalition against Iraq in February 2003. Rationalism would say that Romania was merely currying favour with the US to finalise the NATO integration process. The state had been invited to join the Alliance in 2002 and its accession had to be ratified by each member. Yet the context was not straightforward, considering that France had a NATO veto at its disposal and both Germany and France were highly influential EU decision-makers. France had been very displeased by Romanian solidarity with the US on Iraq and threatened the state's EU candidacy.

According to a rational calculation, Romania was halfway in NATO and could lose much more by antagonising France and Germany. Romania could have formulated a limited backing for the US that did not entail sending armed forces. Instead, Romanian elites across the political spectrum agreed on a vocal Atlantic response to Iraq and full military participation. National identity can explain the state's choice of foreign policy actions. The contradictory European (French-German) and Atlantic views on Iraq prompted an identity

crisis within Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image. After intervening in Kosovo for humanitarian and democratic reasons, Romania as a pro-active liberal democracy seeking international validation could not entertain double standards and distinguish between dictatorships. Romania opted to become fully involved in the coalition against Iraq since this course of action was consistent with the fundamentally re-defined national identity - 'pro-active liberal democracy' - and the emerging Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy.

At the time, specific Cold War memory-myths were particularly meaningful for Romanian leaders, as they reinforced the state's identity re-articulations and its Atlantic perspective. Romania and Central-Eastern European states felt an emotional solidarity with American causes, because the US was collectively perceived and remembered as not having completely abandoned the region during communism. That is why many post-communist states like Romania interpreted their support for the American democratic ideal as a moral duty, even at the expense of traditional relations with France and potential material costs.

After re-defining national identity as a pro-active liberal democracy with an Atlantic vocation, Romania's foreign policy story entered its final post-communist formative period. The years 2004-2007 consolidated and intensified the Atlanticism of Romanian identity and international politics. The post-2005 foreign policy imaginary was significantly shaped by the Băsescu presidential administration. President Băsescu promoted an overt Atlantic orientation and aimed to build a special relationship between the US, UK and Romania. For the first time, the intensified Atlanticism depicted as secondary the other key facet of Romanian national

identity – the 'European' self-image. The latter had substantially impacted on the state's international relations, influencing its stances on the Kosovo intervention during 1998-1999. And the Iraq war of 2003 facilitated the fundamental re-definition of Romania's 'liberal democratic' self-image as pro-active and Atlantic, without explicitly marginalising its 'European' identity.

Nevertheless, as Romania had obtained NATO membership in 2004 and was close to EU accession, the presidential administration as main foreign policy decision-maker had a specific view of the state's international purpose. Romania intended to act like a 'border state' or bridge that linked the Euro-Atlantic community (NATO and EU) with its non-Euro-Atlantic others. Since Romania had received international recognition for two self-images of its national identity – 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider' – through NATO integration, the state focused more on the 'East'. Romania as an externally accepted pro-active liberal democracy with a security provider role wanted to democratise and stabilise the non-Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood. It also needed to maintain the contributions to military operations abroad as part of the international war on terrorism.

These foreign policy meanings were not endorsed by all Romanian elites, especially the Prime Minister. He attempted to rebalance the 'European' self-image and Atlantic dimension of national identity, which would affect Romanian international affairs. The Premier's discursive efforts culminated in the June 2006 episode of internal contestation about withdrawing Romanian soldiers from Iraq. The Prime Minister's challenge to the President's Atlantic option was unsuccessful, because it was not well planned and the 'pro-active

liberal democracy' and 'security provider' self-images had a greater impact on state officials.

Post-2005 Romania's intensified Atlanticism and 'border state' representation configured its Eastern foreign policy. Romania's Eastern projects were supposed to spread democratic values and stabilise the non-Euro-Atlantic vicinity, particularly the Black Sea area, yet produced mixed results. The state's version of a Black Sea initiative had a very short activity as it was mostly ignored by Russia. The possible success of Romania's Eastern policies depended on a reasonably good working relationship with Russia. However, in 2005-2006, the Romanian Presidency consistently antagonised Russia via an aggressive and even hostile rhetoric. This was not a rational behaviour, but rather one shaped by the negative articulations of the non-Euro-Atlantic others advocated by the presidential discourses. The intensified Atlantic vocation of Romanian identity influenced the antagonistic attitude towards the 'undemocratic' Russian other.

Romania's Eastern foreign policy also included improving relations with the Republic of Moldova and the latter's EU prospects. The inter-state communication showed a promising potential that unfortunately deteriorated into a diplomatic crisis. Moldova decided that it did not wish to be 'pushed' by Romania in acceding to the EU. Consequently, Romania's Eastern foreign policy was characterised by tentative progress and ultimately failure in 2005-2006. Such a disappointing outcome was sweetened by Romania becoming an official EU member on 1 January 2007, which granted international validation to all the main themes of Romania's post-communist national identity and foreign policy: 'European', 'liberal democratic' and 'security provider'.

The trajectory of Romania's national identity and foreign policy has been difficult at times, yet the discursive dialogue with the authoritative Euro-Atlantic self has re-defined the post-communist state into a credible European and Atlantic liberal democracy that plays a security provider role in the neighbouring regions.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Romania regarding the Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court (2002); available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Romania_98_2.pdf (June 2014)

Constantinescu, Emil. *Timpul dărâmării, timpul zidirii,* volumes I-IV (Bucharest: Universalia, 2002)

Geoană, Mircea. *Politica externă a României la începutul secolului XXI* (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 2005)

Iliescu, Ion. *Address at the Investiture as President of Romania* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992)

Iliescu, Ion. *Cred în schimbarea în bine a României* (Bucharest: Fundația 'Dimineața', 1992)

Iliescu, Ion. *Fragmente de viață şi de istorie trăită* (Bucharest: Litera Internațional, 2011)

Iliescu, Ion. *Momente de istorie. Documente, alocuțiuni, interviuri, comentarii: septembrie 1991–octombrie 1992* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1996)

Iliescu, Ion. *Renaşterea speranței* (Bucharest: Mondo Media, 2001)

Iliescu, Ion. *Revoluție şi reformă* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1994)

Iliescu, Ion. *Romania in Europe and in the World* (Bucharest: The Foreign Languages Press Group, 1994)

Iliescu, Ion. *Toamna diplomatică* (Bucharest: Redacția publicațiilor pentru străinătate, 1995)

International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report* (November 2004)

Meleşcanu, Teodor. *Renaşterea diplomației românești* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002)

Meleşcanu, Teodor. 'Romania's Option for Integration with the West: Historical and Present Grounds', *Romanian Journal of International Affairs*, volume 1(2), 1995, pp. 5-15

Meleşcanu, Teodor. 'Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game', *NATO Review*, volume 41(5), October 1993

Năstase, Adrian. *Interviuri 2001-2004* (Bucharest: Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2009)

Năstase, Adrian. *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe*, volumes I-II (Bucharest: Fundația Titulescu, 2006)

Năstase, Adrian. *România şi noua arhitectură mondială. Studii, Alocuțiuni, Interviuri 1990-1996* (Bucharest: Asociația Română pentru Educație Democratică, 1996)

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – www.osce.org

Paşcu, Ioan M. *NATO Enlargement: The Case of Romania. Personal Report* (2007)

Severin, Adrian in dialogue with Andreescu, Gabriel. *Locurile unde se construieşte Europa* (Bucharest: Polirom, 2000)

The Archives of Romania's Government – www.gov.ro

The Archives of Romania's Presidency – www.presidency.ro

The European Commission - www.ec.europa.eu

The European Council - www.consilium.europa.eu

The Government of Romania, *Cartea Albă: România–NATO* (Bucharest: Romcartexim, 1996)

The National Salvation Front, 'Statement towards the Country', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number I(1), 22 December 1989

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – www.nato.int

The Parliament of Romania, 'Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Communities, Their Member States and Romania', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 73, 12 April 1993

The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision Number 4 on 5 June 1996 regarding the Appeal Addressed to the Parliaments of NATO Member States', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 119, 7 June 1996

The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision Number 39 on 14 October 1998', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 393, 16 October 1998

The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision number 21 on 19 September 2001 concerning Romania's Participation, together with NATO Member States, to Actions against International Terrorism', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 589, 20 September 2001

The Parliament of Romania, 'Decision number 2 on 12 February 2003 regarding Romania's Participation in the Coalition against Iraq', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 90, 13 February 2003

The Parliament of Romania, 'Romania's National Security Strategy. Guaranteeing Democracy and Fundamental Liberties, Sustained and Lasting Economic and Social Development, the Accession to NATO and European Union Integration', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 822, 20 December 2001

The Parliament of Romania, *Transcripts of Parliamentary Debates* - http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.home

The Parliament of Romania, 'Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 250, 16 October 1996

The Parliament of Romania, 'The Government Programme 2005-2008', *Monitorul Oficial al României*, number 1265, 29 December 2004

The President of Romania, *The National Security Strategy of Romania. European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and more Prosperous Country* (2006)

The United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1441 (2002)*

The United States Department of State – www.state.gov;

The United States Department of Defence – www.defense.gov

The Vilnius Group Countries, *Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia* (5 February 2003);

The Western European Union, *Declaration after the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe* (Bonn, 19 June 2002)

Ungureanu, Mihai-Răzvan. *Întotdeauna loial: note diplomatice pentru o Românie modernă 2005-2007* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2008)

Secondary Sources

Abizadeh, Arash. 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, volume 99(1), 2005, pp. 45-60

Allawi, Ali A. *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2007)

Allen Dauphinee, Elizabeth. 'Rambouillet: A Critical (Re)Assessment' in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), *Understanding the War in Kosovo* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005)

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006)

Anderson, Terri H. *Bush's Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

Angelescu, Irina. 'New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania's Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region', *Perspectives*, volume 19(2), 2011, pp. 123-142

Asmus, Ronald. *Opening NATO's Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002)

Asmus, Ronald D. and Vondra, Alexandr. 'The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, volume 18(2), 2005, pp. 203-216

Attina, Fulvio. 'The Security-Culture Divide in the Mediterranean' in Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, Federica Bicchi and Rafaella Del Sarto (eds.), *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (London: University of Toronto Press, 2006)

Baicoianu, Anca. 'Markers and Shifters of Romanian Identity', *Analele Universității 'Ovidius' – Literary and Cultural Encounters*, volume XIX, 2008, pp. 9-12

Baicoianu, Anca. 'The Trap of Memory: Auto-Orientalism as Victimization', *Internet Journal for Cultural Sciences*, number 16, 2006

Baleanu, V.G. *In the Shadow of Russia: Romania's Relations with Moldova and Ukraine* (Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2000)

Barany, Zoltan. *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Barbu, Bogdan. *Vin Americanii! Prezența simbolică a Statelor Unite în România Războiului Rece* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2006)

Barbu, Daniel. 'Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the 2004 Romanian Elections', *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, volume 5(1), 2005, pp. 9-17

Barbu, Daniel. *Republica absentă: politică şi societate în România postcomunistă* (Bucharest: Nemira, 2004)

Bell, Duncan. 'Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity', *British Journal of Sociology*, volume 54(1), 2003, pp. 63-81

Bell, Duncan. 'Introduction' in Duncan Bell (ed.), *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (London: Palgrave, 2006)

Berger, Thomas. 'The Power of Memory and Memories of Power: The Cultural Parameters of German Foreign Policy-Making since 1945' in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Bieber, Florian. 'Introduction' in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), *Understanding the War in Kosovo* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005)

Bjola, Corneliu. 'NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe', *EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Final Report 1999-2001*, pp. 1-60

Blokker, Paul. 'Constitution-Making in Romania: From Reiterative Crises to Constitutional Moment', *Romanian Journal of Comparative Law*, volume 2, 2012, pp. 187-204

Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

Boia, Lucian. *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001)

Bonchev, Plamen. 'Bulgaria's Way to NATO' in Institute for Regional and International Studies – IRIS (ed.), *Bulgaria: A Loyal Partner and Prospective Member of NATO - Papers of the Institute for Regional and International Studies*, pp. 325-342

Brooks, Stephen. *As Others See Us: The Causes and Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America* (Peterborough: Broadview, 2006)

Bucur, Maria. 'Edifices of the Past: War Memorials and Heroes in Twentieth Century Romania' in Maria Todorova (ed.), *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory* (New York: New York University Press, 2004)

Burke, Peter J. and Stets, Jan E. *Identity Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

Burke, Peter J. and Stets, Jan E. 'Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification', *Social Psychological Quarterly*, volume 62(4), 1999, pp. 347-360

Carey, Henry F. (ed.) *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004)

Carlsnaes, Walter. 'Foreign Policy' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002)

Cast, Alicia D. and Burke, Peter. 'A Theory of Self-Esteem', *Social Forces*, volume 80(3), 2002, pp. 1041-1068

Castoriadis, Cornelius. *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987)

Cărtărescu, Mircea. *Pururi tânăr, înfăşurat în pixeli* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003)

Cernicova-Buca, Mariana. 'Romania: The Quest for Membership' in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.), *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001)

Chereji, Christian-Radu. 'The Concept of Central Europe in the 90s' in Vasile Puşcaş (ed.), *Central Europe since 1989. Concepts and Developments* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2000)

Cioculescu, Şerban F. *România postcomunistă în „ecuaţia" strategică a vecinătăţilor: Balcanii, Marea Neagră şi Orientul Mijlociu Extins* (Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2009)

Ciuta, Felix. 'Lily-Pad Geopolitics: Romania in the Global War on Terror', *Paper for the 7th ECPR-SGIR Conference* (Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010), pp. 1-23

Clunan, Anne L. *The Social Construction of Russia's Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009)

Cohen, Lenard J. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001)

Constantiniu, Florin. *O istorie sinceră a poporului român* (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1997)

Cottey, Andrew. *East-Central Europe after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995)

Crotty, Michael J. *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process* (London: Sage, 2003)

Culic, Irina. *Câstigătorii: elita politică şi democratizare în România 1989-2000* (Cluj-Napoca: Limes, 2002)

Daalder, Ivo H. and O'Hanlon, Michael E. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001)

David, Irina. 'Scholars' Views on Eastern European Perceptions of America', *Synergy*, volume 8(2), 2012, pp. 112-120

DeHart, James P. *The Burden of Strategy: Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO Enlargement* (Washington: Georgetown University, 2008)

Delanty, Gerard. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995)

Denca, Sorin Ş. 'Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Empirical Findings from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, volume 5(3), 2009, pp. 389-404

Dima, Cosmin. 'Conflictul intraexecutiv în regimul semiprezidențial românesc. Primul-Ministru Călin Popescu Tăriceanu versus Preşedintele Traian Băsescu', *Sfera Politicii,* issue 139, 2009

Dimulescu, Valentina-Andreea. 'Presidential Impeachment in Semi-Presidential Systems. Case Study: Romania 2007', *Europolis. Journal of Political Science and Theory*, volume 4(1), 2010, pp. 101-132

Doty, Roxanne L. 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37(3), 1993, pp. 297-320

Doty, Roxanne L. *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996)

Drulák, Petr. 'The Return of Identity to European Politics' in Petr Drulák (ed.), *National and European Identities in EU Enlargement: Views from Central and Eastern Europe* (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2001)

Dungaciu, Dan. 'The Part that Wants to Become Whole. Identity Discourses in the Republic of Moldova', *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*, volume 11(1), 2014, pp. 3-14

Edkins, Jenny. *Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back in* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999)

Edkins, Jenny. *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Eley, Geoff and Suny, Ronald G. 'Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation' in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

Ely, John F. and Stoica, Cătălin Augustin. 'Re-membering Romania' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004)

Donald Falls, 'NATO Enlargement: Is Romanian Ready to Join the Alliance?', *Research Paper for the Air Force University* (2000), pp. 1-64

Fierke, Karin M. 'Constructivism' in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Florian, Alexandru. 'The Perception of the Holocaust in Historiography and the Romanian Media' in Valentina Glajar and Jeanine Teodorescu (eds.), *Local History, Transnational Memory in the Romanian Holocaust* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011)

Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2002)

Gallagher, Tom. *Romania after Ceauşescu: The Politics of Intolerance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995)

Gallagher, Tom. 'A Feeble Embrace: Romania's Engagement with democracy, 1989-94', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, volume 12, 1996, pp. 145-172

Gallagher, Tom. 'Danube Détente: Romania's Reconciliation with Hungary after 1996', *Balkanologie. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires*, volume 1(2), December 1997; http://balkanologie.revues.org/index 222.html (April 2014)

Gallagher, Tom. 'Romania's Desire to be Normal', *Contemporary Politics*, volume 4(2), 1998, pp. 111-125

Gallagher, Tom. *Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong* (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2009)

Gallagher, Tom. *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy* (London: Routledge, 2003)

Gallagher, Tom. *Balkans in the New Millennium* (London: Routledge, 2005)

Gallagher, Tom. 'To Be or Not to Be Balkan: Romania's Quest for Self-Definition', *Daedalus*, volume 126(3), 1997, pp. 63-83

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)

Gheciu, Alexandra. *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005)

Gordon, Philip H. and Shapiro, Jeremy. *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq* (London: McGraw-Hill, 2004)

Goşu, Armand. 'Politica răsăriteană a României: 1990-2005', *Contrafort*, number 1(135), January 2006

Gow, James. 'The War in Kosovo, 1998–1999' in Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2012)

Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995)

Grigorescu, Alexandru. 'East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War: The Choice between "Soft Balancing" and "Soft Bandwagoning"', *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, volume 41(3), 2008, pp. 281-299

Gross, Peter and Tismăneanu, Vladimir. 'The End of Postcommunism in Romania', *Journal of Democracy*, volume 16(2), April 2005, pp. 146-162

Harrington, Joseph and Karns, Scott. 'Romania's Ouestpolitik: Bucharest, Europe, and the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, 1990-1998' in Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (eds.), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iaşi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1999)

Harvey, Frank P. *Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

Helms, Jesse. *Empire for Liberty: A Sovereign America and Her Moral Mission* (Washington: Regnery, 2001)

Henig, Stanley. 'Britain: To War for a Just Cause' in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?* (London: Pearson, 2001)

Hill, Christopher and Wallace, William. 'Introduction: Actors and Actions' in Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2002)

Hitchins, Keith. *A Concise History of Romania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990)

Honneth, Axel. *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (London: Polity Press, 1996)

Hopf, Ted. 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, volume 23(1), 1998, pp. 171-200

Hopf, Ted. *The Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002)

Hosu, Alina. 'Post-Cold War Romania: A Study in the Construction of Security and Identity' in Eiki Berg and Henk van Houtum (eds.), *Routing Borders between Territories, Discourses and Practices* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003)

Howarth, David R., Norval, Aletta J. and Stavrakakis, Yannis. *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)

Hroch, Miroslav. 'From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe' in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996)

Hughes, R. Gerald. *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014)

Huntington, Samuel. 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72(3), 1993, pp. 22-49

Iliescu, Ion. 'Drept la replică' in *Historia*, number 117, September 2011

Ionescu, Mihail E. *Marea Neagră de la 'lac bizantin' la provocările secolului XXI: Culegere de studii* (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2006)

Ivan, Ruxandra. 'Black Sea Regional Leadership in Romanian Foreign Policy Discourse' in Ruxandra Ivan (ed.), *New Regionalism or No Regionalism? Emerging Regionalism in the Black Sea Area* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012)

Ivan, Ruxandra. 'Qui fait la politique étrangère roumaine? La prise des décisions: cadre légal et équilibres informels', *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, volume 6(4), 2006, pp. 923-945

Ivan, Ruxandra. 'La conditionnalité de l'UE et de l'OTAN sur la politique étrangère roumaine des années 1990', *Revista Institutului Diplomatic Român,* volume 2(1), 2007, pp. 104-114

Ivan, Ruxandra. 'L'ombre de l'Empire. Les rapports de la Roumanie à la Russie, 1991-2006', *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. 8(3), 2008, pp. 513-538

Ivan, Ruxandra. *La Politique Etrangère Roumaine (1990-2006* (Brussels: Editions L'Université de Bruxelles, 2009)

Jatras, James G. 'NATO's Myths and Bogus Justifications for Intervention' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington: Cato Institute, 2000)

Kaplan, Robert D. *Balkan Ghosts. A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993)

Karl, Josef. 'A Political and Historical Analysis of Post-Communist Romania', *Romanian Review of Political Science and International Relations*, volume 9(2), 2012, pp. 89-100

Kundera, Milan. 'The Tragedy of Central Europe', *New York Review of Books*, volume 31(7), 26 April 1984

Larrabee, F. Stephen. 'Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe', *Foreign Affairs*, volume 85(6), November-December 2006, pp. 117-131

Larrabee, F. Stephen. *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Pittsburgh: RAND, 2003)

Lauvaux, Philipe. *Les grandes democraties contemporaines* (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1998)

Layne, Christopher. 'Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War* (Washington: Cato Institute, 2000)

Levy, Daniel et al (eds.) *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War* (London: Verso, 2005)

Light, Duncan and Phinnemore, David (eds.) *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)

Lindemann, Thomas. *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition* (University of Essex: European Consortium for Political Research Press, 2010)

Linden, Ronald H. 'Introduction: Romania, NATO and the New Security Environment', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics,* volume 2(2), 2002, pp. 5-9

Linden, Ronald H. 'The Burden of Belonging: Romanian and Bulgarian Foreign Policy in the New Era', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, volume 11(3), 2009, pp. 269-291

Lovatt, Catherine. 'Waiting for the Pay-back', *Central Europe Review*, volume 1(13), 20 September 1999

Maior, George C. *The Danube, European Security and Cooperation at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Bucharest: Encyclopedica, 2002)

Mälksoo, Maria. *The Politics of Becoming European. A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London: Routledge, 2010)

Mandelbaum, Michael. 'A Perfect Failure', *Foreign Affairs*, volume 78(5), September-October 1999, pp. 2-8

Mann, Michael. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Mansbach, Richard W. and Rafferty, Kirsten L. *Introduction to Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2008)

Markovits, Andrei S. *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)

Mazower, Mark. *The Balkans: From the End of Byzantium to the Present Day* (London: Phoenix, 2001)

Micu, Mircea. 'The Europeanization of Romanian Foreign Policy: Mitigating European and National "Misfits" in the International Criminal Court and Kosovo Cases', *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, volume 11(4), 2011, pp. 50-65

Milliken, Jennifer. 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 5(2), 1999, pp. 225-254

Milliken, Jennifer. 'Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea' in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Mills, Sara. *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2001)

Miroiu, Andrei. 'National and International Security at the Dawn of the XXIst Century: The Romanian Case', *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, volume 2(2), 2002, pp. 88-113

Miroiu, Andrei and Soare, Simona. 'Politica de securitate a României 1878-2006: O perspectivă istorică' in Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Marian Zulean (eds.), *Politica de securitate națională. Concepte, instituții, procese* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2007)

Motoc, Iulia and Cioculescu, Şerban F. *Manual de Analiză a Politicii Externe* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010)

Müller, Sean. 'The Conflict between Băsescu and Tăriceanu. A Governmental System Viewpoint', *Sfera Politicii*, issue 126-127, 2007, pp. 50-61

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 'Interview with the President of the Romanian Constitutional Court, Ion Muraru', *East European Constitutional Review*, volume 6(1), 1997, pp. 78-83

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. *Politica după comunism: structură, cultură şi psihologie politică* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002)

Muraru, Andrei. 'Revizionism, uitare şi distorsionare', *Observator Cultural*, number 581, July 2011

Murray, Michelle K. 'Recognition, Disrespect and the Struggle for Morocco' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm, 2011)

Murray, Michelle K. *The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics: Security, Identity, and the Quest for Power* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008)

Nelson, Daniel (ed.) *Romania after Tyranny* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992)

Neumann, Iver. *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Nuti, Leopoldo. 'The Richest and Farthest Master is Always Best: US-Italian Relations in Historical Perspective' in David M. Andrews (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations After Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Onişoru, Gheorghe. *România în anii 1944-1948. Transformări economice şi realităţi sociale* (Bucharest: Academia Civică, 1998)

Oprea, Cristian, Cernahoschi, Laura et al. 'Retragerea din Irak a început cu o baterie' *Cotidianul* and *HotNews.ro* (30 June 2006); http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1170632-retragerea-din-irak-inceput-baterie.htm

Özkirimli, Umut. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

Papadimitriou, Dimitris and Phinnemore, David. *Romania and the European Union: From Marginalisation to Membership* (London: Routledge, 2008)

Paşcu, Ioan M. 'Perspectives of a Prospective NATO Member', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, volume 15(1), 2004, pp. 8-16

Paşcu, Ioan M. 'Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict', *European Security*, volume 3(1), 1994, pp. 153-161

Paşcu, Ioan M. 'Romania's Response to a Structured World' in Daniel Nelson (ed.), *Romania after Tyranny* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992)

Pavel, Dan and Huiu, Iulia. "*Nu putem reuşi decât împreună": O istorie analitică a Convenției Democratice 1989-2000* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003)

Peterson Ulrich, Marybeth. *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999)

Petre, Zoe. 'The Role of the President in Romania's Approach to NATO Integration' in Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (eds.), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iaşi: The Centre for Romanian Studies, 1999)

Phillips, Nelson and Hardy, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction* (London: SAGE, 2002)

Phinnemore, David. 'Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?' in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds.), *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)

Phinnemore, David. 'Stuck in the "Grey Zone"? Fears and Frustrations in Romania's Quest for EU Membership', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, volume 1(1), 2000, pp. 95-121

Phinnemore, David. 'And We'd Like to Thank… Romania's Integration into the European Union, 1989-2007', *Journal of European Integration*, volume 32(3), 2010, pp. 291-308

Pond, Elizabeth. 'Romania: Better Late than Never', *The Washington Quarterly*, volume 24(2), 2001, pp. 35-43

Popescu, Liliana. 'A Change of Power in Romania: The Results and Significance of the November 1996 Elections', *Government and Opposition*, volume 32(2), April 1997, pp. 172-186

Popescu, Liliana. 'Europeanization of Romanian Foreign Policy', *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, volume 10(4), 2010, pp. 50-65

Popescu, Nicu. *EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts: Stealth Intervention* (London: Routledge, 2011)

Preda, Cristian. *Partide şi alegeri în România postcomunistă (1989-2004)* (Bucharest: Nemira, 2005)

Puddington, Arch. *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000)

Racheru, Ileana and Manea, Octavian. 'Prioritățile de politică externă ale lui Traian Băsescu', *Revista 22*, issue 992, 10 March 2009

Ramet, Sabrina P. *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Ringmar, Erik. 'Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History' in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Waever (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London: Routledge, 1997)

Ringmar, Erik. *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

Ringmar, Erik. 'The International Politics of Recognition' in Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.), *The International Politics of Recognition* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2011)

Ringmar, Erik. 'The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West', *Cooperation and Conflict*, volume 37(2), 2002, pp. 115-136

Roper, Steven D. 'Parliamentary Development' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004)

Roper, Steven D. *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005)

Rumelili, Bahar. 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(1), 2004, pp. 27-47

Rupnik, Jacques. 'America's Best Friends in Europe: East-Central European Perceptions and Policies towards the United States' in Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne (eds.), *With Us or against Us. Studies in Global Anti-Americanism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)

Said, Edward. *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2003)

Salajan, Loretta C. *Discoursing on European Identity: A Study of Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy* (Cluj: Presa Universitara Clujeana, 2017)

Salajan, Loretta C. 'National Identity and International Politics: An Analysis of Romania's Post-Communist Foreign Policy Imaginary (1990-1996), *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, volume 16(3), 2016, pp. 357-375

De Santis, Hugh. 'NATO's Manifest Destiny: The Risks of Expansion' in Ted Carpenter (ed.), *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Washington: Cato Institute, 1998)

Scheffer, David J. 'Use of Force after the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order' in Louis Henkin (ed.), *Right versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991)

Sedivy, Jiri and Zaborovski, Marcin. 'Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations' in Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborovski (eds.), *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2005)

Serebrian, Oleg. 'Basarabia: identitate, politică şi geopolitică' in Vasile Boari, Sergiu Gherghina and Radu Murea (eds.), *Regăsirea identității naționale/ Recovering National Identity* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010)

Severin, Adrian. 'Romania Endeavors to Join NATO' in Anton A. Bebler (ed.), *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement* (Westport: Praeger, 1999)

Shafir, Michael. 'Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization": Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe' in Randolph Braham (ed.), *The Treatment of the Holocaust in Hungary and Romania during the Post-Communist Era* (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 2004)

Simon, Jeffrey and Binnendijk, Hans. 'Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July 1997 Summit', *Strategic Forum - Institute for National Strategic Studies*, number 101, February 1997

Sjursen, Helene. 'Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of the EU Polity' in Helene Sjursen (ed.), *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity* (London: Routledge, 2006)

Sloan, Stanley R. *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (London: Continuum, 2010)

Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity* (Penguin Books: London, 1991)

Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991)

Smith, Anthony D. 'State Making and Nation-Building' in John A. Hall (ed.), *The State: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, volume 2 (London: Routledge, 1994)

Smith, Anthony D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

Snyder, Jack. 'Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State' in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)

Soare, Simona. 'Romania's National Security Strategy – A Critical Approach of Transformational Politics', *Monitor Strategic*, number 1-2, 2008, pp. 53-66

Soare, Simona. 'Still Talking Past Each Other: Romanian-Russian Relations', *Russian Analytical Digest*, number 125, 25 March 2013, pp. 14-18

Soare, Simona. 'The Romanian-Russian Bilateral Relationship in the Aftermath of Romania's Euro-Atlantic Integration', *Monitor Strategic*, number 1-2, 2010, pp. 93-121

Stan, Lavinia (ed.) *Romania in Transition* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997)

Stan, Lavinia. 'The Opposition Takes Charge: The Romanian General Elections of 2004', *Problems of Post-Communism*, volume 52(3), May-June 2005, pp. 3-15

Stan, Valentin. *România şi eşecul campaniei pentru vest* (Bucharest: Editura Universității din Bucureşti, 1999)

Stokes, Gale. 'The Unpalatable Paradox', *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, volume 27(2), 1999, pp. 327-329

Taylor, David. 'Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with Postmodern Theory', *Journal of Social Policy*, volume 27(3), 1998, pp. 329-350

The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Analiza Strategiei de Securitate Națională a României* (2006)

The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Raport - Traian Băsescu, şase luni de mandat prezidențial: rezultate şi perspective* (2005)

The 'Ovidiu Şincai' Social-Democrat Institute, *Raport - Efectele 'Doctrinei Băsescu': izolarea internațională a României* (2008)

Toboşaru, Nicolae. 'Axa Washington-Londra-Bucureşti în politica externă şi de securitate a administrației prezidențiale - Deziderat şi realitate', *Pulsul geostrategic,* number 32, 5 July 2008, pp. 1-12

Toboşaru, Nicolae. *Parteneriatul strategic dintre România şi SUA: Istorie şi semnificații geopolitice* (Cluj: Presa Universitară, 2010)

Todorova, Maria N. *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

Ungureanu, Mihai-Răzvan and Goşu, Armand. 'Interview', *Revista* 22, issue 852, 7 July 2006

Vachudova, Milada A. *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Verdery, Katherine. *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)

Voinescu, Sever and Dobre, Gabriela. *The Perception of Romanian Public Opinion regarding Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Bucharest: The Institute for Public Policies, 2005)

Wæver, Ole. 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory' in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002)

Waldman, Felicia and Chioveanu, Mihai. 'Public Perceptions of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Romania' in John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic (eds.), *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe* (University of Nebraska Press, 2013)

Weiner, Robert. 'Romanian Bilateral Relations with Russia and Hungary: 1989-2002' in Henry F. Carey (ed.), *Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society* (Oxford: Lexington, 2004)

Weldes, Jutta. 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2(3), 1996, pp. 275-318

Weldes, Jutta. *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

Wendt, Alexander. 'The State as Person in International Theory', *Review of International Studies*, volume 30(2), 2004, pp. 289–316

Wetherell, Margaret, Taylor, Stephanie and Yates, Simeon J. *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: SAGE in association with the Open University, 2001)

Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994)

Woodward, Kathryn. *Identity and Difference* (London: SAGE, 1997)

Zaborowski, Marcin. "'New Europe" between the United States and "Old Europe"' in Geir Lundestad (ed.), *Just another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)

Zehfuss, Maja. *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Zerubavel, Yael. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995)

Zimmerman, Warren. *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers* (New York: Times Books, 1993)

Acronyms

CDR – Democratic Convention of Romania (centre-right)

DA alliance – 'Justice and Truth' alliance of PNL and PD (centre-right)

EU – the European Union

NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PC – Conservative Party (former PUR – centre-right)

PD – Democrat Party (centre-left)

PDSR – Social Democratic Party of Romania (centre-left)

PNL - National Liberal Party (centre-right)

PNȚCD – National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (centre-right)

PRM – Great Romania Party (right-wing)

PSD – Social Democrat Party (former PDSR – centre-left)

PUR – Humanist Party (re-named PC)

UDMR – Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain

US – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Dr. Loretta C. Salajan

Researcher with expertise in foreign policy analysis, International Relations theory, European security and Romania's postcommunist context. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations and Politics from the University of Sheffield, a Master's degree in International Relations Theory and a PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth University (United Kingdom). Her recent scientific contributions include the books *Discoursing on "European" Identity: A Study of Romania's National Identity and Foreign Policy in 1990-1996* (Cluj University Press, 2017), *A Constructivist Interpretation of the Democratic Peace* (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2018), as well as the internationally indexed articles "National Identity and International Politics: An Analysis of Romania's Post-Communist Foreign Policy Imaginary (1990-1996)", *Romanian Political Science Review*, 16(3), 2016; "The Role of Trauma in Romania's Ontological Security", *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 47(1), 2018 and "Ontological Security and the European Union Global Strategy", *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, 58, 2018. Email: l.c.salajan@gmail.com.

UNIVERSITAS • NAPOCENSIS
ROMANIA
PRESA UNIVERSITARĂ

ISBN: 978-606-37-0501-4